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ABSTRACT 
This research has been based on my experiences of London taxi drivers, both before I 
entered the London Taxi Industry, whilst studying to be a London taxi driver and during 
the thirty years I spent within the industry in a number of roles.  
 
My research has been undertaken in an inductive, broadly ideographic style. The study 
has been developed through initially narrating my experiences and observations in the 
industry and then analysing this account reflexively. The material that formed the basis of 
my narrative account was collected in an ethnographic style. In addition to my narrative 
account I also referenced the small amount of published material concerning the London 
taxi industry and interviewed a number of taxi drivers.  A significant constraint was the 
lack of peer reviewed literature concerning taxi drivers and the taxi industry.  
 
Once I had developed my narrative account I then interpreted it in order to better 
understand the experiences and observations, the institutions and the people within the 
industry to understand and relate how they react and behave within their environment. 
The analysis involved deconstruction and interpretation against a framework of relevant 
literature to facilitate my understanding and assist sense making. I also interpreted the 
interactions with those outside of the taxi drivers’ environment and analysed the persona 
that journalists and others have constructed that is meant to represent the London Taxi 
Driver. I considered the identity and characteristics implied by journalists with the 
prevailing culture and the identity that taxi drivers and the industry sought to portray.  
 
The qualification to become a taxi driver is known as the Knowledge of London. The 
Knowledge, as it is known in the industry, is recognised as an onerous task and has 
developed according to many in the industry into a rite of passage. I found that this 
process, with its rituals and arcane practices, which are accepted consensually by the 
industry, had a significant effect on the taxi drivers’ identity and their status amongst non-
taxi driver peers. Taxi driving is considered in working class circles to be at the upper end 
of a hierarchy of professional driving roles largely due to the achievement of passing the 
Knowledge of London together with the earning opportunity, perceived job security and 
flexibility afforded by being one’s own boss.  
 
Knowledge of London students and taxi drivers appear to demonstrate common 
behavioural traits which I have explored in my research. London’s taxi drivers appear to 
fear an assimilation of their role with other lower status driving roles and this fear has a 
significant effect on any attempts at change within the industry or within its institutions.  
 
The institutions within the industry provided much material for me to consider in the 
context of their alignment or clash with the culture of the industry. Changes in business 
processes and some of the institutions’ relationships with their taxi driver stakeholders 
and the challenges to the industry’s culture are considered as case studies within my 
reflexive account. 
 
The contribution to original knowledge is the insight into the culture and identity of 
London’s Taxi Drivers, the behaviours and relationships within the industry both between 
drivers and the institutions that regulate, represent and benefit from the industry. Taxi 
drivers’ responses to organisational and business process change. Further contributions 
to original knowledge are provided from the realisation that much of the structure 
developed within conventional organisations by management has developed organically 
without management intervention in the taxi industry. Many of the traits of life in offices 
and factories are likewise present in the London Taxi Industry despite the disparate and 
virtual nature of the industry and its reliance on consensual adoption of rules and practice 
rather than managerial influence and formal processes and procedures.   
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GLOSSARY 
As a number of words used in the reflexive account and taxi driver interviews are 
likely be unfamiliar to the reader or used in an unfamiliar way a glossary of terms has 
been provided to make reading the document easier. 
 
The glossary is augmented by a description of the word within the text of the 
document on the first occasion that the word is used. 
 
Appearance 
A colloquial term used amongst Knowledge Students referring to an appointment for 
a verbal topographical competency (Knowledge of London) test. 
 
Bankers  
Questions that are regularly asked by Knowledge of London examiners are termed 
bankers, i.e. Knowledge Boys can bank on them being asked. 
 
Bilker 
A bilker is the industry term for a passenger who absconds without paying the fare. 
 
Blocking 
It is rumoured within the industry that Knowledge Boys who have committed minor 
misdemeanours, turned up late or who have not honoured the rituals of the Public 
Carriage Office are blocked by the Knowledge of London examiners. Blocking means 
the Knowledge Boy is delayed from progressing through the Knowledge. This is 
achieved according to rumours by examiners asking very random or obscure 
points/questions. (See also holding back) 
 
Blue Book 
The Blue Book, which actually has a pink cover, contains 468 lists of journeys. They 
are set out simply as lists e.g. Manor House Station – Gibson Square. No further 
information is provided. Knowledge Students are advised by the Public Carriage 
Office to learn each one of these journeys referred to in the industry as; runs. 
 
Bunce 
Industry term for extra, bonus or unexpected income 
 
Bus Routes 
This is a description for very straight routes that take place normally during the 
evening and at night e.g. West End Theatres to Suburban Destinations. Taxi drivers 
normally undertake these trips using main roads similarly to the routes buses would 
use. 
 
Cabbing 
Driving a taxicab as a vocation. 
 
Circuit 
Circuit is the colloquial name for radio taxi companies in the taxi industry 
 
Cockney Rhyming Slang 
A type of dialect or phrase construction in the English language which relies on 
rhyming words and phrases that sound similar to the subject matter. It is widely used 
amongst people from the East End of London and amongst street traders. Examples 
are; apples and pears = stairs, saucepan lids = kids, trouble and strife = wife. 
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Cottoning Up 
Knowledge Boys learn the shortest route between two points [Places or landmarks] 
by placing a length of cotton on a map and tracking the roads that will provide the 
shortest route between them. 
 
Cover 
Fulfil or undertake a radio taxi booking. 
 
Dirty Dozen 
Twelve streets that driver memorised to take them through the complex one way 
systems in Soho. 
 
Double Bubble 
At one time London Taxi Drivers accepting a hiring of more than six miles were able 
to legally negotiate the fare, this was normally double the metered fare hence the 
colloquial term double bubble 
 
Drives 
Industry term for the specialist taxi driving test.  
 
Etiquette 
Taxi drivers refer to an etiquette whereby one taxi driver does not take a 
trip/passenger that rightfully belongs to another driver. The etiquette has evolved 
apparently by consensus and taxi drivers rigidly abide by it.  
 
Fares 
Within the industry fares have two meanings; passengers/customers are frequently 
referred to as fares; the financial value displayed on the meter is also known as the 
fare. 
 
Flyers 
A word used to describe trips to the airport e.g. I got a flyer today (I got a trip to the  
airport today) or the airport (I was at the flyers today). 
 
For Hire Light 
A yellow light that is fitted into a cowling on the roof of licensed taxis in London. 
When lit this light indicates that the taxi is available for hire. 
 
Gamification 
Developing a business process, procedure or interface into a game or sport. 
Smartfone apps are often modelled on computer games. 
 
Governor (Often pronounced G’vnor or Guvnor) 
The colloquial term for a taxi fleet owner. Fleet owners are typically small companies 
who hire taxis to taxi drivers in London. Drivers still speak of ‘working for’ x or y 
garage or ‘my governor’ does this or that (normally these comments relate to policy 
issues e.g. holidays etc).  
 
Historically, although still self-employed, the fleet owner paid the drivers’ National 
Insurance contributions. Due to changes in legislation this is no longer the case. In 
earlier days fleet owners exercised an element of control over drivers in that it was 
uncommon for drivers to own their own taxi and so the fleet owner dictated the hours 
the driver could work. During this period drivers shared their fares with the fleet 
owner. Today’s fleet owners charge a flat rate for the hire of the taxi and it is up to 
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the taxi driver to make a profit. Fleets today are in effect vehicle rental companies. 
The influence of fleet owners, within the industry, remains to an extent as their trade 
organisation; the Licensed Masters and Proprietors’ Association (LMCPA) is invited 
to take part in consultations with regulators, legislators and local authorities. 
 
Holding Back 
It is rumoured within the industry that Knowledge Boys who have committed minor 
misdemeanours, turned up late for an appearance (verbal competency test) or who 
have not honoured the rituals of the Public Carriage Office are held back by the 
Knowledge of London examiners. Holding back therefore means the Knowledge Boy 
is delayed from progressing through the Knowledge. This is achieved according to 
rumours by examiners asking very random or obscure points/questions. (See also 
blocking) 
 
Knock Back/Knocking back 
Knocking back means a radio despatcher refusing a driver’s bid. Knocking back was 
a sanction when a driver offered a position that was outside of the boundaries of his 
bid. 
 
Knowledge Boys 
Knowledge Students (People studying the Knowledge) are known as Knowledge 
Boys within the industry regardless of age or gender. 
 
Knowledge of London (The Knowledge) 
All aspiring Licensed London Taxi Drivers must pass the vocational qualification 
known as the Knowledge of London which is sometimes shortened to the 
Knowledge.  
 
LAGQ 
An aide memoir to remind taxi drivers to remember the order of the theatres in 
Shaftesbury Avenue; Lyric, Apollo, Globe and Queens Theatres 
 
Legal 
Licensed London Taxi Drivers refer to passengers/customers who pay only what is 
displayed on the meter as; legals i.e. they pay only what is legally required. 
 
Licensed Taxi Drivers’ Association (LTDA) 
The LTDA is the largest trade association in the taxi industry. Its members are all 
London licensed taxi drivers. 
 
Limitation 
A policy to constraint membership of a radio taxi company to its current size i.e. limit 
the number of members. 
 
Liver (the Liver) 
Shortened name for Liverpool Street Station used by radio taxi drivers to shorten 
radio transmissions. 
 
London Licensed Taxi Driver 
The term London Licensed Taxi Driver relates to a person who has successfully 
completed the Knowledge of London vocational qualification as is required by the 
regulatory authority; Transport for London, is medically fit, has a clean criminal record 
and has been licensed as a taxi driver (see also Taxi Driver). 
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Masters 
The trade nick name for the London Motor Cab Proprietors Association. This is an 
association of taxi fleet owners who rent vehicles to taxi drivers. 
 
Metropolitan Conditions of Fitness 
The technical requirements for vehicles to be licensed as taxis were introduced in 
May 1906 and updated in 1927, 2002 and 2007. Requirements include a ensuring 
that taxis can turn within a 25 feet circle and that the step into the vehicle is 10 inches 
from the road. The conditions of fitness, as they are known in the industry, are 
adopted by many other licensing authorities across the country,  
 
 
Minicab 
Minicab is the colloquial London term for a private hire vehicle. Private hire vehicles 
can only respond to pre bookings made by telephone i.e. they cannot ply for hire on 
the street or respond to street hails or form ranks of vehicles available for immediate 
hire. Typically minicabs are saloon cars or multipurpose vehicles as opposed to the 
purpose built vehicles driven by taxi drivers. 
 
Musher 
A musher is a taxi driver who owns his/her own taxi. 
 
One of Our Own 
A common term of endearment or solidarity, implying a distant relative or honorary 
family member, frequently used in the taxi industry and the East End of London to 
describe somebody without pretensions. This term was used typically for a person 
who had done, or frequently did, good deeds in the community 
 
PCN 
Parking Contravention Notice/Parking Ticket. 
 
Point 
A point is a landmark, building, street or other location at the start or finish of a 
run/route. A point or points are colloquial terms used by Knowledge Boys as a 
generic description for the start or finish of a run or route which are used to test a 
student’s topographical knowledge based on verbal competency tests.  
 
Private Hire 
The term private hire relates to vehicles and drivers who are licensed under the 1998 
Private Hire Licensing Act. The term is also used in other parts of the country and 
relates to vehicle licensed under the 1976 Miscellaneous Provisions Act. Private Hire 
vehicles are commonly referred to in London as minicabs. 
 
Public Carriage Office (PCO) 
The Public Carriage Office is an administrative centre for the testing and licensing of 
hackney carriages (Taxis) and taxi drivers and the general administration and 
regulation of the taxi (and more recently private hire) industry in London. The Public 
Carriage Office is situated at 15 Penton Street, London N.1. The organisation is often 
referred to within the industry by the mynomic; ‘[The] Carriage Office’, ‘Penton Street’ 
or ‘the PCO’. 
 
Public Carriage Office Officers/Examiners 
The officers of the Public Carriage Office are responsible for two distinct areas; driver 
testing (Knowledge of London) and vehicle testing (Annual overhaul).  
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The Public Carriage Office Examiners are often referred to by Knowledge Boys and 
drivers by their surnames e.g. Lippet, Finlay et al. Alternatively they are referred to 
as; PCOs or Public Carriage Officers. In PCO literature they are referred to as 
Examiners or in the case of the head examiner; the Chief Examiner. 
 
The Public Carriage Office’s Officers who inspect the vehicles when they are first 
licensed and subsequently each year are known as; Brown Coats or White Coats. 
Those who wear white warehouse coats are supervisors and disputes or borderline 
cases are referred by the brown coats to them. 
 
Punters 
Prospective and actual passengers/customers of London Licensed Taxi Drivers are 
known colloquially as punters or fares. 
 
Quickie Knowledge 
A disparaging sobriquet appended to the attempt by the executives of the radio taxi 
companies to shorten the time taken to complete the Knowledge of London 
qualification which met with fierce opposition from the drivers, the trade press and the 
trade association that represents drivers. 
 
Radio/Radio Circuit/Radio Taxi Company 
Groups of taxi drivers have over the years organised themselves into cooperatives 
that have established and developed radio taxi companies. The phenomenon is often 
referred to as, radio, within the industry, drivers often ask; are you on radio or on the 
radio, meaning do you belong to a radio taxi company. Radio taxi companies are also 
known amongst drivers as; circuits or radio circuits. This possibly relates to the 
technologies used in the early days of radio taxi operations in London. 
 
Reduction 
A reduction is the term used by Knowledge Boys to describe a reduction in the time 
between appearances [Verbal Knowledge of London competency tests] which signify 
progress i.e. the shorter the time between appearances the more progress the 
Knowledge Boy has made. Initially tests are scheduled every 56 days, then they 
reduce to 28, 21 and 14 day intervals between tests. 
 
Run 
A route between two points e.g. Manor House Station to Gibson Square is known 
amongst Knowledge Boys as a run. Points and runs are the basis of verbal, 
topographical competency tests which the Public Carriage Office uses to ascertain 
progress towards the Knowledge of London vocational qualification.  
 
Scrubbed, scrubs 
Cancelled radio taxi company bookings 
 
Sharp End 
Point or front of a taxi rank – the term sharp end is used by radio taxi drivers. 
 
Shelters 
Small green wooden cabins provided by a charity set up by the Earl of Shaftesbury in 
1874 to provide cabbies with ‘good and wholesome refreshments at moderate prices 
 
Stalking 
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If a taxi driver agrees a price with a customer and does not use the meter – this is 
called stalking. When taxi drivers used to split their takings with the fleet owner this 
practice meant that the taxi driver managed to evade paying the fleet owner for trips 
that he stalked. 
 
Subscription Fees 
Charges payable by a taxi driver to a radio taxi company to belong to or subscribe to 
the radio taxi company. 
 
Taxi 
A taxi is a licensed Hackney Carriage. The vehicles used in London are purpose built 
for the London market. Taxis are licensed by the Public Carriage Office (See above). 
 
Taxi Driver 
Licensed London Taxi Driver. A driver who has been found by the licensing authority 
(Public Carriage Office) to be a fit and proper person, satisfied the regulator as to 
his/her topographical knowledge through successfully passing the Knowledge of 
London vocational qualification and possesses a valid London Taxi Driver’s licence 
(see also Licensed Taxi Driver).  
 
Taxi Driver of the Year 
Until recently an annual competition took place to find London’s top taxi driver who 
was subsequently known as the Taxi Driver of the Year. 
 
Tips/Tipping 
It is common and arguably traditional to proffer a gratuity to taxi drivers. The payment 
is often referred to as a tip and the act of giving a tip as tipping.  
 
Wangle 
When a Knowledge Boy is ready to take his taxi driving test he practices in an old 
taxi i.e. an un-plated (or unlicensed) taxi. These old taxis are known as wangle cabs 
in the industry. When a Knowledge Boy is driving around in one of these taxis he is 
doing what is called within the industry; wangling. 
 
WASP  
The acronym used by Knowledge Boys to remember the order of a set of streets that 
are used to travel from south to north in Chelsea and that run into one another. 
(Walpole, Anderson, Sloane and Pelham)   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
My research is important from many perspectives; it is an original piece of 
comprehensive research about London taxi drivers, about their life, their work, the 
personal impact of their training to achieve the vocational qualification known as the 
Knowledge of London, and their relationships with customers, authority, the 
industry’s institutions and each other. Taxi drivers appear to have a distinct identity 
which is perpetrated by passengers and journalists and which, in my experience is 
important to them and has a significant influence on their behaviours, beliefs and 
values and therefore informs their culture and that of the wider industry.    
 
I was particularly interested in the industry culture, the drivers’ motivation and how 
the management of taxi drivers who join a radio taxi company in effect an organised 
group of taxi drivers who have to comply with additional rules and protocols, fits or 
conflicts with the culture of the industry which I found strongly autonomous.  I was 
also interested in how the evolving groups of Knowledge Students and taxi drivers 
interact and interface with each other and the industry regulator; the Public Carriage 
Office.  
 
The reason I chose London’s taxi drivers as a research subject was because I had 
spent many years of my career in the taxi industry and had the opportunity to work 
with, observe and interact with many hundreds of them. It has been these 
observations, together with material gathered from interviews with taxi drivers and 
from the trade and popular press that have informed my research. The aims of my 
research have been to shed light (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1-2, 1995) on an under 
researched community of people and uncover the complex networks, social 
structures, career paths and behaviours that contribute to or influence the culture of 
the industry.   
 
1.1 The London Taxi Industry  
London’s licensed taxi drivers are the people who operate, what are universally 
known as London’s Black Taxis, which are found plying their trade all over London. I 
have lived and worked in London for most of my life and have used taxis regularly 
during that time. The taxi drivers I encountered were always interesting to me as they 
appeared independent and yet provided what I considered and appeared to be a 
homogenous service. During every journey each driver appeared to have a story to 
tell, an opinion to share or used the interaction to narrate the key benefits and 
differentiators of the taxi industry. 
 
The administration of the Knowledge of London qualification, vehicle testing and 
regulatory functions of the industry are the responsibility of the Public Carriage 
Office. I discovered that the Public Carriage Office and its management and staff 
have a distant relationship with the industry. The Public Carriage Office is apparently 
considered almost omnipotent by many in the industry with respect to granting 
drivers’ licences and undertaking vehicle testing, both of which can affect the 
livelihoods of those in the industry, and is both feared and revered by taxi drivers and 
taxi owners (Garner and Stokoe, 2000). 
 
There has been what is considered amongst taxi drivers and industry observers to be 
almost revolutionary change in working practices in the industry brought about by the 
introduction of technology and the emergence of what could be described as 
management dogmas amongst radio taxi company (see glossary) management 
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teams which have run counter to the industry’s apparently normal consensus based 
culture. I analysed the transition of one Radio Taxi Company from a cooperative to a 
corporate entity with particular emphasis on how the business process change was 
managed against the culture of the industry and the impact of the process of change 
(see section 5.4). As will be discerned from my research the taxi industry in London 
has been a hotbed of industrial disputes and action as a consequence of these 
changes.  
 
London’s taxi drivers could be described as a disparate and virtual workforce with 
their own identity (Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail, 1994), motivational and 
management issues. Externally the London taxi industry in general and taxi drivers in 
particular are apparently viewed with curiosity, affection and amusement (Martin, 
2004; Grimshaw, 2005; Craik, 2009, Daisley, 2012). Consideration is given within the 
research as to whether these images have any similarities with the identity the taxi 
drivers themselves apparently cultivate. 
 
I have spent most of my working life within the industry initially as a Knowledge of 
London student, then as a taxi driver, trade journalist, as a committee member of the 
industry’s largest organisation and finally managing London’s largest radio taxi 
company. As I moved from being a passenger to a Knowledge Boy (see glossary) I 
discovered a whole culture and a complex network of relationships within the industry 
between Knowledge Boys and Knowledge Boys, Knowledge Boys and the industry’s 
regulator; the Public Carriage Office and Knowledge Boys and taxi drivers. Once I 
qualified as a taxi driver I became a stakeholder in an even broader network of 
relationships as I interfaced with the institutions in the industry.  
 
1.2 Aims of the Research  
The aim of my research is to fill a vacuum where there is little comprehensive or 
rigorous research into the people, their social structures, their behaviour, and their 
relationships with each other and the institutions that make up the London taxi 
industry. Through my research I wanted to uncover the complex networks, social 
structures, career paths and behaviours that contribute to, or influence, the culture of 
the industry.   
 
The ability of taxi drivers to operate an apparently homogenous service within a 
virtual and disparate workforce group was an area that I wanted to research to 
establish how, if at all, they organised and managed themselves. I wanted to 
research how behaviours such as the etiquette (see glossary) which have evolved in 
order to avoid chaos and a selfish culture (Blau, 1986) developed and became 
accepted by the majority if indeed they had.  
 
I set out to unearth the day to day motivational factors of individual and groups of taxi 
drivers and compare their behaviours with the social norms of working in a 
conventional, contemporary organisational environment (Hatch and Schultz, 1997) 
e.g. an office, shop or factory. I wanted to investigate the similarities between the 
procedures and behaviours that are imposed and encouraged by managers amongst 
workers in classic organisations (Hatch and Schultz, 1997; Beynon, 1975) and those 
that have evolved, apparently organically, amongst London’s taxi drivers and how 
this had happened. 
 
Rich (1997) considers the impact of the many tasks that managers are responsible 
for on job satisfaction and their effect on performance. These are important issues for 
my research as London taxi drivers do not have a manager in the normal workplace 
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sense (Beynon, 1975) from which they may derive job satisfaction. Given that 
situation my research has sought to establish from where or from whom London taxi 
drivers derive their job satisfaction (Beynon, 1975).   
 
Further I sought to highlight the conflict that occurred when the management of the 
radio taxi company in the case studies in section 5.4 tried to exert its managerial will 
during an organisational change management program which ran counter to the 
prevailing culture to this self-managed and independent group. Having been a 
witness to the conflict which appeared to be between the culture of the taxi drivers 
and the approach that management took in relation to organisational change I was 
interested to research the issues that apparently offended the drivers’ identity of 
themselves, their place in the industry, their profession, and the perceived impact of 
organisational change on their identity. 
 
I was not concerned with the change management process per se. My interest was 
as an observer to see how changes in behaviour, power and the frontiers of control 
(Watson, 1982) led in some cases to cultural conflict whilst in other cases they were 
accepted consensually and why this was the case.  
 
 
1.3 Contribution To Original Knowledge 
The contribution to original knowledge from my work will be to provide an insight into 
the culture of the people who make up the London Taxi industry and how they relate 
both to each other and the institutions within the industry. My research will also 
consider the evolution and development of an identity amongst individuals, groups of 
taxi drivers and to an extent the industry. Further I will provide an insight, as to how 
and why a disparate and virtual workforce evolves and adopts behaviours that in 
more classically constructed workplaces managers spend large parts of their 
professional lives trying to engender and instil into the organisations that they 
manage. An important contribution will be the importance of culture and identity when   
management attempt to introduce organisational or working practice changes.   
 
1.4 Research Strategy 
My initial research proposal concerned a more general interest in self-employed 
people who were part of loose formal and informal relationships and groups but 
bound full time to rules and procedures required or implied by the organisation(s) 
they were associated with. These groups also had strong ties to their profession as 
well as the organisations and institutions they were associated with. A key point was 
that they only derived part of their income from the organisations and institutions they 
were associated with e.g. Hospital Consultants, Interim Managers, Supply Teachers, 
Part Time University Lecturers, Management Consultants and Radio Taxi Drivers.  
 
These early research ideas sprang from my familiarity with the business model 
adopted by London’s radio taxi companies who require their drivers to have 
communications equipment fitted into their taxis, display external advertising logos 
(something that is not universally popular amongst taxi drivers); pay speculative 
subscription fees (see glossary), and agree to be bound by rules and procedures that 
have the potential to adversely affect their preferred working practices, personal 
independence or autonomy (Scwalbe and Wolkmir, 2001), and commercial returns. 
These sometimes unpopular requirements are accepted despite, as estimated by 
Computer Cab’s [At the time of my research London’s largest radio taxi organisation] 
management team that only an average 20% of the taxi drivers’ income is generated 
through the association or membership of a radio taxi company. Although there is the 
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potential for the adverse impacts of the organisation’s requirements or policies, 
particularly at the margins, to be detrimental to drivers, the overall proposition 
benefits the majority of subscribing taxi drivers either directly; normally in terms of 
enhanced income, or indirectly through motivational factors, a sense of belonging 
and/or identification with an organisation or institution (Whetten, 1997) or a 
worthwhile cause (Blau, 1986).  
 
After some consideration my research topic developed loosely based on the 
approach suggested by Gill and Johnson (2002, 16-18) who propose that research 
students consider their research strategy based on the following criteria;  
 
‘access [to subjects and data], achievable in [the] time available, symmetry of 
potential outcomes, student capability and interest and the value and scope of 
the research’ 
 
I decided that narrowing the focus of my research to London’s taxi drivers, which 
includes radio taxi drivers, provided a subject area that I was passionate about, and 
about which I had already collected significant data in a broadly ethnographic 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), participant observer (Thomas, 2004) tradition. It 
was a subject that as far as I could ascertain had not been previously researched 
and was therefore novel (Gill and Pratt, 1986).   
 
1.5 Plan of the Thesis 
In Chapter 2 I provide a background to the industry to assist the reader to get an 
early view of the industry, its external perception and an overview of its institutions. 
 
In Chapter 3 I discuss relevant literature. In Chapter 4 I explain at a detailed level the 
methodology I employed and the rationale for it, my theoretical approach, and my 
approach to collecting and narrating my experiences and observations. My research 
was ideographic and inductive in nature.  
 
Chapter 5 is my reflexive account which was developed from two discrete sources, 
the first set was my narrative account based on an ethnographic study of my 
experiences and observations in and around London’s taxi industry together with 
material gathered through a series of interviews with taxi drivers. The second source 
was from relevant comment in the popular and trade press and material from other 
publications. A significant constraint was that there was very little peer reviewed 
literature concerned with the London taxi industry. 
 
My reflexive account includes a significant piece concerning business process 
changes that were made at the largest radio taxi company (see section 5.5) and how 
these changes conflicted with the culture of the stakeholders in that radio taxi 
company. Importantly the relative power and tactics used by drivers to obstruct these 
changes and the actions taken by the radio taxi company management to move 
ahead with the business process changes regardless of the obstruction but what is in 
effect the workforce (the taxi driver members of the radio taxi company) are explored 
within the context of the culture of the industry as I perceived it through my research. 
 
There is a chronological approach to my reflexive account. The account begins with 
the background to the industry describing how the industry operates, observations by 
those within and outside of the industry and its structure and institutions. I go on to 
give an account of my experience as an observer/passenger, taxi driver applicant, 
Knowledge student, taxi driver and ultimately radio taxi company manager. In this 
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section the importance of an informal, albeit widely practiced etiquette (Hooper, 
2007:8; Townsend, 2007; Pessok, 2009; Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1 (Taxi Driver 
Interview, 2008)) or code of conduct amongst taxi drivers is analysed.  
 
I go on to explore the perceived importance of the Knowledge of London vocational 
qualification and its influence on the culture of the industry and its effect on driver 
identity (Christensen and Cheney, 2000) and self-worth. I have sought to identify why 
the Knowledge of London is apparently such an important issue for drivers and 
others within the industry. I have explored what I consider to be an important aspect 
of the culture of those within the industry namely the relationship between the 
regulator and the industry. I researched the behaviours and, interactions with one 
another, the public, the industry and its institutions. I examine the existence of a 
community and where evidence of this exists how it is manifested. In this section I 
have shed light on the complex relationships, practices and culture of the industry.  
 
In order to assist the reader to better understand the case studies at the end of 
section 5 I have analysed one of the important and significant institutions in the 
industry; the radio taxi companies (see glossary). These organisations provide work 
to around a third of taxi drivers (Townsend, 2003) and have a significant impact on 
the organisation and motivation of taxi drivers. Although retaining their self-employed 
status the radio circuits or companies are the closest that taxi drivers in London get 
to working for an organisation. The drivers who subscribe to or belong to a radio 
circuit adopt certain rules and required to operate based on certain protocols. The 
radio circuits were initiators of substantial business process change some of which 
ran counter to the industry culture and led to industrial disputes. I use a case study to 
show how the largest radio taxi company in London sought to manage business 
process change and how the culture of the industry frustrated their efforts. 
 
The final part of section 5 concerns the management of change within the industry.  
In this section I analyse a case study concerning industrial relations disputes where 
attempts were made by an association of radio taxi company Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) to champion changes to the way that the Knowledge of London 
vocational qualification was administered by the Public Carriage Office (see section 
5.2.16)  known within the industry by the derogatory term; the Quickie Knowledge, 
the relative power (Beynon,1975) of those for and against this change and how the 
culture of the industry contrasted and conflicted with the explicit managerial desire for 
efficiency and their implicit desire for power.  
 
In Chapter 6 I consider the aims of my research and present my conclusions and the 
key themes that have emerged through the development of my narrative account and 
my analysis. My conclusions consider the managerial aspects of the industry as well 
as the micro aspects of everyday life (Johnson and Duberley, 2003). The cultural 
stresses introduced by the macro organisation and their impact on the micro aspects 
of the offensive and defensive measures employed to both champion and defeat the 
changes are explained as are the reasons for the perspectives of the stakeholders. In 
this section I have considered the methodologies that I have used and their 
effectiveness or otherwise within my research specifically in relation to the 
development of my narrative account and the analysis. During my research I have 
identified a number of areas of further research these are identified in section 6. I 
have established that the taxi industry is touched and touches many stakeholders. 
Each of these will be influenced by, or will influence part or all of the London taxi 
industry.  
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2. BACKGROUND OF THE INDUSTRY 
There are 25,000 licensed taxi drivers in London (Public Carriage Office, 2007). The 
number of licenced drivers has remained fairly static over the last two decades. To 
become a licensed taxi driver in London prospective candidates are required to 
satisfy the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, a task now delegated to 
Transport for London (part of the Mayor of London’s administration) that they are fit 
and proper persons to become licensed taxi drivers (Public Carriage Office, 2007). 
This legal requirement has been interpreted by the Public Carriage Office as 
meaning that anyone wishing to become, and indeed remain, a taxi driver must have 
a clean criminal record, be medically fit, have a detailed topographical knowledge of 
London and be able to pass a specialist driving test (Public Carriage Office, 2007). 
 
London taxis are purpose built vehicles that have to undergo a strenuous and 
exacting safety test every year as well as regular quarterly inspections. They are 
licensed by the Public Carriage Office on an annual basis. Vehicle requirements and 
fares are effectively set by the Public Carriage Office under powers delegated by the 
Secretary of State for Transport. Interestingly the mechanics of fare setting involves 
laying an order on the floor of the House of Commons. The Public Carriage Office 
has no responsibility for service delivery and no jurisdiction over the number of 
drivers who are licensed. Its responsibility is to licence applicants who meet the 
legislative and regulatory requirements and standards.  
 
London’s taxi drivers derive their business from ranks at stations, airports and focal 
points and from street hailing where prospective passengers lift their arm to signify to 
a taxi that is for hire (i.e. a taxi that has its yellow for hire light illuminated) that they 
wish to hire it. In addition around one third of taxi drivers belong to one of three radio 
taxi companies [known in the industry as radio circuits]. Radio taxi companies offer 
account services to businesses and provide a low priority telephone booking service 
to the general public. Bookings are allocated to a specific taxi in the vicinity of the 
pick-up address using increasingly sophisticated computer systems. Drivers pay a 
weekly subscription charge to belong to the radio taxi company. Account customers 
pay the fare plus a surcharge, the fare is passed to the driver and the surcharge 
retained by the radio taxi company. The fare is collected by the driver from 
passengers who pay cash. The radio taxi companies therefore have two revenue 
streams; driver subscription charges and customer surcharges. 
 
London’s taxi drivers are self-employed. They can buy a taxi or hire one. They can 
choose to belong to a radio taxi company or not. They can work whatever hours and 
days and in whatever areas of London they choose (Public Carriage Office, 2007). 
There is no formal career path within the industry. Length of service does not bestow 
any explicit or tangible benefits. Drivers often meet a regular group of colleagues in 
cafes frequented by taxi drivers (Townsend, 2007, Garner and Stokoe, 2000) or in 
taxi driver shelters (see glossary).  
 
Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2 explained that nicknames rather than actual names are 
a common feature of taxi driver relationships, Townsend (2003) also remarks on this 
characteristic of these relationships. Taxi drivers have a strict code of conduct known 
as the taxi driver etiquette. This etiquette is based on the concept of fairness and, if 
adhered to, ensures that each driver receives the trip that he is fairly entitled to. The 
concept of drivers not taking each other’s trips is a legal requirement within the 
Hackney Carriage legislation.  
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The industry has a vibrant trade press through which the issues of the day are 
debated, obituaries are posted, and letters are published. Much of the press is 
available free to drivers at stations, in shelters and cafes. There are a small number 
of trade associations and trade unions within the industry. About one third of taxi 
drivers belong to a trade association, trade union or radio taxi company (Townsend, 
2003). The industry has a strong commitment to charitable activities mainly 
concerned with underprivileged and disabled children, and ex-servicemen and 
women. 
 
The main competitors to taxi drivers are minicabs. Minicabs are a mixture of family 
saloons, multi-purpose vehicles and high end limousine type vehicles.  Until recently 
minicabs were unlicensed and operated for circa forty years through a loophole in the 
law. Over the last decade legislation (London Private Hire Act, 1998) has been 
enacted and licensing has gradually been phased in for private hire drivers and 
vehicles (minicabs) and now all minicabs are licensed. The chief distinctions between 
private hire vehicles and taxis are; taxis can accept street and rank hiring’s; private 
hire vehicles can only respond to pre bookings (normally made by telephone or more 
recently the internet or smartphone apps). Private hire drivers can drive a wide range 
of vehicles whereas taxi drivers can only drive purpose built vehicles that comply with 
the Metropolitan Conditions of Fitness [A specific regulatory framework that has 
remained unaltered since 1927].  
 
It is well documented (Garner and Stokoe, 2000; Townsend, 2003) that taxi drivers 
hate minicab drivers who they view as stealing their business. Taxi drivers also 
assert that minicab drivers are not properly qualified (i.e. they do not need to 
complete the onerous Knowledge of London qualification). The belief amongst taxi 
drivers is that if there were no minicabs there would be more business and therefore 
more income for what they view as the legitimate licensed taxi industry. 
 
The next section contains references and assertions from sources external to the taxi 
industry. It is here to provide context and an external viewpoint of the identity and 
culture of London’s taxi drivers i.e. how they are viewed by their service users, fans, 
detractors, and other stakeholders.  
 
 
2.1 The External Identity of the Industry 
There is very little peer reviewed literature concerning London Taxi Drivers and 
where it exists it is focused on the cognitive aspects of acquiring the Knowledge of 
London (Skok, 2000) and the regulatory aspects of the industry internationally (Skok 
and Kobayashi, 2007). 
 
Garner and Stokoe propose the correct collective noun for taxi drivers is ‘a grumble’ 
(2000: 24) a reference to what is described by Martin (2004: 63) as the ‘sheer bad-
temperedness of cabbies’. Martin (2004: 63) further informs us that; 
 
‘among themselves, cabbies refer to business customers as "bowler hats", 
while they often address their passengers as "governor", with that familiar, 
fascinating cockney mix of deference and sarcasm (approximately one part 
deference to nine parts sarcasm)’ 
 
This comment is typical of a theme that is apparent amongst journalists and authors 
to describe London’s taxi drivers’ public facing demeanour. Grimshaw (2005:19), who 
is describing a new mobile marketing technology being fitted in some of London 
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taxis, provides a further example of this when he purports that one of the benefits of 
the system he is marketing is providing;  
 
‘relief for some of London’s taxi passengers, stuck in traffic jams and being  
assailed by their driver's trenchant views on everything from the state of the  
economy to the decline of Spurs’ [A London football team].   
 
This is a fairly facetious and risky comment given that London’s taxi drivers will be a 
key stakeholder in the success or otherwise of the product he is promoting.  
 
Daisley (2012:1) describes taxi drivers and their topographical skills;  
 
‘The Black Cab Hobbits are a painfully irascible bunch. Yes they are a noble 
hoard of self-taught artisans, but - jeez - they can make the Daily Mail look life 
affirmingly cheerful. Black cab drivers' knowledge of the capillaries of 
London's heart is at times magical to behold’. 
 
Daisley (2012) like Martin (2004) implies that taxi drivers whilst bad tempered or 
easily prone to temper outbursts provide much more than transport. Daisley (2012) 
acknowledges and in fact admires their Knowledge of London. Daisley goes on to 
assess taxi drivers’ customer service skills and their psyche towards competitors; 
 
‘black cabs have been so used to being the only option that they have been 
completely cut adrift from any idea of service culture. Better distribution has 
meant they treated themselves like the only choice in town’ Daisley (2012:1).  
 
Daisley (2012) continues his theme when he remarks on the physical construction of 
taxis in London; ‘I'm reassured by the protection afforded to me by the Plastiglass 
screen [Taxi drivers and their passengers are separated from one another by glass 
partition]. Like a jail visit on the move’. 
 
The BBC website (2010) also relates its view of taxi drivers’ behaviour towards the 
end of a factual piece explaining a new initiative; 
‘Black cab drivers across London are learning foreign languages ahead of the 
2012 Olympic Games. More than 3,000 drivers for Radio Taxis, one of the 
city's biggest taxi firms, are being given CDs and MP3s teaching them useful 
phrases. The scheme, developed by publisher Collins, will teach drivers 
French, Spanish and Chinese. The company hopes tourists will get a taste of 
cabbies' colourful trivia and forthright opinions‘. 
In a similar style The Economist (2002: 60) exerts that London’s taxi drivers have an:  
 
 ‘impact on popular opinion that scares politicians stiff. The thought of the  
 city's [London’s] 24,000 cabbies bad-mouthing them [Politicians] to several  
 dozen passengers a day has discouraged successive governments from  
            trying to reform the archaic regulations that protect licensed taxis’  
 
Garner and Stokoe (2000) raise the concept of the Knowledge and highlight its value 
as a quality measure of the drivers’ topographical knowledge of London as well as 
suggesting the existence of a particular culture amongst London’s taxi drivers and 
reinforcing the entertainment aspect of a taxi journey in London; 
 
 ‘London’s licensed taxi trade has a culture all of its own. In no other city in the 
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world can you climb into a cab and be more confident of getting a driver who  
knows where he is going, nor be certain of hearing so many apocryphal  
stories on the way’ (Garner and Stokoe, 2000:42) 
 
 and 
 
‘The [London Taxi] drivers are a strangely homogenous group of raconteur 
chauffeurs; guaranteed to have an opinion on any subject you care to name 
and as likely to leave you in silence through your journey as they are to claim 
to have had Naomi Campbell [As a passenger] in their cab the night before’. 
(Garner and Stokoe, 2000:135) 
 
 and 
 
 ‘Next time a cabbie offers you some unwanted advice, cut him a little slack  
 and just agree with him (it is easier in the long run): remember he belongs to  
a noble profession and be thankful he knows where he is going.’ (Garner and 
Stokoe, 2000:13) 
 
 
(Reproduced with kind permission of www.CartoonStock.com) 
 
Craik (2009:15) takes up the theme of added value. Writing in the Evening Standard 
[A London newspaper] she offers a sympathetic tone to the impact of the economic 
slowdown on the taxi industry as well as an insight into the dialogue between 
passenger and taxi driver and a rationale as to why she continues to take taxis and 
why she urges others to do so; 
 
‘ “Where have you been all my life” my cab driver cried. After driving around 
for four hours, he had made £5.20p. As we are swept past Paddington 
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[Station], I could see why: the number of taxis queuing for the cab rank was 
enormous. The [For hire] lights were on but everybody was home. And they’d 
used the tube [The London Underground] to get there. 
 
I do think London cabs are expensive when compared to other cities but I still 
persist in taking them. Here in the dog days of the recession, when hailing [a 
taxi] one feels excessive. I’ve filed the expenditure under a different category 
in my head: ‘entertainment’. Black cabs equal black humour – and £12.50p 
for a bit of laughter is money well spent. 
 
As well as being funny (sometimes unintentionally), black cab drivers are also 
fonts of knowledge. Since Christmas alone [The article appeared on the 19th 
January], I have procured the number of a really good builder, found out 
where to buy the cheapest bacon sandwich in town (a cab hut [Shelter] in 
Kensington Park Road – cheers Mark) and been schooled into how to get my 
daughter into Camden School for Girls (I can’t divulge the means, and 
besides she is only two). 
 
Then there was the journey where the driver started reciting poetry - his own 
composition, of course. A week later, a self-published book of his poems 
turned upon my desk at work, and while it was hardly Blake (Actually it was a 
bit Blakean, but with a dose of William Mc Gonagall thrown in), it was a nice 
gesture. Yesterday a driver told me that in thirty years of cabbing [Driving a 
taxicab as a vocation], his back seat had never been as empty. Support your 
friendly cabbie before it’s too late’ 
 
Craik’s experiences with a number of London’s taxi drivers appear to point to an 
added value service which she is happy to use herself and also to recommend to her 
readers. She highlights cost as an issue and yet justifies this to herself as 
categorising it as entertainment for which she evidently feels willing to pay. This 
justification is added to through what she appears to view as education in how to cut 
building costs, get her daughter into her preferred school and finding out where to 
buy a cheap bacon sandwich. The journey is almost remarked upon as a passing 
comment indicating that the added value is a more important part of the transaction 
than merely transport. Her closing comment and description of ‘friendly cabbie’ 
(Craik, 2009:15) appears to suggest affection for this band of entertainers, 
knowledgeable tutors and fundamentally transport providers. 
 
The literature (Garner and Stokoe, 2000; Townsend 2003 and 2007) that appears to 
seek to describe the identity of, or assert what, a London taxi driver is, and how he or 
she behaves appears to be full of contradictions. The external perspective of the 
industry was not a significant aspect of my research but it did provide some 
contextualisation of the industry. The apparently popular identity of London’s taxi 
drivers cultivated intentionally or accidentally by journalists (Martin 2004; Grimshaw 
2005; Craik, 2009) and authors (Garner and Stokoe, 2000; Townsend, 2003 and 
2007), appears to position London taxi drivers as a homogeneous tribe of verbose 
sometimes bad tempered or cheerful and often opinionated individuals with an 
influence on popular opinion, comprehensive industry specific language and regular 
use of cockney rhyming slang and an excellent knowledge of London’s topography.  
 
Whilst apparently suggesting a broadly common behavioural pattern amongst 
London’s taxi drivers or a common passenger perception which contributes to an 
accepted folklore amongst feature writers and journalists, contributors appear to 
provide very diverse accounts, discourse and narrative concerning their experiences 
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using the Capital’s taxis. Evidently without any obvious conspiracy to do so 
journalists, (Martin 2004; Grimshaw, 2005; Craik, 2009, Daisley, 2012) and authors 
(Garner and Stokoe, 2000; Townsend 2003 and 2007) have concocted a plausible 
picture of London’s taxi drivers apparently based on a sprinkling of experience, 
legend, myth (Stacey, 2001) and possibly imagination and arrived at a popular 
caricature; in effect how the industry and those in it are perceived by others (Aaker, 
1996; Argenti, 1998; BBC, 2010). Three common themes that emerge are the value 
and admiration of the comprehensive topographical knowledge, an apparent 
influence and nobleness, and an appreciation that taxi drivers provide more than just 
transport i.e. added value.   
 
The next section explores the identity of the industry and people in it from feedback 
to the BBC’s websites. 
 
2.2 The Public’s View of the Industry 
The BBC website (1999) describes London taxi drivers in equally colourful language 
but suggests the concept of a particular though unflattering appearance and a 
cheerful disposition. The contributor(s) enlarge on Martin’s (2004) comments 
concerning cockney terminology and introduce the issue of a specific taxi driver 
language along with the concept of the Knowledge which is a colloquialism for the 
vocational training and qualification process involved with satisfying the regulatory 
authority, the Public Carriage Office, that a driver has sufficient knowledge of 
London’s streets, hospitals, landmarks, cemeteries, synagogues, hotels, theatres and 
other venues to be licensed as a London taxi driver. 
 
‘They [London’s taxi drivers] are operated by incredibly cheerful, yet strange 
looking men (and very, very occasionally, strange looking women) who tell 
you, by way of introduction, that the 'rahd's gawn mayd' [Road’s gone mad] 
today. They speak in a mixture of clichés and a dialect called Cockney 
Rhyming Slang and deliver gems from what they call 'The Knowledge'. This 
usually involves reactionary commentary on current news events mixed with 
some very colourful abuse hurled at motorists and pedestrians alike.’ (BBC, 
2009) 
 
Another BBC website (2004) asked the public to email in their ‘best [London] cabbie 
tales’. Given the nature of the survey it is difficult to ascertain whether the sample 
was representative of the wider population, whether the sample was unbiased or 
even representative of the public who use taxis.  
 
There were forty one responses of which nine gave their address as London, seven 
from outside of the UK and the remainder from within the UK. It would appear that 
respondents had points to make whether pro or anti taxi drivers and as such it would 
appear that the sample had some positive or negative bias which they wished to 
express. The comments were interesting and relevant to my research as I was keen 
to understand the public’s perception of the taxi drivers’ identity and contrast this with 
the taxi drivers’ perception. Of the London respondents only one gave a negative 
response that being from a pedestrian’s perspective. All of the London residents’ 
responses were generalised comments or views formed over a period of time. All of 
the non UK responses were positive, relating stories based on single trips and, 
notably, one long term relationship with a London taxi driver.  
 
The non-London residents were most critical of London’s taxis with just under half 
relating a tale of poor quality service, high cost or general dissatisfaction at an 
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individual taxi driver’s conduct. These responses support research (Diener and 
Greyser, 1978) which established that people are more likely to relate bad than good 
experiences but that most are unlikely to make a formal complaint.  
 
The email responses to the BBC website (2004) describing London’s taxi drivers 
spanned a wide strata of human behaviour; from cheerful to miserable, honest to a 
rip off, courteous to greedy and unfriendly. The taxi drivers’ Knowledge of London 
appeared not to be in contention and was accepted as being good but two 
respondents questioned its relevance given that satellite navigation systems appear 
to work well for private hire drivers. There was much criticism of taxi drivers’ 
behaviour towards other road and street users. Whilst not scientific, or as far a one 
can establish a representative sample, the responses to the BBC website are so 
broad and diverse that the apparent journalistic consensus of a common set of 
behaviours is left in some doubt, albeit there is some corroboration of some aspects 
of behaviour e.g. the use of an industry specific language and a continuation of the 
theme that taxi drivers have an excellent Knowledge of London.  
 
2.3 Knowledge of London 
To become a Licensed London Taxi Driver a prospective driver must pass the 
Knowledge of London vocational qualification. The Knowledge of London is 
acknowledged by taxi drivers (Fisher, 2008a), Public Carriage Officers and many of 
the public in London as an onerous and difficult qualification to acquire. There is no 
published curriculum, topographical testing is random and unpredictable and the 
scoring process is secretive. There is a high dropout rate amongst prospective taxi 
drivers. This appears to be because of the length of time it takes to complete the 
Knowledge (Currently three to four years), the lack of a clear understanding as to the 
progress students are making, the demands of the Knowledge acquisition process 
which involves many hours per week of driving around London on a small motorbike 
in all weathers, together with the need to attend a Knowledge School (see glossary) 
and undertake call overs (see glossary). At a fundamental level the scope, size and 
scale of the task is enormous.  
 
As well as the physical demands there are personal and financial deprivations and 
implications; many hours away from family and friends, reduced opportunity to 
generate additional income through working overtime and incurring the cost of 
purchasing and running a motorbike and Knowledge School fees. The Knowledge of 
London has come to be considered within the industry as a character building 
exercise (see appendix 3) or rite of passage (Taxi Driver Interviewee No.3, Taxi 
Driver Interviews, 2008) rather than simply the acquisition and demonstration of an 
adequate topographical knowledge appropriate to drive a taxi. Attempts to speed up 
the process (see section 5.2.16) have been resolutely rejected by taxi drivers and 
their representative organisations. 
 
The Knowledge of London was regarded by anyone familiar with the concept from 
outside of the taxi industry that I raised it with as a very tough almost impossible 
barrier to entry (Porter, 1980) to the industry. When raised with the taxi drivers who 
were transporting me, the Knowledge was ‘presented rigidly as the unequivocal 
expression of the organization and is exalted with a degree of reverence that borders 
on the absurd’ (Christensen and Cheney, 2000:249). Taxi drivers that I travelled with 
as a passenger shook their heads in exasperation or resignation when I asked how 
tough acquiring the Knowledge had been. Fisher (2008a) explained that; ’you could 
never believe how tough it is and also how it completely dominates your life’. Garner 
and Stokoe (2000:62) describe the Knowledge as a ‘scar that never leaves you’. I too 
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found the Knowledge one of the toughest physically and mentally demanding tasks 
that I have ever been involved in. 
 
The literature directly concerning London taxi drivers tends to focus on the onerous 
requirements of the qualification to become a licensed taxi driver (the Knowledge of 
London) and the lessons it provides to those concerned with knowledge 
management and how the human brain acquires, maintains and accesses knowledge 
on the scale that London taxi drivers are required to e.g. Skok (2000).  
 
Garner and Stokoe provide some historical context for the Knowledge and why it was 
introduced; 
 
‘The Knowledge was first introduced in 1851 by Sir Richard Mayne, one of 
two Police Commissioners appointed to oversee the hackney carriage trade, 
following complaints by visitors to the Great  Exhibition that drivers did not 
know where they were going’. (2000:62) 
 
Alan Fisher (2008a) a London taxi driver and trade journalist provides an insight into 
the taxi driver’s view of the Knowledge; 
 
‘The Knowledge is tough. I know some guys that took over four years to 
complete it. Knowing that you had to go out most days on a small motorbike 
[to learn or become familiar with the city] regardless of whether it was 
summer or winter - and winters can be pretty miserable in London - doesn’t 
exactly cheer you up! But London is a big city, and to become a licensed taxi 
driver in the U.K. Capital means knowing not just where every one of the 
67,544 streets are, together with every building in every one of those streets, 
but at the drop of a hat [In an instant], how you get from one to another! How 
do you prepare? You can’t, because you could never believe how tough it is 
and also how it completely dominates your life. I know several drivers whose 
marriages or relationships never survived the strain the Knowledge puts you - 
and those around you - under’. 
 
Despite the onerous demands and deprivations of the Knowledge people continue to 
choose to become taxi drivers. There is no published research as to the processes 
that prompt men and women to become London taxi drivers or why they tolerate the 
apparent deprivations and torturous ritual that is involved in acquiring the Knowledge. 
Abrahams (2000) explains why a number of Jewish men decided to become London 
taxi drivers; 
 
 ‘When we finished our National Service, suddenly we wanted freedom, and 
taxi driving offered us that freedom, away from the factories, and away from 
the bosses. We were our own boss, our own entrepreneur’.  
 
I ascertained that many, if not most, taxi drivers have not stayed on at school and 
continued through to further education. Most drivers that I spoke to about this subject 
had left school with few if any qualifications often this information was voluntarily 
supplied in relation to their aspirations for their children or to support expressions of 
regret about their own education or lack of prospects for a job outside of the taxi 
industry. Therefore, apart from apprenticeships, for many aspiring taxi drivers the 
Knowledge may well be the first formal qualification they have achieved. This lack of 
experience in studying added a further challenge to the Herculean effort that was 
needed to undertake and pass the Knowledge.  
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2.4 Market Research  
A survey studying taxi availability carried out by IPSOS MORI (2007) but 
commissioned by the Licensed Taxi Drivers’ Association (LTDA) included a section 
on customer satisfaction (2007:13) that indicated that ‘an overwhelming majority of 
taxi users are satisfied with their taxi trip (92%) and 65% of these are very satisfied’. 
The survey went on to consider driver attitude and explained that ‘the majority of 
passengers (83%) are satisfied with the attitude of taxi drivers, with only very few 
(6%) expressing dissatisfaction’ (2007:14).  
 
The IPSOS MORI (2007) survey established a claim that ‘88% of customers 
interviewed tipped [Proffered a gratuitous payment in addition to the fare] the taxi 
driver at the end of their journey’ (2007:14). Could this reiterate satisfaction levels or 
simply indicate majority conformance with the tradition of tipping taxi drivers? Given 
that the tipping transaction is a private matter between taxi driver and customer the 
claims may also be exaggerated by interviewees to position themselves i.e. the 
customer as a generous person or someone who respects tradition.  
 
There is some correlation between those claiming to tip and their satisfaction levels 
which may provide some validation of the tipping habits of those who were 
interviewed. Hooper(2009:6) writes in his feature article in Taxi Newspaper [the 
largest circulation taxi trade journal in London] that ‘the reality is, whereas probably 
80% of punters [The London taxi trade term for customers or passengers] tipped 30 
years ago, it’s probably closer to 50% (Or less) now’. Hooper could come from the 
perspective of wishing to understate tipping as leverage for compensatory fare 
increases. The organisation for which Hooper is an elected executive member, the 
LTDA, is involved in negotiating the annual fare increase for the taxi industry with 
Transport for London and he may well wish to minimise the value of tips in order to 
leverage higher fare increases. Customers could come from the perspective of 
appearing generous so neither estimate has, in my view, much veracity. Perhaps all 
one can conclude is that some but not all customers tip taxi drivers.  
 
The survey also asked customers to compare London’s taxi drivers with those from 
elsewhere (2007:15): the results showed that 76% of passengers believed that 
London’s taxi drivers are better than anywhere else.  
 
When compared with ‘customer satisfaction amongst London’s bus and underground 
customers where satisfaction levels are between 77% - 78%’ (2007:14-15) London’s 
taxi drivers (who scored 92%) appear to be providing a service that is a closer fit to 
passengers’ expectations than other forms of transport although given the more 
personal and bespoke nature of the taxi service compared to the bus and 
underground service it is reasonable to expect higher satisfaction levels. 
2.5 The Public Carriage Office (Industry Regulator) 
The Public Carriage Office is as an administrative licensing function and part of the 
Mayor of London’s corporate domain known as Transport for London, its objectives 
are set out below; 
‘The role of the Public Carriage Office (PCO) includes the licensing of taxi and 
private hire services in London. We are also responsible for: 
Reviewing and setting taxi fares  
Appointing taxi ranks  
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Improving travel information  
Making services safer and more accessible  
Helping the Mayor of London integrate public transport in the Capital’ 
 (Public Carriage Office Website, 2009) 
 
The Public Carriage Office (2007) claims on its web site that ‘with 25,000 members, 
taxi drivers are part of a large family’ introducing the concept of a homogenous tribal 
grouping or at least one that suggests a relationship, similarity or shared heritage, in 
effect a society of men and woman. Czarniawska (2000:274) comments that ‘the 
creation of a family-like image of organization is but a way of evoking accountability 
towards an actual community, and not an abstract system’. Watson (1982:261) 
complains that organisational theorists have ‘conceptualized organizations along the 
lines that managers would like them to be: rational systems. ‘teams’ or even 
‘families’. Watson (1982: 261) goes on to lament that adopting this approach ‘has 
meant playing down the uncomfortable realities that managers’ responsibilities 
perhaps should demand that they confront’.  
 
Whether benefiting from the concepts discussed by Czarniawska (2000) or Watson 
(1982) was formally part of the thinking or intention of the management of the Public 
Carriage Office in their use of the metaphor family is unknown. The management of 
the Public Carriage Office may have been attempting to describe their perception of 
the industry, or as Czarniawska (2000) implies trying to evoke or develop 
accountability through an actual community or as Watson (1982) intimates to use 
language as a means of avoiding or not accepting responsibility to confront a 
management issue.  
 
Alternatively the term family may have had a connotation that the Public Carriage 
Office Management Team thought would be attractive to prospective drivers. 
Abrahams (2000), a London Taxi Driver spoke of taxi drivers going on holiday 
together, an image that conjures up close relationships or even the term family. The 
image of community or family may have been considered less daunting for 
prospective taxi drivers than becoming part of a much loved London icon (Malthouse, 
2010) and historical institution. The operation of the Public Carriage Office is 
discussed and analysed further in section 5.2.2 particularly in the content of its 
relationship with the taxi industry, its rituals and behaviour towards Knowledge Boys 
(see glossary) and taxi drivers and how the industry interfaces and regards it.   
 
2.6 Identification Through Language 
A specific taxi driver language features amongst industry and other journalists 
accounts of engagements with taxi drivers (Garner and Stokoe, 2000; Pessok, 2006; 
Jackson, 1999; Martin, 2004; BBC, 1999). Jackson (1999) lists on his website what 
he describes as ‘excerpts from the taxi drivers’ lexicon’ in effect a number of terms or 
a language that drivers use in London in place of recognised English. Below are 
listed a selection of commonly used taxi terminologies; 
 
Selections from the London taxi drivers’ lexicon (Jackson, 1999-2005);  
 
Butterboy - newly licensed driver 
Clock - taximeter 
Cock and Hen - man and woman passenger 
Farmer Giles - piles, [Haemorrhoids] an occupational hazard for taxi drivers 
Flyer - a fare to Heathrow or Gatwick airport 
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In and Out - a return journey 
Legal - the full fare without tip [i.e. what is legally payable] 
Linkman - hotel or club doorman 
Mushers - owner drivers 
On point - taxi at the front of a rank 
Roader - fare outside the Metropolitan Police Area district [i.e. outside 
London]   
 
(See Glossary for additional industry specific terms) 
 
The letter below is interesting as the driver who uses the term ‘Butterboy’ and 
mentions taxi driver etiquette and also refers to the issue of older or longer serving 
drivers advising younger or newer drivers as to how they should behave (see section 
5.3.4). 
 
‘Papa don’t preach… 
I write in response to Mr McEwen's letter, Bad Manners, in TAXI 290. For his 
information, we [newly qualified taxi drivers] are still given a talk on cabbie etiquette 
on presentation day and I for one stick to it! But he is correct in stating how bad the 
trade is getting. For example, I was travelling along Park Lane on the inside lane 
when I was overtaken by another cab, whose badge number started with 68 [Taxi 
drivers’ badge numbers are issued serially so it is possible to approximate how long 
someone has been a taxi driver by his/her badge number], so he was no butter boy. 
He then pulled in front of me as I went on to Piccadilly and, you've guessed it, took 
the next job! I pulled up next to him and asked him what he was up to? He just 
laughed and basically told me to get lost. I was very angry at this point and a few 
words were exchanged. He continued to laugh and be very smug and told me that if I 
carry on like that I'll end up having a heart attack, and then drove off. In the past 15 
months, since I got my badge, I've seen more bad drivers on the road sporting older 
badge numbers. It seems they feel because they've been at it for a few more years 
they have the right to take a liberty with the butter boys and girls, when they should 
practice what they preach’.        (Taxi Newspaper, 2013) 
 
Pessok (2006:2) in his research amongst readers of Taxi Newspaper claims to have 
compiled ‘a list of expressions and words that have been used in the [London] taxi 
trade for over 150 years’. How the longevity of these expressions and words has 
been established by Pessok is not known. Within Pessok’s (2006:2) report an 
attempt at identifying the source of the language is made;  
 
‘Roy Cumming, who was in charge of the Royal British Legion Taxi School [A 
school for Knowledge Students restricted to ex-servicemen or servicemen’s 
dependents] for many years before he retired, Mr Cumming explained that 
cab-talk is a lingua franca (a hybrid language) of Cockney, back-slang, 
rhyming slang, Yiddish and jargon from horseracing and market traders’.  
 
Pessok goes on to report that Cumming expressed concern that the taxi driver 
language is gradually disappearing, a trend which he laments. How Cumming has 
established that the language is disappearing is not known and neither is it clear why 
he is perturbed by its disappearance if indeed it is happening. If it is the case the 
greater diversity amongst taxi drivers in London may be a contributory factor. 
Pessok’s research identified 229 specific words or expressions used or being used 
by London taxi drivers. 
 
Garner and Stokoe (2000) devote a chapter of their book; Taxi! to what they term 
‘The Language’ (Garner and Stokoe, 2000:71). It is apparent from Garner and 
Stokoe’s (2000) accounts (See below) that the provenance of the taxi driver 
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language is not reliable. Garner and Stokoe (2000:71) provide amusing 
interpretations by anonymous taxi drivers of a number of the terms that are 
commonly used by taxi drivers in London; 
 
‘We call the new boys [newly qualified taxi drivers] butter boys. That’s 
because they are taking the bread and butter from the older [longer serving] 
drivers. Or maybe it is because they’ve got the bread but not the butter. I am 
making this up you know. I should get it authenticated; I’m prone to tell lies – 
like all cab drivers’ (Garner and Stokoe, 2000:78) 
 
‘The kipper season [Quiet or flat season] is January, February and March 
when the game [Business levels] is very quiet. It’s the kipper season because 
we are so poor we can only have kippers for tea. Or perhaps it’s because we 
are kipping [Sleeping] rather than working’ (Garner and Stokoe, 2000:86) 
 
The issue of what is described above as lies is returned later in the study albeit in 
less judgemental terms. An oral tradition of storytelling and exaggeration do seem to 
be a theme amongst many taxi drivers in London.  The acceptance of and use of 
industry specific terms and words appears to be widely practiced and appears to 
demonstrate a familiarity with the industry and to be part of its culture. 
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3. LITERATURE DISCUSSION   
This section is intended to provide an insight into some of the literature I have 
referenced and that has influenced my research. It will also provide an insight into my 
perspective of the literature. I have chosen what I consider to be the three most 
important themes within my research namely; Culture, the Management of 
Organisational Change and Identity. 
 
The aims of my research are to provide an insight into the people, their social 
structures, their behaviour, and their relationships with each other and the institutions 
that make up the London taxi industry. Underlying these areas are complex 
networks, social structures, career paths and behaviours that contribute to, or 
influence, the culture of the industry.  Through my research I am keen to highlight the 
conflict and its causes that occurred when the management of a radio taxi company 
that tried to exert its managerial will during an organisational change management 
program which ran counter to the prevailing culture to this self-managed and 
independent group. My research is not concerned with the change management 
process per se. My interest was as an observer to see how changes in behaviour, 
power and the frontiers of control lead, in some cases, to cultural conflict whilst in 
other cases where they appeared to be accepted consensually why this was the 
case.  
 
To realise my research aims culture and identity are important areas to analyse and 
interpret. The conflict, and on other occasions alignment, with the management’s 
approach to organisational change appear to be directly connected to culture and 
identity. I have reviewed and discussed the relevant literature in the sections below 
both at a broad level but also in relation to my specific research.    
3.1 Culture  
The term culture, its meanings and its relationship with ethnography are widely 
discussed and debated in the literature.  
 
McDonald and Foster describe culture as ‘the shared meanings, priorities and 
practices of a group’ (2013: 340).  Watson (1999:112) discusses culture at a broader 
level than meanings, priorities and practices and proposes that;  
 
‘Cultures manifest themselves in the behaviours that follow from them, of 
course, and they are also transmitted through artefacts ranging from the 
clothing people wear to the layout and decoration of the buildings in which 
they work’.  
 
McDonald and Foster (2013) appear to view culture in an almost mechanistic form. 
Whereas Watson extends this somewhat narrow view to encompass the physical 
environment and adds some historical context. Both appear to suggest that culture in 
some ways lead to convention, acceptance of a set of unwritten rules and 
compliance. This apparently tidy and agreeable view of culture does not fit with the 
conflict amongst certain cultures which encourage divergence, disagreement and 
challenge to the status quo. Likewise whilst people may adopt certain norms such as 
wearing the same type of clothing or share views on priorities these do not in my 
view necessarily signify a culture. For example the police may wear the same 
uniform and share the view that they wish to stop or prevent crime but within the 
force there will be multiple cultures at different levels and many sub cultures. Trying 
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to develop a simple view of culture is in my opinion impossible as it is complex, multi-
faceted, constantly changing and far from stable.  
 
Schein describes culture as; 
 
‘the patterns of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, 
discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration, and that have worked well enough to be 
considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct 
way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to these problems’. (1985: 9)  
 
I believe that what Schein has omitted is that new members of a group may not be 
simply passive and recipient to the prevailing culture or even many of the sub 
cultures that will exist. Culture will change, adapt and develop as the groups’ 
constituents change. The changes may not just be physical or restricted to personnel 
changes but changes in perspective and framing brought about by age, life 
experience and many other factors and emotions. What Schein describes could be 
seen as discussed by Fook and Watson (1992) below as attempts by the incumbent 
group members to establish an official culture.  
 
Fook and Watson (1992) and Watson (1999) introduce the concept of an official and 
unofficial culture. The official culture is described by them as the culture that 
management aspire to for the organisation. Whereas the unofficial culture is 
considered to be the culture that is actually exists within the organisation. Watson 
(1999:114) asserts that the official culture is ‘the system of meanings, values and 
norms espoused by the managerial dominant coalition’. Watson (1999:114) argues 
that for long term survival and cooperation that there needs to be ‘not too great a gap 
between the official and unofficial cultures of the organisation; between the 
managerially espoused and the actually prevailing set of meanings, values and 
norms’. A wide or widening gap between the official and unofficial culture would it is 
suggested lead to a lack of cooperation, meanings and values amongst the 
management and the rest of the organisation leading to stresses and lack of 
cohesion. This concept is similar to my views in that I believe based on my 
experience that there is often an official and unofficial culture that develops in groups.  
I am not convinced that the official culture necessarily has to be espoused by 
management as groups are quite capable of developing an official culture i.e. a 
culture that the group believes its members should aspire to whilst practicing, at least 
at times. An unofficial culture could be a less desirable or unattractive culture but still 
attractive to the group’s members but may not necessarily be socially acceptable.  
 
Thomas usefully explores culture in relation to ethnographic studies; ‘ethnographic 
studies have become more common in management research’ and tend to focus on 
three topics ‘organizational cultures, organizational processes and organizational 
employee groups’ (2004:135). Thomas (2004:133) adds that ethnography is about 
‘describing and understanding unfamiliar cultures and ways of life’. I largely accept 
this view of ethnography but I take issue with the term organizational cultures. I 
believe that cultures and sub cultures develop within groups or among disparate 
workforces which may be viewed as mini organisations.  
 
In summary what is clear from the literature is that there is no overarching description 
that can sum up what culture is, how it is formed and developed, and the argument 
remains in a chicken and egg style conundrum as to whether culture is something we 
influence or something we are influenced by. Overall I believe culture to be an 
unstable, ever changing and complex phenomenon which may well be adopted by 
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some at a high level enabling a concept of an official culture to be perceived. I also 
believe that underneath the veneer of an official culture there are sub cultures and 
unofficial cultures and these are influenced, changed, constantly reassessed and 
renegotiated by existing group members, new members and external forces and 
influences.  
 
The next section reviews the literature concerned with organisational, corporate, 
individual and group identity and its relationship with culture.  
 
 
3.2 Identity 
Before I even embarked upon my research it was clear to me that identity would 
become an important theme in my research. Schultz et al (2002) introduce the 
concepts of corporate and organisational identity which they describe as ‘addressing 
the same phenomenon even though they do so from different perspectives’ (2002:3) 
which they link to image and culture. Hatch and Scultz (2000) discuss the concept of 
identification with the organisation where they stress that a key issue is the 
interrelationship between personal and social aspects of identity construction.  Hatch 
and Schultz (2000:15) refer to this concept as ‘who we are’ and ‘what we stand for’ 
and presumably how our beliefs about who we are and what we stand for aligns or 
not with the organisation we are associated with. Schultz et al explain that; 
 
‘In general, the concept of organizational identity refers to how organizational 
members perceive and understand ‘who are we’ and/or ‘what we stand for’ as an 
organization’ (2002:4) 
 
Within my research the concept of an organisation is much looser and less defined 
than is implied by Schultz et al (2002). Therefore the concept of an organisation 
existing in some physical way is not helpful. However even in a virtual organisation 
constituted of disparate groups with few common traits the concept of who we are 
and what we stand for (Schultz et al) is questioned through the trade press, amongst 
groups and even by individuals. 
 
Corporate identity as proposed by Schultz appears to be an aspiration probably 
promoted by management as an official culture (Watson, 1999) whereas 
organisational identity appears to be based on the members of the organisation’s 
critical view of their behaviour, values, ethics, and ethos. I would further propose that 
there is an evaluation of the organisation against the culture of those within the 
organisation where it would be difficult to align the organisation’s identity with the 
members’ identity as they see it unless there was a strong cultural fit. Culture and 
identity are certainly in my view entwined and almost reliant on one another. Culture 
being about what we do and how we do it, what we might describe as the inputs 
whereas identity is much more about a representation of culture almost the outcome.  
 
Albert and Whetten proposed that organizational identity is;  
 
‘a particular kind of question. The question, ‘what kind of organisation is this?’ 
refers to features that are arguably core, distinctive, and enduring and reveal 
the identity of the organisation’ (1985:292) 
 
There appears to be a belief in a concept of an explicit test to identify the identity of 
an organisation although Albert and Whetten do not appear to highlight a great 
importance to alignment of personal and corporate or organisational identity. Albert 
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and Whetten seem wedded to the concept of a physical organisation rather than 
informal groupings with loose tie relationships. 
 
Fombrun and Rindova (2000:95) note that; 
 
’the projection of an organizational identity can be unintentional, (e.g. 
communicated through everyday behaviour, gestures, appearance, and 
attitude)’.  
 
Hatch (2000:25) draws links between organisational identity, cultural assumptions 
and values; 
 
‘identity involves how we define and experience ourselves and this [is] partly 
influenced by our activities and beliefs, which are grounded in and interpreted 
using cultural assumptions and values’ 
 
Hatch’s (2000) description of the impact of culture I believe encompasses some very 
important concepts that are worthy of further discussion. The question of whether 
culture develops amongst groups or influences group culture is a fundamental issue. 
I can accept that the activities, beliefs and values of a group will impact the 
development of a group’s culture but I cannot agree that culture is simply something 
that is adopted by new entrants to groups. Culture is not a stable state concept in my 
view but more of a developing and changing collection of influences. Hatch’s (2000) 
views on identity do align with mine in that we define ourselves through a range of 
tools and interfaces and clearly our culture, our activities and our beliefs will influence 
how we develop our identity. I believe that organisational identity and how we 
formulate, make sense of and describe it are also influenced to a large degree by our 
a priori, our culture, our activities and our beliefs.  
 
Hatch and Schultz (2000:19) continue the theme of projecting organisational identity 
as they propose that ‘communication of organizational identity to external 
stakeholders therefore requires opportunities for personal interaction with them’. The 
theme of personal identity is described by Scwalbe and Wolkomir as what they term 
‘strategically crafted accounts’ (2001:213) of individuals’ lives and actions. Stacey 
describes how ‘identities are constructed in the process of interaction between 
people’ (2001:37). Stacey’s arguments appears less reliant on the existence of the 
physical constructions of organisations and much more aligned with informal 
networks which is more aligned with my research subject.   
 
Watson links identity to culture with his assertion that;  
 
‘we all work on our identities all of the time: making meaning through a 
dialogue with the culture (or cultures, in so far as we are parts of several 
groups), its norms, values and symbols. Through our actions we are 
contributing to culture as well as taking from it’ (Watson, 1994:21) 
 
Watson (1982) goes on raise the important contribution of language rhetoric, 
knowledge, and ideology all of which are used both at an organisational and 
individual level to develop identity. 
 
In summary much of the prevailing literature appears to consider identity through the 
frame of physical organisations or corporate bodies and the alignment of a formal 
culture establish a corporate or organisational identity against which personal identity 
is considered. This very tidy approach to management, personal identity, 
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organisational identity and culture is in my view improbable. Identity is complex and 
multi-faceted and changes frequently.  I agree with the literature that suggests that 
personal identity and potentially corporate identity are not stable state concepts as 
they are continuously renegotiated and strategically crafted. The overall concept 
suggests a continually changing set of criteria influenced by personal interactions, 
culture, strategy, beliefs and values, external influences, ambition and aspiration. 
Stacey’s (2001) view that identifies are constructed through interaction between 
people together with Watson’s (1994) assertion that we all work on our identities all 
the time underlines in my view the influences and flux within which identity 
formulation develops. Corporate or organisational identity appears to be much less 
organic than personal identity and much more aspirational. In a virtual organisation 
constituted of disparate groups it is difficult to understand how identity at anything 
other than a personal level can develop and if this can happen apparently organically 
and without management intervention simply through Stacey’s thesis of identities 
being created through interaction between people.      
 
There is a lack of literature that considers the ephemeral nature of virtual 
organisations and its impact on the already unstable concept of identity both 
individual and organisational. The earlier review of the public’s view of the taxi 
industry (see sections 2.2. and 2.4 above) which was largely around the identity that 
is presented by the industry highlights that virtual organisations are capable of 
projecting an identity at both an individual and organisational level. My research will 
add significantly to this body of knowledge.    
 
In the next section I explore how organisational change and change management 
evolved and have developed from a largely scientific management and engineering 
perspective over which management exercised considerable control to a 
contemporary situation where change relies far more on championing change and 
encouraging buy in amongst stakeholders. My research includes a small number of 
important organisational change case studies and examines how these were 
managed in relation to culture and identity.    
 
3.3 Management and Organisational Change  
Although my research is not based on organisational change or change management 
per se a small number of important organisational change case studies have been 
used in my research to highlight various aspects of the conflict between the 
prevailing culture amongst radio taxi drivers, their identity with the industry, their 
profession, the institutions within the industry and how these conflicted and aligned 
with management’s organisational change practice within one radio taxi company.  
 
I have explored how organisational change and change management literature and 
thinking has evolved over time and explored and discussed the background to this. 
My research explores how culture influenced those who sought to champion and 
those who sought to resist organisational change and the strategies, tactics, rationale 
and rhetoric that they adopted. Much of the literature below apparently springs from 
the pretext that change is inevitable which I consider a somewhat modernist 
proposition from the basis that systems and organisations are stable organisms 
where change is a tidy process that can be replicated regardless of the environment, 
the history, the culture and the identity of the business. My perspective is that a 
modernist approach can frequently focus on the hard factors with little consideration 
of the soft issues. My belief is that focus on the soft factors can make a bad change 
into a good one where as an overly modernist approach can have the opposite effect.  
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My view is that a modernist position falls down where a culture of consensual 
retention of the status quo exists as this runs counter to the apparent consensus and 
impetus for constant organisational change within so much of the literature. 
 
Strickland and Thompson assert that;  
 
‘the need to understand change as a phenomenon is becoming increasingly 
important and that [the] capability to manage change is not as effective as it 
should be’ (1998:9) 
 
Although somewhat removed from the prevailing contemporary paradigm amongst 
organisational change literature Strickland and Thompson’s assertion that change 
can be managed is an interesting concept. This stance conflicts with proponents of 
managers having to adapt to change rather than it being an organised, mechanical 
activity or process e.g. Hays, (2002), Stacey (2001). No doubt some change can be 
managed based on a mechanical process but I would assert such change is unusual 
and only effective in a very special and often extreme circumstances. It is also 
arguable how much formally implemented change actually becomes ingrained and 
effective in organisations. 
 
Strickland and Thompson (1998) are not alone in their belief that change can be 
managed. Burnes goes further in his view that change is inevitable (Burnes; 2004).  
Burnes explains that;  
 
‘change is a constant feature of organisational life and the ability to manage it 
is seen as a core competence of successful organisations’ (2004:1).   
 
Whether change management should be viewed as a core competence or the ability 
to cope with or adapt to change, is a question that I feel worthy of consideration. If we 
accept the proposition that change(s) continues to happen at many levels can we 
manage that change(s) in a mechanical, procedural way or is planning for adaption, 
and a more flexible approach to strategy, really the way forward for organisations? 
Burnes appears wedded to the concept of being ‘in charge’ (Burnes, 2004:1) of 
change;     
 
‘those in charge of planning the change program (change strategists) and 
those employees who receive the impact of the change program (change 
receptors)’ (2004:1).   
 
There are clear examples of this apparently polarised concept of deliberate or 
planned change in the organisational change case studies within my research. The 
case studies appear to emanate from a scientific management or positivist approach 
to operations management whereby there is a single best way. Burnes’ consideration 
of the impact of organisational change and how it is received, accepted and its effect 
at different levels of an organisation is an important aspect of change.   
  
Various schools of thought exist about organisational change; Hiatt and Creasey 
(2003) argue that they stem from two disciplines i.e. engineering/mechanical and 
psychological. Indeed Hiatt and Creasey (2003) posit that;  
 
‘to understand change management as we know it today, you need to 
consider two converging and predominant fields of thought: an engineer's 
approach to improving business performance and a psychologist's approach 
to managing the human-side of change’.   
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This appears to be a somewhat restricted, positivist view of organisational change 
that ignores continuous incremental improvement, environmental influence, 
competitive discontinuities or even evolving and/or informal change processes. 
Despite the limitations of the proposition it has some similarities with the case studies 
considered within my research as they appear to have been considered from a single 
dimension amongst both proponents (engineer’s approach) and opponents (human 
side) of the organisational changes.  
 
Mills et al (2009) argue that early management theories were effectively early 
theories of change management with a goal of restructuring the way work was 
designed and executed. These early attempts to manage and organise work were 
not given the label change management or organisational change but that does not 
misconstrue their appearance as examples of change management and almost 
certainly examples of organisational change. The historical context of organisational 
change appears to suggest that management had more control about how their 
business was managed than appears to be the case today. This is not the subject of 
this piece of research but I have some sympathy with the proposition as the human 
aspect of change in the early part of the last century would have been less important 
and the engineering aspects would have been heightened in importance. This 
paradigm is of course is very different in contemporary organisations and counter to 
today’s prevalent organisational culture of engagement and consultation (Burnes, 
2009).    
 
Similar to Strickland and Thompson (1998), Hiatt and Creasey (2003) assert that our 
understanding of organisational change has been shaped by the classical or 
scientific management, human relations and contingency theory schools of thought. 
Burnes, (2009) also appears to agree with this concept. Strickland and Thompson 
(1998) examine the correlation between organisational change and scientific 
management further. They point out that scientific management advocates viewed 
organisations as rational and scientific entities where workers were solely motivated 
by financial reward which can be adjusted to improve productivity and thereby 
business performance. Strickland and Thompson (1998) remind us that scientific 
management advocates believed that jobs should be designed in such a way as to 
minimise an individual’s skill and discretion and to maximise management control.   
 
The scientific management school of thought did not take into account external 
factors that could affect performance it was very much inward looking and viewed 
change as ‘an internal planned affair driven by a unitary world view focused on the 
rational mechanical nature of work at the operational level’ (Strickland and 
Thompson, 1998:31). This very tidy view of organisational change is almost certainly 
a time based phenomenon and its relevance to modern business thinking is in my 
view almost negligible. The change management case studies in my research are 
clear examples of the conflict between a polarised scientific management school type 
focus and the human relations movement which is discussed below.   
 
As a consequence of the perceived unpopularity of the scientific management school 
by the workforces impacted by it the human relations movement came about whose 
main advocate, Elton Mayo, renowned for his Hawthorne experiments (Mayo,1933) 
placed emphasis on the human needs and the psychological aspects of work. The 
human relations movement subscribed to the idea that improved productivity can be 
achieved by creating an environment which catered for the emotional and 
psychological needs of workers. This involved not only improving the ambience of 
work areas but also introducing the use of soft skills by managers. Burnes (2009) 
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points to Mayo’s theory that workers have to be involved in change if it is to be 
successful.  The question of success is perhaps not as black and white as Burnes 
implies, as I would argue that success will be measured from different perspectives in 
any organisational change process and the potential for diverse and conflicting views 
is significant. 
 
Although there is an obvious difference in approach between scientific management 
and the human relations movement both share some common traits Mills et al 
(2009:27) conclude that ‘both approaches lacked clear guidelines for implementation 
in a variety of situations’ and failed to explore other means of resolving problems.  
Advocates of contingency theory apparently believed ‘that an organisation’s 
operation and structure was contingent upon specific internal and external variables 
namely, organisational size, environment and relevant technology’. (Strickland and 
Thompson, 1998:32). This list seems somewhat short and omits what I feel are 
important issues such as structure, ownership, workforce perception of themselves 
e.g. knowledge workers, instrumental workers etc, stage of business development, 
readiness for change, strategic objectives, competitive position, product lifecycle, 
location, culture and employed vs. a sub contracted workforce.  
 
Burnes concluded that because of the factors above, plus I would suggest many 
others (e.g. availability of technology, funding, capacity constraints and demands), 
organisations would be faced with non-identical problems which would require 
different solutions making the point that rather than have a ‘one best way’ (2009:29) 
approach to managing change in all organisations it was better to have a ‘one best 
way’ (2009:29) approach for each individual organisation. I struggle with this very tidy 
perhaps even twee approach to what is arguably one of the toughest demands of 
management i.e. delivering organisational and/or business process change as in any 
organisation the types of change will vary significantly as will those who are involved 
in the change as will the level of control and which stakeholders have most influence 
or control. I would assert that cultures can be different in different business units, in 
different departments and that sub cultures can exist within even small departments. 
My belief is that change is both messy and painful and attempts to introduce change 
without giving due consideration to the messy and painful aspects of change, the 
type of organisation, as well as the relative strengths of the workforce and 
management could lead to conflict and obstruction. Burnes’ conclusion also assumes 
that management control all change, a positivist perspective, and yet contingency 
theory practitioners and modernists may struggle to adopt this assumption.   
 
Strickland and Thompson, (1998) support my argument to an extent when they 
highlight Burnes’ failure to acknowledge environmental change dynamics as well as 
its mechanistic approach to implementing change. I believe that even this broader 
perspective is unnecessarily and unhelpfully limited.   
 
Banford and Daniel, (2005:392) make the point that the planned approach ‘views 
organisational change as a process that moves from one ‘fixed state’ to another 
through a series of pre-planned steps’ e.g. the unfreeze, change, freeze model 
(Schein and Lewin, 1987). Hays, (2002) argues that: 
 
‘this school of thought assumes that change strategies are intentional and 
rational processes, that rely on analysis, forecasting and planning, thus 
resulting in the logical and rational implementation of change within the 
organisation’.  
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This suggests that planning and executing change in this way is part of a well thought 
through management strategy. Burke (2008:123) describes planned change as ‘a 
deliberate, conscious decision to improve the organisation in some manner or 
perhaps to change the system in a deeper, more fundamental way’. Once again this 
apparently privileged view of what is good and what is not appears narrow and 
unhelpful in change management programs where many stakeholders are likely to be 
impacted and each will have a view as to whether the changes will improve the 
organisation or whether changing the system in a deeper or more fundamental way is 
good or bad for them.  
   
Burnes, (2009:328) asserts that the use of the term ‘planned’ should not be taken in 
its literal sense i.e. a group of people purposefully working out in advance details of 
how and when changes should be made; he clarifies that organisation wide 
assessments are made to ascertain which areas of the business requires change 
and once such areas were identified a plan would be put in place to manage the 
change process in order to achieve the desired objective. Change in this sense is 
clearly different from change that would occur as a consequence of unplanned 
events such as accidents, competitive pressures or disruption, and compliance or 
governance issues or governmental, legislative or regulatory interventions.  
Burnes (2009) posits that planned change is closely associated with Organisational 
Development and forms the centre piece of the practice. Burke (2008:41) describes 
Organisational Development as ‘an approach to organisation change based on 
applied behavioural science steeped in the theoretical tradition of applied social 
psychology’ which appears to be closely associated with the work of Lewin.  Mills et 
al (2009:50) conclude that ‘the [Organisational Development] field focuses on people, 
organisations and planned change with a clear commitment to the human factor and 
organisational effectiveness’. 
 
My view of the literature is that not enough credence is given to what I would term the 
change landscape and the multiple views and perspectives that are awoken by any 
change particularly organisational change. It is interesting that the change 
management and organisational change community appear to see change as a top 
down activity. Amongst the earlier literature the ethos appears to be that 
management know best and that change is good. Little real emphasis appears to be 
placed by them on alternatives to change. Even more recently change has achieved 
almost a beatification as a management tool. It is possibly viewed as a convenient 
alternative to improving management of the status quo. I would also observe that the 
lack of concern and consideration given to the environment within which change will 
take place contributes to the poor record of change within many high profile projects.  
In my view the human perspective needs to be very carefully considered in any 
change program so that there is an understanding of the need for the change and 
any opportunity to develop change champions is grasped. It is also important that as 
many risks and options are gathered and considered by those championing the 
change as possible and these are just not categorised or considered as negative 
inputs or obstacles to change.  
 
In summary change appears to be an unquestioned facet of business/management 
life with challenges to change often viewed negatively. Change appears to be viewed 
as inevitable by much of the literature, as an expected management activity and in 
many cases as an area where management have and can exercise control. The 
alternatives to change seem to be considered rarely as do the wider implications of 
change. Sudden, reactive change does not feature widely in the literature and 
assumptions about the lack of control in many change situations are not considered 
in any depth other than by Stacey (2001). Stacey’s rather disarming and possibly 
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alarming views on allowing people to simply get on with the job in the way they think 
best does not have much cohesion in the management literature concerning 
organisational change. 
 
My own view of organisational change is that the human dimension is paramount to 
achieving a successful change and is an area that needs considerably more focus 
than the literature suggests. Likewise I believe that history, culture, structure, 
ownership and other less tangible issues should feature much more in the planning 
stages of organisational change. Sudden and responsive change is an area where 
different tactics are needed to planned, top down changes and it is my view that 
within a tactical change environment management can and probably should take a 
more strident and directive approach. My view is that currently management are 
operating counter to this logic which is why many organisational change 
management projects are unsuccessful. These important considerations are very 
relevant to the case studies within my research.  
 
3.4  Organisational Definition 
I had originally termed the mass of London’s taxi drivers as a virtual organisation 
throughout my dissertation.  The term virtual organisation was challenging as it has 
been used within the mainstream literature as a label for organisations such as 
Amazon and Ebay (Baroudi, 1994, Malhotra, 2000, Mowshowitz, 1997, Nohria and 
Berkley, 1994). Whilst I accept its common usage I would argue that this is an 
erroneous definition as these organisations physically exist. These organisations may 
well conduct their business virtually but it is possible to visit their offices physically 
and to speak to their employees. They conduct businesses from warehouses and file 
accounts as organisations. My view is that they are web based companies who 
conduct their business on-line and that the term virtual has been used to set them 
apart from traditional traders who operate from high street shops. Hinds and Kiesler, 
1995 talk of ICT based organisation forms which I believe is a more accurate 
description of Ebay and Amazon type organisations. 
 
The level of virtualality achieved by the taxi industry leaves ICT based companies 
such as Ebay, Amazon and Google appearing to be relatively classic organisations 
(Hatch and Schultz, 1997; Beynon, 1975) that manage their businesses within the 
strictures and systems adopted by most large organisations albeit they present 
themselves as less formal, less orderly and offering their employees and customers 
more freedom and choice than their longer established peers. Virgin has to an extent 
attempted to do the same with its airline which presents itself as young, trendy and 
informal yet behind the thin veneer presented to its customers it is very much an 
airline with all the normal safety, procedural and classic organisational structures in 
place that are common amongst its peer group. 
 
The taxi industry has no such veneer. It does not need to disguise the classic 
systems and controls of any peer group(s) as they simply do not exist. The 
organisation is formed from a disparate workforce who have evolved their own rules 
which are practiced voluntarily and consensually and together they have co-created 
their own culture, identity and to a great extent their modus operandi. I would 
propose that the mainstream literature has been somewhat indulgent and possibly 
misled or overawed by the veneer of newer retailers and knowledge management 
companies who because of selling their wares on-line have positioned themselves as 
fundamentally different to their peer group. The taxi driver community makes no such 
claims but is clearly an organisation that operates virtually within a well-defined 
framework but without any of the constraints, systems, processes and controls of 
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classic business structures. It is what Stacey describes as a loose set of complex 
responsive processes (2001). 
 
I would term the mass of London’s taxi drivers as an organisation due to the way they 
have organised themselves into a workforce, a community, instigated training and 
self-help, set up processes and rules and procedures. In effect a group, that has co-
created an organisational entity that is truly virtual but certainly not contemporary 
(Hatch and Schultz, 1997). Taxi drivers operate in what I have termed a Framework 
Organisation. I have derived this term from the concept of framework contracts which 
are normally evolved from a formal tender process. The tender process seeks to 
identify suppliers who meet certain minimum criteria and can prove that they can 
deliver the product or service with a high degree of homogeneity. London’s taxi 
drivers operate within a framework organisation; they have applied, completed the 
qualifying requirements (the Knowledge) to be included in the framework and provide 
services to the organisation’s customers and participate informally in many of the 
functions and practice of more contemporary organisations whilst managing to do so 
without any of the trappings, procedures, buildings and organisation encumbrances 
of more contemporary organisations. 
 
My definition of the taxi industry as a framework organisation is based on my 
research which found some 25,000 people operating completely independently of 
each other whilst appearing to be part of a single organisation or entity by virtue of 
the homogeneity of the service they provide, the key messages they communicate, 
the uniformity of the rituals they participate in, the rules they have evolved e.g. the 
driver etiquette, the co-creation of their identity and culture and the social structures 
and hierarchy that they have developed and within which they operate. They have no 
employees nor do they file accounts for the industry – they are free spirits who 
nonetheless operate within a framework to create what can only be described as an 
organisation.  
 
Within the taxi industry (radio taxi companies, vehicles, ancillary suppliers, 
regulators) there are many bricks and mortar and, what the literature describes as, 
virtual organisations. These organisations don’t in my research deflect from the 
phenomenon that the mass of taxi drivers have evolved practices which have formed 
them into a framework organisation. This framework organisation clearly interacts 
and interfaces with many other, more classic organisations within which taxi drivers 
choose to participate or not.   
  
Wenger (1998) introduces the concept of informal work units which interact with both 
formal and informal work units. Taxi drivers would be difficult to describe as work 
units as they are very clearly individuals operating within a framework of regulation, 
custom and practice. Arguably taxi drivers who belong to radio taxi companies may 
just about fit Krachardt’s (1994) concept of participants and non-participants as those 
that subscribe are certainly participants whereas taxi drivers who don’t subscribe to 
such organisations are clearly non participants. However I would determine that even 
groups of radio taxi drivers are quite some way from being determined as a work unit 
given their freedom to take business from ranks, street hailing and/or their radio taxi 
company. 
 
I believe it is useful to compare taxi drivers to professional organisations e.g. doctors, 
barristers, accountants, who have written codes of conduct and form themselves into 
a professional elite (Stacey, 2001). Similarly to taxi drivers they attempt to create 
hierarchies amongst their members, to set standards of behaviour, of practice and to 
co-create identity and culture and likewise develop into a professional elite. The Bar 
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is an organisation but much of what they do, what they expect of each other is 
conducted virtually. Promotion and recognition is often given through almost 
ephemeral observations, rumours, and stories. Yes they all have to pass formal 
exams, not dissimilar to taxi drivers, but after that their careers are driven by their 
success, their reputation, their observance and consensual acceptance of the 
hierarchies within the professional organisations they belong to.  
 
Hemingway and Breu (2003) stress the transition from traditional to virtualised 
organisations and work units. The taxi industry has been engaged in no such 
transition. The work practices appear to have changed little over the three hundred 
years that they have been operating in London save the substitution of internal 
combustion engines for horses and the introduction of radio in the mid-fifties. 
Arguably the recent establishment of organisations such as Uber and Hailo who 
provide applications (apps) for both customers and taxi drivers to communicate has 
added what the main literature defines as a level of virtualisation to the taxi industry.  
I have therefore defined the taxi industry as a framework organisation throughout my 
dissertation.    
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4 METHODOLOGY 
The research topic I have chosen is an under researched subject that can contribute 
significantly to understanding how socio systems and processes develop organically 
i.e. without formal organisational and management structures, processes and 
procedures or any explicit leadership amongst a self-employed, virtual and disparate 
workforce. I considered that it was important that my research was much more than 
an autobiographical or auto ethnographic (Hammersley and Atkinson1995) account 
of my personal history in the industry and that as far as possible the researched were 
at the centre rather than the researcher.  
 
Due to the apparent lack of any previous comprehensive formal research into the 
London taxi industry, its drivers, social structures and institutions my work should be 
considered an early and hopefully nascent enquiry into the industry. I am keen 
through an ethnographic approach to shed light (Hammersley and Atkinson1995: 1-
2) on its society, values, beliefs, communication channels and culture and how these 
conflicted with attempts to change business processes and institutional structures in 
the industry. Stacey encompasses much of what I sought to identify and interpret 
during my research; 
 
‘knowledge is created in the stories a community of practitioners tell each 
other. Looked at in this way, knowledge is embedded in the ordinary, 
everyday conversation between people. It is primarily localized and 
contextual, distributed through an organization rather than centralized in data 
banks, and embedded in the stories people tell each other about their 
experience, stories that interactively create their experience. Socially 
constructed views of this kind also stress power differentials and politics in 
organizations’. (2001:36) 
 
The methodology I have adopted for my research is qualitative and inductive. The 
main body of material consists of a significant and comprehensive ethnographic 
study which I narrated from my observations and experiences collected whilst 
working within the industry and from a number of interviews with taxi drivers. In 
addition I have used material gathered from the popular and industry press.  
 
4.1 Inductive vs. Deductive 
It is my belief that a deductive (Gill and Johnson, 2002) methodology based on a 
positivist epistemology would have required hypotheses and a clear research 
question (Hammersley and Atkinson1995). Arguably I commenced my research thirty 
years ago building up a repository of stories, participant observation (Thomas, 2004) 
and experiences. My research was based on my narrative account which consisted 
of those experiences and observations, which I considered against relevant literature 
and theory.  
 
I could have taken an objective, modernist, empiricist or deductive (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2003a) approach but considered that this would not be appropriate to my 
research goals (Hammersley and Atkinson1995) as I had no intention to ‘develop 
universal generalizable theory’ (Johnson and Duberley, 2003:107) or to seek a 
rational or objective outcome or to uncover a ‘single true meaning, only numerous 
different interpretations’ (Johnson and Duberley, 2003:96). I was keen to engage with 
myself through thinking about my own thinking (Weick, 1999). I was interested in 
taking an approach whereby I surface and question my intuitive understandings 
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(Schon, 1983). This approach was important given my familiarity with the industry, its 
institutions and the community I was to research as there was a high risk of me not 
recognising the taken for grantedness assumptions (Johnson and Duberley, 2003)  
 
Control of the direction and focus of the research is I believe much stronger when 
deductive methodologies are employed but also I feared at the time that they could 
be somewhat limiting and bounded. This was something I sought to avoid in my 
research. Inductive methodologies in my view accommodate events, emerging 
themes and opportunities derived from tangential diversions (Dalton, 1961) but are 
also much more useful in nascent research of this nature to establish a broad vista of 
themes. 
  
Although I could have developed a clear research question or hypothesis to prove or 
disprove instead what I wanted to do was to consider and analyse the narrative I had 
developed reflexively rather than respond to a question or prove or disprove a 
hypothesis.  I was keen to let the story, the narrative and the direction of the research 
evolve. I would have found the stricture, as I considered it, of a deductive approach 
extremely difficult to embrace as I feel it ‘necessary instead to delve deep into the 
subjective qualities that govern behaviour‘(Holliday, 2008:7).  
 
I would further add that given the richness of my narrative account and the lack of 
previous, comprehensive research in this area and from my perspective a lack of 
desire to develop a clear research question until quite late in the research process if 
at all, an inductive enquiry was the more obvious methodology.   
 
Dalton (1961:3) complains that positivist epistemologies and deductive 
methodologies; 
 
‘frequently do not get close enough to industrial situations to consistently get 
at covert activities and the meanings assigned to them by participants, and to 
spell out the consequences, in terms of individual and group actions, for the 
organization’ 
 
My narrative is rich with group actions, covert activities and, as can be discerned 
from my reflexive account; the consequences of such activities. It was therefore 
important for me to get as close as possible to the industrial situations that were and 
are present in the London taxi industry. As my research progressed I found that my 
methodology enabled me to get close to these situations and the multiple voices that 
were the research subject. 
 
My approach could be criticised as being the outcome of one person who took the 
roles of an interviewer, narrator, respondent, and interpreter. My sense of this is that 
it might well be an issue if it were not for the approach I took to analysis which was 
based on Linstead’s (1993) concept of deconstruction. This approach enabled me to 
rigorously analyse the narrative that I had recorded and I believe enabled multiple 
voices albeit viewed through a single frame. 
 
Burrell and Morgan (2003:6) go on to ‘stress the importance’ within an ideographic 
methodology of ‘letting one’s subject unfold its nature and characteristics during the 
process of investigation’. Whilst making no claim to having researched using a purely 
ideographic approach (Burrell and Morgan, 2003) I have allowed my research to 
unfold (Burrell and Morgan, 2003) both during my period of first hand involvement but 
also through the process of narrating the experiences and observations and 
interpreting them reflexively (Hammersley and Atkinson1995).  
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I was surprised during this process about how much I discovered not only about the 
industry, the community and its culture but also about myself and even my views on 
events and concepts that I had previously simply accepted or failed to be cognitively 
or explicitly aware of. 
4.2 Method Selection  
Having read much of Tony Watson’s work I became interested in his focus on 
industrial relations and work place politics (Watson 1994). This interest and his 
ethnographic approach (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007) was further developed 
through reading Working at Fords (Beynon, 1975) and Men Who Manage (Dalton, 
1961). My research methods were strongly influenced by these practitioners’ work. 
My research was based on real life industrial relations issues. I wanted to explore 
these through developing a reflexive account and present my research in a practical 
and readable format but also ensure that it was academically and analytically robust. 
The approaches to the study and research of industrial relations by Watson (1994), 
Beynon (1975) and Dalton (1961) were, I felt, similar to the research that I intended 
to undertake into London’s taxi drivers. I found the format of these works (Watson, 
1994, Beynon, 1975 and Dalton, 1961) where they blended conversations and 
conversational interviews with observations and academia in a reflexive style lent 
itself to my research subject, and the analytical and ethnographic methodology I 
sought to deploy. 
 
4.3 Qualitative Research 
Holliday (2008:10) describes qualitative data as doing ‘what we all do in everyday life’ 
and goes on to explain that; 
 
‘we have to continually solve problems about how we should behave with 
other people in a wide range of settings, to do this we need to research not 
only how others behave but also how we should behave with them’.  
 
Thomas (2004, 19) describes qualitative research as ‘that which deals mainly with 
meaningful accounts or narrative and verbal data’. Thomas however muses as to 
whether it is helpful to provide definitions between types of research (quantitative and 
qualitative) and concludes that it is not helpful ‘particularly in a multidisciplinary field 
such as management’ (2004, 20). Thomas (2004) justifies his assertion on the 
reduced likelihood of methodological broad-mindedness, collaborative work across 
the boundaries and between different management subjects.  
 
Layder links ethnography with qualitative data;  
 
‘The ethnographic approach tends to use qualitative methods and forms of 
data to describe and analyse particular settings, groups or organizations and 
is sometimes associated with theory building’. (1993, 30) 
 
In my own research I have collected experiences, stories, and observations in an 
ethnographic tradition over a long period of time to narrate the story most of which 
was qualitative, and then interpreted it to develop my reflexive account.  
 
When I began narrating my account it was not to get my story on paper but to 
describe, discuss and consider the experiences of others in the taxi industry and then 
to interpret them. I wanted to compare them with the literature and to uncover original 
knowledge about this unique group. Where similarities exist with an auto 
ethnographic (Hammersley and Atkinson1995) approach is that my reflexive account 
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has a strong story running through it. However I would argue that it is not my story 
but a corporate story (Larsen, 2000) seen, interpreted and written through my eyes. I 
am part of the story but certainly not at its centre. What I have attempted to do is ‘to 
shed light’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:1-2) on the culture of London’s taxi 
drivers and place that insight at the centre of the story.  
 
The balance between descriptive and theoretical narrative is considered by Layder 
(1993:34) 
 
‘It is also possible that the field researcher will decide that the aims of the 
research are more descriptive than theoretical, such as providing information 
on a social process (for example, professional client counselling, or training to 
be a nurse) or on a group (such as homosexuals, or students, or footballers) 
about which little work has been done, or where there are gaps in knowledge’   
 
Narrating the descriptive and analysing against the theoretical and academic whilst 
maintaining a balance was an area of concern for me until I read Layder’s (1993) 
thoughts concerning this. Whilst I have attempted to consider the theoretical and the 
academic constantly during the narration and analysis there are areas where my 
narrative moves firmly into the descriptive but where that is the case I consider that 
this adds important context to the research.  
 
Stacey (2011:35) theorises about what he terms as ‘narrative knowledge’ and 
explains that ‘narrative knowledge takes the form of anecdotes and stories, 
interspersed with evaluations of them’. 
 
My narrative account was based on my experiences and observations (Tedlock, 
1991) of the industry which were gathered in the tradition of an ethnographic study 
(Spry, 2001) during thirty years of working in the industry. I have linked the macro 
with the micro aspects of organisational life which Layder (1993:31) observes as; 
‘one of the central theoretical problems in sociology concerns understanding the 
relationship between macro and micro aspects of social life’.   
 
The events that I have relayed in my reflexive (Johnson and Duberley, 2003) account 
are heavily concerned with anecdotes and stories particularly within the discussion 
and analysis of the industrial relations disputes (Beynon, 1975) concerned with the 
Quickie Knowledge (see section 5.2.16), and the business process change (see 
section 5.4). Language (Watson, 1982), rhetoric, knowledge, and ideology (Watson, 
1982) were significant concepts leading to the disputes and the activities that each 
side took to prevail. I was involved, in all of these industrial disputes and many 
others, some passively and actively in others and I have taken care during my 
analysis as far as possible ‘to expose the underlying assumptions on which 
arguments and stances are built’ (Holland, 1999:467). 
 
 
4.4 Research Duration and Methodologies 
There are stark differences in the duration of subject observations involved in 
ethnographic (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007) studies. Smircich (1983) and Kunda 
(1992) carried out observations lasting six weeks and twelve months respectively 
observing organizational culture. Watson (1994) spent a year as an open participant 
observer (Gill and Johnson, 2002) in a manufacturing company. Dalton’s ‘field work 
and follow up visits continued for over a decade’ (1964:2).There are also significant 
differences in the approach to ethnographic research (Dalton,1964; Beynon,1975; 
Burgess, 1985; Rosen, 1991; Watson, 1994; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). The 
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primary method of obtaining data by Watson (1994) was through informal dialogue 
with his fellow managers having developed personal relationships with them over 
time albeit the subjects all understood that Watson was carrying out research 
whereas Dalton (1964) used covert participant observation over many years; two 
very different approaches.  
 
Smircich (1983) observed the executives who were the subject of her study in a 
variety of organisational settings and held conversational interviews with them 
whereas Kunda (1992) operated as a participant observer, undertook extensive 
conversational interviews with staff members and drew on documentary sources. 
Each had very different methods of data collection.  
 
Beynon’s approach in his book ‘Working for Ford’ (1975) does not discuss his 
methodology but his approach of writing an account, discussing it with the reader in a 
reflective style whilst not identifying his personal findings or judgement had a strong 
resonance with the style that I adopted albeit I was keen to be far more explicit about 
my ‘involvement’ (Kildruff and Mehra, 1997:464), influence, selectivity and where 
made; judgement. 
 
I can claim to have observed, engaged and experienced immersion in the culture of 
the London taxi industry over many years but sadly did not make notes and formal 
observations during that period in Dalton’s (1961) style. My approach has been to 
comprehensively narrate my experiences, feelings and recollections after the event 
and then through analysis and reference to the literature develop my reflexive 
account.  
 
A hybrid approach unintentionally invoking elements of the approach taken by 
Watson (1994), Kunda (1992) and Dalton (1961) has evolved and a strong similarity 
to Beynon’s (1975) style of analysis and writing can be discerned in my work.  
 
Within the development of my reflexive account the areas that have been fully within 
my control are; to decide which events, behaviours, values, apparent beliefs, and 
topics to include and exclude. These have been selected and/or discarded based on 
a simple question; so what? If I wrote up a section and then asked the so what 
question and found that it added nothing to my quest to shed light on (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007) the identity, culture and management of London’s taxi drivers I 
dropped that section.  
 
Narrating the largely descriptive and qualitative and descriptive account that I 
developed to collect all of my material together, and then deciding how best to 
analyse them could have been a challenging task. My decision to present it as a 
reflexive (Johnson and Duberley, 2003) account provided the rigour that I needed to 
deconstruct (Linstead, 1993) my narrative and question my implicit and explicit 
assumptions and the taken for grantedness (Johnson and Duberley, 2003) 
assumptions that can be difficult to discern after such a long period of involvement in 
and consequently familiarity with the industry.  Further the approach I took provided 
the framework to narrate the information I had collected, consider it reflexively 
(Johnson and Duberley, 2003), contrast it against the literature, and begin to make 
sense (Weick, 1999) of it, develop themes and reach robust conclusions. 
 
4.5. Ethnography 
Although not an ethnographic (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007) study in the purest 
sense I would posit that my research has been undertaken in an ethnographic 
tradition. My approach to ethnography contains some elements of autoethnography 
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which Denzin and Lincoln describe as ‘setting a scene, telling a story, weaving 
intricate connections among life and art, experience and theory, evocation and 
explanation’ (2000:765). Each of these ingredients is present to a degree in my 
reflexive account. However further reading provides a clear difference between the 
style of ethnography I adopted which I would claim to be more in the style of some 
aspects of Rosen (1991), Johnson and Duberley (2003), Dalton (1964), Hammersley 
and Atkinson (1995) Watson (1994) than an auto-ethnographic study (Spry, 2001).  
 
Some aspects of Spry’s approach is present within my work where she talks of ‘a 
self-narrative that critiques the situatedness of self with others in social contexts’ 
(2001:710). Whilst I have not based my analysis on this I have compared and 
contrasted my values and beliefs, with others notably the taxi drivers that I 
interviewed. I have consciously attempted not to use ‘privileged knowledge’ (Johnson 
and Duberley, 2003: 84) or authority as a researcher to be judgemental about myself 
and others rather I have attempted to highlight and explain differences rather than 
evaluate them from an ethical, cultural or social perspective.  
 
Although the aims of my research could be considered less ambitious than Rosen, 
his description of the ethnographer’s method of collecting data is useful and has 
similarities with the approach I have taken. Rosen (1991:5) describes; 
 
‘The ethnographer’s method of collecting data is to live among those who are 
the data. He or she tries to learn the subjects’ rules for organizational life, to 
interact with them for a frequency and duration of time ‘sufficient’ to 
understand how and why they construct their social world as it is and explain 
it to others’ 
 
Rosen’s (1991:5) description is interesting as he suggests that it is possible to 
‘understand’ and ‘explain this to others’. Compared to Rosen’s aspirations of 
understanding and explaining to others my research has been closer to Hammersley 
and Atkinson’s (1995:1-2) attempts to ‘throw light on the issues that are the subject of 
the research’ I have attempted to ‘pay serious attention to the means and methods 
whereby social actors [In this case London’s taxi drivers] perform social life and how 
they achieve orderly conduct’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1994:169).  
 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:2) describe in a similar style to Rosen what 
ethnographers do; 
 
‘In its most characteristic form it involves the ethnographer participating 
overtly or covertly, in people’s lives for an extended period of time, watching 
what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions – in fact, collecting 
whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of 
the research’. 
 
Whether I had collected my material ‘overtly or covertly’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1995:5) is an interesting point to consider in hindsight. What is certain is that during 
the process of collecting my material I asked lots of questions, listened to what was 
being said and observed very carefully what was happening. Much of my research 
could be classified as verging on covert as at the time of observation the concept of 
undertaking a research study was not a conscious activity. I do not consider that 
there is any ethical conflict (Thomas, 2004) as the observations were general in 
nature with any specifics reported with full anonymity retained.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
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There is an apparent, significant difference between the planned outcomes or 
epistemological reference frame of Rosen’s (1991) and Hammersley and Atkinson’s 
(1995) research in that Rosen appears to expect to ‘understand [why] and explain’ 
(Rosen,1991:5) whereas Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:2) are content to ‘throw 
light upon the issues’. Rosen (1991) appears to posit an observational role stressing 
understanding and interaction whereas Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) imply a 
much more participative role. During the collection of my data I have both observed 
and participated but did not equal Rosen’s achievement of understanding why and 
then explaining it to others. What I have done is to throw light upon the issues and 
propose potential causes, reasons, and theories as to why events, reactions, 
emotions and outcomes happened as they did based on the circumstances, 
environment, experience, history and culture as it could be established.  
 
Thomas (2004:135) explains that ‘ethnographic studies have become more common 
in management research’ and tend to focus on three topics ‘organizational cultures, 
organizational processes and organizational employee groups’. Thomas (2004:133) 
adds that ethnography is about ‘describing and understanding unfamiliar cultures and 
ways of life’.  
 
These themes are central to my research into London’s taxi drivers from a cultural 
and social science perspective and in their relationship with and the processes 
concerned with the management and delivery of the Knowledge of London vocational 
qualification, the motivation and management of independent London taxi drivers, 
their concerns regarding their identity, and taxi drivers who work for or with London’s 
radio taxi companies, relationships between customers and drivers and the rivalries 
and interfaces between the various driver groupings and factions and the power 
structures e.g. the Public Carriage Office. 
 
4.6 Reflexivity 
The meaning of reflexivity is argued and debated by Holland (1999) who takes some 
credit, or as he terms it responsibility, for ‘introducing reflexivity into certain areas’ 
(Holland, 1999:463). Holland (1999) purports that reflexivity is; 
 
‘Applied to that which turns back upon, or takes account of, itself or a 
person’s self, especially methods that take into consideration the effect of the 
personality or presence of the researcher on the investigation’ (Holland 
1999:464).  
 
Another explanation from Holland is that ‘an important function of reflexive analysis is 
to expose the underlying assumptions on which arguments and stances are built’ 
(Holland, 1999:467). All of this is very relevant to the reflexive account that I have 
developed as I was very close to much of the material that I collected and which 
formed my narrative account. It was important therefore to recognise this and to get 
under what happened and try to ascertain why or when this was not possible. What 
factors; social, structural, historical, political or environmental influenced events, 
actions and outcomes.  
 
At the time I was not, in my view, a researcher in any formal way nor would I have 
termed myself a researcher or thought of myself as carrying out research. My belief 
is that the experiences, stories and observations I collected, the analysis and the 
interpretations I placed upon them will be affected by my a priori especially at the 
fundamental level of what to leave in and what to take out. My a priori will influence 
what I consider to be significant, mundane or worthy of inclusion or indeed exclusion.  
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Alvesson, Hardy and Harley (2008:480) explain that; 
 
‘reflexivity means thinking through what one is doing to encourage insights 
about the nature of social science and, especially, the role that language, 
power/knowledge connections, social interests and ideologies, rhetorical 
moves and manoeuvring in the socio-political field play in producing particular 
accounts’.  
 
Alvesson, Hardy and Harleys’ (2000) explanation of reflexivity is broader than 
Holland’s (1999) and introduces the issues of language, power, knowledge, social 
interests and ideologies as well as underlining what are in my view the political 
manoeuvrings present in all sociological research and life in general. My reflexive 
account is of course my account and almost inevitably within that there will be my 
own manoeuvring and field play (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001) however much I have 
guarded against this and attempted to present as objective account as is possible. 
 
Lafitte (1957) provides further help with understanding reflexivity; ‘All learning 
depends on the reflexive interpretation of one’s experience together with the 
experience of others’ (Lafitte 1957:17). Here Lafitte appears to position the 
researcher at the centre with the researched or observed being somewhat 
secondary. This is an interesting concept and I contend an important one for the 
approach I am took with my research. I analysed my narrative account reflexively 
(Johnson and Duberley, 2003) against my own reference frame and against relevant 
literature to provide perspective.  
 
Johnson and Duberley (2000: 178) compare two forms of reflexivity; ‘methodological 
reflexivity’ and epistemic reflexivity’. The dichotomy between the two forms focuses 
on the exclusion or inclusion within a research framework of the ‘taken for 
grantedness’ (Johnson and Duberley, 2000: 179) views of the researcher. Johnson 
and Duberley (2000: 178) imply that methodological reflexivity ‘is concerned with the 
monitoring by the researcher of their behavioural impact upon the social settings 
under investigation’.  Within an epistemic reflexivity ‘attempts are made to relate 
research outcomes to the knowledge constraining and constituting impacts of the 
researcher’s own beliefs which derive from their socio historical location’ (Johnson 
and Duberley, 2000: 179). They go on to relate that ‘there will always be more than 
one valid account of any research’ (Johnson and Duberley, 2000: 179). I have tried 
within my research to identify the taken for grantedness of each situation and event 
that I have explored within my research. I have also tried to relate the outcomes to 
the knowledge constraining and constituting impacts of my own beliefs.  
 
My reflexive account was based on, my memory, my experiences and ultimately my 
judgement and the question; so what. So what i.e. why am I writing/telling this was 
the determinate as to what events and issues should be included and what were not. 
These decisions were all inevitably influenced significantly by my a priori 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Whilst I had no intention to place myself as the 
researcher at the centre of the story inevitably this has frequently been the case in 
practice.  Lafitte goes on to provide an additional perspective; ‘The psychologist's 
reflexive judgements will be limited by his knowledge of himself in some of the ways 
his subject’s reports are limited’ (Lafitte 1957:21). I would suggest that for 
psychologist read researcher and I believe we arrive at the same place. I would 
propose that it is necessary for the researcher to recognise his/her a priori and how 
this affects judgement, bias, and ultimately the analysis. I would further propose that 
the more this is recognised, understood and appreciated by the researcher the more 
rigour it is possible to apply to the analysis. 
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Johnson and Duberley (2003:8) argue;  
 
‘a key skill that any manager should possess is the ability to reflect critically 
upon the modes of engagement they deploy in making sense of their 
experience then the importance of epistemology to practitioners is only too 
evident because studying epistemology exposes to critical interrogation the 
often unnoticed taken-for-granted assumptions and values which influence 
how versions of reality are socially constructed’. 
 
This is a significant risk within the methodology I have used in my research. Having 
been exposed to the industry for such a long period of time accepting or being 
oblivious to the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ (Johnson and Duberley, 2003:8) of many 
practices, routines, and rituals (Stacey, 2001). Within my reflexive (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2003) account I have used deconstruction (Linstead, 1993) and tried to 
question every area that I raised and ensured that I undertook my analysis with this 
risk clearly in mind. Johnson and Duberley, (2003:146) add a further warning ‘the 
need for researchers and the researched to be reflexively aware of their own 
presuppositions and values’. 
 
Goulder continues in a similar style; ‘A Reflexive Sociology means that we 
sociologists must acquire the ingrained habit of viewing our own beliefs as we now 
view those held by others’ (Goulder, 1970:490). I found that the concept of 
researching one’s self and beliefs can be a difficult concept to grasp let alone 
practice. Once one has had occasion, as I have done, to be surprised at my own 
beliefs it is then considerably easier to start to adopt Goulder’s suggested habit. 
 
Hammersley and Atkinson join the apparent consensus that;  
 
‘the concept of reflexivity acknowledges that the orientations of researchers 
will be shaped by their socio-historical locations, including values and 
interests that these locations confer upon them’ (2007:15).  
 
They also provide a thoughtful point;  
 
‘We do not believe that reflexivity implies that research is necessarily political, 
or that it should be political, in the sense of serving particular political causes 
or practical ends. For us the exclusive, immediate goal of research is, and 
must remain, the production of knowledge’.  
 
Holiday views reflexivity as; ‘the way in which researchers come to terms with and 
indeed capitalize on the complexities of their presence within the research setting, in 
a methodical way’ (Holliday, 2008:138). Amongst the literature I have reviewed there 
exists almost a consensus of what reflexivity entails; the impact of a priori (Holland 
1999; Lafitte 1957; Johnson and Duberley 2003; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007) 
and the researcher’s beliefs and values (Alvesson, Hardy and Harley, 2008; Goulder, 
1970; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Holliday, 2008). Conversely there is no 
obvious consensus in the areas of power and politics, language, and ideologies. It is 
difficult to see how any researcher can be apolitical, which in itself is arguably a 
political standpoint, and also difficult to see how any situation that is being 
researched can be devoid of any politics or power issues. I believe that research into 
politically charged environments benefit from the process of reflexivity (Holliday, 
2008) as much as those where there is an apparent consensus.  
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4.7 Research Question  
An issue that arises frequently in the literature is that of the research question 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1994, Holiday, 2007, Thomas, 2004). The issue for me 
was at what point the research question(s) is developed and how the research 
setting can influence the question. I did not feel, given the nature of my research 
(inductive), that it was particularly important to frame a research question early on in 
the process if at all. What I knew was that I had a great deal of data about the taxi 
industry, the culture and how within a management context change had impacted on 
and conflicted with this culture and it was these data that I intended to analyse 
reflexively and from which identify themes and a contribution to original knowledge.  
 
Unsurprisingly given the nature of his research Dalton (1961: 274) took an apparently 
relaxed view to developing his research question. He lists an eclectic mix of some 
eleven sentences of which most contain more than one question as he describes his 
process to develop a research question. Alternatively Holliday, (2007:28) boldly 
asserts that; ‘the researcher also needs to determine what she wants to find out 
within the area or topic she has chosen’. I would agree in a deductive, quantitative 
study that a clear question or hypothesis early on in the research process is needed. 
I am far less aligned with this assertion in an ethnographic research study where it is 
inductive in nature and the data is therefore qualitative. As one of the approaches to 
ethnography is to research ‘unfamiliar cultures and ways of life’ (Thomas, 2004:133), 
how does one know what one is likely to find out until the research is well underway?   
 
My research gradually developed around a desire to uncover the complex networks, 
social structures and behaviours that contribute to, or influence the identity of 
London’s taxi drivers, their culture and that of the industry and their impact on 
attempts to manage this disparate and virtual group.   
 
4.8 Research Design  
The material that I had collected in a broadly ethnographic tradition was 1) the 
observations and experiences that I had collected during my career in the London 
Taxi Industry 2) taxi driver interviews and 3) the articles and features from the trade 
press, books concerned with the taxi industry and articles and letters from the 
popular press and media. 
 
I originally proposed to interview a maximum of thirty people as suggested by Bailey 
(1994:97). This initial proposal had a caveat that it could be significantly lower 
dependent upon the level of cooperation experienced from both London’s taxi drivers 
and the management of the radio taxi companies they worked with. As it transpired 
the material I had collected during my career in the London Taxi Industry and which I 
had narrated and analysed in my reflexive account and the initial group of interviews I 
undertook with taxi drivers together with the features and articles from the trade 
press produced so much data that there was no necessity, in my view, to undertake 
the originally planned number of interviews.  
 
My research set out to include both drivers affiliated to one of the radio taxi 
companies and drivers who were not affiliated to any radio taxi company. This could 
have provided some interesting insights into any cultural differences between taxi 
drivers who belonged to a radio taxi company and those who did not. Within the 
industry only around one third of drivers work with a radio taxi company (Townsend 
2003). It transpired that the drivers who the Licensed Taxi Drivers’ Association 
(LTDA) selected for interview in response to my request to them were all affiliated to 
a radio taxi company albeit not the same one. During the course of my research it 
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quickly became evident that my reflexive account was substantial in terms of both 
richness and volume. Therefore the opportunity to broaden my research to include 
the different perspectives of taxi drivers who belonged to one Radio Taxi Company or 
another or none at all was not possible. The perceived impact on the industry of radio 
taxi companies and their drivers from the perspective of non-radio drivers could be 
an interesting area to explore in the future.   
 
I was keen to discern any variances in commitment to the industry and the profession 
between radio and non-radio taxi drivers. Likewise, whether the views expressed by 
newer and longer serving taxi drivers came from different perspectives. As ultimately 
my research moved in a different direction (Burrell and Morgan, 2003) I consider this 
to be an interesting area for future research. 
 
The approach I adopted was broadly similar to Gill and Pratt (1986) whose research 
team favoured an in-depth treatment of a limited number of cases in an under 
researched, and relatively novel area this provided what they asserted was an 
alternative, valid approach. Mintzberg (1979:583) also promotes the concept of ‘small 
samples rather than less valid data that were statistically significant’.  The culture and 
management of London’s taxi drivers is certainly an under researched area, and 
could be argued to be novel (Gill and Pratt,1986) based on the unusual nature of 
acquiring the vocational qualification, employment status as well as the lack of a 
contemporary organisational structure (Hatch and Schultz, 1997) and hitherto the 
lack of formal, comprehensive research.   
 
Mintzberg (1973) goes on to add that unstructured observation was perhaps ‘less 
likely to be comprehensive in that it was open to researcher selectivity’ (226). I would 
agree with this statement and fully accept the concept of ‘researcher selectivity’ 
(Mintzberg, 1973:226) as I have been able to select data that I consider important 
enough to include and also reject those data that I decided to exclude. Inevitably my 
a priori will feature in this selection as the recollections are almost certainly based on 
what I recall as being important, interesting and significant thereby both intentionally 
and unintentionally leaving out the more mundane although I have attempted to 
include the ‘micro aspects of organisational life’ (Johnson and Duberley, 2003:107) 
which I consider are important to throw light on the research subject as well as 
broader themes and specific events and themes that contextualise my research.  
 
It is important to point out that my research is not intended to envelope the whole of 
the London taxi industry merely the landscape that was visible to me during my 
largely opportunistic (Hammersley and Atkinson 1994) period of immersion in it. 
Despite the recognition of selectivity I would vigorously defend my research. I have, I 
believe provided a thick description (Holloway 2008) and represented the richness of 
the data setting and the areas that I have implicitly or explicitly selected to include. 
Further I would challenge any suggestion regarding any lack of comprehensiveness 
(Mintzberg, 1973) within the study. 
 
 
4.9 Research Framework 
My ontology is subjectivist. I work within a broadly ‘interpretive paradigm’ (Burrell and 
Morgan, 2003:28) and like Burrell and Morgan’s description (2003:28) of the 
interpretative paradigm ‘am informed by a concern to understand the world as it is, to 
understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective 
experience’. I accept Burrell and Morgan’s view that an interpretative paradigm ‘sees 
the social world as an emergent social process, which is created by the individuals 
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concerned’ (Burrell and Morgan, 2003:28). This description is congruent with my a 
priori.   
 
My approach to the research has been broadly ideographic (Burrell and Morgan, 
2003) having spent much of my career ‘getting inside situations and involving oneself 
in the everyday flow of life’ (Burrell and Morgan, 2003:6).  
 
I do not accept Burrell and Morgan’s view that ‘one can only understand the social 
world by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation’ (2003:6).   
It was opportunistic (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1994) that my research had been 
undertaken using observations and experiences that were derived first hand but I 
would argue that this is not the only way to gain understanding. If this were the case 
the opportunity for obtaining knowledge and understanding would face significant 
obstacles. It is not possible for every researcher to develop the skills, competence 
and acceptance and obtain entry both vocational and to research the research 
subject that they are interested in or have chosen. Therefore huge swathes of 
research would just not take place, robbing humanity of understanding and valuable 
contributions to knowledge.  
 
To accept this approach would mean that research would be restricted to a 
participant perspective implicitly constraining thought to particular, limited reference 
frames and dependent upon the development of the skills to gain first-hand 
knowledge. Burrell and Morgan, in my view understate the significance and benefit of 
subjectivity in research. I do not view empiricism as the only basis for research. Of 
course this may be to take Burrell and Morgan’s assertions too literally. 
 
 
4.10 Research Setting 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1994:28) discuss how the setting and cases are chosen 
and talk about identifying an ‘interesting situation or group of people’ about 
‘opportunistic research’ and about ‘studying history in the making’. I associate these 
three areas strongly with my research. My association with the taxi industry was 
opportunistic, by dint of my employment, and involved meeting with, and working 
alongside, a most interesting group of people who operate in an unusual situation as 
a virtual workforce. My research has been focused around my observations of the 
interactions between the industry regulator and those in the industry, Knowledge 
Boys, taxi drivers on the road, at taxi ranks, in cafes, at meetings and passengers’ 
behaviour. The relationship between self-appointed and formal industry leaders and 
industry organisations e.g. radio taxi companies and taxi drivers is a theme that 
developed during the collection of my data and research and which uncovered much 
of the culture, values, and identity (Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail, 1994) traits of 
London’s taxi drivers. 
 
The conversational interviews and trade press features, articles and comments were 
used to compare and contrast with my sense making and the apparent consensual 
vision of a taxi driver that journalists and others (Grimshaw 2005; Martin, 2004; Craik, 
2009; Daisley, 2012) have developed but I was keen for the drivers I interviewed to 
introduce their own subjects and topics (Dalton, 1961) and for them not to be 
constrained to my, admittedly flexible, agenda. The interviews and trade press 
content have introduced a contemporary element to the study which is something 
that I consider important given the long duration over which the main corpus of my 
data has been collected. There is no intention to carry out any form of gap analysis to 
uncover explicit differences between the culture that I uncovered during my research 
and that which now apparently pertains as this is outside the scope of my research.  
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4.11 Narrative Account 
The main body of my research is a descriptive narrative from which I developed my 
reflexive account. The material was collected in an ethnographic tradition and 
narrated into an account that was then interpreted and analysed.  My narrative 
account included individual events, conversations, observed behaviours, feelings 
about events, actions and activities as experienced by me, descriptions of scenarios, 
and explanations of my observations during my career in the industry.  
 
I would propose that an important area of my research has been in narrating the 
‘submerged aspects of organizational life’ (Turner, 1971:34) about which I gained an 
understanding through the time I spent both as a taxi driver and as a participant 
observer (Thomas, 2004). 
 
I have not attempted Burgess’s (1984) recommendation during the period when I 
collected my material of keeping analytical notes or memos in which preliminary 
questions, hypotheses and models can be recorded. I have been in no rush to reach 
the analysis phase but instead I have been keen to let the data talk, to develop the 
story and narrative in order that it is not polluted by trying to analyse its meanings too 
quickly or to reach early conclusions. I have not attempted during my research to 
seek, identify, prove or disprove hypotheses.  
 
Until I reached a point where I concluded that all the material I intended to capture for 
this research project had been narrated I had given no thought at all to data analysis. 
  
 
4.12 Analysis  
The literature concerning qualitative data analysis is wide ranging in its discussion of 
the merits of various methods (Thomas, 2004; Miles and Huberman,1994; Pearsall, 
1999). Thomas advocates a process of condensing and summarizing data ‘so that 
they are meaningful in terms of the study’s objectives’ (2004:204), Thomas goes on 
to explain that the general aim of analysis and interpretation is to enable ‘the analyst 
to see the wood for the trees’. This seems a narrow interpretation and I would argue 
describes a methodology to deliver a clarification of the data rather than rigorous 
analysis. I would argue that some trees are necessary to provide the descriptive 
narrative to enable thick description (Holloway, 2008) and provide the context that I 
view important within an ethnographic study. Thomas goes on to provide a number of 
techniques that ‘are intended to condense textual materials by reducing them to 
summary statements or by identifying their structural properties’ (2004:217). Thomas 
expands the range of techniques in later sections explaining the use of maps and of 
‘telling stories’ (2004:22). Miles and Huberman (1994) and Yin (1984) have been 
critical of narrative as a technique to analyse qualitative data. Conversely Pearsall 
(1999) argues that narrative is the means by which human beings communicate.  
 
Thomas adjudicates on this dichotomy by suggesting that;  
 
‘stories organize events and actions in to a coherent whole by showing the 
connections between them and the ways in which the linkages combine to 
produce end results or consequences. The outcomes to be explained range 
from individual conduct to large scale collective events’ (2004:225).  
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My narrative account is a combination of ‘individual conduct’ (Thomas, 2004:225) 
and ‘large scale collective events’ (Thomas, 2004:225) but it could be judged to be 
presented in a story telling format and is certainly chronological.  
 
The areas of divergence between my narrative account, the trade and popular press 
and the interviews I undertook were a potentially rich source for discovery. 
Attempting to understand the beliefs and values that underpin contradictory issues 
and points of agreement enabled a fuller understanding of the culture that was being 
researched. 
 
Dealing with text Derrida, (1976) suggests that there are no grounds for arguing that 
any particular interpretation is authoritative. Derrida appears to approach this matter 
through a post structuralist frame. Whilst accepting that text is open to wide 
interpretation and whilst not wishing to claim an authoritative interpretation of the text 
that that I have quoted, cited and reproduced and that are my data I feel that it is 
possible to attempt be objective about its meaning based on my familiarity with the 
context of the text. Without sacrificing description for objectivity and being explicit 
about subjectivity it is difficult to see how the rigour of academic research can be 
applied to the text and how light can be shed on the subject (Rosen, 1991).  Hirsch 
(1967) argued that certainty cannot be achieved but objectivity can. I am not 
convinced as to the validity of this assertion nor the underpinning need for either 
certainty or objectivity. I do however appreciate their worthiness as analytical goals. I 
tend to agree with Thomas’ view that; 
 
‘The interpretation of a text involves the interaction of the reader’s frame of 
reference and prior understandings with the meanings of the text itself’ 
(1994:220).  
 
Hammersley and Atkinson infer that a feature of ethnography is ‘a tendency to work 
primarily with unstructured data, that is, data that have not been coded at the point of 
data collection in terms of a closed set of analytical categories’ (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1994:248). Much of the material that I collected was in the form of 
experiences and observations in the style of Dalton (1961), Beynon (1975), and 
Watson (1994) and were unstructured at the time of collection although the act of 
narrating these experiences began to provide some structure at least at the individual 
experience or event level.  
 
A criticism could be made that some of the data in my study could suffer from 
reliance on my memory rather than diaries, field notes and other documentary 
records (Dalton,1961) that could have been developed over the period I collected my 
material. To an extent such criticism has validity.  I would counter that  this potential 
weakness is more than outweighed by the advantage that Mintzberg (1973: 226) 
identified in unstructured observation that ‘nothing need stand between the work… 
[The researcher]…observes and the theory he develops save his own ability to 
interpret’. Mintzberg (1973: 226) went on to observe ‘that unstructured observation 
was unsystematic and difficult to replicate’. This is a significant issue in my view, 
given the nature of my research; ethnographic, broadly ideographic, inductive and 
reflexive I had no intention to produce replicable results or to deliberately enable 
future researchers to repeat my data collection and analysis methodologies and 
arrive at the same conclusions. I wanted to deliver ‘a product of the time and context’ 
(Van Maanen,1987:75). 
 
Holliday (2008:61) discusses the importance and questions the ‘higher status’ of 
verbatim data. She asserts that ‘it is certainly not the case that what people say is 
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hard evidence of what they think’. I have used verbatim quotes from interviews not 
specifically as hard evidence (Holliday, 2008) but as examples of terminology, 
specific industry language, as polemics, or to introduce opposing or collaborating 
concepts, arguments and standpoints. 
 
My research does not endure the mono or single frame approach that Rosen (1991) 
and Hamersley and Atkinson (1995) experienced as my research is based upon both 
observation and participation. I was one of them; a licensed London taxi driver, I was 
a committee member of the largest trade association, a commentator on the trade 
through my role as a feature writer in a number of trade publications, I recruited 
drivers to the radio taxi company I worked for, dealt with their problems, and 
disciplined them when necessary. I also managed upwards of four thousand taxi 
drivers in my ultimate role of Group Managing Director of London’s largest radio taxi 
company. There are of course drawbacks to this level of immersion particularly in 
respect of identifying and challenging areas of taken for grantedness (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2003). These are risks I was aware of during my analysis and to which I 
have applied as much rigour as I could. Tietze (in Symon and Cassell) recognises 
the challenge;  
 
‘if the ‘normal’ (researcher entering research scene as stranger) process of 
research is to transform the ‘unfamiliar’ and ‘strange’ into the ‘known’ and 
‘familiar’, the research process for the researcher-employee is reversed: the 
challenge is to transform the ‘familiar’ and ‘known’ into the ‘strange’ and 
‘unknown’, with a view to generating a different and more informed 
understanding of the issues under investigation’ (2012: 60) 
 
In order to achieve the process and outcomes described by Tietze (2012) there has 
been a need for deconstruction and sense making (Weick, 1969) to take place in the 
process of taking a raw, mainly unstructured narration and then analysing and 
interpreting this to develop my reflexive (Johnson and Duberley, 2003) account. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007:162) propose that ‘the initial task in analysing 
qualitative data is to find some concepts that helps us to make sense of what is going 
on in the case or cases documented by the data’. It was some time before the 
concepts (which I later termed themes) that I was keen to emerge from my narrative 
account and interpretation became visible to me. 
 
My views, feeling, beliefs and values have been made explicit wherever possible 
whilst fully accepting that they may not always be discernible to me. I have adopted 
Kildruff and Mehra’s (1997:464) assertion that;  
 
‘instead of trying to erase all traces of themselves from their work, 
researchers should seek to demystify technology of mediation by explicitly 
detailing their involvement’.  
 
I adopted Hammersley and Atkinson’s (2007:163) advice to ’exercise some analytical 
nerve, tolerating uncertainty and ambiguity in one’s interpretations resisting the 
temptation to rush to determinate conclusions’.  The analysis process took me nearly 
two years and during much of that period there was significant uncertainty as to what 
much of my narrative account actually meant. Gradually I accepted that my research 
objective was not to provide complete answers but was intended to shed light on 
what is a tribe of people with their own rituals, behaviours and practices. 
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4.13 Taxi Driver Interviews 
I was keen to interview a number of taxi drivers to add a broader dimension to my 
research. I was keen to compare and contrast my views with those of the 
interviewees and thereby to expand the insight into the behaviours, interfaces and 
culture of the industry. 
 
Women represent less than 1% of London’s taxi drivers (Public Carriage Office 
Website, 2009) therefore no special methodologies have been invoked to either 
include or exclude them from my research. There are a total population of ‘almost 
25,000 taxi drivers’ (Public Carriage Office Website, 2009) in London. The age range 
of the taxi driver population in London is from: 21 - 94 years of age (Public Carriage 
Office Website, 2010). There is no published information regarding ethnicity or 
educational background.  
 
The interviewee sample was generated by the Licensed Taxi Drivers’ Association 
(LTDA) who had agreed to help me. They, I believe, contacted a number of their taxi 
driver committee members and asked if they would be prepared to be interviewed by 
me. What became apparent when I met them was that the sample had similar 
demographics although there was significant diversity of views expressed in their 
interviews.  
 
Scwalbe and Wolkomir (2001:204) provided some interesting and useful insights into 
interviewing men which they address to those ‘who do inductive or quasi inductive 
research because our [their] advice presumes that interviews are open to change 
over the course of the study’. This is an interesting point and one that was borne out 
during the study as the interviews did change but how much of that was concerned 
with the inductive (Gill and Johnson, 2002) nature of my work rather than, hopefully, 
allowing the interviewees to determine the direction of the interviews is arguable.  
 
Thomas (2004:165) asserts that ‘in some forms of research such as ethnography, 
information may be sought by the researcher through informal interactions with 
informants’. This was the approach that I felt best fitted with the interviews that I 
intended to conduct although there was the formality of setting a time, venue, etc. As 
against the much more informal approach taken by Watson (1994) where 
conversations apparently just happened. The interviews together with my 
observations of the industry, the trade press and personal experiences enabled me 
to identify patterns, tentative themes and to provide the insights into the industry that 
was the objective of my research. 
 
4.13.1 Interview Format 
During the period of participation and participant observation (Tedlock, 1991) of 
London’s taxi driver population I was conscious that I had formed my own views and 
opinions of the culture. There was a clear risk that this could introduce interviewer 
influence (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001) and/or bias. In order to address this risk, as 
far as possible, I attempted to adopt a neutral stance during interviews and did not 
directly challenge responses that failed to accord with my own implicit or even explicit 
view of the London taxi industry or radio taxi companies operation or their impact on 
the industry. Where such issues arose I asked for clarification or for the interviewee 
to expand their point(s).  
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As the culture of London’s taxi drivers is largely unresearched it provided a 
wholesome and rich source of research subjects.  This methodology supported the 
ideographic (Burrell and Morgan, 2003; Gill and Johnson, 2002; Johnson and 
Duberley, 2003; Holloway, 2008) approach which I adopted in interview where I 
observed the importance of letting one’s subject unfold its nature and characteristics 
during the process’. (Burrell and Morgan, 2003: 6). The ideographic approach (Burrell 
and Morgan, 2003) with its emphasis on subjective accounts and reliance on 
exploring the detailed backgrounds of subjects was very useful in developing the 
interview format.  
 
Roethlisberger, (1941:93) provides guidance which I attempted to adopt concerning 
behaviour during the interview; 
 
‘In the interview I use a number of simple rules or ideas; I listen. I do not 
interrupt. I do not give advice. I avoid leading questions. I refrain from making 
moral judgements about the opinion expressed. I do not express my own 
opinions, beliefs or sentiments. I avoid argument at all costs’. 
 
The interviewing style, given the nature of this research, which I adopted and used, 
was conversational interviews (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:3). This style was 
adopted due to its fit with ethnographic studies as explained by Burgess (1984:102) 
that ‘the researcher learns about the culture and setting of the field site through 
informal, conversational interviews with informants’.  Spradley (1979) refers to three 
types of questions in this style of research: descriptive, structural and contrast 
questions. Examples of these three types of questions that I used were; 
 
Descriptive; describe your normal daily routine 
 
Structural; if you knew passengers were waiting for taxis at all stations on a Sunday 
evening would you change your working hours to serve them? 
 
Contrast; can you contrast your role as a taxi driver with your occupation before you 
became a taxi driver. 
 
I followed up on responses from the interviewees by ‘probing’ (Scwalbe and 
Wolkomir, 2001:208) using questions such as; 
 
That’s very interesting can you tell me more about that? 
  
 How did that make you feel? 
 
I was conscious of avoiding any threat similar to what Scwalbe and Wolkomir 
describe (2001:208) as; 
 
‘the threat built into any intensive interview. The situation is usually defined as 
one in which a stranger sets the agenda, asks the questions, controls the flow 
of talk, and probes for information about internal; or backstage realities.  To 
agree to sit for an interview, no matter how friendly and conversational is to 
give up some control and to risk having one’s public persona stripped away’. 
 
I wanted to make the interviews as conversational as possible and although I offered 
at the beginning of the interviews to send a draft of my interview notes to the 
interviewee, none wanted me to do so. I also made a point that they could ask for 
anything they felt unhappy with to be excluded from my notes, once again they 
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indicated that none did. Further I offered to either use their name or a non de plume 
and none felt the need to use a non de plume. These questions whilst genuine were 
a subtle attempt to move the power (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001) of the interviewer 
into the interviewees’ hands and to avoid the need for power play by them which 
Scwalbe and Wolkomir (2001) identify as a risk in male on male interviews. 
 
The conversational interviews (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:3) were held at the 
premises of the LTDA. I had offered the drivers a choice of being interviewed at 
home, in the back of their taxis or somewhere else that was convenient for them. All 
of the interviewees opted for the LTDA offices. I discovered during the interviews that 
all of the drivers had links with the LTDA. I did consider the possible inherent bias 
that this common bond may have introduced but was satisfied that given the diversity 
of views that were expressed during the interviews and the varying nature of interest 
in the subjects that they and I introduced during the interviews that this was a not an 
important feature in my analysis. This may have been an influence in their venue 
preference in that the premises were not completely neutral to them thereby 
providing familiarity, comfort and security (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001) for the 
interviews if that were needed. 
 
My approach was to welcome the interviewee, invite them to sit at a corner of a 
square committee table with myself sitting opposite at the other side of the corner of 
the table. There was a slight barrier between the interviewer and interviewee but I 
had positioned both chairs so that they were not obstructed fully by the table. I asked 
them how they had travelled to the interview, had they worked first [In their taxi] or 
had they come straight from home. I then spent a few minutes making small talk.  
 
After this I explained that I was carrying out some research into London’s taxi drivers 
and if it was okay with them I would like them to explain about how they became a 
taxi driver, what they thought about the Knowledge, the job, their colleagues and 
anything else they would like to tell me about. I then proceeded to ask an opening 
question e.g. why did you become a taxi driver. I then listened and just prompted 
where appropriate. As far as possible I tried to get them to expand their points rather 
than introduce new points myself. This approach worked well in my opinion. 
 
4.13.2 Interview Content 
At the time of carrying out the interviews I was still developing my narrative account. 
At this point I did not have a clear research question. I had no specific issues that I 
needed or wanted to be clarified by the drivers I was interviewing and was really 
unclear about what might come out and how useful it might be. I knew that I was 
interested in their motivation, the way they saw themselves being managed or how 
they managed themselves, their identity and that of the industry and how they viewed 
the culture of the industry. My strategy was to just meet up and listen prompting 
when they had exhausted a subject. In reality little prompting was needed. The 
drivers appeared happy to talk. Some of this was no doubt because they were keen 
to provide, consciously or subconsciously ‘strategically crafted accounts’ (Scwalbe 
and Wolkomir, 2001:213) of their lives and actions. I feel I got beyond this activity by 
periods of silence, by appearing generous and not challenging any of these accounts 
and once the interviewee had been able to present the persona he wanted I believe 
moved on to provide me with insights in the industry which were less strategically 
crafted (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001). 
  
Burgess (1984:102) refers to a ‘style of interviewing which employs a set of themes 
and topics to form questions in the course of conversation’. My preparation for the 
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interviews was based broadly around this concept. The prompt sheet (see Appendix 
1) I developed was a list of themes and topics. I used this to start the interview and 
then formed questions where needed from the topics and themes that were being 
enunciated by the interviewee. My initial scene setting highlighted the themes and 
topics that were my primary interest but I was happy to sacrifice my topics and 
themes to explore interesting tangents. 
 
The interviews were approached with Fontanna and Frey’s (1994:367) advice that 
interviewing is an aspect of the ‘art of science’ in mind.  The topics in my prompt 
sheet (see Appendix 1) were developed to introduce new subjects and concepts into 
the conversation in the event of pauses and gaps so that broad areas of interest 
were raised but I retained the opportunity for expansion, tangents and side tracking 
by the interviewees in Dalton’s (1961:277) style; ‘questions were prepared but quietly 
dropped to pursue interesting leads as they emerged’. I was keen for the interviewee 
to do the talking and had no intention of slavishly asking each interviewee the same 
questions. The purpose of the prompt sheet was, to an extent, a safety blanket for 
me, during interviews I knew that if the interview dried up and/or I needed to 
introduce a new subject I had some broad ideas listed that were relevant to my 
research that I could introduce to the conversation (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001). 
 
Where appropriate Gouldner’s (1954:247) interview techniques which are described 
as ‘partially non-directive’ were employed. This approach enabled interviewees to 
pursue areas they wished rather than to be required to follow my agenda. The 
research subject and the people involved have a strong tradition of oral based story-
telling relating to their industry’s heritage (Townsend, 2003). The questioning style 
proposed by Gouldner (1954) is relevant and appeared to me to be a style that 
engaged and stimulated the group to provide useful and in depth responses. A clear 
goal was to become aware of what Gill and Johnson (2002:166) describe as 
‘important factors that did not form part of his or her [The researcher’s] preconceived 
notion of the situation’ e.g. previous employment as reason to become a taxi driver; 
Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1 (Driver interview: 2008); job security concerns; Taxi 
Driver Interviewee No.2 (Driver interview: 2008); flexibility to fit with his bouncy castle 
hire business; Taxi Driver Interviewee No.4 (Driver interview: 2008); bankruptcy.  
 
I approached the explanation of the interviewees’ rationale for their first response to 
any questions or themes by asking supplementary questions after they had provided 
an initial answer by asking questions like; what do you mean by that; can you 
expand; what is your assertion based upon. This caused the interviewees to 
reconsider, justify or draw on evidence, examples or reasons for their assertions 
rather than for me to enter into a dialogue that could explicitly expose my position on 
these subjects. 
 
Where these tactics did not immediately prompt additional contributions I remained 
silent until the interviewee commenced enlarging upon their previous points. 
However given the ethnographic and reflexive nature of the study there was no 
intention to simply relay interviewee contributions in an observer mode. What I have 
attempted to do is to explore and analyse what was said, what tone was used, what 
expressions, semiotic indicators and context were present and if any contradictions 
were evident e.g. Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1’s (Taxi Driver Interviews, 2008) 
dichotomy between customer service and his work life balance, and from that seek 
meaning and reason for it and relate it back to the aims of my research.  
 
My experience during the interviews was that I only very occasionally referred to the 
prompt sheet. The interviewees, particularly Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2 and Taxi 
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Driver Interviewee No.3 needed very little prompting at all. During the session with 
Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1, who was my first interviewee, I referred to the prompt 
sheet more frequently than I did with Taxi Driver Interviewee No.4 who took part in 
my last interview. I feel on reflection that although during the first interview with Taxi 
Driver Interviewee No.1 I was not conscious of feeling nervous or self-conscious that 
I probably was and these feelings were the reason why I repeatedly referred to the 
prompt sheet.  
 
On reflection I believe that I was keen to cover off as many of the issues on my 
prompt sheet as possible although having realised that I still feel that Taxi Driver 
Interviewee No.1 had opportunities, some of which he took, to introduce, explore and 
pursue areas that he wished (Gouldner, 1954). I have reflected upon the Taxi Driver 
Interviewee No.1 interview and how my influence may have affected the outcomes. It 
was interesting that this interview focused more on emotions than the other 
interviews and yet I have described Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1 as initially 
appearing to me to be apparently unemotional and impassive (Taxi Driver Interviews, 
2008). At the end of the Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1 interview I recall being quite 
surprised at just how much information I had collected. During the rest of the 
interviews I was far more conscious of Gouldner’s (1954) and Gill and Johnson’s 
(2002) approach and referred to my prompt sheet less frequently.  
 
4.13.3 Interview Notes 
I made minimal notes during the interviews (see Appendix 2) and did not use a tape 
recorder. Scwalbe and Wolkomir, (2001:210) label these (recording devices, note 
talking etc) as ‘signs of an interviewer’s power’ though that was not my primary 
reason for avoiding their use I do concur with the point. My primary reason for not 
using a tape recorder was that I wanted the interviewees to relax as quickly as 
possible and I felt the use of a tape recorder would be a barrier to this objective. 
 
Brief field notes (see Appendix 2), which were mainly notable comments or quotes, 
were taken during the interview on a contemporaneous basis with recall note making 
and reflection being undertaken reflexively (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) after 
each interview had concluded. This approach was taken to avoid losing eye contact 
for long periods and to fully observe the behaviour of the interviewee during the 
interview. I was keen to concentrate on what was being said and to keep the 
interview as relaxed as possible. I suspected that the interviewees may be somewhat 
nervous and by maintaining eye contact, nodding and looking interested I would help 
to provide reassurance and a comfortable environment. However, my main focus 
was on listening to and remembering as much of the interview as possible so I could 
later record it in a reporting format. I made the notes immediately after each interview 
while matters were fresh in my mind. Wherever possible I used the interviewees’ 
words, phrases and constructions even if this reduced the clarity of the write up and 
required the use of parenthesis to provide meaning and approached this task 
reflexively (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001) asking myself questions such as; 
 
 ‘What did I feel and when did I feel it as the interview was unfolding? 
 What kind of impression did the subject seem to be trying to create? 
What was said or not said or not said that surprised me, and why was I 
surprised?’ (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001:217) 
 
Due to the length of the interviews and because I had plenty of time between 
interviews to write up the notes and reflect on the interview I had time to consider the 
questions (above) posed by Scwalbe and Wolkomir. The brief field notes (appendix 
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2) that I took together with the proximity of the interviews to writing them up I believe 
compensated for not recording the interviews.  
 
4.13.4 Interview Outcomes 
Despite my fairly clear goals and approach to the interview process I was not sure 
just how much would come out of my first taxi driver interview. Watson’s (1994) 
assertion that like any other social researcher he was influencing those he was 
researching has an a priori inevitability connected to it. Regardless how hard I 
attempted to remain neutral I could not eradicate my a priori and therefore I 
attempted to follow Watson’s (1994) assertion of endeavouring to be honest about 
this.  
 
The benefits of my approach were that the interviewee did the talking not me as the 
interviewer. In all of the interviews the interviewees appeared happy to talk away with 
little prompting necessary. This provided the interviewee with the stage, they were 
able to reinvent themselves, craft their public persona (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001) 
exaggerate, and avoid areas they would have found challenging or difficult. This 
could be described as a disadvantage of my approach as there was no attempt to 
catch the interviewee out or to validate assertions. A further disadvantage could be 
perceived as the lack of control by the interviewer. The interview was largely driven 
and directed by the interviewee which achieved the aims of my research in general 
and the interviews in particular.  
 
4.14 Summary 
I have used a qualitative methodology based on an ethnographic study which has 
spanned almost three decades. I have enhanced the material I gathered through the 
small amount of published material and extracts and comment from the trade and 
popular press. I have then contrasted and compared this to develop my narrative 
account which I have analysed reflexively to develop my reflexive account.  
 
The next section is my reflexive account in which I have narrated and investigated 
the material that I have gathered in an ethnographic tradition to provide a unique 
insight into the social structures, complex networks and behaviours that contribute to 
or influence the culture of the industry. The industry is fascinating given its disparate 
and virtual nature and yet how it manages to provide an apparently homogenous 
service that is highly rated amongst its customers. Whilst not a specific aim of the 
research the organisation of the industry is remarkable given the lack of any real 
leadership function or day to day management. Some organisations within the 
industry are considered within my reflexive account, notably a radio taxi company 
and the regulator; the Public Carriage Office and how taxi drivers relate to and 
behave towards these organisations. The importance of the Knowledge of London 
qualification and its impact on the identity of taxi drivers is also examined.  
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5 REFLEXIVE ACCOUNT   
My reflexive account begins with my view of the industry, largely moulded by my 
interactions with London’s taxi drivers before I entered the industry. I explore my 
reasons, and those of others, for deciding to enter the industry and the experiences 
of doing so. I follow this with an account of the industry from the inside, exploring the 
complex web of relationships, interfaces, and the impact of the culture and identity of 
London’s taxi drivers on their behaviour and reaction to attempts by institutions and 
groups to impose organisational change.     
 
My reflexive account was developed from a narrative account of my experiences and 
observations together with interviews with taxi drivers. This material was augmented 
with material from the taxi trade and popular press, media articles and publications. I 
have interpreted my narrative account reflexively (Johnson and Duberley, 2003) in 
order to interpret and make sense of the experiences, stories, anecdotes and 
interviews, together with the actions of individuals and the institutions within the 
industry, and the relationships, structures and relative power of groups and how they 
react and interface with each other to throw light upon the culture of London’s taxi 
drivers.  
 
Gill and Johnson (2002: 147) relate in relation to reflexivity that  
 
’rather than to attempt to eliminate the effects of the researcher on the 
phenomenon under investigation, the researcher should attempt to 
understand his or her effect upon, and role in, the research setting and utilize 
this knowledge to elicit data’.   
 
I have attempted throughout my reflexive account to clearly identify my opinions, 
where my a priori has influenced my interpretation or where my thinking or beliefs 
have changed through my reflexivity.  I have used a framework of relevant literature 
as outlined in the previous chapter as a reference point to aid interpretation and 
compare this industry with other workplace and industrial situations. 
 
5.1 The Identity and Culture of The Industry  
5.1.1. Early Reflections 
I am keen to provide context to my reflexive (Johnson and Duberley, 2003) account 
and to identify the feelings, recollections and events from which my account is 
developed. Therefore I have begun with my earliest recollections of taxi usage in the 
area of London where I grew up; Islington. I viewed these through the lens of 
hindsight. I remember there being a strong tradition of occasional taxi usage amongst 
my family and our friends. Taxis were viewed by our family and, I believe, by many 
others in the area, as an occasionally affordable luxury. When I was young and 
before I ever thought of joining the industry, they were a mode of transport that was a 
practical alternative to bus usage when time was critical, when one was travelling 
with luggage or as an occasional treat. This was in an era when car ownership was 
low and certainly beyond my family’s financial means. 
 
When I was in my late teens, taxi drivers generally appeared to me to be of my 
father’s or grandfather’s generation. They were always Londoners, white and 
generally wore a jacket, shirt and tie.  Only when I was in my twenties did I begin to 
see any younger drivers and drivers who were more casually dressed. The age 
observation may of course be contextual; as I became older taxi drivers began to 
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look younger, although my observations regarding a change in dress from fairly 
formal to increasingly informal are more reliable, I think. 
 
The taxis at this time were clean and fairly standard in appearance both inside and 
out. Fares were a bit of a mystery as often drivers had fare charts displayed in the 
taxi on the partition window between the driver and passenger, which were used to 
calculate the fare payable; in effect a calculation of, and supplement to, the fare 
shown on the taximeter. In the days of mechanical and electro mechanical meters, 
adjusting the meters for periodic fare increases was a major logistical exercise and 
presumably expensive to undertake, so a stick on/adhesive fare table showing the 
metered and actual fare was used to avoid the cost and logistical challenge of 
replacing thousands of taximeters. Fares were considered by me and my family as 
fair and I was vaguely aware that they were regulated.  
 
Taxi drivers always expected a tip, a gratuity, on top of the fare. It was normal 
amongst my family to tip and on occasions where I tried to avoid providing a tip the 
drivers’ objections were loud and threatening. Tips were expected and apparently 
viewed as mandatory by drivers, not an occasional or even discretionary 
consideration, and certainly amongst my family the done or correct thing to do. 
 
My experience of taxi drivers prior to joining the industry was that, when I hailed a 
taxi or walked up to one on a rank, I was never quite sure if a taxi driver would take 
me to where I wished to go or whether the driver(s) would refuse the trip request. I 
mused as to whether this was a power play, the autonomy often demonstrated by 
men (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001) or a commercial issue?  The driver was 
apparently able to choose at will whether to accept the fare or not. I recall that when 
we went on our annual holiday my father would go out early to find a taxi just in case 
drivers at our local rank did not want to take us to Paddington Station. As a member 
of the public it was difficult to understand why taxi drivers refused some trips and 
accepted others. Normally refusals were courteous and based on distance (too far), 
time based (not at this time of night/day etc) or personal issues (I have to collect my 
children from school). Taxis were viewed by me as always available, affordable and 
normally reliable despite the problem of spasmodic refusals. 
 
What I gathered from these early recollections was that there was a culture amongst 
taxi drivers that was presented as a fiercely independent identity. This was evident 
through their behaviour; choosing whether to accept a fare or not, practically 
demanding a tip and dressing in a formal style. This was somewhat paradoxical 
given the regulated fares which demonstrated a need to conform to authority. 
Although an ephemeral phenomenon, the dependence of my family and other non-
car owners on them may well have influenced the independent nature of the drivers’ 
identity. 
 
In the next section I explore the identity of London Taxi Drivers further and contrast 
and compare this with the organisational identity that appears to be portrayed to the 
public by taxi drivers. This is highlighted by taxi drivers to their passengers and 
appears to be based on a mixture of regulatory requirements that they consider to be 
important differentiators from minicab drivers, who they view as illegitimate 
competitors.  
 
5.1.2 Taxi Driver Identity  
This section is an introduction to the identity of taxi drivers that they appear to 
cultivate and demonstrate to their passengers through reinforcing apparently 
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important aspects of their qualifications and the regulatory environment in which they 
operate. I also consider naming conventions and the relationship between taxi drivers 
and the industry, which appears to be regarded as an institution in the broadest 
sense, with a high level of legitimacy. The taxi drivers’ identity appears to rely on 
being a London Taxi Driver, which is associated with the onerous requirements of the 
Knowledge of London qualification and the shared values and beliefs of the 
community they belong to.  As such I see each taxi driver as part of an important 
institution rather than just someone working in a branch of the transport industry.  
 
In my experience, once a trip was accepted and the journey commenced taxi drivers 
were either completely quiet, which was quite unusual, responding to any attempts at 
conversation with short sharp answers or, and more normally, they were very chatty, 
often asking lots of questions and providing information about their industry and their 
role in it. They appeared happy to ‘attempt to make sacred a constellation of symbols 
representing the organization’ (Christensen and Cheney, 2000:249). In this case due 
to the lack of an organisation in the classic sense (Hatch and Schultz, 1997) they 
would frequently describe the strict regime under which they operated, the onerous 
requirements of the Knowledge of London qualification, the expense, safety and 
ruggedness of the purpose built taxi, the fairness of the regulated fares system which 
Christensen and Cheney describe as ‘the essential symbols of their identity’ 
(2000:249) and to compare these unfavourably with the unregulated minicab 
industry.  
 
From a structural or organisational perspective London taxi drivers are at best a 
loose coalition of individuals (Watson, 1984) and yet they have been able to identify 
their core competences (Hammel and Prahalad,1990) and demonstrate a ‘strong 
need to remind themselves [and their customers] on a regular basis about the 
symbols, values and catchwords that unite them’ (Christensen and Cheney, 
2000:251).  
 
These experiences provided my early introduction to what I view as the meeting point 
between the individual taxi driver and the taxi industry’s organisational identity 
(Fombrun and Rindova, 2000).  Fombrun and Rindova (2000:95) helpfully explain the 
way that these identities are communicated; 
 
’the projection of an organizational identity can be unintentional, (e.g. 
communicated through everyday behaviour, gestures, appearance, and 
attitude)’.  
 
Although there is no evidence that the drivers I experienced were conscious of the 
process in which they were participating, the taxi drivers I encountered before joining 
the industry were making ‘explicit claims about what the organization is, their claims 
[carried] some of the cultural meaning in which they are embedded’ Hatch and 
Schultz (2002:1001). This embedded culture I perceived contained strong traces of a 
belief in their righteousness, of their legitimacy and of their favourable hierarchical 
position compared to their direct competitor minicabs and other driving jobs e.g. bus 
drivers and van drivers, which were openly viewed by taxi drivers as lower order 
roles. This judgement of other driving jobs appeared to be based on a perceived lack 
of skill i.e. absence of the Knowledge qualification, lower earning potential (Taxi 
Driver Interviews, 2008) and the imposed stricture of working for an organisation 
(Taxi Driver Interviews, 2008) or a boss (Abrahams,2000). Albert and Whetten 
described this process of evaluation 
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’...in terms of a series of comparisons; (1) outsiders compare the target 
individual with themselves [In this case minicab, bus or van drivers]; 
information regarding this evaluation is conveyed through conversations 
between the parties (‘Polite boy’, ‘messy boy’) and the individual takes this 
feedback into account by making personal comparisons with outsiders, which 
then; (3) affects how they define themselves.’ (1985:273) 
 
An issue that is frequently aired in the taxi trade press is the question of whether taxi 
drivers are black cab drivers or licensed taxi drivers. The debate is frequently raised 
by two of the trade’s editors; Alan Fisher and Stuart Pessok. Normally the issue 
focuses on stories in the London or National press where taxi drivers have been 
referred to as black cab drivers or an incident that one of the editors, who are both 
London taxi drivers, has been involved in and where a member of the public has 
used the term black cab or black cab driver. The debate is focused on the fact that 
taxis in the past had to be black in colour but in more recent times can be any colour 
approved by the Public Carriage Office. A recent article, in Callsign magazine 
(2008:32), that was based on a vox populi amongst seven taxi drivers, apparently 
chosen at random, explored this subject. The responses from drivers were centred 
on whether their title still differentiated them from minicab drivers; they explained that 
they were licensed taxi drivers and would always be so despite what passengers or 
anyone else called them. One taxi driver, interviewed for the article, mentioned that 
he ‘was proud to be a licensed taxi driver’ and another mentioned that he ‘had always 
been proud to be a licensed taxi driver’. Differentiation from minicab drivers and 
being recognised as a licensed London taxi driver were apparently more important to 
taxi drivers’ identity than whether customers called them black cab drivers or licensed 
taxi drivers. The reactions from taxi drivers who took part in the Dial-a-Cab survey 
point to an apparent acceptance of the on-going development of this issue, but also a 
strong need for a clear differentiation to remain between licensed London taxi drivers 
and other drivers, particularly minicab drivers, if indeed it exists anywhere other than 
in taxi drivers’ minds.  
 
My view on this limited research is that all of them had an opinion on this issue, 
suggesting that identity, naming conventions and the reputation and values afforded 
by being a licensed London taxi driver are evidently important to their identity 
(Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail, 1994). The importance of identity was borne out 
during the taxi driver interview I carried out with Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1 who 
became emotional when relating his pride at becoming a taxi driver.  
 
From my research and reflection it became evident to me that taxi drivers cultivate a 
broadly common identity and also demonstrate a desire to associate themselves with 
that identity and the values, beliefs and status that it represents. Identifying 
themselves as London taxi drivers is a source of pride for many drivers. As well as 
cultivating their personal identity London’s licensed taxi drivers appear to align their 
identity closely with that of the organisational, or wider taxi industry, identity. The taxi 
drivers’ values seem to align with the requirements of the regulatory environment and 
they appear to juxtapose those onerous requirements into a hierarchical scorecard 
that places them above others who work as drivers in the transport industry. A pride 
in being a licensed London taxi driver and belonging to the industry appears to be 
widespread 
 
In the next section I consider the identity of the wider industry of which the taxi driver 
is just a part. I also consider how the drivers’ identity meshes with the identity of the 
industry.   
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5.1.3 Industry and Organisational Identity 
London’s taxi drivers are part of larger entity which could be described as an industry 
or an organisation, albeit a virtual organisation. Further there are aspects of it that 
are almost institutional in nature. In this section I look at how the wider industry has 
developed its own identity. This is remarkable given that the industry has no 
management function and is a loose tie (Gladwell, 2000) grouping of disparate 
organisations, businesses, institutions, authorities and individuals. Each of these 
have some influence on how the industry’s identity is formulated and then perceived 
by the public, the press and media, taxi drivers and other stakeholders. 
 
The debate in the taxi trade press around identity and naming conventions is 
symptomatic of a branding or identity issue and the drivers’ relationship to that brand 
or identity and the values that are implied by it. Hatch and Schultz (2000:15) refer to 
this concept as ‘who we are’ and ‘what we stand for’. It appears that drivers are 
happier to be defined as belonging to the institution, that is the licensed and 
legitimate industry, rather than to be defined by the colour of their vehicle (see 
section 5.1.2 above). Being defined by the wider organisation and the licensing 
system carries with it the attributes of the Knowledge of London qualification, the 
strict driver and vehicle licensing regime, the three hundred years of history 
associated with the icon (Malthouse, 2010) that is the London taxi industry.  Dutton, 
Dukerich and Harquail term this phenomenon as organisational identification; ‘the 
degree to which a member defines him or herself by the same attributes that he or 
she believes define the organization’ (1994:239).   
 
Having analysed the industry and its social and organisational structures, the 
consistency of the message developed and delivered by the taxi drivers which I 
encountered apparently spontaneously is now considered by me to be somewhat 
amazing. There is no overarching organisation in the taxi industry concerned with 
marketing, public relations and identity. The only organisation which effectively spans 
the industry is the Public Carriage Office which is strictly a licensing and regulatory 
body (PCO website, 2007).  
 
The ‘traditional and accepted patterns of differentiation’ (Beynon, 1975:169) were 
apparently important to taxi drivers to retain the perception of being higher skilled, by 
dint of the Knowledge, than other professional drivers. They were also engaged in 
the process of marketing the wider organisation; the London taxi industry. A constant 
fear amongst London’s taxi drivers often discussed in the trade press and debated by 
groups of drivers is whether their role in its current form will last into the future. The 
proactive marketing and re-enforcement of the value of the individual driver and the 
legitimacy and safety of the wider industry may well be an almost subconscious 
attempt or possibly campaign to preserve the institution. The shortcomings of the taxi 
industry, e.g. trip refusals, are ignored in my experience, as were the virtues of the 
minicab industry, as the taxi drivers I travelled with presented themselves as 
‘insisting that they represent the ‘one true’ purveyor of a product or service in their 
industry [in this case personal transport] and that all competitors are merely imitators 
or impostors’ (Christensen and Cheney, 2000:249), or much worse, as was 
frequently described to me by taxi drivers when describing minicab drivers,. 
 
London’s licensed taxi drivers provide the most visible and accessible interface 
between the public and the industry. They appear to actively communicate, on their 
own volition, the positive aspects of their own and the industry’s identity to the 
travelling public. This appears to be an informal and largely unofficial method of 
adding value to the journey, reassurance of the quality of the service and re-
enforcement of the key differentiators from competitors and substitute services 
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(Porter: 1980,) positioning both themselves and the industry as a value added 
service. The remarkable consistency of the message, from what is a disparate and 
virtual workforce, is important to the identity of the driver and the industry.  London’s 
licensed taxi drivers appear to add credence to the generational learning theory 
espoused by Dickson and Buchholz (1979) whereby ideology is passed from 
generation to generation. The outcome appears to be a very effective communication 
of the identity of both the individual driver and the taxi industry. The lack of any 
coordination of this communication system is an interesting point of learning, as 
conventional organisations expend considerable resources to define their identity and 
communicate it to their stakeholders, yet this virtual organisation appears to manage 
this process completely informally and unconsciously.   
 
In the next section I explore how and why taxi drivers use slogans to project their 
ideology to passengers. I also examine the dilemmas faced by taxi drivers between 
their industry, their passengers and their families.   
 
5.1.4 Identity Enhancement through Ideology and Slogans  
As explained in the previous sections, most taxi journeys I experienced appeared to 
involve the taxi driver seeking or sharing opinion, information or extolling the virtues 
of the industry and embellishing his identity through comparisons with other 
industries or other jobs in the transport industry. In this section I examine the slogans 
and messages that drivers relied upon to explain their ideology to passengers.   
 
The taxi drivers’ discourse that I experienced as a passenger appeared to seek to 
‘project four things: who you [In this case they] are, what you, [they] do, how you 
[they] do it, and where you [they] want to go’ (Ollins, 1995:3). The taxi drivers I 
encountered were keen to talk up the difficulty of qualifying as a taxi driver [who they 
were], how they were subject to a strict licensing regime that regulated everything 
concerned with the vehicle, the fares and how they worked [what they do]. They often 
compared their qualification, licensing regime, regulated fares and prescribed 
vehicles unfavourably with unlicensed and unregulated minicabs and explained why 
minicabs should be banned [where they want to go] and that taxis should be the sole 
provider of personal transport in London.  
 
Christensen and Cheney (2000:251) go on to question whether ‘restating the same 
simple slogan week after week’ might be ‘seen by the external spectator as nothing 
more than an undue repetition of the obvious’.  I recall my feelings towards the 
information that taxi drivers gave out about their industry and the personal demands 
and deprivations of the Knowledge to be ones of interest, of confirmation of what 
friends and family members and other taxi drivers had previously related to me. I felt 
it added value to the journey. It reminded me of the safety and assurance afforded by 
the Knowledge of London qualification, and the value of the highly regulated licensing 
and safety regime under which taxi drivers and their vehicles operated.  At a later 
point, when I was a taxi driver, I recall relating the same points to my own customers, 
almost an ideology, in very similar language and style to that used to relay these 
points to me. Dickson and Buchholz (1979:236); 
 
‘Ideologies result partially from the legacy of institutions and ideas which is 
adopted by each generation, much as a child adopts the grammar of his 
native language and, partially as rationalizations of current self-interest and 
action. In this way ideologies are formulated through the constant interplay 
between current contingencies and historical legacies’. 
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I believe that I voluntarily adopted ideologies that were apparently part of the legacy 
of the institution; pride in the Knowledge of London qualification, the licensing regime, 
the rugged vehicle and respect for regulated fares. I also think I adopted much of the 
ideology of customer management and work ethic, which in truth was to work when I 
could maximise income rather than specifically at times of acutest customer 
need/demand, unless of course they conveniently coincided. The Public Carriage 
Office website (2007) describes the employment status of London taxi drivers to 
people considering becoming a taxi driver; ‘as a licensed driver you can be a self-
employed business person with the freedom to work as and when you wish on a 24/7 
basis, 365 days a year’.   
 
During an interview with taxi driver Taxi Driver Interviewee No.3 he related that ‘the 
beauty of the job is that I can go out [to work] whenever I want’. Taxi Driver 
Interviewee No.2, another taxi driver that I interviewed, confessed that he ‘had joined 
the trade for flexibility’ [of working hours] and that he ‘chose to work evenings 
because they were busy’. Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2 ‘works set hours but go home 
when I get a job fairly close [to his home]’. It could therefore be argued that the Public 
Carriage Office have accepted the custom and practice apparently prevalent in the 
taxi industry that drivers suit themselves rather than mirror their working hours to the 
demand profiles (Slack & Lewis, 2002) of the public and have used that the prevailing 
practice to promote the job to prospective taxi drivers. 
 
I would assert that the licensing authority implies that the industry is more about the 
driver than the customer in their assertions concerning freedom to work as and when 
drivers wish. This is not as surprising as it first appears when the raison d’être of the 
Public Carriage Office is considered. The Public Carriage Office website states that 
its responsibilities are to ‘regulate the industry and license fit and proper persons as 
drivers’ (2009). There is no mention of satisfying customer needs, having any supply 
side (Slack & Lewis, 2002) or demand fulfilment obligations or similar responsibilities. 
In a more customer centric environment demand would be the guide to when drivers 
should work rather than encouraging an ethos of supply being the predominant 
feature of the service. 
 
This section highlights a paradox in the ideology and the culture of the industry 
whereby London’s taxi drivers demonstrate almost an ownership and certainly a high 
degree of support for the imposed regulations and rules of the industry, [i.e. the 
Knowledge of London training and qualification] and the purpose built vehicle and its 
benefits for passengers, but where they have choice, e.g. to work or not during 
periods of high demand, they often put the interests of the industry and passenger 
behind their own personal interests. The use of slogans to communicate the key 
differentiators and value added aspects of the service appears highly effective. 
London’s licensed taxi drivers appear to share common ideologies, perhaps as a 
consequence of their narrow demographic and the shared experience of the 
Knowledge of London and the status they enjoy amongst their non-taxi driving peer 
groups.   
 
 As my research uncovered taxi drivers form groups which could be considered 
communities and almost inevitably within a community there is a desire to form 
hierarchies. The next section considers the frameworks that support those 
hierarchies and how they are formed and developed and their importance to personal 
status.   
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5.1.5 Personal Status And Identity Building 
There is no career path as a licensed taxi driver. Drivers are fundamentally at the 
same level from the day they receive their badge until they retire. This is very 
different from conventional organisations and most professions and occupations 
where promotion, power and status are common themes as people build their 
careers. Consequently it was interesting to reflect on how taxi drivers tried to build a 
perception of seniority and to build personal status. This was often attempted through 
displaying industry knowledge, often with a strong historical bent and using often 
obscure industry terminology to differentiate themselves from new entrants.  
 
My analysis highlighted the importance of information dissemination and storytelling, 
and the way that these activities are used in the London taxi industry to create 
differentials and pseudo superiority and inferiority amongst those who are, by many 
evaluation criteria, equals. 
 
Stacey points out that 
 
‘Knowledge is created in the stories a community of practitioners tell each 
other. Looked at in this way, knowledge is embedded in the ordinary, 
everyday conversation between people. It is primarily localized and 
contextual, distributed through an organization rather than centralized in data 
banks, and embedded in the stories people tell each other about their 
experience, stories that interactively create their experience. Socially 
constructed views of this kind also stress power differentials and politics in 
organizations’. (2001:36) 
 
My research uncovered the inclination for older drivers to use stories to create an 
aura or perception of implied seniority within an industry that had no formal career 
path or hierarchy. In effect they were stressing socially constructed power differential 
phenomena (Stacey, 2001). This was evident amongst drivers who had been driving 
for many years, who used their knowledge and experience of changes in regulations 
and practices to imply or even claim deeper knowledge (and thereby wisdom) to 
establish their place as somehow more senior than newer entrants to the industry. 
Experience of issues were used to cultivate their appearance of seniority, such as a 
long defunct practice known amongst taxi drivers as double bubble (see Glossary), 
which they highlighted as something that was sadly missed. This practice was used 
when the price for journeys over six miles was, by law, negotiable, and it is claimed 
by advocates of the system that a typical outcome of that negotiation was a 
requirement by the driver that the customer paid double the metered fare. The 
practice had no relevance to newer drivers and was merely a tool by longer serving 
drivers to burnish their credentials as being more knowledgeable about the industry 
than their newer counterparts. 
 
Longer serving drivers were also at pains to introduce the information that they had 
undertaken their Knowledge of London tests at Lambeth Road [the site of the old 
Public Carriage Office until 1966] rather than Penton Street [the site of the new 
Public Carriage Office from 1966]. This information was almost certainly provided to 
validate their length of service. The Public Carriage Office in Lambeth Road’s 
procedures for Knowledge of London testing were often referred to by longer serving 
taxi drivers as being far more onerous than those at Penton Street (Townsend, 
2003). This assertion thereby achieved three differentials; the first being the 
completion of what was claimed to be a tougher Knowledge of London testing system 
than had recently been the case, historical knowledge of the industry and a validation 
of their long service.     
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These longer serving drivers also used industry terminology e.g. stalking (see 
glossary) (Townsend, 2003:56) referring to the time when drivers were normally 
employed by a fleet owner and fares were shared between the fleet owner and the 
driver. As well as frequently using obscure or obsolete industry terms, they often 
related to points [Places, venues] that had disappeared e.g. Churchill’s [A 
gentlemen’s club that used to be at the junction of New and Old Bond Streets], and 
which were frequently referred to with affection. The affections were based on the 
quality of work, the social standing of the customers, the fairness of the doorman or 
similar.  These terms and locations were exclusive and apparently designed to create 
a perception of greater knowledge in a proxy or quasi seniority. In fact I believe 
conversations where these phrases were dropped in were often initiated for the same 
reason. The exclusiveness of these terms and locations were in many respects finite, 
as well as belonging to an era that had passed and therefore could not be replicated 
or effectively acquired by newer entrants to the industry.  Stacey discusses such 
points in the context of identity where are he asserts ‘identities are constructed in the 
process of interaction between people’ (Stacey, 2001:37). 
 
In contemporary organisations (Hatch and Schultz, 1997; Beynon, 1975) there are 
clear symbols of hierarchy or deference, often  indicated by the formal office layout, 
differences in privileges between levels of management, the way people address 
each other and, less often, less explicit symbols such as whose work is prioritised 
over whose (Watson, 1994). Given that taxi drivers do not have offices and 
management privileges these important symbols do not feature in their day to day 
working lives and alternative symbols have been developed to create the perception 
of seniority. 
 
Tangible differentiation of status or seniority was found in artefacts such as moving 
from renting a taxi to purchasing one. Renting a taxi appeared to those who owned 
their own taxi to be viewed as bestowing a lower status on the driver. This may be 
because the majority of London’s taxi drivers own their own taxi (Public Carriage 
Office Website, 2009), for reasons of greater autonomy or for other intangible 
reasons. Rarely were financial factors cited as a rationale for ownership and in my 
experience rightly so as there is little economic incentive to commend one approach 
over another, although Taxi Driver Interviewee No 1, implying economic reasons, 
appeared genuinely mystified as to why anyone would hire a taxi.  
 
As is reputed to be the case with former council tenants who purchase their homes 
and replace the doors and windows to differentiate them from the non-owners, owner 
drivers embellished their vehicles with tell-tale signs of ownership e.g. chrome 
bumpers (Instead of black rubber ones), chrome wheel rims (Instead of black ones), 
or they bought a non-black taxi e.g. red, silver etc., which stood out as an owner 
driven taxi, as most hired taxis were black. The keenness to identify their taxi as 
owned was almost certainly part of the desire for status, and the status came from 
owning rather than renting a taxi. Presumably the need for status came from wanting 
to demonstrate that they were advancing along an albeit intangible career path.   
 
Joining a radio circuit was another event that somehow showed that drivers were 
progressing their careers. Radio Taxi drivers implied that they were a step above non 
radio drivers, or were able to earn money quicker or easier than everyone else either 
through being cleverer, smarter or gaining an advantage through the radio circuit 
they belonged to, or through acquiring an additional qualification, e.g. the London 
Blue Badge Tourist Guide licence. 
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Newer drivers tended to obscure their badge (see photograph below), whilst older 
drivers display it prominently.  Taxi drivers’ metal badges display a number which is 
issued serially, so it is simple for drivers to estimate how long a driver has been a taxi 
driver using their own badge numbers as a reference point and adding circa 700 (the 
trend average) new badges per annum. Seniority either through accumulating years 
or service driving a taxi, being an owner driver or belonging to a radio circuit all 
appear to be accepted by drivers as the basis of a hierarchy although none of these 
actually proffer any real or tangible benefit in terms of career, seniority or other 
explicit benefit to the driver 
 
 
 
A London Taxi Driver’s Badge 
Reproduced by kind permission of Taxi Newspaper 
 
As can be ascertained from the section above the taxi industry has a culture that has 
developed based on the importance of the Knowledge of London qualification, the 
ephemeral nature of many of its relationships and the desire for differentiation based 
on length of service and a desire for tacit and tangible symbols of seniority.  
 
Minicabs are a fairly new innovation when compared to London’s taxis having been 
licensed for some three hundred years. The next section explains their 
establishment, the relationship between minicabs and London’s taxi drivers and their 
position in London’s transport system. 
 
5.1.6 Minicabs – Differentiating Identity  
The minicab industry was relatively new in the mid 70’s (before I joined the taxi 
industry), having been in existence for around fifteen years. Minicabs operated 
through what was often described by detractors as a loophole in the law and at that 
time were unlicensed and unregulated.  The minicab industry was singled out for 
vitriolic criticism by taxi drivers through the trade press and also in informal 
conversations at ranks and stations to which I was a witness.  The descriptions 
enunciated by taxi drivers with whom I travelled ranged from driven by rapists, 
muggers and murderers to their vehicles being uninsured and falling to bits, to 
charging whatever fare they [Minicab drivers] felt like. These charges, heavy with 
metaphor ‘on organizational [or industry] identity’ (Hatch and Schultz, 2002:1000), 
stem from  ‘the deeply held assumptions and values of its [the taxi industry’s] 
members which then become closely associated with its identity and its various 
manifestations,’ namely regulated fares, safe and robust vehicles, clean criminal 
records, insured vehicles and a long history of serving London. 
 
In my experience the uncertainty as to whether a taxi driver would accept a hiring or 
not was the major drawback of using taxis versus minicabs. Minicabs seemed always 
to take me where I wanted to go. At the time I did not know whether this was due to 
oversupply (Slack and Lewis, 2002) in the minicab industry, a more flexible approach 
to pricing enabling trips that were financially unattractive for taxi drivers to be made 
attractive for minicabs through price enhancement, or a peculiarity of the market that 
made minicabs keener to take any trip. Minicab fares were not regulated and the 
driver charged an amount, normally £x per mile, reputedly based on the vehicle’s 
odometer reading, although my experience was that minicab drivers often asked 
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what I had been charged the last time I had undertaken the journey and charged the 
same. Tips seemed much less of an issue for minicab drivers than was the case for 
taxi drivers.  
 
Although I had no knowledge of the minicab drivers’ criminal records that I travelled 
with, they always appeared fairly harmless types, albeit the vehicles, which were 
mainly family saloons, were often a little tired in appearance. My experience of the 
fares in minicabs was that they were fairly consistent and generally reasonable when 
compared to similar trips in taxis.  
 
As far as knowing where they were going, minicab drivers often relied on me, the 
passenger, and presumably other passengers, to direct them. This was not the case 
with taxi drivers who objected to being asked to take a particular route. The 
assertions concerning the taxi drivers’ vocational qualification, the regime under 
which they operated, the safety and comfort of their vehicles, regulated fares and taxi 
drivers’ disparaging view of minicabs in general were in my opinion a participation ‘in 
an on-going identity game in which their interest in their customers are often 
overshadowed by their interest in themselves’ (Christensen and Cheney, 2000:247). 
Interestingly minicab drivers did not normally offer any views on taxis or taxi drivers 
and seemed far less political. 
 
The impact of minicabs on the taxi industry was to show that it was possible to 
provide door to door personal transport without undertaking the onerous Knowledge 
of London qualification, nor was it necessary to drive a purpose built vehicle. The 
minicab industry to an extent undermined the taxi drivers’ belief in their legitimacy 
and the public’s approbation of them and the service they provided. At a financial 
level there was a belief that the minicab industry was reducing the income levels of 
taxi drivers. There was also condemnation of the taxi industry regulator for not 
stopping the establishment of minicabs and for not making any visible effort to close 
the loophole that enabled minicabs to operate. 
 
Minicabs were a disruptive new entrant (Porter, 1980) which taxi drivers resented. 
They were clearly a competitive threat and undermined licensed taxi drivers’ identity 
and hitherto exclusive right to transport the public. The competitive features of both 
services were clearly delineated, with licensed taxi drivers relying on the Knowledge 
of London qualification, rugged, purpose built vehicle and Hackney Carriage licensing 
versus a lower cost service, local availability and, importantly, providing a door to 
door to service which was bookable by phone. Minicabs were to remain a serious 
competitive threat to the taxi industry throughout my career in the industry.   
 
5.1.7 Summary 
This section was largely based on my experiences of the London Taxi Industry 
before I became a taxi driver and as such supports the aims of my research to 
provide an insight into the people who make up the industry and their relationships. It 
has other important contributions to the aims of my research. Culturally there is a 
strong reliance within the London Taxi Industry and amongst taxi drivers specifically 
to market the key differentiators of the taxi industry to passengers. The taxi drivers 
use this communications channel with their passengers to develop their own identity 
and highlight their attributes and also those of the industry. From a managerial 
perspective the taxi industry has no centralised or even distributed management 
function. It is therefore an important finding to note that without any formal processes 
or procedures London’s taxi drivers communicate surprisingly consistent messages 
to their passengers.  
 
Michael Sangster Galvin 
Student Number 03082746 
 
 
73 
 
London’s longer serving licensed taxi drivers use historical anecdotes and obsolete 
and obscure industry language to create pseudo, quasi status and differentiate 
themselves from younger and newer taxi drivers. This concept of status development 
appears to be necessary to create a perception of seniority amongst longer serving 
and older taxi drivers. Other icons of seniority such as owning a taxi and purchasing 
one in a different colour to the standard black taxi to highlight ownership are also 
used to portray a perception of seniority. This apparently cultural need to enhance 
individual identity appears to fill a gap in an industry where there is no career path 
compared with more conventional organisations where status, seniority and career 
paths are normal outcomes of career progression. With no management function it is 
remarkable that London’s taxi drivers have developed their own career path; via 
seniority and process the licensed taxi drivers seek to establish an identity that 
clearly differentiates them from minicab drivers and positions such taxi drivers as an 
elite within a perceived hierarchy of professional drivers. This positioning appears to 
be important and widely practiced amongst licensed taxi drivers.  
 
The next section investigates the history, the processes and the apparent importance 
of the Knowledge of London training process and qualification to the identity and 
culture of London’s taxi drivers. The Knowledge, as it is known colloquially, is far 
from a simple administrative process and the rite of passage achieved by qualifying 
as a taxi driver has a significant effect on the demographic, culture, identity and the 
reaction to attempts to manage taxi drivers and their response to organisational and 
process change.     
 
 
5.2 The Knowledge of London – Ritual and Rite of Passage   
The Knowledge of London, or as it is known in the industry, the Knowledge, has 
evolved from an administrative function to resolve problems with taxi drivers not 
knowing where they are going into what I think is a system of arcane and obscure 
rituals with onerous physical and personal demands. The system is accepted 
consensually by the industry and a number of attempts at change and modernisation 
have been strongly resisted.  The Knowledge of London qualification has a Darwinian 
effect on the industry where only the strongest and/or most determined candidates 
survive the process. This situation impacts on the demographic of the industry, 
narrowing it to the tenacious and determined. The Knowledge also influences the 
identity of the individual driver as well as the wider industry. 
 
In this section I examine the history of the Knowledge, the processes and systems, 
the folklore, the outcomes and attempts that were made to modernise and shorten 
the Knowledge. The aims of my research included shedding light on the behaviours 
of those in the industry and looking at the relationships between Knowledge Boys 
and licensed taxi drivers and their relationships with the institutions of the industry. 
The Knowledge of London provides opportunities to analyse all these issues, as well 
as considering issues of identity, culture and management within the wider industry.  
  
5.2.1 Career Appeal 
Taxi driving in London was considered by my non taxi driving peers and workmates 
as a good job. Taxi drivers were viewed as part of an upper or skilled working class 
that included publicans, porters in the wholesale food markets (Billingsgate, 
Smithfield and Convent Garden) and print workers, who at the time were envied for 
their closed shop employment rights and reputed short hours and high pay. Beynon 
discusses the concept of ‘the new affluent working class’ (Beynon, 1975:101) and 
laments that ‘they have been increasingly concerned about money to the neglect of 
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traditional brotherhood with their workmates’. He  pursues the theme of skilled 
workers and interestingly specifically printers; 
 
‘The skilled worker already has a freedom. A freedom which finds its 
expression in the dignity which printers and other skilled men derive from the 
superiority of their work’ (Beynon, 1975:187) 
 
This theme resonates with the beliefs amongst working class groups (Blau, 1986) 
that I belonged to, who had a clear hierarchy in mind when talking about different 
jobs, trades and professions. Taxi driving was seen as on the same level as printers 
and publicans, regarded as an elite in working class circles at the time. This 
description fits with the generally expressed view amongst taxi drivers when I first 
became a taxi driver. At that time conversations amongst drivers were that the part 
time drivers who were printers etc when driving their taxis did not “play the game” 
[Follow the informal rules or etiquette] and “were selfish”.  This was an interesting 
phenomenon as I found that licensed taxi drivers as a group generally committed to, 
and observed the rituals, traditions and etiquette of the industry. Perhaps the printers 
and others saw themselves as printers etc. who also drove taxis rather than taxi 
drivers. 
 
Many of the industries (Dockers, electricians, porters in London’s wholesale markets) 
that enjoyed short working hours, closed shop policies and relatively high pay that 
enabled their members to drive taxis part time were already largely defunct when I 
became a taxi driver.  Fleet Street printers, the last of this group aside from 
publicans, were just starting to be made redundant due to increased automation and 
many started to drive taxis on a full time basis. As this process happened fewer 
mentions were made about printers, presumably they either began to play the game 
[follow the commonly observed etiquette] once they were full members of the industry 
or fell off of the non-printer taxi drivers’ radar.  
 
Taxi driving was often compared, by older, non-taxi driver acquaintances of mine, to 
London dock workers from a pay and right to work perspective. The term ‘closed 
shop’, implying high entry barriers or some form of limitation of numbers or 
grandfather rights, was often used by friends of mine to describe the taxi industry. 
The point that I believe my peers were making was related to autonomy (Scwalbe 
and Wolkomir, 2001) and the favourable terms that taxi drivers worked under as a 
result of their autonomy and apparently strong employment rights brought about by 
what my friends perceived to be closed shop practices. Although the taxi industry 
was never a closed shop per se, the Knowledge of London was an effective, albeit 
unintended (Garner and Stokoe, 2000) barrier to entry (Porter, 1980) that had the 
effect of presenting a closed shop ethos. An interview with a taxi driver (Taxi Driver 
Interviewee No.1) highlighted the same feelings about being a taxi driver that I had 
gathered from my other peers; the concept of autonomy (Scwalbe and Wolkmir, 
2001), flexibility in relation to working hours (taxi driver interviews) no boss 
(Abrahams, 2000) and security (Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1) which is analogous to 
the closed shop principle. 
 
I knew that I had to be twenty one years of age to become a taxi driver and had 
considered becoming a taxi driver off and on since passing my driving test when I 
was seventeen. I started a part time catering business when I was eighteen which 
after three years became full time, albeit most of the work took place at the weekend. 
I finally decided to become a taxi driver during the transition from ceasing full time 
work to build the catering business, as I had the interest in doing so, as well as a 
good income and plenty of spare time which would enable me to undertake the 
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reputedly onerous training that would be needed. My situation was very similar to the 
claims made by both Taxi Driver Interviewee No.3 and Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2. 
All of the drivers I interviewed and many that I engaged with whilst working in the 
industry valued what they termed flexibility highly.  
This flexibility enabled taxi drivers to work part time in other roles, engage in hobbies 
or even live in other parts of this country (Cornwall is an example) or, in two cases I 
know of, abroad (Holland and France), and then work in London driving their taxis in 
short intensive bursts. 
 
My career decision to become a taxi driver was based on information and 
assumptions accrued by me over a number of years about the benefits of becoming 
a taxi driver, plus two final pieces of personal experience; my sister in law’s father 
and both of her brothers were taxi drivers, and my knowledge of their lifestyles 
accorded with the picture I had formed of a taxi driver’s earning potential. In addition 
to this my elderly workmate’s son was a London taxi driver and he used to relate 
occasional snippets about particularly good trips that his son had undertaken and 
observations regarding his lifestyle; home owner, car owner and ability to take 
frequent family holidays abroad, which was less common at the time than is the case 
now.  
 
I knew that I would shortly be leaving my part time job and would have the time 
needed to undertake the Knowledge. Subsequently I left my job and made the 
decision to become a London taxi driver, based on peer group information about 
earning and lifestyle potential but without any guarantees that these would be 
achieved. My decision had been based on anecdotal evidence and second and third 
hand accounts of the requirements of the Knowledge and the earning potential of a 
taxi driver. I had no real insight into the job itself, motivational factors, or any potential 
risks or downsides, but I was happy to launch into the major undertaking that was the 
Knowledge of London qualification. However I did own and operate a burgeoning 
outdoor catering business so my income was secure. I also I had the time required to 
work on acquiring the Knowledge of London. 
 
Although my decision might be considered foolhardy or impulsive I was to discover 
during my research that my approach was not unusual. Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1 
is 45 years old and has had a London Taxi Driver Licence for thirteen years. Before 
he became a taxi driver he had worked at a courier company.  He ‘decided to 
become a taxi driver after a workmate suggested doing so’. When asked why he had 
decided to become a taxi driver Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1’s view was that ‘it 
provided him with security’. The security he was seeking was a response to the 
prevalence of people being sacked for no apparent reason by the courier company. 
He went on to explain that he ‘knew nothing at all about being a taxi driver’ but was 
’attracted to being able to work whenever’ [to be able to work at any time].  
 
Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1 explained that the company he worked for routinely ‘just 
sacked people’ and whilst he was not overly concerned he was aware that the next 
routine sacking might involve him. This discussion demonstrates the image that taxi 
driving has amongst working class people. It is seen as being a secure job, (Beynon, 
1975) where you are your own boss (Abrahams, 2000). I was to establish that the 
level of security enjoyed by taxi drivers as assumed by people outside of the industry 
was not shared by those in it. These are similar views to those that used to be 
expressed amongst my peer group towards other trades e.g. printers, porters in 
wholesale markets, publicans et al, which are seen as upper working class roles. 
Ultimately all of these roles have changed significantly and are now either skilled 
white collar roles or substantially less prestigious amongst working class peer groups 
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and in terms of the benefits previously afforded through the closed shop protocols. 
The belief of job security was sadly misplaced and has ultimately crumbled in many 
upper working class roles but despite the pessimism of many within the licensed taxi 
industry it has endured. 
 
In this section there is evidence that those outside of the taxi industry in working 
class roles view the job of a taxi driver as being towards the top of an intangible 
hierarchy of roles. I, like many applicants, had decided to attempt to join the industry 
with little real understanding of the demands of the Knowledge and the actual earning 
potential of the job. It does not seem unusual to join the industry for the benefits of 
being your own boss, the flexibility and perceived job security. This rather shallow 
consideration of whether to plunge into the Knowledge of London training may 
explain the high level of attrition amongst Knowledge Boys which is highlighted in the 
next section.  
 
The next is focused on a discussion of the Public Carriage Office, the regulatory 
entity responsible for the taxi industry in London, and those who work there. 
 
5.2.2 The Public Carriage Office  
From the moment that potential drivers wish to become taxi drivers they experience 
what I believe to be one of the most significant and, to an extent, archaic control 
systems that I discovered within the industry; the Public Carriage Office (PCO). The 
PCO website defines the organisation’s role; 
‘The role of the Public Carriage Office includes the licensing of taxi and 
private hire services in London. We are also responsible for: 
Reviewing and setting taxi fares  
Appointing taxi ranks  
Improving travel information  
Making services safer and more accessible  
Helping the Mayor of London integrate public transport in the Capital’ 
 (Public Carriage Website, 2009) 
This apparently innocuous list is modest in comparison to the drivers’ apparent 
beliefs in the PCO’s near omnipotence within the industry. What the PCO does or 
does not do and what they should or should not do is a common theme within 
discussions between drivers. These themes and discussions feature regularly within 
the trade press [Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2 and see extract from Taxi Newspaper 
below (Taxi, 2012)]; 
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The above letter is interesting as it highlights the mismatch between how the Public 
Carriage Office defines its role; very much as an administrative licensing authority 
and regulator and how many in the trade, including the writer of this letter, see it and 
its role. Of particular note is his expectation of ‘help’ from the PCO in dealing with the 
police, local authorities and others. 
 
At the time that I was first involved with it as an aspirant Knowledge Boy, the Public 
Carriage Office (PCO) was under the control of the Home Office and operated by the 
Metropolitan Police. It has since moved under the control of Transport for London, 
the authority responsible for commissioning all forms of transport in London.  
The PCO then was housed in a grey pre-fabricated or modular concrete, 60’s type 
building situated in Penton Street in Islington in Central London (See photo below). 
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Public Carriage Office, (http://blackcablondon.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/penton-
street.jpg) reproduced by kind permission of http://blackcablondon.com  
  
 
My impression was that the atmosphere in the PCO building was governmental and 
bare, the temperature inside was cold, there were plain neutral coloured walls, 
polished tiled floors.  It was very quiet, with very few people in sight, although behind 
frosted glass panels one could see human shapes and hear voices, phones ringing 
and other office activity.  
 
Watson (1999:112) in discussing culture, explains that the physical environment and 
other artefacts have a purpose; 
 
‘Cultures manifest themselves in the behaviours that follow from them, of 
course, and they are also transmitted through artefacts ranging from the 
clothing people wear to the layout and decoration of the buildings in which 
they work’.  
 
During my early interactions with the PCO I formed an impression of being treated 
very much as an outsider and certainly not a welcome visitor or somebody visiting 
what I had assumed to be the headquarters building of the industry I was attempting 
to join. 
 
The PCO staff members were in my view typical civil servants of the era; they had an 
institutional aura that gave the impression of the task being more important than the 
public they served.  I don’t know what their view of aspiring taxi drivers was but it 
certainly did not fit the description used latterly amongst Government and Local 
Government Officers of clients. At the Public Carriage Office women were 
receptionists and clerical workers whilst the managerial roles were filled by white, 
apparently middle class, middle aged men.   
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The men were polite but in a stilted, head-masterly manner. Their speech was 
unusually slow and considered, neither heavily accented nor overly affected. The 
men were dressed quite formally; sports jackets, slacks, crisp shirts and ties and 
well-polished shoes. They were clean shaven with very tidy hair. This style was 
described by Scwalbe and Wolkomir as to ‘convey a business like seriousness of 
purpose, without crossing into off putting formality’ (2001: 209). The PCO Examiners 
as I learnt their job title to be, certainly managed to convey a ‘business like 
seriousness’ (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001: 209) but their manner appeared almost 
fashioned to be off putting. Their semiotic indicators e.g. withering looks, as though 
viewing an undesirable substance rather than a group of people seeking a new 
career were certainly off putting as was the delivery of their speech.  When I later 
discovered that they were all retired policemen working a few years into their 
retirement I was not surprised. Neither was I surprised when I discovered that their 
surnames were typically English or Scottish, e.g. Smith, Miller, Lippet, Stoddard, 
Finlay, Shearn, all very British. The apparent culture of the Public Carriage Office 
was counter intuitive to Watson’s (1999:112) proposal that; 
 
‘for effective cooperation to take place, people need a degree of common 
language and some sharing of priorities but also, for people not to be 
endlessly calculating their cynical and sectional self-interest and keeping 
themselves at a distance from others, there have to be assumptions and 
relations based on common values’  
 
None of Watson’s proposals were apparent to any extent in the culture of the Public 
Carriage Office, in their language or their behaviour or artefacts, as far as I could 
see.  
 
The PCO’s individual offices were peculiar in appearance; they were longer and 
narrower than normal offices; noticeably sparsely furnished and felt decidedly chilly 
at any time of the year, this was before the days of air conditioning being common. 
The small uncomfortable waiting room, the anonymous corridors where staff and 
their activities were obscured from view by frosted glass and the bare, cold offices of 
the Public Carriage Office conveyed an institutional message that the Knowledge 
Boys were very much on the outside. I felt the venue conveyed a feeling of lowering 
the significance of the Knowledge Boy from being part of the institution to a mere 
invitee or barely tolerated visitor. When compared to other testing or regulatory 
regimes there was no collegiate, client or partnership approach. The Public Carriage 
Office, its staff and its functions appeared to have nothing to do with Knowledge Boys 
and yet their existence and purpose was largely concerned with Knowledge Boys 
and administering their vocational testing. 
 
The examiners’ desks were unusual. They were similar in style and appearance to 
Government issue teachers’ desks that were seen at the time in schools and other 
public sector buildings, save that at the Carriage Office they had a shelf on two 
wooden brackets at the back of the desk (the side nearest to the Knowledge 
student). The shelf appeared to provide no purpose other than to further separate the 
students from the examiners and possibly to obscure the paperwork on the 
examiners’ desks. There were no pictures, personal effects, bookshelves or anything 
that suggested that someone worked in these offices every day. Possibly the offices 
were only used for interviews and the Public Carriage Officers then worked in 
another part of the building. Why this would be so is difficult to understand. 
Alternatively perhaps the Public Carriage Officers were as unattached to the Public 
Carriage Office as they apparently were to the taxi industry. My early interactions 
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with the PCO and my perceptions were, I learnt, not uncommon amongst Knowledge 
Boys. The institution that was the PCO, the building and its employees projected a 
very clear identity; they were above Knowledge Boys, authoritative, scrupulous, cold 
and discreet. The behaviours were almost akin to that of a closed religious order. The 
culture of the institution appeared to be strong and perhaps derived or influenced by 
the backgrounds and a priori of the management i.e. the police force. The 
demographic was narrow and therefore the behaviours that were exhibited were 
unsurprisingly similar. Why the PCO management encouraged, if they did, 
sanctioned, if they did, or even tolerated this unfriendly culture was and remains 
difficult to understand.  
 
The next section explores the power structure that was exercised by the PCO in 
general and its Knowledge of London examiners in particular. Although seen at times 
by some Knowledge Students as oppressive and unnecessary it was interesting to 
discover the high degree of consensual acceptance, and, amongst some in the 
industry, belief that the ritualised power plays were actually beneficial to the longevity 
of the industry. 
 
5.2.3 Public Carriage Office – Power Structure 
The Public Carriage Office is both highly regarded and feared by those in the 
industry. The PCO had the ultimate power with Knowledge Boys; the examiners 
could decide to sanction what are known as reductions (see glossary) or ask 
awkward questions that meant that the Knowledge Boy was unable to proceed to 
become a taxi driver. For taxi drivers the PCO has the power to pass his taxi 
mechanically sound to operate for another year or to insist on a plethora of minor (or 
major) repairs prior to passing or licensing the taxi. Likewise the PCO has the power 
to revoke licences. On the more positive side the PCO is viewed by some as the 
bulwark of the industry and through its power to uphold standards provided 
reassurance of the industry’s continued existence and future.   
 
Although the Public Carriage Office exerts considerable power over the Knowledge 
of London and vehicle licensing processes it is not the only power structure within the 
industry nor is it the only institution, either internal or external, to the industry that can 
exercise power over, or influence on it. Amongst London’s taxi drivers there appears 
to be confusion about where power lies, its use, misuse and impact on their identity. 
Metonyms (Musson and Tietze, 2004) appear to be used to disguise their confusion; 
terms such as Penton Street [the location of the Public Carriage Office], the PCO 
[Public Carriage Office often shortened to the Carriage Office], and the vaguer terms 
them and they. Assertions such as; they should do something about minicabs 
[meaning presumably that the Public Carriage Office need to initiate change to 
legislation or regulation], or, it is alright for them dictating which vehicle we have to 
use [vehicle types for use as taxis are prescribed by law], are common amongst 
groups of taxi drivers when discussing the shortcomings of or desired changes to the 
industry. These terms are used to signify decisions, pronouncements and impacts on 
their job, security or as a demand for action e.g. Penton Street need to do something 
about this.  
 
These vague almost metaphorical (Musson and Tietze, 2004) references to authority 
I feel contrast very strongly with the very clear delineation and structure of power at 
Fords (Beynon, 1975). The understanding of those structures appears to be 
facilitated by the trade unions at Fords. A clear difference between the situation at 
Fords (Beynon, 1975) and the taxi industry is that at Fords the workers were clear 
about the power structure within the organisation and how they identified and 
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interfaced with it. Apparently the workers at Fords felt threatened by the organisation 
but protected by both their union and their group behaviour or response to any 
dispute or realised threat. Whereas in the taxi industry the fear of assimilation is 
widely felt, as explained during the taxi driver interviews I undertook, the facilitation or 
protection enjoyed at Fords is absent due to the lack of commitment by the majority 
of taxi drivers to organisations such as unions and trade associations (Townsend 
2007), and the disparate nature of the industry structure. Arguably it is easier to 
organise groups of workers who are in the same building or at the same plant each 
day. The virtual structure of the taxi industry adds a layer of complexity to anybody or 
any group seeking to coordinate unified behaviour in response to a threat. 
 
Within the London taxi industry there is no tradition of any coordinated or group 
response to any external or realised threat to individuals or the industry in general. 
The workers at Fords were able to identify with the union whereas the taxi drivers 
appear to identify with the Knowledge and the longevity of their industry to provide 
some form of job protection or obstacle to change. It is interesting that whilst the taxi 
industry clearly has structural weaknesses that mitigate against waging an effective 
defence of the status quo or pushing back any imposed changes, politicians appear 
genuinely concerned at the influence that the industry can generate (The Economist, 
2002). 
 
Beynon’s (1975) book is rich with stories of management and workers battling out the 
dividing lines between power, control and identity. Workers were apparently able to 
identify with either Fords or with their trade union but not both. Taxi drivers do not 
have the same enemy as the Ford workers as discussed by Beynon (1975) i.e. 
management, neither do they have the protection of a trade union in the way Beynon 
(1975) describes it nor the group dynamics and unity displayed by workers at Fords. 
 
The Public Carriage Office’s use and arguably misuse of power (Townsend, 2007) 
appears to be accepted consensually by the industry. This phenomenon appears to 
be a consequence of taxi drivers’ fear of assimilation and their implicit belief that the 
tougher the regulatory regime the more likely the industry will remain in in its present 
incarnation. The ritualised torment of Knowledge Boys during their Knowledge of 
London tests is seen as a quality control measure and, although not explicitly stated, 
I strongly suspect as an effective barrier to entry to the industry. 
 
The Public Carriage Office whilst viewed by some in the industry as misusing power 
appears actually to align with many in the industry through the retention of the high 
standards in the vehicle testing that the industry generally champions as a key 
differentiator with minicabs. Its use of power concerned with the Knowledge is 
accepted consensually by many. The taxi industry appears impotent in protecting 
itself from imposed change or abuse of power but has the reputation of being 
fearsomely powerful by some outside of the industry. This paradox is interesting and 
somewhat puzzling. Comparisons with other industries such as the motor industry 
provide some important contrasts; Ford workers were strongly aligned with their 
union and resentful of their management whereas the taxi industry seemed until 
recently unaligned with any organisations such as unions and unclear about who 
their enemy, if they had one, actually was. This situation was perhaps aggravated by 
the virtual nature of the industry.  
 
The PCO is seen as a powerful player in the taxi industry.  One of the ways in which 
this power is exerted is through its role as the sole taxi licencing body for London. Its 
methods are sometimes criticised by the industry but its purpose is accepted largely 
consensually. The next section describes the business process for learning the 
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Knowledge of London. Although neat and tidy in graphical form each step I was to 
discover was painful, difficult, demotivating and/or uncomfortable.  
5.2.4 The Business Process for Learning the Knowledge  
The business process for learning the Knowledge of London is set out below. The 
entire process took me just over a year but some students took double or treble that 
time due to other commitments. I have added a brief description of each stage of the 
process; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1 – The Knowledge Process 
Below is a diagram of my experience of the business process of learning the 
Knowledge. 
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Boys is considerable. The personal discomfort of travelling around London on a 
motorcycle, uncomfortable interviews, the scope of knowledge acquisition, the 
separation from wife and children, the financial deprivations of not being able to work 
overtime and overall adverse impact on friends, family and life are all narrated and 
discussed in the following sections. Like much of the Knowledge of London process 
there were no clear instructions as to how one went about applying and once 
accepted what one actually had to do. The next section explains what I and others 
discovered and how we progressed through the application process and induction 
meeting. 
 
5.2.5 The Knowledge of London - Application and Induction  
This section highlights important issues around the relationship between the PCO 
examiners and Knowledge Boys, their relevant identities and how these are 
presented and positioned. It is also important from the perspective of Knowledge 
Boys’ relationships with and to each other.  
 
My sister in law’s brothers and her father were all taxi drivers and it was they who 
informed me about what I needed to do to apply to begin the Knowledge. After 
obtaining the relevant forms from the Public Carriage Office (PCO) I completed them 
and returned the application and medical forms to the PCO. At this point I was asked 
to attend a meeting at the PCO on a set day and time over which there was no 
choice. I attended dressed in what is nowadays commonly termed smart casual as in 
my view I was only attending an introductory meeting. 
 
The induction meeting for new Knowledge Students took place in a large room at the 
Public Carriage Office, it held around 30 people. The seats were typical Government 
issue and made of tubular steel with a moulded grey plastic seat and backrest. My 
peers, the prospective taxi drivers, were all white males. Most were dressed in suits 
that had the appearance of mainly being used for interviews, weddings and funerals 
and few of my peers looked comfortable in them. There were clear signs of 
nervousness amongst the prospective taxi drivers; pale faces, sweating, 
uncomfortable gestures and worried expressions. On the way into the building I had 
seen several standing outside nervously smoking.  Personally, I felt quite comfortable 
despite being dressed a great deal less formally than my peers. In my view there was 
no threat or reason for concern. We were simply there for a presentation. The 
reasons for the appearance of nervousness amongst my peer group was, I later 
discovered, concerned with the rumours and stories (Stacey, 2000) that circulate in 
the taxi industry and amongst Knowledge Boys to which, up to this point, I was 
blissfully unaware. 
 
The meeting was conducted by a pleasant but rather stiff middle aged man who 
looked and dressed as described earlier (see section 5.2.2.). Hatch and Schultz 
(2000:19) propose that ‘communication of organizational identity to external 
stakeholders therefore requires opportunities for personal interaction with them’. The 
meeting was exactly that, the opportunity to communicate the Public Carriage 
Office’s identity with a group of prospective new entrants to the industry, which I 
remember feeling was governmental, formal, distant, cold and official. Christensen 
and Cheney (2000:258) expressed the belief that ‘most organizations want their 
audiences to see them as stable yet responsive entities, with an inspiring history and 
a reliable presence’. I am not convinced that this belief applies to my early 
experience of the Public Carriage Office. Whilst its staff were able to portray stability, 
the representative of the organisation showed no interest or aptitude for 
responsiveness. History was mentioned during the presentation but the presentation 
could not even remotely be described as inspiring. The Public Carriage Officer 
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appeared to see his presence as a stabilising influence on the process but he clearly 
had no personal connection with the industry, or if he had he went to great trouble to 
disguise it.  
 
The Public Carriage Officer was relatively well spoken with a trace of a Home 
Counties accent. He provided a brisk and somewhat lofty run through of the 
requirements of becoming a London taxi driver, occasionally delivered in somewhat 
withering tones. It was neither encouraging nor discouraging. He spoke in a matter of 
fact manner, outlining the scope of the Knowledge of London qualification by listing, 
somewhat airily, the types of landmarks, buildings and routes that prospective taxi 
drivers would be expected to learn, including around 25,000 streets. Interestingly 
Fisher (2008a) a part time journalist and London taxi driver who completed the 
Knowledge, claims that taxi drivers are required to learn 67,544 streets, considerably 
more than the Public Carriage Officer’s estimate. His presentation lacked any 
passion, any interest or any imperative. He could have been presenting a health and 
safety briefing that he had made hundreds of times before. I probably expected more 
encouragement and some emphasis on the scale of the task that the group were 
setting out to undertake. Notably there was no attempt at humour. 
 
The Public Carriage Officer went on to explain that recognising the location of 
landmarks and important buildings and knowing how to get from one ‘point’ [a point is 
the industry terminology for the start of a run. It can be a street, landmark, building or 
focal point] to another using the shortest route [known within the industry as a run] 
would form the basis of a series of verbal tests. His tone was what I considered at the 
time to be detached complacency. This may be explainable as Roy (1954:257) 
alluded to ‘the social class, educational, cultural and general historical awareness of 
actors condition the set of ideational resources which can be drawn on’. Did he view 
himself as a mature, white collar, professional from the middle classes addressing a 
group of young blue collar workers? Did he consider himself better educated or 
qualified than this group who would trawl the streets of London for years trying to 
acquire the Knowledge with many giving up the task as it proved too difficult for 
them? There appeared to be a power play at work but if that was the case what was 
the purpose? Watson helps here with his assertion that;  
 
‘we all work on our identities all of the time: making meaning through a 
dialogue with the culture (or cultures, in so far as we are parts of several 
groups), its norms, values and symbols. Through our actions we are 
contributing to culture as well as taking from it’ (Watson, 1994:21) 
 
One could certainly claim that either deliberately or subconsciously the Public 
Carriage Officer did a great deal of work on his identity during the meeting and as a 
by-product did quite a lot of work on our identity, which meant that by the end of the 
meeting I felt that both parties were quite clear that they came from different ends of 
a continuum and that there were no obvious shared values or goals. My goals were 
to join an industry to enjoy a relatively good income and flexible working hours, to be 
part of an admired and envied group of upper working class people and to feel a 
belonging to an iconic feature of life in London. The Public Carriage Officer appeared 
to distance himself from the industry and showed no enthusiasm for the industry, its 
iconic status or wish in any way to be part of it.   Dalton (1961:49) introduces the 
concept of being ‘able to work behind a screen of assured formalities’. As my 
engagement with the Public Carriage Office continued through my taxi driving career 
my perception was that formality was used as a defence mechanism, a safety 
blanket and a methodology to avoid dealing with issues. 
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These traits, discerned through the manner in which the Public Carriage Officer 
delivered his presentation, suggested to me that he saw himself as completely 
detached from the taxi industry. This struck me as strange as he was very much part 
of an organisation, the Public Carriage Office, that was in my, and I later discovered 
amongst many Knowledge Boys’, view totally omnipotent, and in reality was 
responsible for the administration of that very industry that he was at pains to 
distance himself from. The Public Carriage Officer displayed an identity that was far 
more associated with the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office, of which the 
Public Carriage Office was a department, rather than the taxi industry which it was 
responsible for administering and regulating, and with which it had daily contact. If 
the Public Carriage Officer on that day and my subsequent experience of them was 
meant to relate what Dutton and Dukerich (1991:521) defined as ‘organizational 
image’ being ‘what [organisational members] believe others see as distinctive about 
the organization’, it was certainly very clear that being inscrutable, clinical, detached, 
impersonal and in some way from a higher order were effectively communicated by 
this organisational member (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991).  
 
Watson (1982:266) posits  
 
‘the implicit contract which existed between each member of the group [that 
he was researching] and the organization was of the type more associated 
with members of the middle class than the working class’  
 
In this case it appeared to be that we were being excluded, subtly and skilfully, from 
any implicit contract other than to understand that like the gap between clergy and 
laity one is allowed to see in, but not to come in. Watson’s observation (above) was 
explicitly demonstrated and anyone who had the perception of belonging to, or an 
aspiration to join the middle class was clearly targeted and stripped of these illusions.   
 
The language the Carriage Officer used was accessible without being particularly 
inclusive. The Public Carriage Officer studiously avoided any hint of friendliness, 
encouragement, respect or awe for the task ahead. The administration of the process 
was clearly his only interest. He provided no advice on how to go about the learning 
process, no insight into the eventual job as a taxi driver and maintained an 
impersonal detachment throughout. He spoke of the public’s requirements ‘to jump 
into a taxi driven by a driver who knew where he was going’. The term public was 
delivered from my perspective as though the people at the meeting were not part of 
it, as though they were a race apart; these were Knowledge Boys and then there 
were the public, they were not interchangeable, one could almost describe this as 
being a form of caste system. This feeling, which I would attribute to a ‘radical 
humanist’ (Holland 1999:473) perspective of attempting to ‘alienate and dehumanise 
the person’ is one that I am not normally aware of feeling but in this case I felt it very 
strongly.  
 
By applying to become taxi drivers and by attendance at the Public Carriage Office’s 
introductory meeting we had somehow been positioned or involuntarily positioned 
ourselves as no longer members of the public. It could even be argued that we had 
ourselves surrendered our membership of the group known as the public and entered 
what was presented as the vague world of the Knowledge. Was this a way of 
establishing the Public Carriage Officer’s ‘group ideology’ (Watson 1982:266) through 
‘the development of a set of images and justifications’? If so what was their ideology? 
The implicit indications from the Public Carriage Officer were that Knowledge Boys 
were a form of sub class. Presumably if my earlier point pertains and the Public 
Carriage Officer’s behaviour was about his identity (Watson, 1994) and not ours, he 
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viewed himself as a member of the officer or executive class. I perceived that he was 
trying to establish a hierarchy whereby applicants to undertake the Knowledge of 
London were at the bottom. He certainly appeared to be at pains to make clear that 
he had personally managed to retain his membership of that group known as the 
public. 
 
The Public Carriage Officer went on to explain that road traffic and criminal offences 
incurred whilst acquiring the Knowledge of London would result in automatic 
exclusion from the Knowledge. This was delivered with the absolute conviction of an 
autocratic institution, an organisation that was above any normal legislative principles 
such as appeals, due process or judicial scrutiny. Watson (1994: 115) suggests that 
this is a management technique acting as ‘a unified body imposing a new language 
and way of thinking’. The thinking that was being encouraged was that the Public 
Carriage Office and its officers were empowered to act outside of the normal 
principles of natural justice. 
 
The Public Carriage Officer’s penultimate comment was that only ten out of every 
hundred applicants finish the course and become taxi drivers. This was delivered 
with mild glee, he could have added the words; so most of you are just wasting both 
your own and my time. What was apparent was that the Public Carriage Officer took 
no interest in, or no responsibility for, the high dropout rate. Whereas in many 
organisations this level of attrition would have been an area for concern there was no 
apparent concern acknowledged by the Public Carriage Officer. The Public Carriage 
Officer’s final and closing comment was linked to this statistic when he related that he 
would therefore probably not see most of us ever again and weakly, with some 
embarrassment or discomfort and certainly in my opinion no sincerity, wished me and 
the other prospective Knowledge Students luck with our endeavours.  
 
The meeting had lasted some 45 minutes. At the end we were invited to ask 
questions – oddly not one question was raised. This struck me at the time as a very 
odd event. I have often reflected on how the power play that was evident throughout 
the event evolved. Were we as a group already conditioned to accept that the Public 
Carriage Office and its officers were omnipotent? Were our predominantly working 
class sensitivities bowed by the Public Carriage Officer’s middle class pretensions?  
Did our desire to become a taxi driver, our self-interest (Watson 1982) overcome our 
natural instincts to ask questions, stick up for our rights and challenge authority? Or 
had the Public Carriage Officer spent the forty five minutes intimidating us all so we 
did not ask any questions?  
 
From my own perspective I had been told by my sister-in law’s father (who was a taxi 
driver) to say ‘yes sir, no sir, and three bags full sir’ when attending the meeting and 
if in any doubt to keep my mouth firmly closed if asked anything by the Public 
Carriage Officer. Perhaps everyone else at the meeting had been given the same 
advice or versions of it. My perception of this meeting was that it was a well-
rehearsed ritual where both parties had their clearly defined roles which they had 
played out. The Knowledge Boys had proven they were happy to capitulate their 
demographically cultivated behaviour norms in deference to the pretensions of the 
Public Carriage Officer. He had underlined the Public Carriage Office’s rumoured 
institutional omnipotence and privilege, and his personal seniority within the 
relationship through language and gesture. 
  
The delivery of the briefing by the Public Carriage Officer was slow, it was deliberate, 
it was withering and it came across as routine. Dickson and Buckholz (1979:235) 
refer to 
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‘the legacy of institutions and ideas which is ‘adopted’ be each generation, 
much as a child ‘adopts’ the grammar of his native language and, partially, as 
rationalizations of current self-interest and action. In this way ideologies are 
formulated through the constant interplay between current contingencies and 
historical legacies’. 
 
This begins to explain why we adopted our roles within the meeting. What is not 
explained is why at the end of the meeting everyone departed without comment or 
eye contact with one another. Why did this happen? Why was there not a sigh of 
relief, a smile, or a knowing wink? We were apparently of a similar age, culture, 
almost certainly from a working class background and I would suspect all Londoners. 
We were peers, we had all just been through the same shared experience and were 
heading for the same career. It struck me at the time and has since that the lack of 
recognition of one another amongst this group was strange and quite unusual. Lads 
of this age in similar situations often, in my experience, demonstrated some gesture 
or body language, a nod, a toss of the head, eyes rolling to heaven or muttered 
‘Alright’ or some other commonly observed term or behaviour. If an ideology had 
developed amongst this group, how had it happened? Did they all have relations who 
were taxi drivers and who told them before going to the meeting to adopt a totally 
different persona to that which is normally displayed amongst working class young 
men? I did not research this at the time but from my own perspective I had been told 
not to engage with anyone and just leave the meeting quietly by my brother’s taxi 
driver in-laws.  
 
On reflection I concluded that the meeting had demonstrated to me that people, me 
included, were prepared to jettison their normal social rituals, expectations and 
aspects of culture in exchange (Blau: 1986) for being recognised as conforming with 
the behaviour expected to be exhibited by the Public Carriage Office.  The unwritten 
rules had apparently been communicated to all those present who then adopted the 
role, the rituals and behaviour that was required. This struck me as incredible at the 
time and even now on reflection is surprising and notable. 
 
I perceived that the meeting had very little to do with explaining the Knowledge 
acquisition and testing process and instead was an exercise in using language to 
create a hierarchy and understanding about the institution and its relationship with 
Knowledge Boys, together with the behaviour expected from them. I wonder, on 
reflection, whether the introductory meeting at the Public Carriage Office and the 
behaviour demonstrated by both the Public Carriage Officer and the Knowledge Boys 
was an implicit contract (Watson, 1982:266) developed through tradition or whether it 
was a carefully orchestrated attempt to demonstrate the relationship between trade 
and regulator or possibly both. 
 
The next two sections describe the process for acquiring the Knowledge of London. 
The first considers the difficulties in finding out how to actually begin acquiring the 
Knowledge and the second describes the challenges of the process involved in 
testing. These difficulties and challenges are relevant to my research from the 
perspective of explaining the process that Knowledge Boys need to go through and 
the exacting detail that is involved in the learning and testing processes. It goes 
some way to explaining why acquiring the Knowledge of London takes so long and is 
considered so arduous by those who attempt to complete it. It also explains the high 
drop-out rate amongst Knowledge Boys. The length and the difficulties of acquiring 
the Knowledge of London appear to influence both the culture and the identity of 
London’s taxi drivers. The perseverance and tenacity required to complete the 
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Knowledge of London adds a Darwinian element to the demographic of the survivors 
i.e. those Knowledge Boys that actually qualify as London taxi drivers. 
 
5.2.6 The Knowledge of London - Path Finding 
This section is descriptive rather than analytic or reflexive as I believe it is important 
to describe the process of learning the Knowledge so that the scale and scope of the 
task is clearly defined.  
 
Having been to the Public Carriage Office for my introductory talk I embarked on 
acquiring the Knowledge of London. A booklet was provided by the Public Carriage 
Office known as The Blue Book, which curiously had a pink cover. The booklet listed 
486 runs that provide a framework for acquiring the Knowledge of London. An 
example was the simple listing of Manor House [Underground station] to Gibson 
Square; no other instructions were provided.  
 
The concept was to find the shortest distance between each point (e.g. Gibson 
Square is a point) noting places of worship, entertainment and importance, as well as 
landmarks and institutions such as hospitals, gentlemen’s clubs, embassies, airline 
offices, cemeteries, sporting venues and local authority buildings that were on the 
routes (or, as they are known in the industry, runs). In addition one was advised to try 
to remember junctions and side streets and generally to develop a complete picture 
of the run (e.g. Manor House to Gibson Square is a run). The advice on what to do 
and how to go about it was provided to me by my sister in law’s relatives who were 
London taxi drivers. However I was aware that they were printers working on national 
newspapers as well as taxi drivers with families and had busy lives. So despite 
implying a genuine willingness to help me I knew that the reality was that they did not 
have the time to do so. I also had gathered from my sister in law’s relatives that 
acquiring the Knowledge was to be a solitary occupation. Blau (1986:15) describes a 
‘solitary activity’ as ‘pathetic’ and I can concur with that description because trundling 
around the streets of London on a moped getting wet and cold was pathetic. 
 
The steps on the run, in effect a plan of the route, were ascertained by either of two 
main methods. The first method entailed Knowledge Boys purchasing or acquiring (I 
acquired them from my sister in law’s father) a complete set of blue book runs. These 
runs would contain a list of instructions similar to ones below; 
 
LoL  [Leave on the left]  Green Lanes 
X  [Cross]   Brownlow Road 
R [Right into]  Pemberton Road 
X [Cross]   Grosvenor Avenue 
F [Forward into]  Wallace Road 
 
The format above is important as the competency interviews [known as 
appearances] require the Knowledge Boy to provide their answers in a ritualised form 
based on the example above e.g. Leave on the left Green Lanes etc. 
 
Obtaining the runs already formulated as above made getting started as a 
Knowledge Boy very easy as it avoids having to work out routes prior to setting off.  It 
also avoids having to change routes when one is out on the motorbike learning them 
and discovering that a route has to be recalculated due to restricted turns, one way 
systems etc which were not discernible from maps. The development of Satellite 
Navigation Systems (SatNavs) and map based computer applications postdates my 
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involvement with the Knowledge. The impact of SatNavs and other technologies on 
the process of learning the Knowledge will be an interesting area for further research.   
 
An alternative approach is known as ‘cottoning up runs’ (Townsend, 2003:11). 
Cottoning up involves a process whereby the two points of the run e.g. Manor House 
(Underground Station) and Gibson Square are located on a map and then a piece of 
cotton is stretched across the map between the two points. The Knowledge Boy then 
traces the shortest route, in effect the roads and streets straddling the length of the 
cotton, and records these for later use on his moped when he goes out to learn the 
streets and landmarks. This method is an excellent methodology to build a picture of 
the map of London in one’s head, as one is constantly referring to the map and 
learning the relationships between main arterial and radial routes. It also assists with 
spatial familiarity. However it is often fraught with problems when one actually drives 
the run due to one way systems, restricted turns and roads that are closed in the 
middle or partially or fully pedestrianised.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Knowledge Boy 
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A Knowledge Boy (reproduced by kind permission of 
http://www.pbase.com/reddishtiger/image/47397549)  
 
As can be appreciated the level of detail that the Knowledge student is required to 
learn is significant and many regard it as tougher than a degree course. That was 
certainly my experience. The requirement to actually visit all of the points, drive and 
learn the runs and as a consequence being exposed to the elements begins to 
explain why many people consider the Knowledge such a difficult task. As discussed 
elsewhere, these difficulties ensure that only the most determined and tenacious 
Knowledge Boys complete the course. This has the effect of limiting the demographic 
of taxi drivers to the determined and tenacious. The cost of the Knowledge from an 
intellectual, personal, financial and physical endurance perspective affects taxi 
drivers’ identity and leads them to feel that their job should be secure as they have in 
effect earned a right to be a taxi driver. It also has the effect of drivers positioning 
themselves as being at the top of a vocational driving hierarchy. These perceptions 
evidently impact the culture of drivers and of the industry more generally. 
 
In the next section I examine the Knowledge of London testing process  
 
5.2.7 Threat to Masculine Self 
This section examines two cultures; that of the Public Carriage Office and its 
examiners and staff and the Knowledge Boys who were trying to become London taxi 
drivers. The two cultures were in most respects very different. There are also clear 
examples of identity cultivation amongst both groups, both for very different reasons. 
 
Power plays were very evident amongst the Public Carriage Officers who had the 
mechanisms in place to stop, hold back and hinder the progress of Knowledge Boys 
apparently quite autonomously and without any sense of fairness or potential for 
audit or appeal. There were no video cameras, recorders or any other equipment 
used during appearances [the colloquial name for topographical competence tests] 
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and therefore no audit trail of appearances. Any complaints would have been simply 
dealt with on the basis of the Knowledge Boy’s word against the Public Carriage 
Officer’s.  I have no evidence of anyone ever complaining in a formal manner about 
the conduct of any competency test as do so would have exposed the Knowledge 
Boy to the risk of being held back i.e. stopped from progressing to become a taxi 
driver. 
 
Scwalbe and Wolkomir (2001: 209) purport that when interviewing men ‘where an 
interview is held conveys a message about what the interaction is about’. Their 
advice concerned selecting appropriate venues. The Public Carriage Office appeared 
to wish to convey that Knowledge Students were very small cogs in a very big wheel. 
Their physical comfort and emotional needs did not feature and if there was an 
objective, establishing discomfort appeared to be the goal. In each examiner’s office, 
which was bare and cold, there were two chairs, one for the examiner positioned 
behind his desk and one for the student. The student’s chair was positioned 
approximately ten feet from the examiner’s desk. 
 
The ritual on entering the Public Carriage Officer’s office was to stand in front of his 
desk until he had sat down (or if already seated looked up) and outstretched his 
hand, at which point the Knowledge Boy handed the Public Carriage Officer his 
appointment card (see appendix 4). He would then wait to be asked or be told to sit 
down. This instruction varied slightly by examiner from officious to almost being 
politely invited to do so.  
 
Stories abounded amongst Knowledge Boys of Knowledge Students sitting down 
before being asked or invited to do so, or moving the chair nearer to the examiner’s 
desk and starting the appearance by being asked “Are you a furniture remover Mr X” 
or “Do you, or have you ever, worked for Pickfords” [a large, well known furniture 
removal company] and when the surprised interviewee responded in the negative he 
was told in no uncertain terms to ‘leave the furniture alone then and replace the chair 
in its original position’. This ‘minimizing’ (Scwalbe and Wolkomir 2001: 209) appeared 
to me to be a demonstration of power, to set the scene and to reinforce the formality 
which was used to maintain control. 
 
The ritualistic questioning was in my view a tactic designed to impose or retain 
control. At each appearance the examiner launched into asking about eight questions 
in rapid succession which took the format of “take me from Smith Street to Portman 
Square”. This took place without any niceties or greeting. 
 
Scwalbe and Wolkomir 2001:208) propose that ‘the interviewer will offer some sort of 
preamble before launching into questions’; their advice is written as a guide to good 
interviewing techniques. The very opposite appears to be the case with Public 
Carriage Office examiners who studiously avoided any small talk or ‘preamble before 
launching into questions’ Scwalbe and Wolkomir (2001: 208). The motivation for this 
appears to be in order to exercise control and/or distance, authority or even 
inscrutability rather than what Scwalbe and Wolkomir (2001:208) suggest as the 
correct way to set the scene for an interview; ‘This lets men feel less like they 
relinquishing control to a stranger with an unknown agenda’. An unknown agenda 
describes precisely the nature of the interview questions being asked which involvd 
journeys from anywhere to anywhere within Europe’s largest city. 
 
Scwalbe and Wolkmir (2001:204) explain that ‘in Western culture, men who wish to 
claim the full privileges of manhood [or in this case seniority] must distinguish 
themselves from women [or in this case Knowledge Boys] by signifying greater 
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desires and capacities for control of people and the world, autonomous thought and 
action, [and] rational thought and action’. Scwalbe and Wolkmir (2001:204) describe 
this concept as ‘masculine self’. Ironically I consider that the interviewers (the 
Knowledge of London examiners) were very aware of the threat to masculine self 
(Scwalbe and Wolkomir , 2001) and of demonstrating their perceived power, and 
thereby to locate Knowledge Boys as lesser (less masculine) beings. It would appear 
that the interview was considered a success by the Public Carriage Officers if the 
threat to masculine self was fully realised and adversely affected the Knowledge 
Boy’s confidence and consequently his ability to respond competently to verbal 
testing.  
 
This implicit threat to masculinity may well have contributed significantly to the dread 
of appearances that many Knowledge Boys described. The combined impact of 
unfamiliar surroundings, a ritualised approach to the interview including, arrival, the 
small and uncomfortable waiting room, being called from afar, ritualised presentation 
of the appointment card, not allowing the student to reposition the chair and then ‘to 
open oneself to interrogation is to put oneself in a vulnerable position, and thus to put 
one’s masculinity further at risk’ Scwalbe and Wolkomir (2001: 218). For many 
Knowledge Boys this would have been, and appeared to be, a nerve wracking 
experience. 
 
Although positioned as topographical knowledge tests, appearances appear to have 
been contrived to reduce Knowledge Boys’ confidence, deliberately unsettle the 
students and to make each appearance an endurance. When one adds in the 
financial and relationship stresses that are caused by the need to spend many hours 
away from home and work on a motorbike learning London’s streets the importance 
of quickly proceeding through the Knowledge was heightened and it is easy to 
understand why these apparently important occasions ended up for many as 
occasions to dread. 
 
The Knowledge I discovered was bathed in ritual and pretension. These conditions 
had the effect of heightening any lack of confidence or nervousness amongst 
prospective Knowledge Students. This phenomenon was used by Knowledge Boys 
to develop stories and rumours which were often exaggerated adding to the stress of 
the Knowledge Boys. Like the training to acquire the Knowledge of London, the 
testing process was another test of endurance, tenacity and determination which 
restricted the pool of Knowledge Boys who actually survived to become taxi drivers.   
 
The next section looks at behaviours between Knowledge Boys and how they formed 
groups and communities under certain conditions, but remained aloof singly or in 
small numbers in others.  
 
5.2.8 Behaviour Between Knowledge Boys 
In this section I examine the differing views amongst Knowledge Boys and taxi 
drivers about the task of the acquiring the Knowledge of London. I also provide a 
glimpse at the culture of Knowledge Boys through some insights into the behaviours 
and interactions between Knowledge Boys.  
 
Learning the Knowledge was undertaken by most Knowledge Boys I knew and saw 
using mopeds. Normally the mopeds had a perspex or wooden board attached to the 
handlebars on which the details of the run or a map could be attached so that the 
Knowledge Boy only had to glance down as he was driving along to see the next step 
on the run (see illustration on page 87). A moped was the ideal transport to get 
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around and learn London as Knowledge Boys could stop at various points of interest 
and make notes or consult maps without adversely impacting other traffic.  
 
These mopeds with their tell-tale board enabled fellow Knowledge Boys to be 
identified. The convention appeared to be that Knowledge Boys nodded at one 
another but conversation was rare even when arriving almost together at the same 
point at the end of a run. Where conversation did take place it was strangely stilted 
and cumbersome. There was an apparent embarrassment and barely disguised 
desire to avoid conversation and engagement. This behaviour appeared strange to 
me as in other scenarios where similar aged groups of lads from similar social 
backgrounds with a common interest met conversation was easy. The Knowledge 
appeared to provide a common starting point for conversation but did not seem in 
practice to do so.  
 
Normally Knowledge Boys driving their runs and looking up points operated alone, 
but occasionally pairs were spotted. Conversation was strangely negative for a group 
of fairly young men. An opening question such as, “How’s it going” would in most 
walks of life I had experienced warrant a polite, “Fine thanks” or even “Great”. 
Knowledge Boys responded with comments such as; “It’s tough isn’t it”, “Not too bad” 
or occasionally; “It’s a nightmare” or just shrugged their shoulders nonchalantly or 
rolled their eyes upwards in a gesture suggesting “Don’t ask”. In my experience there 
was no concept of mentoring or mutual support as responders did not want to pursue 
the point that they had made. Nor did they wish to discuss the Knowledge, the run 
they had just completed or any other similar subjects. This I considered to be odd as 
the Knowledge and its foibles were the only subjects we as strangers had in 
common. Stacey (2001) describes these interactions as ‘the local rules of 
communicative interaction’ (2001:119). There was only one occasion where this 
experience was positive which I discuss later. It appeared to me that Knowledge 
Boys just wanted to get on with the Knowledge in their solitary and insular style.  
 
The Knowledge was for me, in the main, a soulless, depressing and lonely activity. It 
frequently involved getting freezing cold and soaking wet and then trundling around 
for hours in that uncomfortable state. In order to complete all the runs, one had to 
travel considerable distances to the extremities of Greater London. Practical issues 
such as finding public toilets were a major issue. Some areas of London had both a 
reputation and a feeling of being quite inhospitable and sinister, added to which 
mopeds are prone to reliability problems which is a real nuisance if you are many 
miles from home. 
 
Taxi Driver Interviewee No.4 had a different view concerning the Knowledge to most 
other taxi drivers I had discussed this with. Taxi Driver Interviewee No.4 thought, 
‘The Knowledge was the best thing that one could ever do’. He confessed to ‘driving 
around struggling (to remember places etc) for eight months’ and then ‘eight months 
and a day later it came together’. He enjoyed learning the streets and the history (of 
London and its environs); he, ‘loved every minute of it’. 
A driver interviewed by Garner and Stokoe (2000:46) is less relaxed about the 
Knowledge process, ‘It’s like a recurring nightmare – you have to keep at it. Go out 
on the bike six or seven times per week. If you leave off for a week or two you lose it 
[i.e. you forgot what you had learnt previously]’. 
Acquiring the Knowledge is a self-managing activity. Knowledge Boys decide 
personally how much time to spend acquiring the Knowledge and at what times. 
They appear to operate alone and not to engage in small talk together, despite 
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sharing a common interest and through it a common bond with other Knowledge 
Boys. Despite the relatively narrow demographic, mainly young, working class men 
with a shared interest, they were not normally disposed to converse or share 
experiences. This culture appears to be developed disparately as many Knowledge 
Boys did not attend Knowledge Schools or congregate in groups. Possibly their taxi 
driver sponsors or mentors told them not to spend time chatting and instead get on 
with the Knowledge. Alternatively the hours away from home and impact on earnings 
through not being able to work overtime may have imposed their own discipline. As I 
explain later the experience as a Knowledge Boy on the road was very different to 
my experiences when I joined a Knowledge School.   
The next section concerns an activity known as calling over which enables the 
Knowledge Student to learn and then recite the runs that he had learnt whilst out on 
his motorbike. This was important as not only did it remind the Knowledge Student of 
the runs he had learnt but also enabled him to practice annunciating the run in the 
format required by the Public Carriage Office. The section below provides an 
important insight into the community based culture of taxi drivers which in the case 
below demonstrates the supportive nature of that culture. There is also discussion of 
the impact of the Knowledge on the wives, girlfriends and mothers of Knowledge 
Boys.    
 
5.2.9 Calling Over 
I was told by my taxi driving in laws that it was best to continually repeat to oneself 
the streets that one had travelled along throughout the run that one was learning, so 
that by the end of the run it could all be recited and committed to one’s memory 
banks. This practice was known as calling over.  On some runs this was easy yet on 
many it was very difficult as at the end of the run one could not remember where the 
run had started let alone recall the streets on the run. It was very demotivating and 
occasionally depressing. It was easy to see why the dropout rate, as described by 
the Public Carriage Officer at the introductory talk (see section 5.2.5) to the 
Knowledge, was so high. As well as the physical discomfort, the mental pedagogic 
challenge and the psychological stress of the task was hugely time consuming 
(Garner and Stokoe, 2000). I spent three or four full days per week on my bike and 
two or three hours an evening on call-overs (Townsend, 2003:14) [Call-overs or 
calling over were the industry terms applied to a practice whereby someone would 
assist a Knowledge Boy to recite the runs they knew]. I was to learn that the time I 
expended on the Knowledge was fairly typical of most Knowledge Boys who actually 
completed the Knowledge. 
 
The process is to call over a list of directions, in a set format, for each run from 
memory, naming all of the streets, roads etc that took you from the start point to the 
end of the run. Students needed to mention whenever they could the major roads 
they had crossed, and then checking that the run that they had called over was 
correct (Townsend, 2003).  
 
Calling over is an activity that often involved two or more Knowledge Boys or in some 
cases a wife (Fisher, 2008), a girlfriend (Townsend, 2003) or even the Knowledge 
Boy’s mother (Fisher, 2008). The call over partner would announce the two points 
[the pick-up and destination in the same style as the PCO] e.g. Manor House to 
Gibson Square, the Knowledge Boy would provide the location of the two points 
verbally from memory i.e. Green Lanes, N16 and Theberton Street, N1, and then 
proceed to recite the run [The shortest route between the two points] in the same 
manner as was used by the Public Carriage Office for the verbal tests used to assess 
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competence. These are in effect mock Public Carriage Office topographical 
competency tests. 
 
This activity could be very stressful as the wives, girlfriends or mothers didn’t have 
any reference point apart from the printed or hand written run in front of them. 
Sometimes a Knowledge Boy when answering may have missed out a technical 
point e.g. crossing a road which is a nice to have rather than an essential element of 
the run, the non-Knowledge Boy call-over partner would stop the call-over and the 
Knowledge Boy would be struggling to understand why. Wives of taxi drivers I have 
come across in a social environment often talk about when their husband was on the 
Knowledge and their dread of assisting their partner/husband with call-overs. Call 
overs with taxi drivers or other Knowledge Boys were much easier and provided a 
social aspect to acquiring the Knowledge.  I joined a Knowledge School (see below) 
which enabled me to find two call over partners and most evenings we went around 
to each other’s houses and called over for two or three hours. One of my call-over 
partner’s prospective father-in-law, Charlie Rubenstein, was a taxi driver and he used 
to take great delight in testing both his future son-in-law and I and was far tougher 
than the Public Carriage Office examiners. He also used to provide what I considered 
at the time to be interesting snippets about the industry, an industry which in truth I, 
along with most Knowledge Boys, knew little about.  
 
During my research these snippets about the industry became an increasingly 
important source of information and knowledge about my new career and assisted 
me to learn about the culture of the industry. Stacey terms this phenomenon as 
‘narrative knowledge’ (2001:123) which he describes as being ‘embodied in the 
informal stories they tell each other about their work’. These stories provided me with 
information about issues such as taxi driver etiquette, the unwelcome behaviour and 
sharp practices of some drivers at hotels, reports regarding the behaviour and 
interactions with customers and discussions about real life trips that Rubenstein had 
picked up and the route he had had taken. Rubenstein gave up two or three evenings 
per week to assist his future son-in-law and me to acquire the Knowledge of London. 
Rubenstein was a taxi driver helping a new entrant. Whilst fully understanding why 
he might help his future son in law to get a new and hopefully well paid job it 
appeared to me to be an act of philanthropy for him to help me. Perhaps he gained 
from Blau’s concept of ‘social exchange’ (1986:8). 
 
Rubenstein also had three brothers who had become taxi drivers. I never discussed 
why he and his brothers had become taxi drivers but it was interesting that this family 
tradition had moved into the next generation with his future son-in-law becoming a 
Knowledge Boy and ultimately a taxi driver. During my time in the industry I assessed 
that 20-25% of the drivers I knew were 2nd or 3rd generation taxi drivers. This 
phenomenon was important to the culture of the industry as it provided continuity, 
generational links and channels through which historical stories were communicated. 
The longevity of the taxi industry appeared important to taxi drivers and was an 
important aspect of their culture and identity. 
 
This section has highlighted the demands of the Knowledge from a time perspective 
and the impact on, and help from, Knowledge Boys’ families. It also provides an 
insight into the consensual acceptance of the Public Carriage Offices’ ritualised 
topographical testing regime. The impact on the culture and identity of taxi drivers is 
clearly significant due to involvement of family and friends and the self help and 
support networks that develop around the Knowledge Boys, as well as the intellectual 
and mental effort that was expended on acquiring the Knowledge. An important 
benefit of Knowledge Boys engaging with taxi drivers was that they began to receive 
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an insight into the industry, its rituals, its customs and day to day experience of being 
a taxi driver. This was often the first real insight that Knowledge Boys had of the 
industry that was to be their career.     
 
The next section concerns another institution of the taxi industry, Knowledge 
Schools. My experience of the Knowledge School that I joined and then attended 
presented a very different culture amongst Knowledge Boys to that I experienced at 
the Public Carriage Office induction meeting and those Knowledge Boys I happened 
across whilst out on my motorbike acquiring the Knowledge of London. The 
Knowledge Boys who attended the Knowledge School that I belonged to presented a 
different identity and exhibited very different behaviours. They were much more of a 
community. This identity, the culture and the behaviours and social norms that had 
developed are described below. 
5.2.10 Knowledge Schools 
One particular encounter with a fellow Knowledge Boy led me to join a Knowledge 
School (see photograph below). The chap I met, whilst out on my moped, was a 
cheerful, cockney street wise type who enquired how I was getting on, this was quite 
unusual amongst Knowledge Boys.  He quickly came to the conclusion that I was in 
need of some serious assistance. He advised me to join a particular Knowledge 
School, the first time I had realised such places existed.  
 
 
 
A Knowledge School (http://www.the-london-taxi.com/siteimages/hires/Knowledge-
school-1.JPG)  
 
The Knowledge School was housed above a working men’s social club in the 
Ladbroke Grove area of West London. The school was situated in what was a large, 
rather run down, former functions room which was arranged with about 30 square 
tables each surrounded by four seats. The tables were covered with large maps of 
London mounted on boards and covered in plastic to preserve them. The manager 
and teacher was Stanley King, a pleasant and helpful man in his fifties who had been 
a taxi driver for many years. When I first joined the school he introduced me to, and 
sat me on a table with, another three Knowledge Students as he termed them. These 
Knowledge Students along with all the others I met at the Knowledge School were 
very friendly and happy to both enquire about my experiences with the Knowledge 
and relay theirs. There was a ‘we are all in this together’ atmosphere. This was very 
different to any previous encounters with Knowledge Boys whom I met on the road 
where conversation was rare and where it did take place it had been stilted. This was 
an interesting environment as there was definitely what Blau (1986:8) described as 
‘social exchange’ in evidence.  
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The groupings at the Knowledge School were based on Blau’s (1986:20) proposition 
that there are two types of association, where attraction is based on whether the 
outcome will be ‘extrinsically’ or ‘intrinsically’ beneficial. At the Knowledge School as 
far as possible Knowledge Boys selected the table to sit on primarily for extrinsic 
benefit. I was to discover that they were not there to help others but instead they 
were there to be helped and so sitting on a table with Knowledge Students that were 
more advanced than themselves made for a more beneficial session than one where 
the students were just pleasant and friendly but at the beginning of their learning and 
therefore of little, if any, help, or likely to provide any real benefit. However more 
advanced students had little interest in having novices at their table so manoeuvres 
took place to exclude those who had little to offer but much to gain. Normally these 
manoeuvres involved placing jackets or bags on seats or claiming that someone was 
expected to take the empty seat, or similar ploys. This was a social exchange (Blau, 
1986) scenario; when one first joined the school seats were hard to find but as one 
progressed with the Knowledge one was welcomed by all and one found oneself in 
increasing demand and popularity.     
 
The ethos of the school was self-help, with Knowledge Boys testing one another with 
some guidance from the teacher. The data that informed the curriculum at the 
Knowledge School was based on a group of students who stood outside the Public 
Carriage Office asking Knowledge Boys as they left the Public Carriage Office what 
questions they had been asked at their appearance [verbal topographical 
competency test] and then reproducing these questions on printed sheets. They also 
asked each Knowledge Student which examiner they had had their appearance with. 
On the sheets, next to each question, were listed the initials of the examiner who had 
asked the questions and the phase of testing that the student who was being asked 
the questions was on e.g. 56 days, 28 days, 21 days or 14 days. [Appearances start 
at 56 days and as progress is made the duration between each is reduced, 
conversely if progress is not made the duration can increase to 112 days etc]. An 
example of the entries on the sheet is below; 
 
Lippet 21 [Days) 
King Edward’s Street   to   King Edward’s Lane 
Royal Free Hospital  to  St Pancras Coroners’ Court 
 
Finlay 14 [Days] 
William Wallis Memorial  to  The Scotch House 
Dunedin House  to  Caledonian Airways 
 
Each sheet contained around 25 questions, or runs as they are known in the 
industry, and therefore 50 points [The start and end of each run is called a point]. It 
was considered important amongst Knowledge Boys to travel to each point to see 
exactly where it was and if there were any road traffic restrictions that would require a 
Knowledge Boy to provide a protracted answer, for example to see if there was a 
barrier in the middle of the road that would prevent the Knowledge Student 
answering “drop on the right” or similar. It was also suggested by Knowledge Boys 
that travelling to the point assisted them to remember it as well as developing the skill 
of getting from one random point to another. 
 
Predominantly the age range of the students at the Knowledge School was fairly 
narrow between the mid-twenties and up to around thirty five. Approximately a third 
of the people were working in full time jobs and undertaking the Knowledge in their 
spare time. There were two sessions at the Knowledge School, lunchtime and 
evening, Monday to Friday. The lunchtime group was smaller than the evening 
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group. The lunchtime group were predominantly full time Knowledge Students or 
students with a part time job. A number of full time Knowledge Students had been 
undertaking the Knowledge on a part time basis until they reached a certain stage 
e.g. their appearances were reduced to a twenty one day frequency.  The rumour 
(Stacey, 2001) amongst Knowledge Boys was that a reduction to a twenty one day 
testing frequency was significant and implied acceptance by the Public Carriage 
Office that the student’s Knowledge of London had reached a standard that had 
demonstrated the potential of the Knowledge Boy’s Knowledge to progress to 
become a taxi driver.  There was never any evidence for this claim that I was aware 
of but this interpretation offered the opportunity for the student to feel they were 
exercising some control or ownership of the process. Evidence of this was that those 
part time students who could afford to do so, including myself, often decided to 
become full time students at this point.  This interpretation enabled a pseudo 
milestone to be introduced into the process where few formal milestones existed. 
 
The evening group was almost one hundred per cent part time Knowledge Students 
with full time jobs. Evenings attracted the very small number of mature or older 
students. The diversity of the group was narrow and appeared to include a 30/70 split 
between Jewish and non-Jewish students, who were what could be described as 
white British males with literally one to two per cent of non-white students. None of 
the students appeared to have any obvious disability.  I was a fairly typical white, 
male British Londoner, who began as a part time student moving to become a full 
time Knowledge Student once I reached the 21 day testing threshold, and so was 
part of the stereotypical Knowledge Student population. The demographic struck me 
as unusual given the multi-cultural make up of London and the fact that around 50% 
of the population is female. 
 
My experience was that much of the Knowledge Students’ time together at 
Knowledge Schools is spent demonising the Public Carriage Office and its officers 
and frightening the life out of each other through exchanging stories, anecdotes and 
gossip. Stacey explains this activity; ‘individuals are constructing much of the world in 
which they act’ (2011:33). The activity was a representation of narrative knowledge 
(Stacey, 2001).  
 
Stacey, (2001:33) suggests that; 
 
‘understanding [the] mind not simply as processes of representing an external 
reality but as processes of fantasy, repression, and so on, which construct an 
‘inner world’ in which perceptions of reality may well be distorted’.  
 
Dalton (1961:64) describes ‘random cliques’ who congregate to exchange 
‘incomplete bits of information’ (Dalton 1961:64). In the case of the Knowledge of 
London process these activities have the effect of adding unnecessarily to the stress 
of appearances [verbal competency tests] that many students experienced and the 
onerous demands of the Knowledge in general.  
 
It is difficult to see why this ritual of spreading rumours, telling stories, creating myths 
and generally creating mischief has become established and further why it continues. 
If as Stacey (2001) suggests the mind is constructing this world, what is the logic for 
developing an even more stressful situation than the actuality of it. One consideration 
could be that it is the creation of an excuse for failure or to exaggerate the difficulties 
and challenges to enhance the status of the Knowledge amongst non-taxi driver 
peers. As analysed later in this account this phenomenon is repeated amongst taxi 
drivers. It appears from Dalton (1961); Beynon (1975); Watson (1994), that 
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workplace gossip and exchange of ‘incomplete bits of information’ (Dalton,1961:64) 
is a normal workplace occupation. Watson (1994:21) describes gossip as a form of 
‘talking to our culture’ and of ‘coping’ with the big issues in life. In this scenario 
perhaps Watson’s views could be stretched to highlighting a fear of never finishing 
the Knowledge and of the personal and financial impacts that this would have on the 
Knowledge student. Alternatively it could be viewed as creating an unnecessarily 
competitive environment which to some degree has a Darwinian effect of causing the 
weaker to drop out of the Knowledge thereby freeing up capacity for the stronger or 
more determined to succeed.   
 
From the perspective of the aims of my research the Knowledge School provided a 
rich research setting. Behaviours were much more community based than was the 
case with random encounters with Knowledge Boys on the road. Social exchange 
was in evidence as were the manoeuvrings to gain maximum benefit. Stories and 
anecdotes formed a significant part of the conversations that took place. Although the 
culture was based on self-help and mutual support there was also an undercurrent of 
one upmanship and a power culture based on spreading fear. There were some 
elements of identity cultivation; to appear more knowledgeable and to have more 
apocalyptic stories than other Knowledge Students. This slightly competitive culture 
was interesting to me as there was no real benefit to position oneself as more 
knowledgeable than other students other than from a self-worth perspective and to 
encourage invitations to sit with more advanced students.   
 
In the next section the culture and behaviours exhibited by both Knowledge Boys and 
office staff at the Public Carriage Office (PCO) are considered. I also look at how 
principles and expectations of reasonable well-mannered behaviour are sacrificed in 
order to demonstrate conformity with the perceived formal cultural of the PCO. This 
section is important in the context of the Knowledge of London testing process, 
known as appearances in the industry, which is discussed in detail in section 5.2.12  
5.2.11 Public Carriage Office - Organisational Culture 
The second interaction that most Knowledge Students have with the Public Carriage 
Office (PCO) is when they are required to attend their first appearance. The 
appearance is a verbal test of the Knowledge Boy’s topographical knowledge as 
described in section 5.2.10. In this section I examine the culture and exhibited 
behaviours of both groups; the Knowledge Boys and the staff at the PCO, I also look 
at how identity of the individual is sacrificed in order to demonstrate conformity with 
the rumoured requirements of the PCO. It is important to note that the Knowledge 
process was based on rumour and expectation rather than a clear set of published 
requirements.  
  
The verbal competency tests at the Public Carriage Office, known in the industry as 
appearances [presumably because the student was asked to appear in front of the 
examiner], were apparently nerve wracking occasions for many Knowledge Boys. 
The reasons for this were initially unclear to me. Many of the people I knew, or whom 
I got to know, that were Knowledge Students were far from easily intimidated. Many 
were East Enders, ex boxers, street wise, physically and mentally tough and robust 
characters (Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1.) so what was it that injected such a visible 
and explicit nervousness into their normally calm and confident demeanour?  
 
Scwalbe and Wolkomir (2001, 206) suggest that issues such as ‘race, class and age 
in combination with certain topics, can also heighten the threat potential of an 
interview’. For many Knowledge Students, age and class were a potential threat, as 
the Knowledge Boy community evidently consisted predominantly of young cockney, 
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working class lads whilst the examiners were apparently white, middle aged or older, 
fairly well spoken professionals who were of the Knowledge Boys’ parents’ or even 
grand parents’ generation.  
 
 
Knowledge of London examiners. (Callsign, 2003:8) 
 
The appearances consisted of a question starting with any street, landmark or 
building in the whole of London and ending with the route to any other street or 
building in the whole of London. The randomness of the questions does much to 
explain the unpredictable nature of the appearance and hence the nervousness of 
Knowledge Students. I observed that for married Knowledge Boys in particular the 
outcome of a bad appearance, i.e. where the Knowledge Boy was unable to answer 
the random questions, effectively leads to a continuing, adverse financial impact and 
physical and emotional separation for many hours from their wife and family, during 
what was ostensibly their leisure time, as most of them worked full-time.  
 
On arrival at the PCO students were required to go to the first floor and present their 
appointment card (see appendix 4) at a small window with a sliding panel. If the lady 
was not standing at the window the two or three staff who were typing or writing at 
desks in the office area that was visible from the window would not acknowledge or 
provide any gesture of recognition to the student.  The receptionist, a rather sharp, 
snappy and unsmiling young lady would sigh, tick a book and tell, rather than 
request, suggest or advise, students to go to the waiting room. Why this behaviour 
was apparent or exhibited is difficult to understand. I believe that those working at the 
institution had developed a view of Knowledge Boys as a lower form of life and 
reacted and behaved accordingly. It was made clear through gesture and speech 
that there was a them and us culture pervading the PCO. The typists were not 
inclined to step in if their receptionist colleague was not available as the Knowledge 
Boy(s) waiting at the counter was less important than their work, and the receptionist 
clearly demonstrated resentment at having to deal with Knowledge Boys at all 
despite this apparently being her job and a significant reason for this group being 
employed.     
 
In the waiting room there were normally six or eight Knowledge Boys. Often they 
were smoking [smoking at this time was perfectly legal and quite normal in public 
buildings], looking uncomfortable in their suits, sweating and shaking and generally 
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emitting an appearance of wishing they were anywhere but there. Scwalbe and 
Wolkomir (2001:210) propose a concept amongst males of ‘non-disclosure’ or ‘very 
limited disclosure’ of emotions. This was not the case at the Public Carriage Office; 
many of the interviewees openly exhibited very nervous emotions. This was once 
again an unusual situation in my experience for young working class males, who 
normally presented a tough or unaffected persona in threatening or stressful 
situations. My strong suspicion is that the financial and personal strain of the 
Knowledge meant that every appearance was a stressful situation for these people. 
They knew that the test could result in them spending more time away from family 
and friends and possibly earning less overtime etc. These adverse impacts on their 
family life and finances with the ritualised, unfriendly, sometimes threatening and 
often unhelpful behaviour of those who worked at the Public Carriage Office and 
possibly their lack of experience of interviews and tests meant that the Knowledge 
Boys had difficulty in not disclosing their emotions (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001).  
 
On one occasion when I was due for an appearance there was a lot of fog and as a 
consequence the trains were running late. I arrived about 10 minutes after the time 
indicated on my appointment card. On arrival at the window on the first floor I 
apologised to the receptionist for arriving late. I was expecting a response of “oh 
that’s okay” or similar but instead was told in the sharpest tone possible that on this 
occasion I would be seen but if I was ever late again I “was off of the Knowledge”. I 
have no idea if she had the authority to say this, if it was true, and if so under what 
circumstances this action could be enacted. I did not challenge it as I had become 
what can only be described as institutionalised into accepting whatever behaviour or 
admonishment the Public Carriage Office staff dished out rather than run the risk of 
being branded a troublemaker and finding my progress on the Knowledge halted or 
even worse, reversed. I had heard tales of such things happening to other, albeit 
unnamed, Knowledge Boys and did not wish to risk proving or disproving the veracity 
of those stories which were a form of narrative knowledge (Stacey, 2001). 
 
If this was part of a planned brainwashing or character altering program it had 
worked. My badge had become more important to me than certain of my principles or 
sensitivities. I had submitted to a junior member of staff being unnecessarily rude and 
aggressive and threatening me with doubtful authority, but I was not prepared to 
challenge this behaviour. She had in effect exposed the fact that I had given her 
power for the reasons described by Blau (1986:122) ‘power depends on people’s 
needs for the benefits those in power have to offer’. My acquiescence was based 
upon the stories and rumours forming narrative knowledge (Stacey, 2001) about the 
organisation amongst Knowledge Boys of stoppers [These were obscure questions 
asked to stop the Knowledge student being able to answer questions at his 
appearances and therefore halt progress through the Knowledge of London 
qualification] and other tools and tactics that were rumoured to be ranged against 
awkward or non-conforming Knowledge Boys by the Public Carriage Office. An 
example of these was deliberately being kept waiting several hours for their 
appearance, which provided a powerful deterrent against such errant behaviour but 
also as an encouragement or incentive to demonstrate the expected or conformist 
behaviour and adherence to the rituals prevalent within the Knowledge of London 
environment.  
 
It would be valuable to know if this approach to interviewing was official PCO policy 
and/or formed the formal culture (Watson, 1999) of the PCO. My view would be that 
this behaviour amongst Public Carriage Office examiners was what Watson 
(1999:113) termed the ‘unofficial culture’. Whether this was the case or whether the 
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ritualised behaviour (Stacey, 2001) was exercised with the implicit or explicit sanction 
of the senior management at the Public Carriage Office is open to conjecture.  
 
The Public Carriage Office from my first encounter at the introductory meeting had 
signified a middle class professional culture exhibited through business attire, cold 
tidy offices and an explicit expectation of conformity. It appeared that the rituals of 
organisational life, in this case the expectation of suitable attire, deference, and 
uncomplaining adherence to the rituals that were evident at the Public Carriage 
Office reinforced the concept of ‘this is the way we do things around here’. Stacey 
explores this concept; 
 
‘institutions and organisations are the notions of habits, customs, traditions, 
routines, mores, values, cultures, paradigms, beliefs, missions, and visions. 
These are all ideas about the repetitive, enduring shared practices of people 
in their on-going dealings with each other in institutional life’ (2001, 43)  
 
Blau (1986:270) explains at length this phenomenon; 
 
‘These norms mediate between the issue of commands and the compliance 
with them, whereas other forms of power are not mediated but are directly 
enforced by the persons or groups who exercise power themselves.  
Legitimate power can reside in impersonal principles and offices, which 
makes it independent of the individuals who administer the principles and 
occupy the offices. It consequently, can be transferred from one person to 
another - from one incumbent of an office to another - and delegated by 
superiors to subordinates’. 
 
Whether Blau’s very interesting prognosis is accurate or not in relation to the 
receptionist and other staff at the Public Carriage Office is difficult to assess but it is 
certainly a strong possibility. Getting through the Knowledge as quickly as possible 
was a far stronger objective for me than a requirement to be dealt with courteously by 
the staff employed at the Public Carriage Office. 
 
What is apparent from this section is that identities and cultures amongst the two 
main groups appear to be quite different. Whilst there may exist expectations of 
certain standards of behaviour these are lowered by Knowledge Boys in order to 
demonstrate conformity and minimise the amount of time taken to complete the 
Knowledge. The staff at the PCO appear to have adopted an organisational culture of 
demonstrating dislike for Knowledge Boys. Their dealings with Knowledge Boys 
appear to be condescending to the point of rudeness. As the PCO staff were not 
interviewed and were largely outside of the scope of my research it is difficult to 
understand how and why this behaviour developed, what purpose it served and 
whether it was encouraged or tolerated by the management of the PCO.  Blau’s 
(1986) interesting theory on the way that such cultures and behaviours develop 
appears relevant to the PCO. 
 
Both the PCO staff and the Knowledge Boys demonstrate very clear identities and 
yet in the case of Knowledge Boys these are readily sacrificed consensually in order 
to pass through the Knowledge. This is significant given the identities that the 
Knowledge Boys appear to cultivate outside of the PCO environment where they 
appear tough, streetwise and generally confident. The observations made by Blau 
(1986) about how cultures develop within institutions appears very relevant and helps 
to understand why the receptionists in particular cultivated an identity of being 
snappy and unhelpful in order to reinforce the culture whereby the PCO staff and 
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officers are at pains to distance themselves from Knowledge Boys specifically and 
the rest of the industry in general. It has to be considered that an alternative theory 
could have been that the behaviour exhibited was not an institutionally or even group 
based development, but a generational or class based demonstration of discipline, 
communication, ritual and values. Theories about why the interactions between PCO 
and Knowledge Boys were conducted in this way were the subject of much 
discussion amongst Knowledge Boys. 
 
The following section describes interactions between the Knowledge Boys and the 
PCO examiners during the verbal competency tests known as appearances. In this 
section I draw upon the observations and themes above to highlight the identity and 
culture of the actors.  
5.2.12 Appearances – Verbal Competency Tests 
This section provides important insights into the behaviour of PCO examiners and 
the prospective taxi drivers during verbal topographical competency tests known as 
appearances.  
 
Although I did not suffer from the nerves that many other Knowledge Students 
displayed I certainly found appearances to be grim, strange and demotivating events. 
There has, according to taxi drivers always been a tradition of aggressive, mildly 
bullying behaviour amongst Public Carriage Office Knowledge Examiners 
(Townsend, 2003). Garner and Stokoe quote an anonymous taxi driver;  
 
‘The examiners are tough. They are mostly ex-police officers. In my day there 
was one called Hedges; we used to call him the killer with a smile’ (2000:53).  
 
It appeared to me that as all of the Knowledge Boys just wanted to become taxi 
drivers they seemed to have just accepted and tolerated this frequently exhibited, 
and often unreasonable, behaviour almost consensually. We had decided that our 
badge was worth more than our self-respect. Likewise the Public Carriage Officers 
had apparently decided that it was safe for them to behave in this way with little 
danger of complaints. 
 
One of the explanations of this behaviour amongst Knowledge Boys was that the 
Public Carriage Office examiners were there to test the Knowledge Boy’s character 
and to prepare him for the abuse and bullying he would experience from the public. 
According to Taxi Driver Interviewee No 3 this behaviour was intended to be 
character building aspect of the Knowledge process. The importance of this process 
was later to be used as a key plank of the arguments against an initiative by radio 
taxi companies to shorten the Knowledge or introduce became known as the Quickie 
Knowledge (see section 5.2.16).  
 
You were expected, when your name was called, to swiftly proceed from the waiting 
room to the examiner’s rather cold and very bare office and to present your 
appointment card (see Appendix 4). Although swiftness was never explicitly ordered 
or requested the nature of the call implied a need for speed. This implication of speed 
was interesting given that the Knowledge of London examiners were there to test 
Knowledge Students; the implicit message was that this task was being squeezed 
into a busy schedule and that it was not their primary purpose or interest but I have 
no evidence that they had any other tasks to perform.  
 
Often the examiner did not look up when the student entered his office but simply 
held his hand out into which you placed your appointment card.  A fellow Knowledge 
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Student, Alfie Bond, related a story of when he first went into Mr Finlay’s office. He 
had heard that Mr Finlay was a difficult examiner with a fiery temper and he feared 
the worst. However, when he went in, Mr Finlay held out his hand in an apparently 
friendly gesture and Bond instinctively smiled, grasped Mr Finlay’s hand and shook it. 
Bond related afterwards that when Mr Finlay extended his hand Bond quickly 
decided that the stories he had heard were erroneous and that, “Mr Finlay was a nice 
old boy”.  A visibly shocked Mr Finlay sharply withdrew his hand and shouted, “Card, 
laddie, card!”. Bond handed over his card sheepishly and the appearance continued. 
Blau (1986:270) explains that  
 
‘social values that legitimate authority are [the] media of organization, which 
extend the scope of organized social control. The common values and norms 
in a collectivity that legitimate the authority of a government or leadership and 
enforce compliance with its commands constitute a medium of organizing 
power’.  
 
While neither a government or in my view a leader the Public Carriage Office was a 
regulator with an administrative responsibility for quality, the quality being the 
students’ Knowledge of London (Public Carriage Office, 2009). It was also apparent 
that the Public Carriage Office viewed quality to consist of more than mere 
topographical competence. It was evident through the behaviour of those within the 
institution that they saw the Knowledge Boys’ compliance with their social values and 
norms as a quality issue that they were responsible for. In turn Knowledge Boys were 
prepared, as I was, in order to get my licence, to legitimate that authority (Blau, 1986) 
consensually thereby extending the scope of their social control. We conformed what 
Watson (1999) terms the formal culture of the institution.  
 
The Knowledge Boys waiting for their appearances sat in a waiting room which was 
some 20-30 feet from the Public Carriage Officers’ offices. Some of the examiners 
walked to the waiting room and asked for their interviewee whilst others shouted the 
Knowledge Boy’s name from their office. When this happened it was not always easy 
to hear what was being said or the name being called. 
 
On one occasion Mr Finlay shouted a barely audible name and as no one else in the 
waiting room moved I assumed it must be me and went into his office. He took my 
card, asked me my name and then asked me in sinister and cold terms in what could 
only be described as a growl, “Why if your name is Galvin have you responded to a 
request for a Mr Rocket”. Mr Finlay had a pronounced Scottish accent and he 
shouted at me as a sergeant major would shout at an errant private that I “would 
never, ever make a taxi driver as you do not listen and if you ever did I would starve 
to death as you would only be able to pick up cockneys as they are the only people 
you can understand”. He then ordered me out of his office. I slunk back into the 
waiting room to await another call. Looking at this reflexively Mr Finlay was 
demonstrating an extreme example of the rites of passage that appeared to form part 
of the organisational rituals (Stacey, 2001) of the Public Carriage Office. He 
demonstrated an example of his power, awarded consensually by me and others 
who had decided that getting a taxi driver’s badge was more important than enjoying 
social niceties and experiencing normal standards of behaviour. It appeared to me 
that each Public Carriage Office examiner attempted in some way to change the 
Knowledge Boy’s behaviour to reflect the Public Carriage Office’s culture. A British 
stiff upper lip in the face of abusive behaviour evidently was one of the requirements. 
 
Every Knowledge Boy I knew had a Mr Finlay story, all them involved a violent, 
aggressive and explosive incident. I have two; the Mr Rocket episode (explained 
Michael Sangster Galvin 
Student Number 03082746 
 
 
106 
 
above) and another was when I had an appointment with him prior to his retirement. I 
was called into his office, I handed over my card and was told to sit down. He then 
smiled sweetly at me and went on to ask several questions. I could not understand 
any of them as he affected the strongest Scottish accent imaginable. I had been told 
before by other Knowledge Boys that under no circumstances should one ever tell Mr 
Finlay that you could not understand his accent as he would go ballistic [Ballistic was 
a colloquialism that was always used when relaying Mr Finlay stories]. I feigned 
forgetfulness of the precise location of the pick-up and destination points. I acted out 
a struggle to remember each point followed by a wearisome ‘Sorry sir, I just cannot 
recall either point”. He was pleasant, he smiled a great deal, and he appeared 
sympathetic to my predicament of apparently not being able to remember these 
places.  
 
As a result of his concern and demeanour the stories I had heard about Mr Finlay lost 
traction, apart from his Scottish accent. He seemed a pleasant and considerate man. 
We got painfully to the end of the verbal test without me being able to either 
understand or answer even one question and he handed me back my appointment 
card. He then appeared to, almost, talk off  the record; he smiled and may have 
gently laughed and said in a mild Scottish brogue “Now tell me laddie, you could not 
understand what I was saying could you”? I stupidly concurred and chuckled and true 
to the rumours about Mr Finlay he exploded in rage and snarled at me that I “would 
never make a taxi driver because you  would only ever be able to pick up cockneys!” 
If this was a character building exercise it certainly worked, this had been an awful 
experience and I faced another 56 days before I had another appearance. Blau 
(1986:259) comments that;  
 
‘social sanctions through which moral norms are enforced are essential in 
order to discourage individuals who are not strongly committed to them from 
deviating these norms as well as to fortify the moral commitment of those who 
have made it’.  
 
The Public Carriage Officers, particularly Mr Finlay, were very good at demonstrating 
their power through implementing social sanctions (Blau, 1986) and these, certainly 
in my case, enforced moral and behavioural norms (Blau, 1986). Taxi driver 
interviewee No3 explained that ultimately when one became a taxi driver the 
ritualistic tormenting that had gone on became a social bond (Blau, 1986) between 
drivers, a shared experience that we had survived. In effect it is evidently a rite of 
passage consensually accepted by Knowledge Boys. 
 
There was a set format in which responses to the Public Carriage Office Examiners’ 
questions were to be answered. The format was ritualistic. The ritual was never 
explicitly requested by PCO Examiners but instead passed from Knowledge Boy to 
Knowledge Boy (Dickson and Buchholz, 1979). Stacey observes the concept of 
‘enduring shared practices of people in their on-going dealings with each other in 
institutional life’ (2001, 43). This observation of shared practice, each of the actors 
playing their part; the PCO examiner’s eccentric behaviour and the Knowledge Boy’s 
acquiescence to the ritualised torment meted out to him, is present in the interactions 
described above. 
 
During the interview and in response to the questions enunciated by the PCO 
examiner the Knowledge Boy was expected to state where both points were, e.g. 
Smith Street is situated off of Kings Road, Chelsea and Portman Square is off of 
Wigmore Street, Marylebone, adding the word ‘sir’ at the end of each point in a 
pseudo military manner. He was then required to provide a verbal route from one 
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point to the other, ideally using the shortest possible route, observing one way 
systems and where possible stating the names of roads that were crossed at 
junctions and intersections.  
 
The questions asked at appearances were often highly esoteric and eclectic. They 
often included peculiar societies or organisations, unusual premises e.g. closed down 
theatres or cinemas, obscure alleyways and mews e.g. Bleeding Heart Yard or Hay’s 
Mews, or oddly named buildings e.g. it was discovered that Isherwood House which 
was a commonly asked question was actually Fisherwood House – the F had fallen 
off of the sign above the building at some point many years before, hence Isherwood 
House. The F had been subsequently replaced but at the Carriage Office the 
question was still asked as Isherwood House. This approach to questioning suggests 
that the Public Carriage Office wanted Knowledge Boys to tap into the grapevine or 
rumour mill and to be able to demonstrate they had done so through responding to 
these idiosyncratic questions. This appeared to signal to the examiner that the 
Knowledge Boy was working hard to pass the Knowledge. 
 
The Incognito Hotel had closed many years before I undertook the Knowledge but 
was still asked as a point. Knowledge Boys mused that this predilection for non-
existent buildings and organisations was because people often use defunct 
landmarks as an identifying point. This may have some validity as my elderly aunt 
often used Collins’ Music Hall, a concert hall on Islington Green, as a landmark 
decades after it had been obliterated by bombing during the Second World War. 
Alternatively the reasons may just be as simple as that many questions used by 
Carriage Office examiners have never been updated. This meant that Knowledge 
Boys who simply learnt the contemporary names for buildings and landmarks were at 
a disadvantage. This point is important from a learning process perspective. It was 
not raised at the introductory meeting to the Knowledge of London and although the 
reasons for it mentioned earlier in this chapter are appreciable it made learning and 
then answering questions at appearances difficult and added even more randomness 
to the potential questions.  
 
In the same vein questions were often asked in strange, mildly amusing 
combinations; America Square to America Street, St George’s Street to St George’s 
Square and Webb’s Road to Lettice Street. There were also macabre questions such 
as a hospital to a cemetery, Courts to prisons, Registry Offices to Maternity Hospitals 
and other peculiar combinations.  Sometimes, once the Knowledge student had 
completed a recital of a route or run he was asked to reverse it. Such is the focus 
during appearances in getting from one place to another and picturing the route in 
one’s mind’s eye it was often difficult or even impossible to remember where the run 
had started and therefore the student could not complete the return run. This 
situation was for me an example of a real test of concentration, topographical 
knowledge and quick reactions. These questions were much harder than those which 
were apparently based on industry idiosyncrasies or examiner eccentricities.   
 
Questions during appearances were often topical. If there had been a big story 
regarding a Government Department or a company it was common for the building 
that the organisation operated from to feature as a point. An example might be a 
highly publicised crime; the examiner may ask the Knowledge Student to ‘take me 
from’ the felon’s address or the address of the crime to the Old Bailey or to 
Wandsworth Prison or similar.  It was therefore important to keep up with London’s 
events and news. I later discovered when I was a taxi driver that topical events did 
have some relevance with the job as either passengers asked if I knew where certain 
places were e.g. the Iranian Embassy (during the siege), or on occasion passengers 
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wanted to drive past addresses that were in the news. This was an area of 
questioning that I felt was relevant to the role of taxi driver. However all of this added 
to an already highly random and unpredictable questioning system. 
 
Some Public Carriage Office Examiners, there were about six, asked questions 
regularly; these were known as bankers [a small set of questions a Knowledge 
Student could bank on being asked by each examiner]. Therefore if you knew which 
examiner you would be seeing at your next verbal test [this could be discerned from 
the pencil written initials in the next box on the appointment card (please see 
Appendix 4 where it is just possible to make out the initials on Fri 11th May as JF (Mr 
Finlay) and Mon 19th November SH (Mr Shearne) ).  Once you knew which examiner 
you were due to see at the next appearance you were able to learn his bankers for 
the phase of testing you were on (56, 28 or 21 day testing intervals), so that you 
answered as many questions as possible. The Knowledge Schools assisted this 
process by printing the examiner’s initials and testing phase on the question sheets 
they produced and sent out to Knowledge Students each week. I imagine, and have 
evidence (see next paragraph) that knowing the bankers and being able to 
confidently recite them when asked provided evidence that the student was 
committed to the Knowledge. Alternatively they may just be questions that involved 
points (pickups and destinations) or runs (routes) that the examiner knew well. Of 
course neither explanation may apply. 
 
Whilst sitting in the PCO waiting room before an appearance I was to witness an 
event involving the concept of bankers; a Knowledge Student had gone into Mr 
Smith’s room. Mr Smith was a very typical PCO Knowledge of London Examiner. He 
was tall, smart, well groomed, and quite gentlemanly in manner, moderately well-
spoken and around sixty years old. He had the aura of a head teacher or civil 
servant. Mr Smith’s room was next to the waiting room. It was normally difficult to 
hear anything from the neighbouring offices when sitting in the waiting room, save for 
a low volume mumble. On this occasion voices in Mr Smith’s office became raised 
and the student could clearly be heard complaining in aggressive and abusive tones 
that ‘the Knowledge process is unfair’. Mr Smith’s retort was that the student was not 
showing any commitment ‘and did not even know my [Mr Smith’s] bankers’. The 
Knowledge Student retorted loudly that he was ‘fed up with being treated like shit’. Mr 
Smith then dismissively informed the student that he ‘was off the Knowledge’. This 
was followed by Mr Smith’s door being banged violently shut and aggressive 
muttering of abuse up the corridor by the, now, former Knowledge Student.  
 
This incident indicated to me that knowing or not knowing an examiner’s bankers was 
a significant issue, not only from a perspective of being able to maximise the number 
of questions answered but also by proving commitment. The reliance on and 
prevalence of bankers was certainly indicative that the PCO Knowledge of London 
Examiners only knew a small number of points and routes i.e. their bankers. If not 
why did they have bankers? Were they a proxy measure of commitment? The above 
incident implied that the Knowledge of London Examiners attached a certain level of 
importance to Knowledge Students knowing them. 
 
It was not permitted to ask the Public Carriage Officer any questions about the run. I 
discovered this on my second appearance when I was asked what I thought was 
Leyton Road in East London. I responded in the required format; Leyton Road is in 
Temple Mills, off Major Road, Leyton, only to be told I was not correct by the PCO 
examiner. I then asked which Leyton Road he wanted and he responded gruffly “you 
are doing the Knowledge not me”. At this point, frustratingly, I had lost the opportunity 
to answer the question. After my appearance I checked with the Knowledge Boys 
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who stand outside the PCO collecting points and they said the examiner had asked 
several students the same question and it was Leighton Road in Kentish Town. This 
suggested that the PCO examiners were not focused on establishing topographical 
competence but yet again demonstrated a form of ritualised power play and/or 
sought evidence of being plugged into the industry or Knowledge community in some 
way.  
 
Once the PCO examiner had asked about eight questions that was the end of the 
examination. Normally no information or indicator was given as to whether the route 
was right or wrong, or whether the student had done well or badly.  Why was the 
testing process so stark? Why were questions asked and answers given in such a 
ritualistic (Leave on the left N street, right into Z road etc) fashion? At the end of the 
test the ritual (Stacey, 2001) continues with complete inscrutability as to how the 
interviewee has done. No indication of success, failure, encouragement, 
admonishment or advice. The Knowledge Student had no idea at all whether the 
examiner knew the routes or even the points. Making no comment, entering into no 
discussion not showing any emotion nor giving out any semiotic indicators enabled 
the examiner, whether intentionally or not, to maintain his authority, anonymity, 
detachment and his apparent topographical superiority over the Knowledge Student. 
It also left the student unclear whether he had done well or badly unless he was the 
fortunate recipient of a reduction [a reduction in the frequency of appearances – see 
below]. At the end of the interview there was just an impersonal ‘take this card to the 
counter’ utterance by the Knowledge of London Examiner.  Blau’s (1986) social 
exchange did not feature; the Public Carriage Officer had no apparent interest in any 
social exchange with Knowledge Boys.  
 
Scwalbe and Wolkomir (2001: 206) raise the issue of  
 
‘the interviewer’s awareness of the threat potential [To the masculine self ], 
alertness for problems arising because of this threat, and ability to respond in 
a way that makes the interview successful’.  
 
and (2001:218) provide some advice that  
 
‘if an interview feels tense from start to finish, or if a subject never opens up 
[In this context cannot answer the questions, even if he/she knows the 
answers], then it is usually clear that something has gone wrong and a 
change of style or protocol is called for’.  
 
The achievement of a tense interview from start to finish would appear to have been 
considered a success by the PCO examiners involved and therefore no change of 
protocol would have been considered necessary. 
 
Initially students are required to appear every fifty six days. Once they have shown 
some progress the student receives what is known as a reduction (see Glossary). 
Reductions are in effect a reduced number of days between tests or appearances. 
Appearances or topographical examinations are then held every twenty eight days, 
then every twenty one days and ultimately two or three occasions at fourteen day 
intervals. The consensus amongst Knowledge Students was that once a student 
received a reduction to 21 days they had been accepted as having a good enough 
Knowledge to become a taxi driver. As far as I am aware this assertion is based on 
assumption rather than fact.  My experience was that the stories concerning the 
Knowledge are all really based around what to do and not to do to get through the 
Knowledge. At a lower level the stories are really saying ‘present the expected 
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behaviour and conform to the rituals’. The stories almost imply that the student is 
diligently acquiring the Knowledge of London but over and above that success is 
based on encouraging conformity with the institution’s apparent values and not 
displaying maverick traits. 
 
Some students who had enjoyed a reduction, e.g. from appearing every fifty six days 
to instead appearing every twenty eight days, found after two or three poor 
appearances that they were moved back to fifty six day appearances and had to start 
the long process of answering well again in order to get back to appearing every 
twenty eight days. I knew two people who had endured this unpleasant and highly 
demotivating experience. This event caused them to seriously consider quitting the 
Knowledge as this was a devastating blow and had serious impacts on their morale, 
stamina, family life and finances. Happily they both decided to continue with the 
Knowledge and went on to become taxi drivers. As always in the taxi industry, there 
were stories of students who were put on 112 days or even 224 days. As with many 
taxi trade stories, no one knew when these events had happened or what the 
students’ names were. However these stories and rumours provided the motivation 
to be well prepared at each appearance i.e. to change behaviour and action in 
response to gossip (Dalton, 1961). 
 
Despite the lack of evidence, and possibly quite unfairly, I and other Knowledge Boys 
suspected that rebels, however low key their rebellion might be, would be quietly 
squeezed out by the PCO examiners and it was this suspicion together with the 
rumours and stories that led me to overlook the receptionist’s supercilious and often 
rude attitude, as I am sure other determined Knowledge Students did. It is difficult to 
discern what may be described here as the truth. It is more likely that this was simply 
a collection of rumours, stories and circumstantial and anecdotal evidence that were 
compiled by me and others to construct an inner world in which perceptions of reality 
may be distorted (Stacey, 2001). However it was significant enough for me to 
conform, overlook issues and generally comply with what I believed at the time was 
required.  
 
The informal sanctions that were rumoured to be available to the PCO examiners 
were commonly known amongst Knowledge Students as; holding back, blocking and 
stoppers (see Glossary). Although each was subtly different the outcome was the 
same, the Knowledge Boy continues to have appearances at the same interval 
length e.g. every 56 or 28 days.  
 
Stoppers and blockers, it was rumoured, were given to people who did not turn up 
smartly dressed or appeared not be servile, conformist or compliant enough with the 
rituals practiced by the PCO. Stoppers and blockers were, according to Knowledge 
Boy folklore, ridiculously obscure questions which no one could reasonably be 
expected to answer, or, as sometimes was suspected, to involve non-existent places. 
The theory amongst Knowledge Boys was that these were inflicted on students who 
arrived late for appearances, did not seem to be working hard enough at the 
Knowledge, were too flash, or had some form of misdemeanour on their criminal 
record or driving licence that was insufficient to keep them off of the Knowledge but 
that the PCO took a dim view of. Whether any of this is true, or whether the mythical 
Knowledge Boy who started such stories simply did not know the questions he was 
asked, is open to conjecture.  
 
The last verbal test concerned with the Knowledge of London is known within the 
industry and at the Public Carriage Office as a req (see Glossary). No one I have 
asked is quite sure why it is termed a req. In the film The Knowledge (1979), a 
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description was given by the actor Leonard Rosenthal in his role as the difficult and 
legendary senior Public Carriage Office Knowledge Examiner, possibly based on Mr 
Finlay. He explained it related to a final test to requisition a [taxi] driver’s licence. 
Knowledge Students are told at their last fourteen day appearance (most only attend 
one or two 14 day appearances) that their next appearance will be their req. 
Whereas all other appearances take place in the morning reqs are held in the 
afternoon (See Appendix 4 – Mon 10th March) and whilst most appearances consist 
of approximately eight to ten questions a req lasts about an hour and involves not 
only tens of runs but also scores of points. The points are usually read from lists e.g. 
 
Bonnington Hotel 
National Hospital 
Royal Overseas League 
Lobb 
Purdeys 
Horniman Museum 
Etc 
  
After each point is read by the examiner, the Knowledge Student states where the 
point is, e.g. Scott’s – Mount Street, US Embassy – Grosvenor Square etc. 
 
As seems to be the norm in the taxi industry rumours circulate amongst Knowledge 
Students that some unknown Knowledge Student at some unknown time failed his 
req. I found no evidence of this. Every Knowledge Boy I knew who went for their req 
passed and I suspect that is always the case. Once again the process that is the 
Knowledge is bathed in ritual and intrigue, which appears to enhance the 
achievement of the rite of passage from being a Knowledge Boy to becoming a taxi 
driver. 
 
My req was very different to any standard appearance. After reporting to the normal 
sliding window that was signposted as reception, I was informed that I should sit on a 
chair in a corridor rather than the customary instruction to “go to the waiting room”. 
Almost to the minute of my appointment time the Knowledge Examiner, a Mr Shearn, 
walked along the corridor, courteously checked that I was Mr Galvin and suggested I 
follow him to his office. He was visibly relaxed and whilst not quite cordial displayed 
an air of interest in the way that a headmaster might interact with a prefect or sixth 
former, or a doctor might interact with a patient. When we got into his office he 
suggested that I remove my jacket and hang it on a coat stand as “we shall be here 
for some time”. There was an element of enabling me  
 
‘to assume a triple expert role: as one whose experiences are not easily 
grasped by outsiders [Learning or acquiring the Knowledge], as one who 
knows how questions ought to be asked to get at the heart of things [complex 
one way systems, runs involving taxi routes such as the colloquial nicknames 
given to routes by Knowledge Boys so they remember them e.g. WASP 
[Walpole Street, Anderson Street, Sloane Street, Pelham Avenue], LAGQ 
(see Glossary) and the Dirty Dozen (a route through Soho’s complex one way 
systems)], and as one who knows the answers’ (Scwalbe and Wolkomir 
2001:208). 
 
This was a very new and very welcome experience but at the same time slightly 
disconcerting. The conduct of the req was a complete reversal of the normal 
approach adopted by the Public Carriage Officers at appearances. There was an 
intellectual or academic feel to it, verging on mutual respect. In fact most of Scwalbe 
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and Wolkomir’s advice re interviews which I cite above as being ignored or even 
reversed to create maximum tension was adopted and embraced. There were even 
positive comments about routes etc. “Yes, that was very good” etc. 
 
Whilst not quite surreal the experience was somewhat uncanny. This was a pleasant 
ritual but very definitely a ritual of sorts. The journey through the Knowledge had 
started with the introductory meeting involving withering explanations about the 
Knowledge and how most people would never acquire sufficient Knowledge to 
become a taxi driver, what I and others (Townsend, 2003) considered to be ritualistic 
bullying at appearances and now a further ritual involving courtesy and apparent 
mutual respect. This gave me a feeling of being about to enter into membership of a 
‘professional elite’ (Stacey, 2001:223). The removal of me as a Knowledge Boy from 
the rest of the group in order to attend an afternoon session for my req appeared to 
me to be significant. The invitation to hang up my coat rather than simply comply with 
the ritual of handing over my card, waiting to be told to be seated was another 
apparently significant relaxation of the ritual and Knowledge Boy/PCO relationship. 
 
Blau (1986:254) suggests that ‘cultural values legitimate the social order and the 
various arrangements that sustain it’. The PCO appears to be both dreaded and 
respected in equal measure by both Knowledge Students and taxi drivers. 
Knowledge Boys appear to appreciate that the Knowledge is tough and has to be 
gone through. There is no clamour for it to be dumbed down or reformed, and in fact 
the attempt by the radio taxi company executives to do so through the introduction of 
the Quickie Knowledge (see section 5.2.16) led to an aggressive backlash from the 
industry, thereby legitimising the social order as Blau purports (1986).  The evidence 
was that Knowledge Boys I knew claimed that they had been asked “a load of 
rubbish” (i.e. points that no one could be expected to know) but as the tests were one 
on one it was never clear if any of this was true. I could never claim to have been 
asked rubbish or to have been held back. However apart from arriving late once by 
ten minutes, going into Mr Finlay’s office when he had asked for Mr Rocket and 
confirming what appeared to be Mr Finlay’s worst fears about Londoners being 
unable to understand Scottish accents (see section 5.2.12), I had followed the tacit 
rules and therefore did not fit the rumoured criteria for being held back.  
 
In Blau’s (1986: 254) words; ‘Legitimation entails approving social consensus that 
endows existing or expected social conditions with value, thereby stabilizing or 
promoting them’. By doing everything that was expected; arriving early, suitably 
attired, using yes sir or no sir in response to questions, knowing all of the examiners’ 
bankers, not moving furniture, etc. I had approved the social consensus. In exchange 
I had made more or less average progress through the Knowledge of London 
qualification.   
 
At the end of the Knowledge the prospective taxi driver has two more hurdles before 
receiving his licence; he has to take a specialist driving test (see section 5.2.13) and 
then take a further, albeit cursory, test on his Knowledge of the suburbs of London. 
Once again this test was held in the afternoon (See appendix 4 – Mon 24th March). 
Once these two last tests are satisfactorily completed the Knowledge Boy becomes a 
taxi driver. 
 
In summary what my research established is that PCO examiners have cultivated an 
identity and the PCO as an institution has developed or adopted a culture which is 
accepted by Knowledge Boys consensually. Knowledge Boys appear to accept the 
implicit institutional formal culture and cultivate the identity they present to conform to 
that culture. Much of the Knowledge process is revealed to Knowledge Boys through 
Michael Sangster Galvin 
Student Number 03082746 
 
 
113 
 
rumour and anecdote as the PCO does not specify any of the behavioural 
expectations.  The appearances are not merely a test. Due to the demographic, 
mainly young working class men, and their need to complete the Knowledge 
expeditiously due to financial and family pressures, appearances are fraught events. 
A bad appearance prolongs periods away from family acquiring the Knowledge and 
impacts them financially by preventing them from earning overtime. The Knowledge 
Boys accept the rudeness, the aggressive behaviour, the rituals and the 
idiosyncrasies of the Knowledge as a rite of passage from Knowledge Boy to taxi 
driver.  
 
During these interactions between Knowledge Boys and PCO examiners peculiar 
ritualised behaviours are in evidence. These behaviours appear to have little to do 
with testing the Knowledge Boys’ topographical Knowledge of London but appear to 
be accepted consensually by Knowledge Boys. 
 
The ritualistic and idiosyncratic nature of the Knowledge of London testing process 
extends to a specialist driving test that all aspirant London taxi drivers are required to 
take. The next section describes the process, the ritual and the impact on aspirant 
taxi drivers.  
5.2.13 The Driving Test Ritual 
I imagined that the driving test would be a very straight forward administrative 
process that sought to establish the driving competency of the aspirant taxi driver. 
This proved not to be the case. Once again my feeling was that the PCO, assisted by 
Knowledge Boys, folklore and rumour, had managed to turn administrative processes 
into tests of character, introduce stress and worry and wrap the whole event up in 
mystique and intrigue. Once again the identity of Knowledge Boys is expected to be 
cloaked in conformity with the unwritten rules. Once again the PCO examiner, this 
time the driving test examiner, was at pains to avoid any friendliness or show, or 
even feign, any interest in the industry. The culture of both the taxi industry and the 
PCO were poles apart but like clergy and laity they briefly met, albeit with some 
embarrassment and an almost palpable desire to make any meeting or engagement 
as quick and painless as possible before retreating to the familiarity of their own 
cultural territory. The rules were communicated, as often they were during the whole 
Knowledge process, by anecdote and rumour rather than in an information leaflet. 
This ritualistic approach to the driving test was very clearly accepted consensually by 
the aspirant taxi drivers. As to why this culture has developed I can only assume that 
is a continuation of the rite of passage that taxi drivers value as proof of the onerous 
requirements of the Knowledge, which somehow differentiates them from other 
driving jobs and adds value to their vocational qualification.  
   
I fully expected to receive my badge on completion of my driving test, known 
colloquially in the trade amongst Knowledge Boys as one’s drive [my italics – see 
Glossary]. It was rather an odd test and the reasons for it and what it was meant to 
achieve were far from clear. There was no documentation or readily available 
information made available by the Public Carriage Office (PCO), merely a form to 
apply for a driving test. The Knowledge School that I attended organised drives as an 
integral part of their service.  The prospective driver needed to book a drive with the 
PCO who administered and undertook the drives. Taxi driving tests took place on 
Wednesdays and Fridays only. When I enquired at the PCO about the driving test I 
was told to speak to a Knowledge School or garage [Large taxi fleet operators are 
often known as garages in the industry]. Curiously like the Knowledge process the 
PCO were not willing or did not expect to have to provide instructions as to the 
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process, curriculum or other information concerning the driving tests that they were 
responsible for administering. 
 
A few days before the test I and another Knowledge Boy were told to stand at a bus 
stop which was outside the driving test centre. The test centre was an open 
compound in Balls Pond Road in Islington. We were instructed to watch another 
prospective taxi driver taking an actual taxi driving test. We were told somewhat 
furtively by the driving instructor that it was important to look inconspicuous and 
appear to be waiting for a bus and only glance over occasionally at what was known 
as the yard work, which involved the driver being tested manoeuvring his taxi 
between two pieces of wood on the floor, and between posts. Why this level of 
subterfuge was necessary was not explained but the delivery of the instruction 
implied widespread understanding and to ask why would have seemed naive.  
 
There were the normal bleak taxi trade stories of students failing prior to setting off 
because the PCO examiner had spotted that the taxi had an out of date tax disc, the 
wrong tyres or was not clean enough.  The veracity of these stories is somewhat 
dubious. A further twist was added to the driving test by Knowledge Boys who 
claimed that three failed tests resulted in the prospective taxi driver being thrown off 
the Knowledge. This added a level of stress to the driving test process because after 
passing through all of the stages of the Knowledge with its inherent pressures, the 
thought of it all ending based on failing a driving test seemed cruel.  As in the 
previous section, there was no validation of these rumours and neither was there any 
documentation from the Public Carriage Office to refute it. 
 
The driving instructor used to take a group of Knowledge Boys out on what are called 
in the industry wangles (see Glossary). Wangles are driving lessons in a taxi. I was 
also lent a wangling cab by the Knowledge School. A wangle cab was an old cab 
which is no longer licensed in which one can drive around and become familiar with 
the peculiar features of a London taxi prior to the actual driving test. The driving 
instructor claimed that the PCO driving examiner would trust his recommendation 
concerning a prospective taxi driver’s driving ability. He also claimed that he “kept the 
examiner talking” whilst the student carried out the yard work. I witnessed this when I 
was watching another driver take his test, the driving instructor deliberately stood in 
front of the PCO examiner (In effect obscuring the examiner’s view of the driver 
carrying out the yard work) engaging in animated conversation while the prospective 
driver did his yard work.  
 
I was told by the driving instructor that during the test I was not to catch the 
examiner’s eye in the rear view mirror, not to initiate a conversation and to answer 
any questions with both hands firmly and visibly on the steering wheel whilst looking 
straight ahead. My thoughts were that this was yet another ritualistic encounter 
bathed in mystique and fanned by rumour and folklore (Stacey, 2001), and yet it was 
nothing more than a driving test. 
 
On the day of the test I was advised by the Knowledge School driving instructor to 
turn up suited and booted [A cockney expression meaning: well or formally dressed]. 
The examiner was a short, quite elderly man who wore a suit, shirt and tie, buttoned 
up raincoat, trilby hat and, as usual amongst Public Carriage Officers, his shoes were 
very well polished. He was very English looking and had a well-cared for moustache.  
 
The yard work was in effect a three point turn which had to take place between two 
wooden poles laid on the ground, followed by two reversing exercises which involved 
reversing between two upright poles, as though reversing into a narrow entrance, 
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e.g. a garage. If the driver completed the yard work satisfactorily, which we were told 
by the driving instructor meant completing the manoeuvres without making contact 
with any of the poles, the driving examiner got into the passenger cabin of the taxi 
and directed the driver on a thirty minute journey. During the test he said nothing 
other than take the next available right, second left and other similar instructions. We 
travelled to the City of London where he instructed me to park up. He got out and 
went to the bank. He told me before leaving the taxi, somewhat gravely, that if a 
police officer came along I was to drive off but to return for him. When he returned 
from the bank, he simply told me to drive back to the test centre, i.e. no other 
instruction regarding the route.  Once safely back at the driving test centre I was 
invited to sit in the passenger cabin of the taxi. I was told to sit on one of the fold up 
seats so that I was facing the examiner and was then quizzed by him on the Highway 
Code. Following this exercise I had to explain the meaning of a number of road sign 
images held aloft on cards.  The test went without incident. After the Highway Code 
Test he told me I had passed. He then signed a form which I was to take to the PCO 
in order to collect my badge.  
 
Similar to the Knowledge, the taxi driving competency test is the subject of much 
rumour, speculation and many stories amongst Knowledge Boys. Also like the 
Knowledge the preferred methodology to successfully complete the driving test is 
communicated to Knowledge Boys informally through the communications web of 
stories and anecdotes. Blau’s (1986) observations concerning legitimation from 
social consensus has resonance with the PCO driving test. I have never heard of a 
taxi driver or Knowledge Boy criticising the test or the need for it. In my opinion it is 
another ritual that participants appear to accept consensually as part of the rite of 
passage. It had as far as I could see no obvious benefit to the driver or the public. 
What it did achieve was an embellishment of the claims made by taxi drivers as to 
the difference between them and minicabs [minicab drivers were unlicensed and 
therefore there was no requirement for an additional driving test]. Similarly to the 
process of acquiring the Knowledge of London with its strange, unwritten rules and 
requirements, that are made more stressful through rumour and myth passing, what 
appears to have developed into a very special, idiosyncratic driving test that is also 
subject to myth, anecdote and rumour appears also to have been accepted 
consensually by Knowledge Boys wishing to become taxi drivers. It is apparent that 
Knowledge Boys and taxi drivers view the trials and tribulations of these processes 
as somehow securing their future and differentiating them from other driving jobs and 
therefore being worthwhile. 
 
The next section explains how a moment that should have been memorable felt like 
nothing more special than making a small purchase in a shop. Despite the ability of 
the PCO and the Knowledge Boy community to turn the Knowledge process into an 
art form cloaked in ritual, intrigue and rumour the purpose of it all was to become a 
taxi driver and at that point be presented with a badge (licence). The next section 
explains how at the end of a roller coaster ride type experience the presentation of 
the badge was nothing more than a minor administrative interaction.    
 
5.2.14 Receiving My Badge   
This section examines the process of collecting the coveted green taxi drivers badge 
once all of the testing, demands and deprivations of the Knowledge of London had 
been completed. Once the last two tests (Suburban Knowledge and Driving Test) 
were completed the driver is required to collect his badge from a window at the 
Public Carriage Office.  
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The apparent intimacy and professional respect demonstrated by the PCO Examiner 
at the req was not in evidence when I collected my badge and taxi driver licence. 
There was no ceremony, no ‘well-done’, and no good luck wishes. It was a case of 
hand in a form at a window, pay 15p [The maximum the Public Carriage Office is 
allowed to charge by law] and receive a Hackney Carriage licence, a copy licence 
which is given to the garage that a driver hires his cab from, and a metal taxi driver’s 
badge. The badge is required to be worn at all times when operating as a taxi driver 
and, interestingly, when appearing in front of a Policeman or a Magistrate.  
 
The process of issuing the licence and badge was handled by the Public Carriage 
Office administrative staff in the same way as a counter clerk providing a form at a 
post office or the experience of asking for and receiving a railway time table at a 
station booking office. The end of the Knowledge was less personal than the start 
and the start was a great deal less than personal. On reflection I recognised that 
whilst the end of the process or exercise had an administrative hue the beginning 
had been an exercise in social and cultural conditioning. My feelings at that point 
were that the Public Carriage Office was a curious mix of omnipotence, detachment, 
indifference and intimidation – how this behaviour benefited any one of the 
stakeholders is difficult to deduce.  
 
I was somewhat surprised at the level of indifference and the detached behaviour 
demonstrated by the people who worked at the Public Carriage Office. I was 
especially struck that it continued even at the moment, a big moment for me and no 
doubt others, when I collected my badge. Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1 supported this 
assertion concerning the importance of this moment when he related that he could 
remember nearly twenty years later the precise day that he received his licence; 21st 
April 1995. This was clearly an important event for him; evidently more important 
than for me as some time later I could not even remember the year that I received my 
licence and certainly a great deal more important than the attention afforded to it by 
the PCO. 
 
With hindsight I believe that this administrative approach to handing over the badge 
and licences could be compared to receiving notification through the post that one 
has been awarded a degree but at least with a degree there is an opportunity to 
attend a graduation. There was no such concept within the taxi industry although I 
did arrange a celebratory dinner with a few Knowledge Boys and their wives whom I 
had got to know whilst at the Knowledge School, together with my parents and 
Charlie Rubenstein who had helped so much with callovers and mock Public 
Carriage Office tests. Organisationally the Public Carriage Office maintained its 
stance of merely administering the taxi industry whilst remaining steadfastly aloof 
from it. I observed that the self-service approach to the Knowledge remained 
constant to the end. Therefore if anyone who passed the Knowledge felt a 
celebration was needed they needed to organise it themselves.   
 
As I walked out of the Public Carriage Office after receiving my badge the normal 
gaggle of Knowledge Boys trying to find out what questions one had been asked was 
absent from the front of the building. It was around lunchtime and appearances are 
normally held up to about eleven o’clock. I presumed that they had all gone back to 
the Knowledge Schools to deliver the latest intelligence that they had gathered. 
There was no one to share my joy with. I had just passed what I and many other 
Londoners (Townsend, 2007; Garner and Stokoe, 2000; Fisher, 2008; Taxi Driver 
Interviews, 2008) considered to be the most difficult and arduous test in London and 
no one was there to say well done. I walked around the corner into Pentonville Road 
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and hailed a taxi to take me to Cambridge Heath Road in London’s East End where I 
was to collect my taxi. The taxi driver never spoke during the journey. 
 
Probably the greatest disappointment was at the end of the Knowledge when the 
realism dawned that all of this effort, ritual humiliation, physical discomfort and stress 
had been endured simply so that one had become a licensed taxi driver. Although 
that had been the goal it quickly became apparent that for the effort involved the 
outcome was slightly underwhelming. The camaraderie that had developed, the 
identity that I had built and the aura of seniority that I had managed to cultivate with 
other Knowledge Boys during my progress through the Knowledge School, which 
was a community (Blau, 1986) to which I had belonged and established myself 
within, was coming to an end and I was literally soon to start a new job as a taxi 
driver. Was I in fact almost sad to be moving from the Knowledge to driving a taxi? 
Almost ridiculously the Knowledge process had morphed from what had originally 
been simply acquiring a vocational qualification to become a taxi driver to an 
occupation in its own right. I had become immersed in the culture of the Knowledge 
and obsessed with the acquisition of London’s topography not to be a better taxi 
driver but to beat the Knowledge of London examiners and also to burnish my 
credentials amongst my peers who were also on the Knowledge. I have often 
wondered since; did others feel the same? The process and experience of the 
Knowledge of London is a rich subject for further research.  
 
I had arranged to hire a taxi subject to passing my driving test to collect it straight 
after I had collected my licence and badge. The people who owned and worked at 
the taxi garage considered me passing my test as a cause for celebration and were 
thrilled and generous in their congratulations when I arrived at the garage as 
London’s newest taxi driver. I drove out of the garage, switched on my ‘For Hire’ light 
and quickly picked up my first customer. During my time as a Knowledge Boy I was 
told that the tradition in the taxi industry is that the first fare is given free of charge. 
This tradition, I was informed by various people in the trade during my time as a 
Knowledge Boy, would have an impact on one’s luck as a taxi driver. A free fare for 
the first customer may not guarantee good luck but charging for your first fare would 
guarantee bad luck throughout one’s taxi driving career. I honoured the tradition 
although my customer was incredulous and embarrassed by the gesture. Thankfully 
the trip was fairly short. 
 
Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1 related his experience; the fleet owner, Mickey Ascott, 
from whom he was going to hire his taxi, met him at one fifteen on the day he 
expected to receive his badge outside the PCO and handed over the taxi. Taxi Driver 
Interviewee No.1 explained that he immediately “trapped” [Was hailed by a customer] 
a job but he added that he carried out his second trip free of charge as well “just to 
ensure a lifetime of good luck”.  
 
The process of acquiring the Knowledge is daunting from every perspective, it is 
physically and mentally demanding and at times demotivating given the lack of 
feedback. The rituals are tiresome and the myths and legends that surround them 
add to the stress of the process. The view expressed by Taxi Driver Interviewee No.3 
that it [the Knowledge] sorts the wheat from the chaff is true to the extent that one 
has to be determined to complete the task. As to the question of whether the process 
and all that entails actually means that a better calibre of person becomes a taxi 
driver I cannot claim to have found any evidence that either supports or contradicts 
this hypothesis.  What the Knowledge certainly appears to achieve is a feeling of 
initiation, of having achieved a rite of passage to join a tribe, select group or even a 
professional practice who have shared an identical experience. This feeling I believe 
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manifested itself in a respect that was shown and observed amongst taxi drivers for 
each other. 
 
This section shows that the PCO, in what it does and in what it fails to do, affects the 
Knowledge Boy and/or licensed taxi driver. The lack of a positive end to the 
Knowledge is I believe a reflection of the PCO’s detachment from the industry and 
the individuals within it. The carefully crafted identity of being quite separate from the 
taxi trade was clearly in evidence when the whole process was completed. A feeling 
of being on one’s own was experienced and I was soon to learn that was the nature 
of the job of being a taxi driver.  
 
The next section examines how taxi drivers view the Knowledge process as a rite of 
passage and importantly as a phenomenon that binds the trade together.  
 
5.2.15 The Knowledge – Binding the Trade Together 
When I asked Taxi Driver Interviewee No.3 where he saw the taxi industry going in 
the future he responded; ‘The Knowledge binds the trade together; it doesn’t matter 
who comes into the trade, they all have to do the Knowledge’. ‘I am against positive 
discrimination and the Mayor buying bikes for some ethnic groups to do the 
Knowledge’. [Just before the interview the London Mayor, Ken Livingstone, had 
announced a scheme to increase ethnic representation in the taxi industry and 
proposed buying mopeds, paying Knowledge School fees etc to encourage people 
from under-represented groups to undertake the Knowledge in order to make the taxi 
industry more representative of London’s population].  This had been widely 
condemned in the industry and trade press on a ‘we did it [paid our own way] and so 
should they [the underrepresented groups]’ basis. ‘The Knowledge should not be 
watered down, it is character building, and it sets the standard’ (Taxi Driver 
Interviewee). Taxi Driver Interviewee No.3 ‘has four mates doing the Knowledge and 
I wind them up [tease them] that only one will pass’. It appears that amongst taxi 
drivers in London the high dropout rate amongst knowledge students is proof that the 
quality of new taxi drivers is assured and that the Knowledge is being maintained as 
a rite of passage.  
 
An alternative view could be that the Knowledge has little to do with quality and just 
ensures that only the tenacious and the financially stable succeed. This view would in 
my opinion be fallacious as clearly the Knowledge achieves a high level of quality, as 
measured by taxi drivers’ Knowledge of London, as explicitly noted by the BBC 
(2010, see section 2.1). The impact of the Knowledge vocational qualification on the 
identity and culture of taxi drivers is evident and given the high esteem that they are 
held in is similarly a quality re-enforcing process.  
 
The attractiveness of becoming a taxi driver was considered by me and my 
workmates as the ability to work long, albeit flexible, hours in a well-paid job and 
migrate from being lower or standard working class to upper working class. As 
posited by Abrahams (2000) the independence of becoming self-employed as 
opposed to working for an organisation was also attractive. The lack of an obvious 
boss was also something in a working class environment that was viewed with a 
degree of envy (Abrahams, 2000). Taxi drivers were, amongst my workmates and 
peers, a group we respected because of the fact that they had passed the, widely 
acknowledged, very difficult Knowledge, were their own bosses and earned a much 
higher income than we did, all of which seemed to be paid in cash and on a daily 
basis. Those that we knew were home owners which was unusual at the time.  
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The recognition amongst taxi drivers and their peers of the enormity of the 
Knowledge as a task, together with the stress and pressure that was caused by the 
rumours and stories that circulate amongst Knowledge Boys appears to develop a 
mutual respect amongst taxi drivers. It appears that London’s taxi drivers value the 
shared experience of the Knowledge and regard it as an identifier that forms a bond 
of mutual respect. This mutual respect concerning completing the Knowledge, 
together with the taxi drivers’ faith that every single taxi driver has had to complete it, 
almost certainly binds the trade together and unites taxi drivers in the common cause 
of maintaining the status quo.  This status quo, whereby every new entrant must 
complete the Knowledge of London, is important to taxi drivers as evidenced by their 
consensual acceptance of the rigours, the eccentricities and idiosyncratic nature of 
the testing process. 
 
According to those I interviewed. Likewise the bond between drivers is also under 
threat. Without the Knowledge, or should the Knowledge be watered down London’s 
taxi industry implicitly fear that it would be in danger of losing its place in the 
hierarchy of driving jobs where it is currently perceived to be at the top. If any loss of 
status, and thereby identity were to happen the very attributes of the role that attract 
many people to become taxi drivers would be at risk. The next section deals with just 
such a threat, caused by an attempt to disrupt the equilibrium within the trade by 
introducing what was termed as a Quickie Knowledge, and how the culture of the 
industry was counter to these attempts and the behaviours that were manifested as a 
consequence. 
 
 
5.2.16 The Quickie Knowledge  
During a period of rapid growth in demand for radio taxis in London during the 
nineties, caused by a buoyant economy and vigorous growth in the financial and 
legal sector in the City of London, attempts were made by some radio taxi company 
managements to urge the Public Carriage Office (PCO) to reduce the time it took 
Knowledge Students to complete the Knowledge of London qualification thereby 
enabling quicker entry to the industry. Their objective was to provide a larger pool of 
candidate taxi drivers from which to recruit drivers from to expand their radio taxi 
companies.  
 
These attempts ruined the individual proponents’ reputations within the industry. Very 
quickly a ‘group ideology’ (Watson 1982:259) developed that mobilised the trade 
press, trade associations and individual, and groups, of taxi drivers against the 
proponents. Bendix (1963:264) explains how ideology develops;  
 
‘The attitudes of individuals do not become the public opinion of a group 
merely by the process of addition. Instead, public opinion is formed through a 
constant process of formulation and reformulation by which spokesmen 
identified with a social group seek to articulate what they sense to be shared 
understandings….I call these articulations ‘ideologies’ in the specific sense of 
[an] idea considered in the context of group action’ 
 
What was clear early on in this process was that the Knowledge was sacrosanct 
amongst taxi drivers. This was evidenced from the consensual approach to the 
Knowledge whereby the physical and mental demands of acquiring the Knowledge 
together with the onerous testing process were readily accepted by Knowledge 
Students who completed the process and considered both necessary and important. 
It meant that all taxi drivers were equally qualified, it defined their identity and 
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influenced their culture. It was not viewed as public property and a candidate for 
small groups of individuals to manipulate to suit their narrow business or commercial 
needs.  
 
The sobriquet of the Quickie Knowledge was adopted by critics to describe the 
initiative and this was used as a form of abuse to the perpetrators for years after their 
attempts had been abandoned. The major trade association, the Licensed Taxi 
Drivers’ Association (LTDA), in effect the spokesmen as referred to by Bendix (1963), 
ran a campaign for many years; ‘No to a Quickie Knowledge’ which London’s taxi 
drivers supported vociferously. 
 
The trade press ran series of abusive articles verging on hate campaigns against the 
perpetrators. Letters apparently poured into the trade press and those that were 
published viciously refuted that there was any shortage of radio taxi drivers and 
condemned the vested interests (Callsign, 2003) attempting to ruin the trade as they 
described it by flooding it with poorly trained drivers.  
 
‘There has been much recent speculation regarding the issue of new taxi 
driver licences. It claims an apparent dilution of the standards now required to 
obtain the coveted All London Green Badge [Taxi driver’s licence]. Led by 
one driver organisation, the speculation infers that the present day KoL 
[Knowledge of London] is tougher than it was a few years ago. It has also 
been claimed that pressure was brought onto the Public Carriage Office by 
taxi proprietors and other ‘vested’ interests, to pass out candidates quicker in 
order to satisfy those proprietor’s profit margins without regard to any 
economic downturn and drivers’ earnings at the time’. (Callsign, 2003:8) 
 
The fact than less than a third of drivers subscribed to a radio circuit (Townsend, 
2007) was cited as evidence that any structural defect was to be found in the sales 
proposition of the radio taxi companies rather than an inherent supply issue within 
the industry.  
 
This was a clear example of what Watson describes happening in his case study; 
 
‘As a result of the need for individuals to come together to look after common 
interests in the face of greater relative power of the employing interest [or in 
this case the radio taxi companies a pseudo employer], we see a process 
going on at all levels throughout employing organizations in which individuals 
relate themselves to others in objectively similar circumstances to defend or 
advance shared interests. Group mobilization, both formal and informal, thus 
occurs throughout the organization’ (1982: 264).  
 
The culture in the taxi industry in London is very much one of maintaining the status 
quo, of all being equal and importantly that the Knowledge binds the industry 
together. These attempts by the management of the radio taxi companies offended 
each of those important principles. It went further as it provided no tangible benefit to 
taxi drivers directly, it merely enabled the radio taxi companies, in effect businesses, 
to benefit from the taxi drivers’ loss of identity, status quo and was completely 
counter to their culture. The test was clearly one of relative power (Watson, 1982); 
could the taxi drivers and their organisations stand firm against the radio taxi 
company executives? The mobilisation that Watson (1982) refers to is clear in this 
scenario as can be seen from the vitriolic comments in the trade press, identifying the 
proponents as vested interests. A further example of this mobilisation was the trade 
press giving what was a from the proponents’ perspective a change in business 
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process the sobriquet; the Quickie Knowledge. This term was then successfully 
through formal and informal means turned into a term of abuse. The informal 
networks that are very much part of the culture of London’s taxi drivers were 
successful in highlighting this issue and influencing if not public opinion (Bendix, 
1963) certainly the opinion of the community that were affected by it. 
 
The Licensed Taxi Drivers’ Association carried out a survey to show that there was 
an empty taxi every ten seconds in certain main thoroughfares of London and 
concluded that therefore there was no shortage of taxi drivers and no need to alter 
the Knowledge testing process. The LTDA issued a statement regarding the 
behaviour of a member of the Taxi Board [The London Taxi Board was an industry 
wide coalition of taxi organisations, the regulator and the vehicle manufacturers who 
met regularly to informally develop policy for the industry]; this individual was one of 
the proponents of the Quickie Knowledge.  
 
‘No Quicky Knowledge 
 
A prominent member of the London Taxi Board recently issued a public 
statement to the effect that the 1089 new driver licenses issued last year in 
London were "Clearly NOT enough". 
 
It is this type of view that prompted the LTDA to suspend its membership of 
the Taxi Board and to fight against those who wish to see a "quicky" 
Knowledge and London flooded with Licensed Taxi Drivers.’ (LTDA, 2012) 
 
The perpetrators were branded by the trade press, the de facto industry spokesmen, 
trade associations and the industry leaders, as having vested interests (Callsign, 
2003). This term, vested interests, was widely and wildly thrown around at the time 
by the trade press and drivers. Watson elaborates, ‘Group leaders or spokesmen 
play an important part here in converting potential common objective interests into 
recognized or subjective ones’ (1982: 264). The Knowledge of London is an imposed 
vocational qualification and despite the personal, physical deprivations of it, the 
humiliating rituals enacted by the PCO examiners and the psychological overhead of 
separation from family, adverse financial impact, unclear curriculum and uncertainty 
over duration and progress, my research has established that it is accepted 
consensually by Knowledge Boys and regarded by taxi drivers as a rite of passage 
(Taxi Driver Interviews), as an achievement, as an investment and as a key 
differentiator from other driving jobs that taxi drivers perceive as being of a lower 
order.  
 
Each of these are important points that influence the culture and form the identity of 
London’s taxi drivers. The attempts to remove any of them or in some way to soften 
their impact on new entrants by claims of needing more taxi drivers and suggesting 
that somehow the Knowledge of London was tougher in recent times than was 
previously the case and doing so from an apparently privileged position of 
management once again offended the identity and culture of London’s taxi drivers 
who strongly felt that they were all equal whether driving a taxi or managing a radio 
taxi company.  
 
The coalition of taxi drivers and others that came together is understandable when 
we see that that the implicit contract or effort-reward bargain is constantly liable to 
redefinition to the employee’s [In this case the taxi drivers’] potential disadvantage 
(Baldamus, 1961). The fear that the LTDA either helpfully highlighted or chose to use 
as a form of abuse, depending upon your viewpoint, was that enabling greater 
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numbers of taxi drivers through lowering what, is in effect, a barrier to entry (Porter, 
1980), meant dilution of the available business and therefore lower profits or longer 
working hours for existing taxi drivers. As Watson (1982:264) asserts; 
 
‘unless individual employees have qualities which are unique, or particularly 
valuable to the organization, they will be relatively powerless to defend 
themselves in the face of these pressures, and even less likely to improve 
their position’.  
 
The watering down of the Knowledge of London as the radio circuit principals’ 
attempts were often referred to during the period of animosity, would have removed 
the unique and valuable quality (Watson, 1982)  that taxi drivers consider as the 
important symbol of their security and from an academic perspective their identity, 
i.e. the Knowledge of London qualification.  Beynon (1975:153) points out I believe 
quite rightly that; ‘what most working men want of a job is that it offers some security’. 
This was supported in the interviews that I carried out amongst taxi drivers; Taxi 
Driver Interviewee No.1 stated, when asked why he had decided to become a taxi 
driver, that ‘it provided me with [Job and financial] security’. The moves to water 
down the Knowledge were in many taxi drivers’ view going to damage the level of job 
and financial security they enjoyed.  
 
In their Joint Association of Radio Taxi Associations (JARTA) meetings the principals 
of the radio taxi companies used terms such as “Luddites” and “small thinkers” to 
describe what they termed “the illogical behaviour” of taxi drivers’ who had railed 
against the Quickie Knowledge. They accused the trade associations e.g. Licensed 
Taxi Drivers’ Association of “being politically motivated” and “opportunist”. The radio 
taxi management teams depended ‘on the assumed existence of certain 
organizational goals’ (Watson 1982:261), for example that all, or the majority of 
drivers/members, wanted to see their radio circuit continue to grow. What could 
never be assumed, and apparently was by the radio circuit executives, was that the 
taxi drivers would support these objectives even if was at a cost to themselves at 
both a collaborative and individual level. The direct cost to taxi drivers was potentially 
the loss of, or damage to, their status, identity, autonomy, and their financial and job 
security. 
 
This is an interesting and important concept. The radio taxi company executives 
appear to have gambled that radio taxi drivers would put utilitarian ideals ahead of 
personal identity and the prevailing culture of their peers and the industry. They also 
seemed to question drivers’ intelligence and ability to make logical decisions, thus 
assuming for themselves a privileged position whereby their ideas were logical and 
made by more intelligent people. 
 
The radio taxi management teams appear to have identified a need for the radio taxi 
industry to continue to grow and develop through meeting customer demand for more 
taxis and what was often referred to as “a more dynamic” or “responsive service”, 
which apparently meant taxis waiting for customers not customers waiting for taxis. 
The Knowledge was viewed by radio taxi circuit executives as a barrier to entry 
(Porter, 1980) and consequently an adverse impact on the growth of the businesses 
they managed and the taxi industry in general. Whereas the drivers and trade 
associations relied on two arguments, firstly that there were two thirds of the driver 
population (those who did not belong to a radio circuit) who could be recruited by the 
radio circuits if the proposition was suitably attractive and secondly that customer 
service would reduce, as new drivers came on stream who did not have the benefit of 
the traditional Knowledge of London which took a long time to acquire and was an 
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effective character test for aspiring taxi drivers. Their position was that the Quickie 
Knowledge would adversely impact the customer experience as the driver would lack 
adequate topographical knowledge and may not have the character traits to deal with 
the public. A further point was made that this situation would benefit neither the taxi 
trade in general nor the radio taxi companies whose principals were championing it. 
 
In addition to the two arguments put forward by the taxi drivers and their champions, 
the implications were that the radio circuits were more interested in profit, salaries, 
and personal benefits such as pensions and company cars than in the taxi drivers’ 
wellbeing, hence the sobriquet of ‘vested interests’ (Callsign, 2003). The underlying 
argument from the drivers and their supporters was that protecting drivers’ incomes 
and job security was more important than greater availability of taxis for passengers 
during peak periods of demand. This is once again a demonstration of drivers’ views 
of a hierarchy where taxi drivers’ interests are evidently rated above those of 
customers. 
 
Taxi drivers waiting for customers would have a direct adverse impact on their 
earning capability which is one of the important reasons to become a taxi driver. My 
research established that taxi drivers do not consider themselves to be an 
organisation in any conventional understanding of the term. They view themselves 
and are constantly presenting their identity as self-employed businessmen. This 
individuality appears to encourage placing oneself and one’s own interests at the 
centre of decision making. It is this culture that enabled opponents of the Quickie 
Knowledge to marshal against attempts to consolidate the individual taxi drivers into 
a mass whose main purpose is to satisfy the needs of London’s taxi travelling public.  
 
During my interaction with the radio taxi organisation principals it was apparent that 
they had moved, psychologically, from being Knowledge Boys who had completed 
the Knowledge themselves to taxi drivers, to managers and then to businessmen and 
ultimately to self-styled and appointed statesmen of the industry. They used terms 
such as “people being unable to see the big picture”, that “emotion had got in the way 
of common sense”. They ‘labelled pejoratively’, in Watson’s (1982:261) terms, 
‘employee reluctance to go along with such changes’ as “resistance to change”.”‘By 
implication, this is to be seen as a generally bad thing and, of course, an irrational 
thing.”, (Watson:1982:261). Initially they adopted Watson’s (1982) analysis that 
‘overcoming change is thus a matter of simply getting people to see sense, rather 
than a matter of some interest groups exerting power with regard to others’ (Watson, 
1982:261). I never heard the term irrational used during this period but ‘illogical’ was 
often used when discussing the driver and trade press reaction to what the radio 
company principals viewed as “a rational and logical” solution to a purely business 
problem.  
 
One of the main protagonists for the changes constantly used terms such as a 
“logical process” and “what we need is lateral thinking, not blinkers” when promoting 
the change. Drivers who were vehemently against the changes were labelled as 
“ignoramuses”, “not very nice people”, “not very bright [intelligent] people”, and 
“trouble makers” by management. A charge of “a lack of loyalty” was used by the 
radio taxi company principals to describe the actions of drivers who were against the 
change.  
 
Pettigrew (197:573) draws attention to what he calls ‘the less rational and 
instrumental aspects of organizational behaviour’ and ‘for greater attention to be to 
the paid to the ways in which organizational members [In this case taxi drivers, their 
representatives and the radio taxi company principals] act as creators of symbols, 
Michael Sangster Galvin 
Student Number 03082746 
 
 
124 
 
languages, beliefs, visions, ideologies and myths’. All of the parties involved were 
busy developing their language; ‘vested interests’ (Callsign, 2003) was used as a 
form of abuse towards the proponents and trouble makers, and ‘ignoramuses’ 
towards the opponents. Symbols were also evident; suits were the symbol of the 
radio company principals and taxis [The vehicle] were the symbols of opposition.  
 
Both groups had created a vision; opponents spoke of new Quickie Knowledge taxi 
drivers who, unlike those who had been through the traditional Knowledge of London 
training and testing process, no longer knew where they were going [had no, or 
scant, topographical knowledge], streets flooded with more empty taxis and taxi 
drivers unable to make a living due to the influx of new entrants. The radio circuit 
principals described an industry that was withering on the vine, unable to meet 
customer demand. Ideologies became increasingly entrenched and polarised, and 
language reverted to sound bites based around us and them. Interestingly both 
groups used the terms us and them to describe themselves and their opponents. 
Belief amongst both groups appeared absolute. Both groups apparently believed in 
their actions and ideologies and demonstrated a belief that they and their ideology 
were destined to save the industry. 
 
Similar to Watson’s case study the language was of ‘improving communications and 
showing the workforce [In this case radio taxi drivers] that changes were to 
everyone’s advantage and thus not to be resisted’ (1982:263). Graphs were 
produced by the protagonists showing how long the Knowledge used to take and that 
it was now taking longer. This change was presented by management as a bad thing 
but many drivers saw it as good news as if the Knowledge took longer there would be 
fewer drivers. They reasoned that this meant more business for existing taxi drivers. 
Further statistics were produced which highlighted that there were more drivers who 
were over seventy years of age than under thirty five. This was presented in the 
press controlled by the radio circuit principals as shocking evidence of a trend of long 
term industry decline. What the true significance of this bald statistic showed was 
never validated or explained. Neither was any historical context or explanation 
provided, the taxi industry may have had an age profile where more drivers were 
over seventy than under thirty five for decades. The more the problem was 
considered by the radio taxi company principals as a communications challenge the 
worse relations became between the proponents and the opponents of the Quickie 
Knowledge. 
 
The original proponents let it be known to the industry through the trade press that 
large fleet owners in London were also involved, supportive and championing the 
Quickie Knowledge and therefore in favour of expanding the number of drivers. This 
caused further acrimony amongst taxi drivers and other opponents of the Quickie 
Knowledge. The fleet owners like the radio taxi company principals viewed a higher 
number of taxi drivers as a potential opportunity to increase business. Even today 
fleet owners are often referred to in the trade press pejoratively as ‘vested interests’ 
(Callsign, 2003) or the Masters [This is taken from the name of their association, the 
London Master Carriage Proprietors Association, known as Masters for short – the 
term Masters is normally used sarcastically to imply bosses from when most drivers 
worked for a Master i.e. fleet owner rather than owning their own vehicle]. Although 
approximately one third of drivers belonged to a radio circuit less than 10% hired a 
taxi. This prompted terminology such as ‘the tail wagging the dog’ when drivers 
criticised the fleet owners’ involvement in the campaign for the Quickie Knowledge.   
 
I was never witness to the culture of London’s taxi drivers and the identity that they 
cultivated being considered or discussed at proponent meetings. Instead the 
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emphasis was on resolving a communications problem. The lines between the 
parties were increasingly drawn as management against workers (taxi drivers). The 
taxi drivers were unhappy about what they saw as peers trying to position 
themselves as professional managers and irritated by the fleet owners siding with the 
radio taxi company executives. The radio taxi management teams were also irritated 
by the taxi drivers’ refusal to address what they saw as an unemotional business 
problem.       
 
Not surprisingly proposals for replacing the character building experience inherent in 
acquiring the Knowledge of London with the Quickie Knowledge, which would 
change the character of the qualification from a physical, mental and psychological 
endurance to a computer program that could be learnt from the comfort of a 
Knowledge Student’s spare bedroom, and replacing live appearances with a Public 
Carriage Office Examiner with tests that are taken online, responding to multiple 
choice questions, were often argued as reasons to preserve the Knowledge in its 
current form. Once again it is interesting to observe that the qualification is viewed by 
taxi drivers as primarily what is good for the driver e.g. differentiation from other 
drivers, rather than providing a specific customer benefit.  
 
It is also interesting to note that customers or their views were not involved in any 
significant way by either the proponents or opponents of the Quickie Knowledge. The 
only explicit reference to customers was the radio taxi company principals’ reference 
to meeting customer demand. The opponents of the Quickie Knowledge (mainly taxi 
drivers and their advocates) made an implicit gesture to customer service when they 
mentioned the likelihood that new Quickie Knowledge drivers would not know where 
they were going which would obviously have an adverse customer impact. This non-
involvement of customers appeared to be because the dispute was really a power 
battle between taxi drivers and radio circuit principals, and to a lesser extent fleet 
owners, and is another example that shows that customers’ views are not really 
considered significant within the industry. 
 
The radio taxi management teams in this scenario were in my view attempting to use 
language to describe and imply that the taxi drivers who were against the change 
were illogical, incapable of lateral thought, emotional, and therefore less able 
intellectually than the radio taxi management. One could go as far as to say that the 
protagonists of the Quickie Knowledge felt the taxi drivers were in need of leadership, 
or someone else to do the thinking, who possessed the experience, competence, 
qualifications or qualities that the taxi drivers lacked. This was analogous to Berger 
and Luckman’s (1967) vision of the way language is used in the social construction of 
meanings and Mills’ (1963) discussion of the exercise of vocabularies of motive. The 
motive here was to convince what were considered by management to be the silent 
majority, ‘that to oppose management plans is not only to be other than sensible 
[illogical] but is to threaten the domestic harmony of the team’ (Watson 1982:272). 
 
The Knowledge qualification was, in my opinion, and still is believed to be, regarded 
as the ‘master symbol of the organization’ (Christensen and Cheney, 2000:249). The 
actions of the fleet proprietors and radio circuit principals were seen by many drivers, 
I believe, as treachery, an insidious attack on the trade by people who belonged to it 
and who gained their living from it. These comments are mine but contain the 
language and sentiment used at the time by drivers. The perpetrators were all 
licensed taxi drivers, although it was many years since they had actually driven a taxi 
for a living. The fact that members of the taxi drivers’ own group were championing 
the changes annoyed the drivers more than if it had been driven by parties external 
to their group. As this was in effect a peer vs. peer battle, something that I discovered 
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during my research, it was considered to be the type of battle that encouraged the 
taxi drivers to feel able to fight with greater vigour. I believe that these actions 
brought out the worst in the taxi drivers as their biggest fear, lack of differentiation, 
loss of identity and assimilation with lower order driving roles, e.g. minicab and bus 
drivers, was heightened. 
 
 
5.2.17 Summary 
The Knowledge of London vocational qualification is judged by those who undertake 
it and their non-taxi driver peers to be a significant, demanding and difficult 
undertaking. The task appears to be made more difficult by the arcane practices 
adopted by the Public Carriage Office (PCO) who appear to provide little guidance, 
no feedback and expect prospective taxi drivers to discover through informal means 
what is required on many levels, including but not limited to behaviour in and around 
the PCO and its staff and examiners, the delivery of answers during topographical 
tests, how Knowledge Boys can self-assess their progress on the Knowledge and 
how to actually acquire the Knowledge. PCO staff and examiners appear to behave 
in an unreasonable manner at times to Knowledge Boys and yet this is accepted 
consensually by those acquiring the Knowledge.  
 
The archaic and eccentric rituals of the Knowledge appear to have developed over 
time and to be readily accepted by Knowledge Boys.  The high drop-out rate 
amongst aspirant taxi drivers appears to be accepted by both the PCO and 
Knowledge Boys. Knowledge Boys demonstrate a high level of subservience to the 
staff and examiners at the PCO. The PCO staff and examiners appear to have a 
formal culture of remaining diffident to the taxi industry in general and Knowledge 
Boys and the Knowledge of London process specifically. Knowledge Boys evidently 
spend a great deal of time and energy demonising the PCO through informal 
communication channels using rumour and anecdote extensively to do so..    
 
Knowledge Boys whilst acquiring the Knowledge apparently deliberately begin 
travelling around London on their own. They appear to avoid contact with other 
Knowledge Boys. This behaviour amongst a narrow demographic is unusual. This 
culture then changes significantly when they join a Knowledge School and appear to 
join and behave very much as a community. Quickly hierarchies are formed based on 
topographical competency levels which are assessed informally.   
 
The personal demands of acquiring the Knowledge, together with the approbation 
that is meted out by non-taxi driving peers when one becomes a taxi driver, is 
important in the formation of the identity of taxi drivers. In addition to these factors the 
longevity of the industry, the legitimacy of the role, and the acceptance into the 
industry by existing taxi drivers enables the new taxi driver to associate himself with 
the identity of the industry. These important factors appear to influence taxi drivers to 
adopt and cultivate an identity that is closely aligned with the industry, its 
antecedents, mores and values.     
 
Given the technological changes that we are experiencing with SatNavs and other 
navigation aids the relevance and necessity for the Knowledge process could be 
questioned. However taxi drivers, Knowledge Boys and even those who are 
attempting to join the industry appear readily to accept the rigours and demands of 
the Knowledge consensually as a rite of passage, a quality control measure and a 
way of elevating their profession to be more than just a driving job. The demands of 
the Knowledge appear to be transposed from a vocational qualification to a 
justification and a probably naïve, albeit implicit, assurance of continuity and 
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legitimacy.  The attempts by the executives of the radio taxi industry to downgrade 
the Knowledge, as it was viewed by the taxi industry, was roundly rejected and the 
proponents pilloried for attacking such an important icon of the industry. 
 
Overall the Knowledge of London could be described as an anachronism. Whilst it 
ensures that every new taxi driver has an excellent topographical Knowledge of 
London and its landmarks, my research suggests that its real value is that it operates 
a rite of passage into an ancient and honourable institution. Its rigours and demands, 
together with the ritualised approach to testing, are consensually accepted by 
Knowledge Boys and almost revered by taxi drivers. These factors are important 
influencers on the culture of the industry and the identity of both individual taxi drivers 
and the industry which they are closely aligned with.    
  
The next section considers the transition from Knowledge Boy to taxi driver and the 
social interplay, structures, etiquette, and culture of life as a taxi driver. The 
relationship between taxi drivers, passengers, the industry’s institutions and, in light 
of a lack of management, the leadership of the industry are examined. An important 
factor in the next section is the similarities between the behaviours and aspirations 
amongst what is a virtual workforce and workforces in more conventional 
organisations (Hatch and Schultz, 1997).  
 
 
5.3 Behaviours, Interactions and Identity  
In this section I have provided an insight into the transition from Knowledge Boy to 
taxi driver as I experienced it and as it was related to me by other new taxi drivers. I 
examine the behaviours and interactions between taxi drivers and between taxi 
drivers and others in the industry and taxi drivers with passengers. I have examined 
the identity that taxi drivers appear to portray to each other and the wider community 
through the daily routines and rituals of taxi drivers’ working lives, taxi drivers’ values 
and beliefs and the relationship between groups and institutions within the industry. I 
have also sought to highlight ritualised behaviours and sought to understand how 
these have developed and why. All of these important interactions have provided an 
insight into the culture and identity of London’s taxi drivers. During my research I was 
drawn to establishing whether there is a culture in the industry that new taxi drivers 
adopt or whether the organisation is a culture that subtly adjusts and changes with 
each new recruit.  I have sought to identify why things happen as they do, why taxi 
drivers behave as they do and why the interactions that form the social exchange 
(Blau, 1986) on which the industry appears to thrive happen as they do.  
5.3.1 Relationships; Taxi Drivers and Knowledge Boys 
In this section I relate my experiences of the relationship between taxi drivers and 
Knowledge Boys. I use specific events to highlight the manifestation of the 
relationship. I go on to consider how, when a Knowledge Boy transitions to become a 
taxi driver, new taxi drivers are treated by the existing taxi driver community.  
 
The relationship between Knowledge Boys and taxi drivers was in my experience 
ephemeral and consisted mainly of short vignettes. My research showed that it was 
common for the small number of taxi drivers who provided any acknowledgement of 
Knowledge Students to shout, some aggressively and others, I believe, jokingly, from 
their taxis to “Give it up” [it being the Knowledge] or “Give it up, the game’s [industry 
is] finished” [No longer commercially viable]. Most taxi drivers, even when sitting in 
their taxi next to a Knowledge Boy at traffic lights, said nothing and did not make eye 
contact or acknowledge Knowledge Boys in any way. Very occasionally a taxi driver 
might enquire in a kindly manner how one was getting on with the Knowledge and 
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possibly indicate how tough they found it themselves and even make the odd positive 
or encouraging comment such as “It is all worth it in the end” or similar. These were 
generally snatched conversations whilst waiting at traffic lights or whilst waiting in 
traffic jams.  
 
It appeared to me that from the more kindly or jocular taxi drivers’ perspective the 
Knowledge was something different and unconnected with the industry. Knowledge 
Students were in my view considered by taxi drivers at best to be with but definitely 
not in the industry Whetten (1997) and there appeared to be no competitive rivalry 
(Porter, 1980) or similar conflicts. This was a similar trait in my view to that of the 
Public Carriage Officer who gave the introductory talk to aspiring Knowledge Boys 
and his explicit detachment from the industry (see Section 5.2.5). Blau (1986:17) 
stresses that ‘...the basic reward that people seek in their associations is social 
approval’. In my experience social approval (Blau) was not given easily and certainly 
not frequently given by the taxi drivers or the regulator to Knowledge Students. 
 
A small group of Knowledge Boys that I knew from the Knowledge School used to 
meet regularly at a coffee stall in Westminster at four o’clock each afternoon. The 
stall was frequented by taxi drivers who also met regularly as well as occasional 
attendees. Both groups, taxi drivers and Knowledge Boys, stood in their own groups 
and rarely interacted except for occasional light hearted jibes from the taxi drivers 
towards the group of Knowledge Boys. This was probably not surprising given the 
very different cultures that the two groups belonged to. The jibes were normally 
delivered as loud asides that the taxi drivers knew the Knowledge Boys would hear, 
often accompanied by the taxi drivers pointing or other gesticulations towards the 
group of Knowledge Boys.  
 
The jibes concerned how, “They [the Knowledge Boys] all think they will become 
millionaires driving a cab” or similar. These jibes were made whilst each group of 
about four to six members stood in loose circles some six foot or so away from one 
another drinking tea. The Knowledge Boys also made jibes mainly with comments 
such as, “What’s the matter with you, had to work more than four hours today?” or, 
“Why has he got the hump [why is he fed up/annoyed/grumpy]?  Only been to the 
airport three times today?” The taxi drivers were in my view trying to either assert 
their rank or superiority or undermine the Knowledge Boys albeit with what appeared 
to be light hearted banter. The Knowledge Boys were having none of it and sought to 
paint the taxi drivers who were leading the comments as inept, albeit in their 
apparently superior role. This rivalry was only ever on show to my knowledge at this 
particular tea stall. It had an almost informal or off the record feel to the interactions. 
At all other times as previously noted I witnessed that taxi drivers largely ignored 
Knowledge Boys. 
 
Shortly after I received my taxi licence I clearly remember feeling that the Knowledge 
of London procedure and the role of taxi driver were poles apart in so many ways, 
e.g. the focus changed from learning to earning. As a taxi driver I soon became 
interested only in where my next fare/passenger was coming from and consciously 
stopped looking at and trying to memorise every building, something that had 
become habitual while undertaking the Knowledge. As a Knowledge Boy there were 
no thoughts of picking up customers; my only thoughts were trying to cram into my 
memory as many landmarks, streets, points and runs as I possibly could. So perhaps 
the separation of both groups was not as strange as it appeared to me at the time. I 
was not aware, apart from the odd aggressive, “Give it up” cat call, of any explicit 
antipathy from taxi drivers towards me as a Knowledge Boy. This could be explained 
through the high dropout rate of Knowledge Students (see section 5.2.5) which 
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controlled the number of successful students and thereby restricted growth in the taxi 
driver population. This appeared to allay taxi drivers’ fears, if they had any, of being 
overrun by new or additional taxi drivers.  
 
Even when I was a taxi driver and things were quiet, during cyclical downturns I can’t 
ever remember feeling any personal antipathy to or threat to my livelihood from 
Knowledge Boys. I certainly had no intention or motivation to shout, “Give it up,” or 
similar at Knowledge Boys and neither did I see any benefit in providing 
encouragement to someone I had never met before and was unlikely to see again; 
there was no social exchange benefit (Blau, 1986) to be derived from these activities 
in my view. 
 
In summary, taxi drivers appear to have little real interest or antipathy towards 
Knowledge Boys and likewise Knowledge Boys had no reason to interact with taxi 
drivers. Both groups have their own distinct identity and tasks to perform. Both 
groups appear to socialise with their peers and have little real interest in or of 
socialising with each other. This is probably due to the lack of any social exchange 
benefit. The exception to this was the banter that was evident at the Westminster tea 
stall. The next section concerns the integration of the new taxi driver into the industry 
and its culture and how this happens. 
 
5.3.2 Integration into the Industry – Identifying with Groups  
In the taxi industry new taxi drivers are known as ‘butter boys’ (see Glossary).  The 
reasons, like much of the lexicon of the industry, are lost in the mists of time (Garner 
and Stokoe, 2000). Butter boys are renowned within the industry as being hard 
working and are often derided by other taxi drivers as being greedy and or needy. 
This description has its roots, I believe, in an ideology prevalent in the taxi industry 
that the more money one person, e.g. a butter boy, takes, the less there is for the 
rest. Alternatively it could just be jealousy that butter boys are better motivated to 
earn more money and perhaps, due to personal circumstances, many are single, 
having waited to complete the Knowledge before getting married, and are therefore 
able to be much more flexible about their working hours than people with families.  
 
I observed a number of Knowledge Students who became taxi drivers and when they 
did they certainly lived up to the reputation of a hard working butter boy. I felt that 
they summoned the energy and enthusiasm from the elation of finishing the 
Knowledge and the motivation that is derived from the fascination of starting a new 
job. It was quite usual for a new taxi driver to return to the Knowledge School with his 
shiny new badge where he received much approbation from his peers. On these 
visits it was common to state that he would, ‘put his head down’ an industry term 
meaning to work hard, until he had paid off his debts incurred whilst studying for the 
Knowledge and had saved up for a good holiday. Several full time Knowledge 
Students that I knew had put off the date of their wedding until the Knowledge was 
finished and so they had the goal of paying for a wedding, buying and furnishing a 
house and paying for a honeymoon. It was surprising to me just how quickly these 
formidable goals were normally achieved. This energy may well have been a 
consequence of the narrow demographic from which taxi drivers are derived, within 
which there is a great deal of self-discipline and determination which was used to 
acquire the Knowledge but may well then be utilised to work hard enough to achieve 
these financial feats. 
 
Most of the part time and some full time Knowledge Boys I had known, once they 
received their badge, had the pressing need to earn money. Many had families and 
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the Knowledge had put financial pressures on their families. A lack of holidays due to 
spending all of their spare time learning London’s streets, an inability to work 
overtime, the cost of a moped and Knowledge School fees and in some cases the 
need to pay back loans to family members and possibly banks and other institutions 
that had been needed to fund the completion of the Knowledge also played a part. 
New drivers were often keen to purchase their own taxi and were therefore focused 
on saving up the deposit. A number of these issues were, I recall, an incentive for 
many to live up to the hard working ethic for which butter boys were renowned. 
Although established or long serving drivers adopted a disparaging tone towards the 
long hours that butter boys typically worked, there was an acknowledgement that 
they had completed the arduous requirements of the Knowledge and had on the day 
they qualified had rightly become full members of the community or group.  
 
The group of established drivers appeared to be particularly sensitive to, or 
consciously or unconsciously jealous or envious of, the often younger and certainly 
more energetic newcomers to the industry. Although this jealousy, if that is what it 
was, was largely concealed, only being made explicit when butter boys spoke of their 
takings and financial goals, or of purchasing new taxis, luxury holidays or similar. It 
may of course have been something very different; an inverted snobbery or a 
demonstration of what Scwalbe and Wolkomir (2001:213) observe, ‘...to recognize 
that men often exaggerate rationality, autonomy and control’. These older taxi drivers 
may be keen to demonstrate or claim that they have financial control and can 
therefore work less hours, or that they are more in control of the job of a taxi driver 
and make their money more easily than butter boys can.  Working sensible hours for 
a reasonable return is likely to be far more prevalent and representative of the 
ideology of the older or long serving group than those they regard as newcomers 
such as butter boys, who simply want to earn as much as they can to achieve 
financial recovery from the adverse impact of the Knowledge of London on their 
personal finances followed by a return to financial stability. 
 
Taxi drivers in London operate independently from one another and without any 
extrinsic need to form groups of any kind. Blau (1986) has much to offer in relation to 
the human need to form groups, the proclivity to associate with others and benefits 
derived from social exchange. He explores why people are attracted to one another 
and why they form and reform groups and discusses his concept of exchange, where 
he describes social exchange in which each gains something while paying a price. 
Blau goes on to propose that social approval is earned for conforming to group 
standards, and this exchange process is what generates in-group pressures. These 
in-group pressures seem to me to be instrumental in influencing almost universally 
accepted behaviours within the taxi industry.  
 
Roy (1954) talks of workers belonging to lots of groups and their ideologies are 
therefore formed by these groups. One of the important groups that taxi drivers 
appear to belong to is likely to be constituted from taxi drivers of their own vintage. 
Knowledge Boys make friends with other students on the Knowledge and then as 
they graduate as taxi drivers they apparently and often form groups. As taxi drivers 
they get to know taxi drivers on the same radio circuit as they belong to and 
associate with groups who have similar interests, beliefs and values, e.g. groups of 
drivers who regularly go on charity outings or those who regularly work at the airport. 
If they are long serving and older drivers, their peers are likely to be similar in many 
ways; possibly they were conscripted to national service or were formerly trade union 
members or worked in similar industries prior to becoming taxi drivers. During my 
research I noted that they demonstrated many of the same cultural traits e.g. held 
very similar political views or were happy to follow regulations, both formal and 
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informal without questioning their relevance or veracity. Groups also form in the 
various cafes and shelters used by taxi drivers. These are often more than simply 
opportunist groups, and in my experience the patronage of these establishments 
were broadly likeminded individuals, supporting Blau’s (1986) and Roys’ (1954) 
theories about groups.  
 
How much of the behaviour that is demonstrated is determined by membership of 
groups such as butter boys, taxi drivers, long serving taxi drivers and so forth, and 
how much is concerned with the ‘masculine self’ (Scwalbe and Wolkmir 2001:204) 
and gender is difficult to discern. The industry is almost totally male dominated and 
this may well influence conversation and boasting to present a masculine self whose 
autonomy was far greater than other groups such as butter boys. Older and long 
serving drivers appeared to want to present their prowess at what is in effect hunting 
and gathering as much stronger than amongst butter boys. These long serving 
drivers appear to be trying to present themselves as more in control of their world 
than butter boys who they position as being at the mercy of luck rather than 
benefitting from experience. 
 
I remember feeling immediately after I received my taxi drivers badge and licence, 
known in the industry as the driver’s badge and bill [the colloquial name for the 
drivers licence], that I was now part of the industry. I read the trade press avidly and 
spoke to drivers at ranks in railway stations. I continued to stop at a coffee stall 
known amongst taxi drivers as ‘The Sanctuary’ which was opposite Westminster 
Abbey. Here butter boys, whom I had known as Knowledge Boy peers, typically 
stopped and chatted and sought information or to share experiences. I quickly moved 
on to visiting cafes where taxi drivers ate and very soon developed friendships 
amongst taxi drivers and joined in the banter, as far as I was concerned, just as 
authoritatively as anyone else. These meeting places are analogous to the mini 
university at Astra Zeneca (Hatch and Rubin, 2005), that created a meeting place for 
professionals in the industry, the difference being that the meeting places for 
practitioners in the taxi industry had evolved rather than been created by 
management. The outcome was the same; a place for practitioners in the industry to 
meet. 
 
There were a number of such places whose names and locations are very familiar to 
London’s taxi drivers; The Royal Oak, The Granby Grill and The Piccolo, all of which 
were commercially operated establishments: in addition to these are the small green 
huts known as shelters (see Glossary) distributed across London (see photograph 
below).  
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Cabman's shelter, Hanover Square, March 2006 reproduced with kind permission of Urban 75 
 
 
Many of these shelters are known by nick names e.g. All Nations, Bull and Horns, 
whereas others are known by the road or street they are in e.g. Pont Street Shelter, 
Hanover Square Shelter (pictured above) or even the area e.g. St John’s Wood 
Shelter and Notting Hill Gate Shelter.  Each of these venues gave taxi drivers, 
practitioners similar to Hatch and Rubin’s professionals (2005), an opportunity to tell, 
share, agree and embellish the taxi industry’s ‘corporate story’ (Larsen, 2000:197), 
as well as providing a platform and audience for individual anecdotes and identity 
formulation (Watson, 1994). Given the tradition of verbal storytelling amongst taxi 
drivers (Garner and Stokoe, 2000), these venues provide an important function within 
the industry in that they enable dissemination of information and the telling and 
preservation of the industry’s history, albeit in an informal, verbal and often anecdotal 
format.  
 
Whether my integration into the industry was typical is difficult to say. I would suggest 
that it was as others I observed had experienced a very similar integration. My 
observation of being a Knowledge Boy, the Knowledge acquisition process, the PCO, 
Knowledge Schools, call overs and ultimately as a taxi driver being accepted into the 
community by dint of my qualification leads me to conclude that mine was a very 
typical integration. Although I felt integrated into the industry at a macro level, 
integration or acceptance as a member of the various micro groups that continue to 
form in the industry are a very different matter. Eligibility, albeit informal, for 
membership of the various groups was reliant on certain dependencies e.g. age, a 
priori, length of service and also on the frequency of meeting at certain cafes and 
shelters or belonging to a radio circuit. Membership of these groups appears to 
involve acceptance of the culture of those groups and a strong identification with it. 
Whilst there was no imperative to belong to any group, Blau’s thesis of social 
exchange and Roy’s theories regarding members adopting the group’s ideologies 
appear to be borne out by my observations.  
 
Having discussed above my integration into the industry and some of the groups, the 
next sections analyse life as a taxi driver and what that means.  
5.3.3 Businessman or Employee 
From my research I discovered that most of the taxi drivers I knew had seen their 
employment status change from that of an employee to being a self-employed taxi 
driver. Whilst the two statuses, employee and self-employed taxi driver, appear very 
clear their definition were often debated by new taxi drivers.  I found the role of taxi 
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driver to be very casual and informal. There was no contract (Watson, 1982, see 
below) with anyone. I realised that in previous, conventional jobs that I had been 
employed in I would have had a formal and/or implicit contract with my employer. 
There would have been agreement on the hours I was to work, how the work should 
be done and a variety of written and unwritten rules such as what to wear at work. 
Yet as a taxi driver any such decisions were left entirely to the individual. I recall this 
freedom to be both liberating and slightly worrying although some comfort was 
gained from observing other taxi drivers and through social interchange in cafes and 
shelters.  
 
Another area of discomfort for me was that I appeared to be working in very short 
bursts for each customer I picked up, providing little if any job security. 
 
Watson (1982:263) writes ‘Every individual when he or she takes up 
employment in an organization can be seen as making an implicit contract 
with the employer. This involves a set of largely tacit assumptions built around 
the core of an explicit employment contract about what the employer will 
provide by way of meeting the personal goals, wants and interests of the 
individual (money, status, satisfaction, power, security etc) in return for the 
individual’s contribution to the purposes of the employer (doing so much work 
of such a quality etc)’ 
 
These assumptions referred to by Watson were totally missing from my role as a taxi 
driver. I was not, in my opinion, truly a businessman nor was I an employee. I felt 
myself to be in a strange middle ground where I had much of the responsibility, and 
in all honesty the freedom of self-employment, but strangely lacked the freedom of a 
businessman to make fundamental decisions e.g. pricing [London’s taxi fares are 
strictly regulated and any changes are subject to endorsement through Parliament 
through the laying of an order on the floor of the House]. In the role of a self-
employed taxi driver every pound was earned as a direct consequence of my labour. 
I felt I had neither the implicit contract referred to by Watson nor the formal contract 
common amongst employees. What I had was a list of abstracts of laws and 
regulations, some constraints regarding fares, vehicle choice and compellable 
distance (see glossary) and no real feeling of achievable personal goals such as 
career path, power, authority or security. Discussions with other new taxi drivers 
concerning these issues provided evidence that other new taxi drivers felt equally 
bewildered and unnerved by the new found freedoms provided by their new career. 
 
Aside from the legal and regularity framework inherent in the taxi industry I had full 
autonomy (Scwalbe and Wolkmir, 2001) regarding my working hours and the number 
and length of shifts I worked.  Watson raises the issue of, ‘...an organisational future 
in the form of a promise of promotion or other forms of career advancement’ 
(1994:61). A future of career advancement and promotion was not an option in the 
role of the taxi driver who was for the most part at the same level on the day he 
retired as the day that he first received his badge. There was/is no official promotion 
and any promotion was of a pseudo or proxy nature which was purely determined by 
the driver’s own view of self and included advancements such as owning his own 
taxi, joining a radio taxi company and/or perhaps becoming a committee member of a 
radio taxi cooperative or a charity.  
 
It appeared that there was likewise no chance to build a real business other than 
perhaps joining the small number of people who bought and sold airport trips from 
hotel doormen, as the only person one could employ was  one’s self. This is in some 
ways similar to many other self-employed, small businesses operated by 
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professionals e.g. solicitors, accountants, surveyors and architects where they qualify 
and then largely operate as individuals with no career path, although they have the 
choice of expanding their practice and employing additional professional staff. This 
was not an option open to London’s taxi drivers due to the regulatory and legislative 
constraints that do not allow anyone but a licensed taxi driver to drive a licensed taxi. 
Similar to taxi drivers, the status of other professionals is often enhanced through 
taking up positions in their chartered organisations, charity work and involvement in 
their industry community. This suggests that the limitations to building a business that 
I perceived as a taxi driver are more of a self-employment issue rather than specific 
to the industry. 
 
I found myself listening to fellow taxi drivers’ views of themselves as self-employed 
businessmen and considering those views naive and even grandiose given the reality 
of what they could influence or control. My view included the feeling that many 
drivers considered the lack of a boss as evidence that they were a business man 
(Abrahams, 2000). There was a lack of any explicit customer focus, albeit even 
without this customers generally seemed happy with the service (Ipsos Mori, 2007).  
 
The lack of any control or influence on marketing the service, sales and pricing, 
supply, capacity, workforce planning or geographical spread (Slack & Lewis, 2002) 
suggests to me that drivers are not businessmen but much more self-employed sole 
traders. Stacey (2001) champions corporations operating without the need for 
objectives and the other paraphernalia of organised work; could the taxi industry be 
his vision in practice? Is the taxi industry an institution that just works without the 
need for top down management frameworks? My view is that taxi drivers are 
business men in some respects given that they need to self-organise, self-regulate 
their working hours, organise their tax and other financial affairs and yet operate 
within a structured and regulated environment. This organisational environment could 
be viewed as very restrictive for those taxi drivers with an entrepreneurial spirit.  
 
Having come from a background of running a small business I found the contrast with 
driving a taxi and considering that as a business stark. When I operated my own 
small business I had much more freedom to make choices about customer service, 
marketing, pricing and a host of other demand and supply side (Slack and Lewis, 
2002) issues.  Those choices had a very direct and quick impact on how my business 
performed. In the taxi business, drivers at taxi ranks and in cafes often described 
themselves as small businessmen and lamented a lack of respect for that position by 
the public and the regulator and the status and responsibility that went with it. I on the 
other hand viewed taxi driving as a job with more freedom and flexibility than during 
my period either as a conventional employee or as a business owner/operator. 
 
As a taxi driver there were in my view no strategic decisions to be made at all. The 
strategy for the industry, if there ever was one, has been lost in the passage of time. 
If there ever was one it was probably only intended to clean up or regulate an 
informal industry (Garner and Stokoe, 2000). If I am generous about the regulator I 
suppose developing and operating a regulated industry with trained drivers and using 
licensed vehicles could be described as a mission. From a driver’s perspective my 
decisions were almost entirely tactical and operational; when would I work and where 
would I work? The nearest I got to a strategic decision was whether to buy a taxi or 
hire one, whether to belong to a radio taxi company or not and whether to join a trade 
association, which I suppose in a formal or academic sense could be considered a 
strategic alliance (Das and Teng, 2001).  
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My research demonstrates that identity and image are perceived as important to taxi 
drivers albeit there are a number of dichotomies in the early part of a taxi driver’s 
career; e.g. whether he is a businessman or a pseudo employee is a typical area of 
confusion. Their status as self-employed businessmen or pseudo employees is an 
important issue for many. Identity in general appears to be a significant issue at an 
industry level and differentiation at an individual level requires the development of 
status in an industry where everyone is equal in terms of earning potential and 
qualification and in reality where there is no career path. Taxi drivers have little real 
need for decision making outside of when to work and for how long. Most other 
decisions are made by the regulator. An interesting, fairly personal, cultural 
observation is the way that taxi drivers are happy to discuss these feelings despite 
their relationships with one another being what can be termed as loose tie (Gladwell 
2000).   
 
The way that relationships between taxi drivers develop and how they are manifested 
is explored in the next section. During my research I uncovered the concept of 
creating an aura of seniority by mainly older or longer serving taxi drivers, referred to 
above, through identity cultivation and the development of status symbols and the 
use of exclusive language and historical knowledge. Taxi drivers as a body appear to 
have created a hierarchy of driving jobs and placed themselves at the top; this 
phenomenon is also discussed below. 
 
5.3.4 Relationships between Taxi Drivers 
Transitioning from being a Knowledge Boy, which, as explained in earlier sections, 
had its own culture and behavioural norms, to being a taxi driver, meant learning a 
whole new set of behaviours (Stacey, 2001). It also meant forming new bonds and 
friendships as I had already established that taxi drivers did not socialise with 
Knowledge Boys. This section explains how I went about this, my observations and 
experiences and provides an insight into London taxi driver identity, culture and 
behaviour and the relationships that are formed amongst this disparate and virtual 
group. 
 
From my earliest moments of becoming a taxi driver I recall that there was a 
noticeable change in the relationship and behaviour that existed between groups of 
taxi drivers compared to that between groups of Knowledge Boys or between taxi 
drivers and Knowledge Boys. It was quite normal as a taxi driver when stopping at 
traffic lights for another taxi driver who had pulled up next to my taxi to gesture with a 
knowing wink, or to raise his eyes to heaven or to exhibit similar friendly semiotic 
signals much as any other colleagues or workmates may do when in close proximity 
to each other.  Relationships amongst taxi drivers, despite for the most part not being 
known to one another and being competitors, were generally somewhere between 
indifferent to cordial. Taxi drivers were normally helpful to one another, albeit with 
some tensions obvious at times between newer, younger and longer serving drivers. 
It appears that the need for social exchange (Blau, 1986) tempted younger drivers to 
listen to older/longer serving drivers. The younger drivers gained recognition and 
possibly information and knowledge (Stacey, 2001) and the longer serving drivers 
gained status as wise and knowledgeable and almost certainly derived amusement 
and value from the social exchanges, and set boundaries and parameters based on 
the cultural value of equality.  
 
Whilst out working change for fares paid with high value bank notes were a frequent 
problem. Requests to and from other taxi drivers for change of a banknote were 
generally cheerfully and helpfully fulfilled. Likewise drivers were happy to remind one 
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of a particular club, restaurant or other point [Landmarks, addresses, destinations 
etc] that had temporarily slipped the memory. However behaviours changed 
somewhat when drivers congregated on taxi ranks. 
 
When waiting on a taxi rank I quickly learned that older taxi drivers in particular were 
always happy to find a friendly, possibly young and naive face who would listen to 
their normally gloomy predictions of instant doom for the taxi industry. I felt that I had 
never earned money so quickly or so easily, in contrast older drivers painted a 
picture of a parallel universe where it was hardly possible to scratch a living. They 
also had a habit of finding ways to depress fellow drivers. As an example of this 
behaviour I recall one older taxi driver who walked up to the side window of my taxi in 
Euston Station and enquired, “New cab?” It was obvious it was new due to the 
condition of the vehicle and the registration plate. When I cheerfully responded in the 
affirmative, proud that I had bought my first taxi and the step I had taken along my 
pseudo career path, he went to great lengths to describe an inherent problem with 
the new model of taxi that I had brought and predicted imminent mechanical disaster.  
 
Needless to add that taxi was one of the most reliable I ever drove. This man simply 
wanted to take the new butterboy with his shiny new taxi driver’s badge and shiny 
new taxi, down a peg or two and by introducing doubt and concern ensured that I 
endured the same worries as drivers who were driving around in elderly taxis. 
Earning more money, displaying external symbols, e.g. a new cab, started to 
challenge this value and therefore caused offence. It was this offence in my view that 
this driver and many others in other scenarios sought to address with their putdowns.  
Why did they do this? Was this a method of bursting a young, keen taxi driver’s 
enthusiasm or youthful exuberance? Was it a sport or some form of amusement to 
relate in a café or shelter at a later time? Was it once again a play for power through 
seniority and emphasis of apparent autonomy (Scwalbe and Wolkmir, 2001)? Was it 
simply the case that the older drivers were unable or unwilling to work the hours 
necessary to make enough money and were genuinely finding it difficult to generate 
sufficient income and honestly believed the industry was doomed? Through my 
research I reached the conclusion that this phenomenon related back, in my view, to 
the cultural value that all taxi drivers are equal. 
 
Watson explores a concept that is relevant to this phenomenon, “A key assumption, 
encapsulated in the concept of work orientation, is that what a person’s work means 
to them is a key influence on how they perform it,” (1994:59). An observation based 
on Watson’s concept would be that as a butterboy I enjoyed my work and 
approached it with enthusiasm and motivation and as such I believe I did a god job 
for the passengers. Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1 expressed similar views. Could it be 
that to these older drivers the job was boring and miserable and the way they 
performed it was the opposite to me? Or was it simply a relationship issue between 
new and older drivers? Watson helpfully adds that; 
 
 ‘An individual’s orientation to work is never static; their life circumstances and 
the specific circumstances prevailing in the work situation influence what they 
are looking for and what they expect to get’ (Watson, 1994:62) 
 
I considered the disparaging comments made by longer serving drivers about butter 
boys working long hours to be a form of inverted snobbery. Many taxi drivers I 
observed apparently prided themselves on being wiser or smarter than their 
colleagues and working fewer hours, or even just claiming to work less hours. Such 
claims were a method of validating their apparently savvy taxi driving credentials. 
They appeared to want to position themselves through accounts that exaggerated 
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their ‘rationality, autonomy and control’ (Scwalbe and Wolkmir, 2001: 212) as being 
streetwise and nobody’s fool (e.g.Taxi Driver Interviewee No.4). These observations 
of the relationship between longer serving and older taxi drivers were analogous to 
the relationship between taxi drivers and Knowledge Boys, albeit taxi drivers’ 
professional competence was never in my experience questioned in these 
exchanges. 
 
Taxi drivers considered themselves to be at the top of the driving jobs hierarchy, and 
at the top by a significant margin. My experience, as a taxi driver, was that I 
considered myself far better, more professional and somehow more legitimate than 
other people who drove for a living. This was because I had undertaken the 
Knowledge of London qualification and enjoyed the status and kudos associated with 
it amongst non-taxi driver peers. This assertion was commonly expressed by other 
taxi drivers when we discussed this. Some went on to add that our earning potential 
was far better than other people they knew who drove for a living. There were a 
number of taxi drivers that I knew who had previously worked as bus or other drivers; 
this apparent progression from bus or delivery driver to taxi driver (Taxi Driver 
Interviews) supported the concept of a hierarchy. Taxi drivers’ position in the 
vocational driving hierarchy was evidently an important part of the drivers’ identity.   
 
A further example of the concept of an apparent hierarchy amongst different driving 
jobs was further evidenced by taxi drivers’ comments regarding other drivers, 
especially bus drivers, who were viewed as part of a much lower order. Particularly 
during quiet periods of the year taxi drivers would make comments such as, ‘If things 
get much worse I may as well become a bus driver’. The implication being that, 
during periods when business was quiet, taxi drivers’ earning potential was reduced 
down to a similar level to that of bus drivers. Van drivers and motorbike couriers were 
viewed as even lower in the order of driving roles. This view was formed on the basis 
that no formal skills were required to drive a van or motorbike whereas even bus 
drivers had to prove their bus driving ability and operate with a special licence based 
on those skills.  
 
Taxi drivers’ behaviour, their relationships and their position in the vocational driving 
hierarchy all appear to be important to their identity as being at the top of driving 
roles. Their position at the top is validated by the onerous requirements of the 
Knowledge of London qualification. It also appears that culturally taxi drivers view 
equality with one another as an important concept. They are quick to deflate any of 
their number who seek to rise above the norm. Interestingly some of the behaviours 
that are presented, especially between older and younger taxi drivers, appear driven 
by a desire not to achieve equality but, it could be argued, are aimed at achieving a 
level of equilibrium within the industry. 
 
The next section continues the theme of behaviours and relationships and examines 
how taxi drivers socialise whilst at work. The culture of the taxi industry appears 
welcoming and inclusive. New members of the industry appear to be readily 
accepted by the majority of other drivers by dint that they had completed the 
Knowledge of London and therefore deserved or had earned their place in the 
industry, as already discussed.  However in a disparate and virtual workplace forming 
relationships as one would in a conventional job or profession appeared to be 
difficult.  It was therefore interesting to explore how this has been achieved amongst 
my peers 
 
Michael Sangster Galvin 
Student Number 03082746 
 
 
138 
 
5.3.5 Socialising at Work 
In more contemporary jobs socialising is often achieved through getting to know 
colleagues during induction; those in the same team, those who work in close 
proximity, in the canteen, at the water fountain and photocopier and working in 
project groups. The London taxi industry is very different. Drivers who do not wish to 
may never talk to another taxi driver. They can simply go out in their taxis, do their 
work and go home. This section explores why taxi drivers socialise at work, how this 
happens and what benefits the parties derive from such interactions. 
 
Holliday (2008) compares qualitative research with learning what we do in everyday 
life. She explains that to do this we need to research not only how others behave but 
also how we should behave with them.  An example of this concept was evident to 
me when visiting a café for the first time where I knew many taxi drivers ate. The café 
was noisy, busy and crowded with many taxi drivers shouting excitedly, laughing 
loudly and gesticulating wildly. As I walked towards the counter past the tables I 
exchanged knowing nods and smiles  with taxi drivers who caught my eye and 
looked vaguely familiar. I sat at a table with a few other taxi drivers, none of whom I 
knew but it was one of the few empty places available. I was soon involved in the 
conversation. The conversation was very different to those that take place on taxi 
ranks, which are often business related and relatively serious, frequently doom laden 
and often negative in style. The conversations in cafes were light, exaggerated, 
animated, there was much laughing and gesticulating, mimicking customers, speech 
and laughter was loud and raucous, whereas on ranks conversations were 
conducted in quiet almost restrained tones with minimal gestures. Whilst I was able 
to join in the conversation with the taxi drivers on my table apparently easily, I 
remember adopting Holliday’s (2008:10) advice, “...it was necessary to watch for 
clues, form hypotheses – calculated guesses – about appropriate behaviour, then try 
things out, observe the result, then confirm, adapt or reject the hypothesis.” Stacey 
describes these types of interaction as ‘local rules of communicative interaction’ 
(2001, 119) which he attributes ‘to self-organizing processes from which the pattern 
of communicative experience emerges’ (2001, 119).  
 
What quickly became apparent was that being anti-establishment, particularly critical 
of the Public Carriage Office, Mann and Overton [the sole supplier of London Taxis at 
the time], the police and the Licensed Taxi Drivers’ Association, was generally 
accepted as good amongst my dining companions, whereas a far less critical 
approach was taken when discussing radio taxi companies,of which many of the 
participants were members. Banter would not include any encouragement to or 
glorification of violence, theft, disability, abject racism, sexual references or anything 
that would encourage any driver to risk losing their badge, although the personal 
traits of those present e.g. meanness, extravagance, politics and the personal traits 
of one’s own kids (lazy, difficult), parents (a nuisance/great support), wife or girlfriend 
(demanding, expensive tastes etc), were all apparently fair game.  
 
The next time I went into that café I was invited to sit at the same table that I sat at on 
my first visit and quickly a rapport developed.  Over time we became friendly, rather 
than friends. These relationships are known in London working class circles as 
mates, in a similar style to workmates; friendly, loyal, happy to converse and share 
work issues but contained and not normally extended to be included in more 
personal aspects of a person’s life. This relationship was described by Gladwell 
(2000:46) as ‘loose ties’, which he described as ‘a friendly yet casual social 
connection’. These were relationships that had few demands; friendly when we met, 
able to memorise a few relevant anecdotes, stories or facts and possibly an in joke or 
continuation of a specific banter often linked to an event, previous job or personal 
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trait, e.g. sick note (frequently ill), lucky Jim (often unlucky), Eddie the bus (previously 
a bus driver), but requiring little or no maintenance or any explicit commitment. 
 
Given the nature of taxi driving, which involves travelling all over London most taxi 
drivers have several watering holes [the industry colloquialism for cafes frequented 
by taxi drivers] that they use and quickly I found that I had a group of mates in each 
one. Despite picking up passengers all of the time, taxi driving is a surprisingly lonely 
job. Groups of friends in taxi based cafes provided a network in which one could 
share what I considered to be a more normal workplace relationship (Watson, 1994; 
Beynon, 1975; Blau, 1986). This development from simply focusing on earning 
money being a motivator to wishing to establish a network of workmates has 
similarities with Maslow’s (1954) Hierarchy of Needs, moving from hygiene factors 
through to self-actualisation, and certainly fitted with Blau’s (1986) social exchange 
theory. In the café we were individuals recognised for our personality traits, 
conversation and value as a human being. In the taxi we were simply part of a group 
or mass providing a somewhat homogenous service with apparently limited value or 
importance at a human or individual level. This concept is explored further in the next 
section. 
 
Continuing my examination of the culture of welcoming a new member into the 
industry, I shed light on the local rules, cheerful and light conversation in cafés, 
laughing easily and demonstrating an explicit anti-establishment bent. An important 
insight was the comparison of conversations in cafes and on taxi ranks, which were 
very different. Learning these local rules enabled a smooth transition to the industry. 
Completing the Knowledge provided the rite of passage from Knowledge Boy to taxi 
driver and acceptance amongst that peer group. Quite how and why these local rules 
have developed is not clear. Meetings in cafes appear analogous with normal 
workplace interactions in conventional workplace settings and for the taxi driver 
appear to provide a sense of normality, of belonging to an organisation, which I 
certainly found a welcome interlude to the lonely and isolated nature of taxi driving.    
 
The next section continues the theme of taxi driver relationships and is concerned 
with the relationships and behaviours between taxi driver and passenger.  Some 
evidence is provided through trade commentators and magazines where drivers and 
passengers are presented as being in conflict, as discussed earlier.  Customer 
comments are also examined in this next section and appear to show a degree of 
affection for taxi drivers and their views, despite some less positive aspects of 
behaviour. An important point in this section is the discussion of self help and advice 
provided by taxi drivers to taxi drivers to help them cope with what are perceived as 
difficult customers. 
5.3.6 Relationships with Customers 
London’s taxi drivers spend approximately 50% of their working day with passengers. 
This section examines the relationships that taxi drivers have with their passengers, 
what their passengers think about their customers and how taxi drivers deal with 
difficult customers.    
 
Given the random nature of the majority of taxi hires in London it is very unusual for a 
taxi driver to pick up the same passenger. However there appeared to me to be a 
desire for recognition amongst passengers who frequently used taxis. This desire 
appears to be handled by both regular taxi passengers and drivers through a 
familiarity with each other that quickly establishes a rapport during what are normally 
very short journeys. Frequent taxi users displayed a confidence, almost a fondness, 
and demonstrated what appeared to be affection for their driver. They asked rather 
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than instructed their driver to take them to a destination and always engaged in 
conversation. From the driver’s perspective we knew that a regular user would 
always tip and never quibble about the journey or the cost.  
 
Within the industry itself, random passengers as opposed to regular riders appeared 
to be considered as objects to parody, to mimic and to complain about. During an 
interview with Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1, he noted his surprise that, “drivers dwell 
on customers who are arseholes,” which may go some way to explaining Taxi Driver 
Interviewee No.2’s focus on miscreant customers. When I spoke about levels of 
importance Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1’s view was that, “The passenger is more 
important than the driver as they are paying”. Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1 went on to 
explain that he thinks that, “The passenger is in charge as they are paying but the 
driver is in control”.  
 
During an interview with Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2 he volunteered that; 
 
“Stupid people [He was talking about customers] give me the hump [annoy 
me]; last week a customer asked, “Is Jermyn Street and Saville Row the 
same thing?” [same place].  Two months ago I pick up at Putney and am told 
to go to Mayfair; the customer said, “I will get [provide] the address on the 
way”.  We got to Hyde Park Corner [six miles from Putney and a quarter of a 
mile from Mayfair] and I asked, “Where in Mayfair do you want?”, The reply 
was, “I don’t like your attitude; you have a problem”.  We were only around 
the corner from Mayfair at this point.” 
 
I asked Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2 how he viewed the customer and driver 
relationship in terms of hierarchy; he responded that, “The customer has the power to 
stop the driver and after all he who pays the piper...”. 
 
Commentary on the relationship between drivers and passengers within the trade 
press are critical, flippant or facetious, intimating a hierarchy that places drivers 
above passengers.  McNamara (2007:6) publishes a regular feature in Taxi 
Newspaper called ‘Stupid Customer Complaint Line’, where drivers are encouraged 
to write in with stories about ‘stupid customers’ (McNamara, 2007:6). Hooper 
(2007:8) in his regular feature article in Taxi Newspaper provides an insight into his, 
and possibly the industry’s, beliefs concerning a driver/passenger hierarchy as well 
as some interesting examples of the taxi driver lexicon mentioned earlier in my 
research; 
 
“Number three has got to be the punter [taxi industry term for a customer or 
passenger] with no money who will ‘have’ to stop at a cash point [ATM]. What 
is it with these plonkers? [A mildly abusive term inferring lack of intelligence] If 
you were going out for the evening, or even getting a cab, wouldn’t you get 
the cash out first? Like most people these idiots think you (because you are 
driving a taxi) can stop and wait anywhere, and when you point out that you 
can’t, they just think you are another cabbie suffering from SAD! [Seasonal 
Affective Disorder] 
 
Number four is the same plonker but this time he’s got a £50 note. “No 
change? Why not, you’re a taxi aren’t you?”  We’ve all heard that remark 
haven’t we? To satisfy all situations you would have to carry a £300 quid float! 
 
Number five has got to be the same plonker (he gets about don’t he?) who 
then says “Can I have a receipt for that?” Never heard of a tip mate? “ 
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A quote from an unknown taxi driver in Garner and Stokoe’s (2000) on the subject of 
the relationship between taxi drivers and their customers asserts, “We’re the only 
profession that is truly united – we all hate the public” (p139) 
 
A customer writing in the letters page of London’s Evening Standard newspaper 
reports mixed levels of service and poor value for money; 
 
‘I often have to take taxis home from work late at night, and could write a 
short novel about my experiences. I have been booted out [thrown out]  of a 
cab halfway home because the driver suddenly remembered he had a pre-
booked job, I’ve been asked to get out by a cabbie after I queried the much 
longer route he was taking, and a had a driver refuse to take me because I 
wouldn’t pay in advance. Several times I have had cabbies unwilling to take 
me south of the river. I’ve had very positive experiences too, but given the 
cost of cabs, these should be the norm. If I take Addison Lee [London’s 
largest Private Hire company] or the minicab firm near my work, I pay £15 
less for the same journey’. (Evening Standard, 9th April 2010:50) 
             
The customer appears to be a reluctant user of taxis and gives no indication of 
having made an official complaint. S/he is gracious enough to admit to having had 
positive experiences as well.  From the customer report what appears to be in 
evidence is a high degree of autonomy by the drivers, who refused to take the 
customer, or threw the customer out of the taxi.  Schwalbe and Wolkomir (2001:213) 
caution against believing that “...men act with as much autonomy as they claim or 
assert”. Yet here we have an example reported by a customer that describes 
behaviour that indicates a high level of autonomy. 
 
Taxi drivers, like many professionals, claim a high level of autonomy but my research 
agrees with Stacey’s conclusions that this autonomy is ‘precarious’ (2001: 224) as 
taxis and key areas of the taxi drivers’ business model (e.g. fares) are highly 
regulated and therefore autonomy is constrained. The ability to exercise autonomy is 
also socially constrained (Blau, 1986) by group behaviours such as observance of, 
and compliance with, the driver etiquette. The level of autonomy is also constrained 
by the legal framework under which taxi drivers operate where actions such as 
refusing trips and ordering customers out of taxis is in breach of regulations and quite 
possibility legislation.  
 
It is worth noting that the customer uses the slightly affectionate term ‘cabbie’ 
(Evening Standard, 9th April 2010:50) when referring to what he or she describes as 
taxi drivers demonstrating miscreant behaviour. It is also interesting that s/he is 
prepared to pay £15.00p more than a substitute service (Porter,1980) for a taxi 
journey on the expectation of a positive experience. 
 
London’s taxi service does not appear to be a typical standard public service, or 
customer service orientated transaction. Drivers expect a certain amount of respect 
for what they are; a much loved London icon as they were described by London’s 
Deputy Mayor Kit Malthouse (University of Loughborough, 2010), what they have 
done i.e. qualified for the Knowledge of London (Garner and Stokoe, 2000) and the 
fact that they are self-employed and their own boss (Abrahams, 2000). Customers 
likewise can be robust and uncompromising in their dealings with taxi drivers. The 
letter to the Evening Standard (2010:50) highlights the customer tackling the driver 
about the route the driver was taking and refuses to pay the fare in advance, a not 
unusual, and arguably not unreasonable, request from drivers who work at night who 
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are prone to customers running off without paying, arguing over the fare or finding 
the customer does not have sufficient money at the end of the journey. The narrative 
and relationship is much more a business to business type dialogue than a business 
to public, consumer or customer facing relationship.  
 
When I was discussing my experience in a cafe with a group of colleagues about a 
trip where the customer had moaned the whole journey about the route, the traffic, 
stopping at red traffic lights and zebra crossings the unanimous advice was to, “Just 
act thick” [Pretend to be stupid]. They counselled that people think, “You are just a 
thick cab driver, so act like one”. This approach, which I tried, worked; it subtly 
moved the responsibility from me to the passenger. I felt absolved of the pressure to 
know what was in reality impossible to know and the trips became easier to manage. 
The other issue that often cropped up was that people would run up to the taxi, 
breathless and tell me that they were late for a meeting at, for example, eleven 
o’clock and could I find a way to dodge the traffic and get them there on time. This is 
a tall order on short trips where there is little scope for creative routes. It is an even 
taller order if the journey on a good day would take 20 minutes and when it was 
already ten to eleven. Encouraged by my colleagues I employed a tactic whenever 
someone jumped in and said they had to be at a destination within x minutes on a 
journey that could take twice the time of braking sharply, accelerating rapidly and 
generally providing an impression of enthusiastically doing my best. Generally these 
tactics worked with the customer, even if they arrived late they appeared happy with 
the service. 
 
In later models of taxis on the roof lining just above the windscreen there was a clock 
fitted. My colleagues advised me that you should always set it five minutes slow. This 
gave the customers who were short of time a false sense of security, i.e. that they 
were not as late as they feared. I was a little concerned about the ethical dimension 
but as my colleagues said, it was not my fault the customer was late and this 
approach simply provided them some with peace of mind during the taxi journey. 
Notably this comment was followed by raucous laughter. Once again it worked. The 
function of this behaviour was to avoid taking the responsibility for arriving on time a 
responsibility that the customer was keen to move from themselves to the taxi driver. 
By following the advice of my colleagues I was able to avoid taking this responsibility. 
 
Although these incidents had been introduced to me as almost facetious advice on 
reflection I believe I had been the beneficiary of an informal system that socialises 
new members into the doings of their workplace (Beynon, 1975). This system had 
started through tacit knowledge derived from trips with talkative taxi drivers before I 
had started the Knowledge, information gleaned from friends and family who were 
taxi drivers, the gossip and feedback that I gathered at the Knowledge School and 
specifically stories from newly qualified taxi drivers who came back to the Knowledge 
School to share their experiences. These together with the introductory talk at the 
Public Carriage Office, anecdotes from my call over partner’s father in-law, Charlie 
Rubenstein, and advice and features in the trade press had left me almost fully 
socialised. During this tacit process of what in a formal or contemporary setting might 
be described as induction I had become aware of and tacitly accepted the deep 
layers or meaning, value, belief and assumption (Hatch, 1993; Schein, 1985, 1992; 
Schultz 1994) that forms the culture of the London taxi industry.  
 
This socialisation enabled me to position the relationship with the customer 
appropriately and avoided me taking responsibility for issues that were not in my 
control. Although there appears to be a culture of toleration of customers amongst 
taxi drivers I don’t believe I ever subscribed to it. I did however enjoy the parodying 
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and mimicking of customers by drivers and their light hearted advice as to how 
drivers should have dealt with various situations. These sketches were normally 
presented in a highly amusing and entertaining manner and because all of us had 
experienced the same types of customer issues were a shared experience. The next 
section provides some examples of the rituals that are evident and practiced in the 
taxi industry.  
 
5.3.7 Rituals at Work 
Although I witnessed some examples of ritualistic behaviour and routines (Stacey, 
2001) amongst the taxi drivers I interviewed, their view derived from the taxi driver 
interviews that I undertook was that they did not feel they engaged in any rituals nor 
were they consciously aware of any other taxi drivers doing so. Presumably they 
never reflected upon this aspect of their behaviour. The drivers I interviewed did 
mention ‘routines’ and ‘my normal route into work’ both of which I would consider to 
be ritualistic but from their perspective were apparently considered habits.  My 
experience conflicted with this position both as a taxi driver and as a passenger. I 
was impressed at the ritualistic behaviours that were demonstrated by both drivers 
and passengers. 
 
The ritual of only taking one’s own job (Journey/Passenger), which is discussed in 
section 2, known as taxi driver etiquette, is a significant ritual from which much of the 
taxi industry’s behaviour and character is defined. Hiring, as discussed above, is also 
ritualised; the customer hails or approaches the taxi, states or requests to be taken to 
their desired destination, this is then momentarily considered by the driver before 
accepting the hiring. Any deviation from this ritual by customers was not appreciated 
by drivers. Customers appeared content to wait for the driver to signify that he was 
going to accept the hiring. This is peculiar given that the taxi driver is legally obliged 
to take the customer up to six miles [since changed by TfL to twelve miles]. Whether 
this legal obligation is widely known by customers was not explored during my 
research. Whilst operating as a taxi driver I was aware that some customers were 
aware or in some cases vaguely aware of this obligation. Whether they were aware 
or not the ritual could be explained as a demonstration of good manners; it is politer 
to ask than to tell. Alternatively regardless of the legal obligation customers may have 
felt more comfortable to travel with a driver who was willing to take them rather than 
one who was legally obliged or one who the customer had to insist took them to the 
required destination. 
 
The manner in which the end of the journey process is conducted is also ritualistic, 
although different customer segments perform slightly different rituals. Almost all 
customers ask the driver how much the fare is despite it being displayed on the 
meter in front of them. The driver responds. The customer pays and a ritualised 
approach to giving a tip and/or asking for a receipt is followed. I would propose that 
these are rituals based on the repetitive and formulaic nature of the interchanges and 
the expectation of certain behaviour by each of the actors. It was interesting to note 
that the drivers I interviewed did not recognise these behaviours as rituals but instead 
saw them as good manners. This is strange given that what appear to be termed 
good manners are a highly ritualised exhibition of behaviour. The demographic of 
London’s taxi drivers may explain this phenomenon as given they were mainly 
Londoners they would have travelled in taxis before becoming taxi drivers and just 
inherited the ritualistic behaviour they now demonstrate.  
 
I found during my research that rituals were few but frequently practiced, e.g. the 
passenger/driver ritual of hiring and paying which took place at the beginning and 
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end of every hiring. Likewise the identity that taxi drivers have developed and 
informally market to their customers appears to be a defence against the apparently 
perceived threat of assimilation [the term assimilation is used in the taxi industry to 
signify the deregulation of the taxi industry i.e. the curtailment of the Knowledge of 
London and other regulatory requirements leading to an assimilation into a driving job 
rather than as it is currently viewed by those in it as a profession] which is discussed 
in the next section. It is nonetheless a ritual.  
 
Taxi drivers in London have a constant and oft expressed fear of the concept of 
assimilation which is examined in the next section. There appears to be a tangible 
fear that the high standards that define the taxi industry (according to drivers) could 
be swept away and thereby the flexibility and job security that paradoxically the 
drivers appear to feel is secured through the ritual of acquiring the Knowledge and 
the requirements to comply with the regulatory framework, often expressed as 
onerous, that the taxi industry works within. 
5.3.8 Assimilation - The Constant Fear 
Although never expressed in such words by taxi drivers assimilation with minicab or 
other lower order driving jobs was a concern amongst taxi drivers. Any attempts to 
water down the Knowledge of London qualification, to deregulate fares, to adopt van 
conversions as taxis, to direct their labour in any way and to move from an expensive 
annual vehicle safety check, known colloquially in the taxi industry as the overhaul, to 
a standard MOT was greeted with fiery outrage. These stringent requirements 
appear to define the industry and are synonymous with the taxi driver identity that is 
commonly cultivated and presented to customers. 
 
The oft mooted intention by Government to license minicabs, ostensibly due to safety 
concerns and in response to many campaigns by women’s and other groups such as 
the Diana Lamplugh Trust [Women’s groups were prompted to campaign for the 
licensing of minicabs in order to address the high level of sexually motivated attacks 
against women using unlicensed minicabs in London, often quoted as a rape a day] 
provided another threat to the industry which sent even the most placid of taxi drivers 
that I knew apoplectic. Taxi drivers wanted minicabs banned, not licensed, and 
pointed to the stringent licensing regulations for taxis and generally good safety 
record as reasons why licensing minicabs was unnecessary as taxis could take up 
the customer demand that would be displaced if minicabs were banned. How realistic 
this claim was is difficult to evaluate at the time but it proved a popular position in 
such debates. 
 
I observed that the concern amongst taxi drivers was that their future could evolve 
towards sameness, homogeneity, and assimilation with other driving jobs and 
consequently loss of status, security, flexibility and earning potential. Taxi drivers 
commented that once the Knowledge was gone the erosion of other benefits would 
follow. They were particularly concerned about the adverse impact on fares which 
they saw as becoming lower if the Knowledge were dropped or watered down. In 
effect this was seen by taxi drivers as an attack on taxi drivers’ autonomy (Scwalbe 
and Wolkmir, 2001). The freedom for taxi drivers to choose their working hours would 
also be at risk in an assimilated environment, they argued. This assertion is almost 
certainly based on a fear of loss of power through moving to an environment with low 
barriers to entry (Porter, 1980), which they believe would weaken the taxi drivers’ 
autonomy as he would move from being relatively rare, courtesy of the effective 
barrier to entry caused by the Knowledge qualification, to a plentiful, albeit not so well 
trained, commodity.  
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Whilst only taxi drivers undertook the Knowledge, and whilst the Knowledge had a 
ubiquitous reputation, certainly amongst many Londoners and people who live or 
work in London, as arduous, hugely difficult and delivering real tangible benefit to 
customers, taxi drivers felt safe. Any attempts to remove or reduce the value of this 
great symbol of their industry (Christensen and Cheney, 2000) were strenuously and 
aggressively opposed as were any suggestions of extending a cut down version of 
the Knowledge to minicab drivers.    
 
The risk of assimilation appeared to suggest three direct, adverse impacts on 
London’s taxi drivers; a loss of their distinct identity, a levelling of the hierarchy 
amongst driving jobs that taxi drivers considered themselves to be at the top of and 
on working conditions such as earnings, flexibility and job security. The motivation for 
the assimilation process to begin and identification of the agency that would sponsor 
such an activity appeared somewhat vague. Drivers who raised the issue of a lack of 
longevity for the industry seemed to consider the lack of effective representation 
(Townsend, 2003) as a key weakness that might enable assimilation to take place 
with little meaningful opposition.   
 
Without a management infrastructure and the communications systems and 
processes that are present in most larger organisations the taxi industry has 
developed informal methods to disseminate information effectively.  The section 
below provides examples of how these methods work in practice. 
   
5.3.9 Information Dissemination 
London’s taxi drivers work independently of each other but interface on ranks, in 
shelters and cafes.  Information is provided informally by word of mouth and through 
more formal channels such as the bountiful choice of trade newspapers and 
magazines.  As well as information, rumour and gossip are quickly spread around the 
industry. Likewise the history and notable historical events connected with the 
industry are communicated verbally to new entrants to the industry. This section 
sheds light on the types of communication that take place, the implications and the 
reasons and motives behind it.    
 
Within a short time in the industry I quickly realised that the discussions that took 
place in cafes and shelters, in the pages of the trade press and casual, often short, 
discussions on taxi ranks enabled a process of diffusion (Ryan and Gross: 1943) of 
rumours, gossip, information and work practices. This informal, yet powerful, process 
enabled rumours, stories and more factual information to be disseminated through 
the industry very quickly and very thoroughly. The practical implication of this process 
is to demonstrate the power of maintaining culture through stories and anecdote. 
A specific example of this concept was when there were changes to aspects of taxi 
vehicle design or engineering e.g. a new engine type. Drivers quickly established 
from early adopters of the new vehicle its good and bad points and then this 
information was communicated by word of mouth around the industry through the 
process of diffusion. Information was also shared to a more discrete community 
where a change had a narrower impact, for example amongst radio taxi drivers 
generally or a specific radio taxi company’s drivers in particular, who were 
recognisable to each other as each member was required to display company logos 
on their taxis. This information was often perceived as negative if it related changes 
to policy, process or procedure, e.g. an increase in circuit charges [Charges to the 
driver for belonging to and receiving radio services].  It might also be news of a 
contract that had been lost by one Radio Taxi Company to another. As well as 
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rumours, drivers quickly passed factual information to one another such as a Public 
Carriage Officer making spot checks on the condition of vehicles at a particular 
station or taxi rank. 
In considering this phenomenon I have considered some questions; what effect does 
this have? Why is it done? What is the function of this? The effect varies; if the 
gossip or rumour is positive (e.g. London’s hotels have never been busier, possibly 
with the addition of a well-known hotel or two being cited as fully booked) it can 
motivate other drivers. Alternatively if it is potentially bad news (e.g. no fare rise this 
year, radio circuit fees being increased) the opposite effect is often the outcome – de-
motivation. As to why it is done and the function of it there appears to be no real 
purpose other than to temporarily enhance or help to ‘construct the identity’ 
(Watson:1994:21) of the person starting or spreading the rumour. Stacey suspects a 
deeper meaning; ‘stories are the folklore of the workplace, which may express hidden 
organizational realities’ (2001:125). Stories in the taxi industry were frequently 
lacking specifics such as names, dates and locations and yet were frequently 
delivered with what appeared to me to be absolute belief and conviction. The veracity 
of these stories were often in doubt and appeared to serve an anti-establishment 
agenda. Stacey (2001) alludes to stories being about something other than itself.  
Stacey’s assertion may well be the case as many stories that were told to me about 
vehicles for example may just have been highlighting a lack of trust about the vehicle 
manufacturer or the quality of the vehicle rather than the specific subject of the story 
or to position the message sender as being more knowledgeable or wiser than other 
drivers, often the receivers. The stories in the industry always appeared to be directly 
associated with the institutions in the industry and their actions and policies and 
rarely about individuals within it. Where individuals featured these were normally 
institutionally based, a dishonest despatcher or an over-zealous Public Carriage 
Officer. These types of stories frame the taxi driver as a victim of the more powerful 
forces represented by the institutions of the industry. Stacey’s (2001) assertions have 
resonance with the positions of those who circulated these stories and their various 
political leanings. 
Blau’s (1986) concept of social exchange may also play a role. In return for an 
exaggerated or foundationless piece of information perhaps a more useful or genuine 
piece of information or gossip will be returned in exchange. Less seriously, Taxi 
Driver Interviewee No.2 explained that; ‘[Taxi] Drivers are really good at telling 
stories, starting legends; it’s a form of entertainment’. In some respects this is not 
dissimilar to behaviour in offices and factories (Beynon, 1975) where rumours and 
gossip are spread amongst workmates. The main difference in the taxi industry is 
that the workmates have much looser ties than people who work in more 
conventional workplaces and are often therefore exchanging gossip and stories with 
people who are for the most part almost strangers, only bound together by virtue of 
their licence and occupation. Gladwell (2000) points to the strength of loose tie 
relationships which are relationships of choice rather than of physical or institutional 
proximity.   
I was possibly more gullible than Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2 and felt in my early 
career that the flow of information from drivers had high integrity because it was 
being passed from one taxi driver to another i.e. within a peer group or amongst 
workmates, colleagues or fellow professionals or practitioners. To be effective these 
interchanges relied upon an implicit trust in one taxi driver by another and therefore I 
was ready to accept and believe the information I was given. The reality I discovered 
over time was that often information was used to further personal agendas and to 
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achieve this the information was often exaggerated, had no basis, was confused, 
simply malicious or deliberately distorted in a similar way to that noted by Allport 
(1947:139) where he describes how, ‘The simple unadorned facts that constitute the 
‘kernel of truth’ in this rumour were from the outset distorted in three directions’. He 
goes on to relate the processes; the story was ‘levelled’, all kinds of details that are 
essential for understanding the true meaning of the incident were left out and the 
story was ‘sharpened’ and a process of ‘assimilation’ took place. The story was 
changed so it made more sense to those spreading the rumour. It was also likely that 
other processes were at work that sensationalised the story enhancing its interest as 
well as enhancing the authoritativeness of the story teller.  
An example of these processes at work was when new taxis were first fitted with 
power steering. I was one of the first drivers to purchase a taxi with powered steering 
and within the first few days was told by several drivers in quick succession that a 
number of taxis, the number varied randomly from three to five, had turned over due 
to the adverse effect of the powered steering unit. These rumours were never 
validated. No reports appeared in the trade or London press, there were no recalls, 
photographs or other evidence. I concluded that no such event had ever taken place 
however as I was an early adopter of a taxi fitted with power steering I can confirm 
that the steering did feel very different to previous taxis I had driven and drivers may 
well have experienced a sensation similar to the vehicle being likely to turn over. My 
point is that what Allport refers to as a ‘kernel of truth’ (1947:139) was present but the 
story was ‘sharpened’. 
Another example occurred one day whilst in Euston Station sitting in my brand new 
shiny taxi, an older driver explained in great detail how a new type of bolt had been 
fitted in new taxis which were hollow to save the manufacturer money and when it 
snapped, as it inevitably did, it caused the engine to be destroyed and for some 
obscure technical reason the warranty did not cover this problem. Once again no 
such thing ever really happened as far as I know: was this just an older driver trying 
to put down a younger driver who was a bit too proud of his new taxi, or the same 
processes, such as sharpening, at work? 
 
Shelters and cafes were also popular venues for anti-establishment and often 
outlandish and excitably delivered stories about the Public Carriage Office. The 
stories normally related to the threat of fare reductions, increases in driver numbers, 
and/or Public Carriage Office Inspectors ordering taxis off the streets for the most 
minor issue imaginable, e.g. the driver was wearing shorts. LTI Mann and Overton 
(the taxi vehicle manufacturer) were frequent targets with stories of imminent and 
significant price increases, faults that were at epidemic proportions and of which LTI 
were either unwilling or unable to resolve, often involving growing numbers of taxis 
that were unserviceable with their drivers unable to work and therefore earn money. 
The reaction to such stories by groups of taxi drivers was frequently boisterous, 
abusive, ribald and humorous. In the environment of shelters and cafes the stories 
were delivered in almost polemical terms encouraging vigorous debate. The subject 
matter the PCO and LTI were almost guaranteed to generate a reaction as most taxi 
drivers had strong views about both institutions. Whereas on ranks and at stations 
there was a somewhat dark and sinister tense to the delivery. Why this difference in 
tone and tense was so discernible is difficult to understand and perhaps worthy of 
specific research.  
London’s taxi drivers used stories to customers to position their industry as superior 
to private hire drivers and, in contrast to private hire drivers at the time, legitimate. My 
experience of this phenomenon was prior to becoming a taxi driver when I used to 
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take taxis and be regaled by the driver with stories of how rapists, muggers and ex-
convicts were driving private hire vehicles, which at the time were known as 
minicabs. Once I became a taxi driver I found to my surprise that I also engaged in 
similar, though not so extreme, diatribes with customers. Why I did so was difficult for 
me to understand. Was it just copycat behaviour, the need to promote or reinforce 
our unique selling propositions or was it identity formulation, or attempting to create a 
clear hierarchy in the minds of my passengers? 
More malicious stories circulated about unpopular radio circuit dispatchers and/or 
management which were clearly designed and relayed to either damage the 
unscrupulous or to injure the reputations or election prospects of the innocent.  
Stacey (2001:124) explains that, “stories perform a psychoanalytic perspective 
representing emotions, hidden desires and repressed wishes”. I would suggest that 
these hidden desires and repressed wishes in relation to taxi drivers would almost 
certainly include an end to private hire/minicab drivers and a return to a taxi 
monopoly situation in London. They are also likely to include some trimming of the 
PCO’s powers often considered almost omnipotent and certainly misused. The 
vehicle manufacturer was often described as a near monopoly and at times when the 
odd fringe manufacturer went out of business was factually a monopoly. Drivers 
variously wished for a mainstream manufacturer to enter the taxi vehicle market or 
some other event that would reduce what were considered exorbitant vehicle 
purchase prices. How do these rumours start? Who gains from starting the rumours? 
The answer to both of these questions would appear to be no one, apart perhaps for 
a momentary feeling of power when spreading the rumour to the gullible and 
receptive. These stories appeared to be based on envy and even I suspect malice for 
the vehicle supplier and/or to demonstrate to others a superior knowledge of what 
was happening within the industry. To be a bit more than an equal, to demonstrate 
that the teller was a little more street wise or in the know than the receiver. Festinger 
(1956) describes this activity as cognitive dissonance whereby people seem to want 
their cognitive expectations to be transformed into reality. This concept has some 
resonance given the examples provided above as the PCO, the vehicle manufacturer 
and minicabs all had axes that the taxi drivers frequently ground. 
This section has provided an insight into the role of taxi drivers in disseminating 
information effectively to their colleagues. The method is very informal and often 
involves a lack of precise information, at times it is difficult to discern fact, fiction, 
malice and rumour. Amusement, genuine attempts to be helpful, social exchange, a 
temporary feeling of power or a wish to demonstrate meta knowledge plus less 
ethical reasons appear to form the reason for this activity. This informal process is 
also used to maintain and preserve the industry’s history and notable events. Culture 
is influenced by this communications channel and identities are both built up and 
destroyed through the process. Overall the process is effective in disseminating 
information to a disparate workforce without the need for formal communications 
processes and policies that are common in conventional organisations (Hatch and 
Schultz, 1997).They are also used for more sinister reasons such as to unseat 
elected officials, damage the careers of the apparently unscrupulous and to give vent 
to personal vendettas leading to the recipients taking a view that there must be some 
truth in the rumours and stories and acting accordingly. 
In the next section I consider the use of stories, jokes and pranks and the purpose 
and role of these in relationships between drivers. In the next section I shed light on 
some of the stories, jokes and pranks that I have learnt about and how and when 
they are used. Academics share their research about the reasons for these 
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behaviours and narratives and these are discussed and considered in the next 
section. 
5.3.10 Stories, Jokes and Pranks 
As you will read in this section there is a culture of in jokes, familiar stories, myths 
and fables, and pranks amongst taxi drivers. The reasons for these behaviours and 
their purpose are examined below.  
 
London’s taxi drivers are both proud (e.g.Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2,) and 
bemused (e.g.Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1) that those in the trade have so many 
stories and so much gossip to share with one another. Stories based on familiar 
themes (PCO, LTI and Minicabs) that have general interest within the industry and a 
standard, almost formulaic or ritualistic interaction amongst drivers in cafes and 
shelters enable almost instant familiarity, despite the level of friendship commonly 
observed amongst London’s taxi drivers being what Gladwell (2000:46) describes as 
‘loose ties’. Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2 related that “drivers are really good at telling 
stories, starting legends; it’s a form of entertainment at tea places and shelters. I only 
stop for the necessity to eat, for the banter, and the abuse [making fun of each other], 
driving is [a] solitary [occupation]”. Taxi Driver Interviewee No.3. termed these stories 
as “rumour mongering” [spreading or trading in rumours] and hinted at a darker side 
[seditious or mischievous] to these activities mentioning the word “factions” [alluding 
to splinter groups within driver organisations and radio circuits seeking to overthrow 
the management teams for unscrupulous or mischievous reasons] in sinister tones.  
 
Taxi Driver Interviewee No.4 related stories that he had heard or events, mainly tricks 
and practical jokes on other drivers, which he had participated in, all of which were 
light hearted and innocent. One example that Taxi Driver Interviewee No.4 related 
concerned a shelter keeper who was known to be very careful with money and 
always concerned that his customers paid for what he had served them. One evening 
a driver who appeared perfectly respectable, but completely unknown to the shelter 
keeper came in and ordered a dinner. He ate it, the shelter keeper was very pleased 
to have what he thought might be a new regular customer. When he had finished his 
meal he explained he was just popping out to get his cigarettes and never returned. 
The drivers found the shelter keeper’s increasing discomfort hilarious and it was 
many days before they let him into the joke.  
 
Likewise Townsend (2003) relates a story of drivers putting gravel into a driver’s 
wheel hubs. This led to a constant noise which worried the driver and which he 
related to his friends in the shelter. They expressed surprise and warned of many 
possible and expensive likely causes. Once again it was sometime before they 
informed the driver of the actual cause.  I never uncovered why drivers feel the need 
to do play these jokes and tricks on one another but what I established was that they 
were a constant source of amusement and hilarity in the shelters. The purpose 
appeared to be to build friendships and groups and to provide entertainment. 
 
Beynon (1975) explains that at Fords there was an element of tricks and jokes being 
played on foremen and fellow workers. Beynon explains that ‘often they had no 
purpose, they were just a joke’ (Beynon, 1975:85). It is interesting to note that drivers 
who frequent the same shelters and form closer than normal relationships with other 
drivers take on the behaviour and characteristics of workers in factories who work 
much more closely together than the normal proximity of those in the taxi industry. 
 
Shaw (2000:182) relates that ’narrative is used to preserve the past and to learn from 
it, usually with an internal focus, communicating to the same organization that the 
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stories are about’. In 2003, Alf Townsend, a London taxi driver for forty years 
published a book titled ‘The London Cabbie’ (2003) and in 2007 published a 
paperback version titled ‘Cabbie’. Townsend’s writing is very much in this vein.  
 
The book concerns Townsend’s long taxi driving career and contains a sprinkling of 
amusing tales. He relates stories of pranks, gentle revenge and far-fetched tales 
which could be described as well-known fables within the industry. These stories 
which have been told either to me, or within earshot many, many times are so 
ridiculous as to be without any real foundation. Within the narrative he draws on 
lessons that can be learnt and dangers for the industry in the future. It is unclear 
whether Townsend had aspirations of a wider audience than the taxi industry when 
writing the book. His book also provides an historical perspective and therefore 
preserves the past (Shaw, 2000) describing the introduction of minicabs, 
establishment of the largest taxi trade association (the LTDA), his experiences as 
Taxi Driver of The Year (see Glossary) and insights into the onerous experience of 
qualifying for the Knowledge of London.  
 
An example of a story from Townsend’s book that is commonly told in the London 
taxi industry (Townsend 2003) is reproduced below; 
 
‘Story 1. A mate [friend] of mine got a job [trip/journey/passenger] to Dover on 
the basis that the punter [customer] had missed his train and was trying to 
catch, or connect with, a cruise ship. He agreed an arrangement with the taxi 
driver whereby if the taxi driver managed to get the passenger to Dover in 
time for the ship he would double the fare (i.e. pay twice what was on the 
meter) but if the passenger missed the ship the driver would receive nothing. 
The taxi driver drove to Dover like a lunatic and just as they arrived at the 
East Dock in Dover they saw the cruise ship pulling out of the harbour. The 
taxi driver, who reputedly used to be in the navy, drives up to the top of the 
White Cliffs of Dover and signals the ship using his headlamps and 
semaphore. The ship’s captain responds to his signal and returns to Dover. 
The passenger is so thrilled that he has caught his ship that he gives the 
driver double [the] fare plus a huge tip’. (Townsend, 2003:162). 
 
This story appears to relate in exaggerated and ridiculous terms the ability of taxi 
drivers to turn adversity into victory. The driver had driven his passenger probably 
seventy miles and due to missing the ship was likely to receive nothing. Some quick 
thinking and his fortunes were turned around and both the driver and passenger 
benefited. Presumably the subliminal message is not to give up without trying 
everything possible first.  
 
Story 2. ‘A bloke [Cockney term for a man] I know was driving his taxi along 
when he was stopped by the police. The policeman was very rude and 
aggressive to the taxi driver concerning a trivial issue (minor road traffic 
violation or similar). Suddenly a window at the back of the cab opened and 
the passenger transpires to be the Commissioner of Police [or a High Court 
Judge, a Lord or famous Barrister, I have heard all four mentioned as different 
drivers related the story/joke to me] intervenes, the police either recognise the 
passenger or are convinced of his credentials and are completely deflated 
and embarrassed and the driver is then permitted to resume the journey. At 
the destination the passenger proffers his card and insists that the driver 
contact him if any more is heard of the incident’. (Townsend, 2003:162) 
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Townsend adds a slight twist to his version of the tale invoking the police vs. taxi 
driver example in that the passenger who is unknown to the police theatrically hands 
a business card to the driver telling him in front of the police to ‘contact me at my 
Chambers’ (Townsend, 2007:162). This has the expected impact on the police 
officers and they wave the driver on his way. When the driver later inspects the card 
it transpires that the passenger was a well-dressed fruit and vegetable merchant from 
Covent Garden wholesale fruit and vegetable market. What this story achieves is to 
portray the taxi driver as vulnerable to bullying, in this case by the police, but of being 
saved by his passenger. This story has similarities with the cultural fear of a driver’s 
vulnerability to authority and the risk to his licence and continuing ability to earn a 
living.   
 
Interestingly these behaviours are revealed to be similar to those exhibited in Ford’s 
factory amongst workers there (Beynon, 1975). As you will read this is surprising 
given the different employment statuses of workers at Fords and taxi drivers. The 
amount of interaction and time spent together is very different between the two 
groups but this culture appears very similar. There appears to be various views as to 
why stories and fables are used ranging from a verbal record of the industry’s history 
to an entertaining art form (Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2).  
 
Beynon posits that at Fords ‘the stories of victories that were relished most were 
those which were deeply imbued with humour’ (1975:85). In both of the stories that 
Townsend (2003) chooses to reproduce in his book the taxi driver, despite the odds 
being weighed against him, achieves a victory against the misuse of authority. 
Beynon (1975) relates a similar scenario amongst workers at Ford where stories are 
told to newcomers. Like Townsend (2007), Beynon recalls that ‘the same stories 
were told to me dozens of times’ (1975:75). This is interesting in respect that in the 
factory environment at Fords the same people work closely all day, yet every day 
similar behaviour is exhibited by taxi drivers who in the majority of cases have loose 
tie (Gladwell, 2000) type relationships and see each other, with few exceptions, 
relatively infrequently and are a virtual rather than a conventional workforce. Is story 
telling based on myth and legend specific to the taxi trade and car production 
industry or a cross cultural workplace phenomenon? Beynon (1975) hypothesises as 
to whether the stories are a form of lesson handed down through generations; 
 
‘These stories provide us with illustrations of the period. The fact that they 
were told so often indicates the significance of this period. In their telling, the 
stories take on a further significance. In handling the present, men call upon 
the past for guidance. The lessons of the past are learned and handed on as 
stories.  The past structures creating in men partial explanations of the world 
which are worked out in action. And told again’.  (Beynon, 1975:75) 
 
This section shows that there is a culture of jokes, stories, fables and pranks 
amongst London’s taxi drivers. These behaviours appear to serve a number of 
purposes; humour, the preservation of history, the celebration of victories, and as a 
form of education. The practice and reasons for these behaviours are similar to those 
demonstrated at Fords and yet there are considerable differences between the 
identities and the cultures of the two groups. From my own perspective the culture of 
storytelling was adopted without consciously realising that I was actually doing so. 
Whether this was the case for every taxi driver is unclear but the behaviour was in 
my experience widespread and if nothing else provided entertainment, amusement 
and to an extent educational benefits. 
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In the next section the concept of taxi driving being a lonely occupation which, when 
faced with stress and conflict, can demotivate and depress drivers is explored. 
Drivers have informally developed methodologies that provide a form of support 
through the use of humour. Once again the behaviours presented by self-employed 
taxi drivers have similarities to those presented by office based employees, this 
despite their very different levels of interaction and work place proximity.  
 
5.3.11 Gaining Motivation from the Experiences of Others 
Given the disparate nature of taxi driving there is little opportunity to observe how 
colleagues deal with different issues. This is particularly true when dealing with 
difficult customers. In this section I shed light on how the industry has developed 
what could almost be called informal mutual support groups to assist each other to 
resolve stress through humour. 
 
In my experience there were days driving a taxi where one hardly picked up a 
customer who spoke English. When customers spoke English there were times when 
they showed no interest in holding a conversation. There were likewise days where 
two or three customers in a row were rude, cutting, aggressive or critical of the 
vehicle, taxis in general, my driving, the route taken or the fare. These were 
depressing days and I often questioned whether it was a case of the customer being 
at fault or me being de-motivated or miserable in some way, in effect a cause and 
effect dichotomy. During such periods I would either just go home completely fed up 
(this was particularly in the early days of driving a cab), or stop for a sandwich, often 
eaten in the back of the taxi. Later I learnt that these were common feelings 
experienced by many taxi drivers and managed through unloading whatever the 
issues were or just choosing another mood via listening to others’ embellished and 
elaborate stories about customer interactions in taxi shelters. This behaviour 
compares with someone in a conventional job (Watson, 1982) who may go to see 
their manager, HR, a confidante or, as with taxi drivers, socially exchange (Blau, 
1986) with a colleague(s) at the photocopier or in the canteen. 
 
After I had been driving a taxi for a while, probably a month or two, I would often stop 
in a café that was frequented by taxi drivers and join in the banter which had the 
effect of removing the de-motivating impact of miserable customers. In fact stories 
about miserable or unhappy customers were an important ingredient of the banter 
and jocular discussions amongst taxi drivers at such venues. Stories in taxi driver 
shelters and cafes of drivers’ encounters with customers were a popular form of both 
entertainment (Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2) and, I strongly suspect, a form of 
therapy. My experience of difficult customers was a disturbing one, as they had the 
option to complain to the Public Carriage Office and thereby put one’s badge 
[licence] and therefore livelihood in jeopardy. In addition they may refuse to pay the 
fare, or in some cases the likelihood of violence or at least aggression and/or abuse 
were a realistic threat. After a particularly difficult encounter with a customer some 
form of support was needed and cafes or shelters provided a useful venue to explain, 
discuss and rationalise those events which were normally presented as stories or 
occasionally as reports.   
 
Taxi drivers would arrive at a café or shelter and either crossly, or in wearisome 
tones, describe to the group of taxi drivers present, some of whom they may know 
whilst others may be strangers, an event that has just happened in graphic detail, 
describing facial expressions, tone of voice, age, build, accent, gait etc. Often the 
story teller would parody and/or mimic the offending passenger, exaggerating 
accents, facial expressions, gait, or other idiosyncrasies. Sometimes this involved 
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rearranging clothing, borrowing a hat, spectacles or other garment from the taxi 
driver group. They would provide a blow by blow account of the altercation and then 
the rest of the drivers would join in with similar stories or suggested smart comments 
or ripostes that should have been made to this now absent customer. Rarely did 
anyone take the customer’s side. Often additional drivers would arrive during or at 
the end of a tale. Often the whole story or sometimes parts of it were retold, normally 
during the retelling the story would get better with exaggerations or extra detail added 
in. The discussions amongst the group were normally laced with wit and ended in 
raucous laughter and clear guidelines, not always serious, about how to deal with 
similar customers in future. The end result was a café or shelter filled with much 
happier drivers.  
 
This behaviour was in many ways an informal therapy or support session that 
motivated drivers who would have otherwise spent the rest of the day brooding about 
this one fare or just have gone home and forfeited the rest of the day’s money. Blau 
(1986) discusses the approach taken to similar issues in a conventional office 
environment of a law enforcement agency. Regulations required that agents who 
encountered problems should speak to a supervisor. However Blau observed that; 
 
‘lunch periods were filled with shop talk, involving either one official telling the 
others about interesting issues he had encountered in a case or one asking 
the opinion of the others how best handle an intricate problem’ 
(Blau,1986:viii).  
 
Despite the two environments being very different (an apparently classic office 
environment versus a virtual organisation or collective) and despite the two sets of 
workers being employed under very different circumstances salaried vs. self-
employed the characteristics of sharing work experiences are remarkably similar. 
 
These informal self-help groups amongst taxi drivers appear to quickly transform the 
bad experience of a difficult customer into a fun session where the whole group 
contribute similar experiences, suggestions for witty responses to criticisms and 
generally manage to motivate each other. Watson (1982) and Blau (1986) relate 
similar, although lower energy and less raucous, sessions amongst office based staff 
who had endured a demotivating experience. Blau’s concept of social exchange 
(1986) is very relevant to the taxi drivers’ sessions as everyone has something to 
gain from the exchange, motivation, fun, an appreciative audience and some 
practical advice for the next time such an incident was experienced.    
 
5.3.12  Summary 
The transition from Knowledge Boy to taxi driver is a painless process as within the 
taxi driver community the fact that one has completed the Knowledge of London 
provides an unquestioned rite of passage and acceptance into the industry. Although 
some stresses are apparent between long serving drivers and butterboys this is 
almost at the level of parent and adolescent, where the parent is urging the 
adolescent to adopt the culture, values, beliefs and identity of the majority. Amongst 
peers there is a ready acceptance and welcome for new entrants. 
 
Those within the taxi industry, a virtual organisation, appear to adopt many of the 
traits and behaviours that can be seen in more conventional and closely knit 
organisations such as offices and factories. Stacey’s (2001) work concerning how the 
local affects the global and vice versa has some resonance with my findings that the 
adoption of the same or very similar behaviours to office and factory workers appears 
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to be a natural phenomenon that even in a disparate and virtual organisation seems 
to develop organically from local interactions, whereas in more conventional 
organisation much management time is spent developing and stimulating the same 
behaviours and the processes and procedures to support them. Loose tie 
relationships without the overhead of maintaining close personal contact or working 
in close proximity appear to flourish and develop into a community not dissimilar to a 
factory or office. Communities appear to evolve and develop without any form of 
management intervention or leadership to provide support, guidance and establish 
behavioural norms that are accepted consensually by the workforce.  
 
These communities or groups when formed appear to welcome new entrants, who 
quickly learn or are taught the local rules and expected behaviours. Jokes, myths and 
fables are used to convey humour, record history and educate. Informal support 
groups form and provide venues for off-loading demotivating experiences which are 
transformed into entertaining therapy sessions. Rituals are prevalent in the industry 
and are practiced by both drivers and their passengers but appear not to be 
recognised as such by the drivers I interviewed. The interactions between customers 
and taxi drivers are particularly ritualised. Communication amongst taxi drivers whilst 
informal and ad hoc is surprisingly effective, however the veracity of some of the 
information is questionable. Once again management in more conventional 
organisations expend considerable energy in attempting to introduce a team spirit 
and to establish processes for communication within the organisation. The London 
taxi industry appears to show that left to their own devices people will develop 
effective communication strategies and form groups and provide support for one 
another.  
 
The formation of groups in the taxi industry is interesting and suggests that there is a 
human desire to form groups and be attached to peers. Moreover within these 
groups, despite the homogeneity of the role, earning capacity and career prospects 
drivers strive to create hierarchies and pseudo seniority. Once again this appears to 
be a human trait to differentiate and claim quasi privilege and respect through the 
use of trade specific language, historical knowledge and years of service. Drivers 
also jostle for individual recognition and status through claiming to work less hours 
and earn more money than their colleagues. Some drivers also assert a higher level 
of autonomy as proof of their superior knowledge of the industry. London’s taxi 
drivers whilst apparently keen to differentiate themselves amongst their peers appear 
to be at one when comparing their professional qualifications with other driving roles. 
They claim a hierarchy of driving roles where they are at the very top due to their 
vocational qualification. Providing frameworks for seniority to be recognised is an 
area where management often intervene and provide the trappings of seniority, e.g. 
offices, bigger desks, parking spaces etc, whereas the taxi industry has managed to 
turn a completely flat structure into a multi layered system of status and seniority 
without any management or leadership intervention.  
 
There appears to be a very obvious and strong culture in the industry and my 
research found that as new entrants adopt the culture and progress through their 
career, they appear to appoint themselves guardians of it. This guardianship is 
manifested through coaching new entrants and striving for equilibrium. The trade has 
a clear identity which is communicated by drivers to customers in a surprisingly 
consistent way. Drivers also appear to aspire to live up to the identity expected of a 
London taxi driver and apparently developed by drivers themselves guided by the 
trade press and influential writers such as Alf Townsend. An important issue for 
London’s taxi drivers’ identity is their employment status as self-employed 
businessmen and the autonomy that this status provides.  
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In the next section an important institution of the industry, radio taxi companies, are 
discussed. These organisations provide a channel to enhanced earnings for taxi 
drivers but are also a dichotomy for London’s taxi drivers, who are independent and 
virtual operators and arguably sole traders and businessmen and yet are required to 
comply with procedures, rules and adopt certain behaviours. The section below 
explores this dichotomy and the implications for management of trying to get taxi 
drivers to conform to procedures and rules so that radio taxi companies can satisfy 
their corporate desire to provide a homogenous service, fulfil customers’ needs and 
honour contractual requirements. 
 
5.4 Culture and Change Management 
Although largely an autonomous and virtual collection of individuals the London taxi 
industry has institutions that are conventionally managed and operated, e.g. the radio 
taxi companies. In addition there are those within the industry who seek to instigate 
or manage change, e.g. the various trade associations such as the Licensed Taxi 
Drivers’ Association (LTDA, the trade association representing drivers), JARTA, (the 
trade association that represented radio taxi companies) and the trade press. Two 
examples of such changes that I was witness to during my career in the taxi industry 
were the attempts by the Radio Taxi Company Executives to introduce the Quickie 
Knowledge (see section 5.2.16) and the various changes that took place within 
London Wide Radio Taxis/Computer Cab, the largest of the radio taxi companies.  
 
Radio taxi companies (also known as circuits) were the one part of the taxi industry 
where significant organisational and business process change took place during the 
course of my research. These examples are important and help to analyse the 
culture and identity of taxi drivers and the management style that appears to be 
needed to manage change in business processes and behaviour amongst taxi 
drivers. They provide important examples of the cultural beliefs and the impact of 
identity, both individual and organisational and how some approaches to change both 
offended and ran counter culture to the industry. The examples have been produced 
as case studies and are analysed in the sections below. 
 
Radio taxi operators are an institution within the industry. Their function was to 
provide taxi drivers with additional income and provided value as a tool with which to 
fight the incursion of minicabs into the industry. Some drivers I know loved radio 
circuits and others hated them. It appears that every driver had an opinion as to 
whether they had been a valuable contribution to the industry or had damaged it. 
London taxi drivers I spoke to had decided to join a radio taxi circuit for a number of 
reasons, chief amongst these was the opportunity to earn more money or the same 
amount of money quicker and/or easier. Many also joined for altruistic reasons; to 
help what they viewed as the fight against minicabs and to win back business for the 
taxi industry. Often drivers were prompted to join a radio taxi circuit as a 
consequence of being recommended to do so by another taxi driver, this was what 
happened in my case. 
 
The recommendations from other taxi drivers to join a radio taxi company were often 
based on increased earning potential, often expressed as having two irons in the fire.  
In effect a driver on radio [the colloquial term for belonging to or subscribing to a 
radio circuit] can trap [the industry colloquialism for securing or finding a fare] a trip 
from the street or through the radio, thereby potentially doubling the chances of 
picking up a fare. Fares from the radio circuit were also promoted as being higher 
value than street hails and typically involved travelling longer distances. There were 
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additional benefits in that payments were guaranteed by the radio circuit, every fare 
included an automatic gratuity and, as was often the case, waiting time was involved 
and a supplement was paid for the time the taxi and driver were kept waiting. Due to 
the nature of radio trips drivers used less diesel and benefited from frequent breaks 
rather than expending energy (physical and mental) and fuel driving around looking 
for fares.  
 
Many radio taxi drivers identified with their circuits, manifested by its drivers who 
made unsolicited comments such as “I love this circuit” even in front of their 
organisation’s staunchest critics. Taxi drivers who supported radio circuits were 
impressed by the circuit’s ambition to win back the taxi drivers’ work from minicabs. 
Radio drivers would often drive long distances rather than let a customer down. They 
often operated uneconomically and accepted the rules and policies of the radio circuit 
management. These drivers had an explicit personal alignment of belief with the 
organisation’s espoused value system (Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail, 1994 and 
Hatch and Schultz, 2000). This alignment appeared particularly prevalent amongst 
the newest radio taxi company in London, London Wide Radio Taxis (later to become 
Computer Cab), which enabled that radio taxi company’s management to ask and 
demand more from drivers than was really commercially viable (Blau, 1986). This 
love of their circuit and the organisational changes outlined in the paragraph below 
led to significant relationship problems between London Wide Radio Taxis’ radio 
circuit members, particularly though not entirely limited to founder members, and its 
management. 
 
Some of the important organisational and business process changes (Burnes, 2009) 
that were introduced by London Wide Radio Taxis circuit’s management ran counter 
to the culture of the industry and the reactions to the disputes that were engendered 
by the change management process (Strickland and Thompson, 1998) were 
important in relation to the aims of my research, which were to provide an insight into 
the industry. During my interpretation and analysis I examined the target or formal 
culture (Fook and Watson, 1992) of the radio taxi companies, as determined by the 
management of the radio taxi company concerned, and considered both the formal 
and informal cultures (Fook and Watson,1992) that prevailed within the taxi industry, 
in order to analyse why the changes were so resolutely resisted by the taxi drivers 
who belonged to that company.  
 
The important cultural issues that were given insufficient weight by management 
during the change process appeared to be based around the movement of the 
frontiers of control (Watson, 1982). The view shared by many drivers was that they 
were self-employed businessmen and expected or wanted to be treated as such, The 
prevailing view was that all taxi drivers are equal (Taxi Driver Interview, No.2) and so 
did not want to have their working processes determined by those they viewed as 
their peer group but who in reality were business managers with fiduciary 
responsibility for the companies they managed. The sections below discuss the radio 
taxi companies’ attempts to introduce business process and other changes, how the 
various methods they invoked fitted or conflicted with the prevailing culture and the 
effect this had on the chances of successful implementation. 
 
5.4.1 Computer Cab Change Management Case Study One  
Computer Cab (formerly London Wide Radio Taxis) was an undercapitalized 
business entity owned by the Licensed Taxi Drivers’ Association (LTDA), which was 
also an organisation that had little capital. This case study is concerned events that 
took place in circa 1985. During one serious financial crisis for Computer Cab, and 
following the blocking of a number of resolutions to enable the LTDA to raise its 
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borrowing limits by the small number of activists who regularly attended LTDA branch 
meetings, the company’s financial situation became acute. The Managing Director of 
Computer Cab and the General Secretary of the LTDA, who was also the Chairman 
of Computer Cab, announced that they would be at the LTDA North East Branch 
meeting which was to be held at the Queens Head Public House, in Hoxton, East 
London one particular evening. Computer Cab drivers were urged to attend. The 
agenda (raising money from drivers who belonged to the radio taxi company) had 
been deliberately leaked and as a consequence so many drivers attended that it was 
not possible for everyone to fit into the hall where the meeting was held. The meeting 
hall was a small functions room above the pub. Those who could not fit in the 
meeting room lined the stairs to the hall, stood in the pub or milled around outside. 
 
It was estimated by those present that over three hundred drivers attended, which 
was about thirty per cent of the radio circuit’s members at the time. The Managing 
Director asked that standing orders be suspended so that the one important issue of 
radio taxi-company funding could be fully discussed by the drivers who had turned up 
specifically for this one purpose. The small branch committee was ambivalent to his 
request (a demonstration of the ‘we are all equal here’ ideology) but following 
prompting by the General Secretary the branch committee asked those present to 
vote on the proposition to suspend standing orders. The six regular attendees, who 
were anti radio circuit activists, who had arrived early and were in their normal seats 
at the front of the hall facing the table occupied by the branch committee, objected in 
the strongest and most vitriolic terms. They claimed to have a complete lack of 
interest in the radio company’s business, a desire to hold their normal LTDA meeting 
and that standing orders should be adhered to as they attended every month not 
“once in a blue moon”.  
 
Similar to union members at Fords, “strong elements of ritual permeate the branches 
and branch meetings” (Beynon, 1975:205) and these members saw no reason for 
their rituals to be disturbed. Arguments and scuffles ensued as to whether the 
standing orders should be suspended or not until in the end the General Secretary of 
the association stood on the committee table in order to be both seen and heard and 
insisted on discussing a proposal that every member contribute one hundred pounds 
in cash as a permanent loan to the radio taxi company. At this intervention the crowd 
in the hall erupted into both cries of support and anger. Members on the stairs were 
calling for the meeting to be moved out into the street so they could hear and 
probably so they could contribute to the discussion. Instead a system of verbal relays 
was used to pass the main discussion points to them. How accurate these reports 
were is difficult to say particularly given the taxi trade habit of sharpening and 
flattening stories. 
 
My feeling was that the meeting was ugly, unpleasant, aggressive, loud, intimidating, 
and raucous. The temperature in the room due to so many people being there was 
really uncomfortable and the language was of the foulest variety. The management 
of the radio taxi company were accused of being incompetent, acting ultra vires [a 
small number of legal/Latin terms were used frequently at branch meetings – ultra 
vires was used to imply that the LTDA Executive Committee was acting outside of its 
powers as stated in the association’s rule book] and being out of order and in breach 
of the rule book. Threats of judicial review and injunctions were thrown around by the 
regular attendees. The anger was palpable. Some of the regular attendees attempted 
to storm out of the meeting but could not do so because of the numbers of people in 
the room which meant that they had to squeeze and shuffle past people rather than 
exit with a theatrical flourish. Eventually after many options were discussed a system 
which was to become known as the roller bond was agreed. The system was based 
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on ten per cent of the value of contract or account trips being deducted at each 
payment cycle and then rolled up until they reached a set figure and then returned to 
the driver in a lump sum. The figure agreed at the meeting was four hundred pounds 
which was an effective loan of an average of two hundred pounds per member. It 
was also up to a four hundred pounds loan from driver to company. The net benefit 
was twice (£200) what the management had originally asked for (£100) and the 
impact at certain points just before the bond rolled over was four times (i.e. £400) 
what had been asked for.  
 
After the matter had been resolved the drivers became very friendly and jovial, they 
congratulated the management for their courage in facing them and the meeting 
ended in the most amicable way possible with the management being clapped and 
cheered. Why the meeting began aggressively and became so emotive and why the 
eventual figure was twice what the management originally wanted was a mystery to 
me for much of the rest of the time I worked for the radio taxi company. The most 
likely reason was that drivers may not have been totally surprised or even totally 
against the idea of, or need, for a loan, but disliked the manner in which the change 
was introduced, which offended the ‘we are all equal’ ethos of the industry. The 
transition in mood from initial seething anger to clapping and cheering became a 
common format for radio circuit meetings from this point onwards.  Quite why this 
format evolved is difficult to discern. However what can be taken from this example is 
that unlike relations between management and workers at Fords where almost a 
class struggle was played out (Beynon, 1975:88-89), taxi drivers appeared to want to 
work with management, albeit on an equals’ basis. The management appeared 
unwilling to convince, persuade or try to sell to the drivers; instead they relied on their 
managerial status for the authority to impose change. This was counter to the culture 
of all taxi drivers being equal. 
 
The next section considers the business problems experienced by Computer Cab in 
the early days of computing where computing power was expensive and difficult to 
scale up. In Computer Cab’s case the technology partner, Honeywell Bull, was just 
not able to support the company’s growth. Additionally, it was nearly impossible to 
acquire more radio channels due to the number of radio spectrum users in London. 
These practical constraints to growth led management to look at better using the 
resources they already had through business process changes. These business 
process changes led to significant industrial relations problems with the taxi drivers 
who worked with the company. 
 
 
5.4.2 Computer Cab Change Management Case Study Two 
The challenge of maximising growth in an environment of technical constraint (limited 
numbers of radio channels and computer processing power constraints) 
necessitated, from a managerial perspective, significant operational and business 
process change.  Drivers responded almost uniformly to change. They did not find 
change easy and almost immediately after any change, however small, was 
introduced they left the company in larger than normal numbers (throughout 
Computer Cab’s history 1% of drivers left every month). As well as leavers there was 
a residue of drivers who did not leave but instead continued their membership in a 
state of simmering discontent and unresolved conflict, expressed through very 
emotive, often angry and frequently abusive phone calls and a great deal of 
complaining and moaning over the radio and at LTDA branch meetings. Although 
LTDA branch meetings were not strictly speaking anything to do with the radio taxi 
company, members of the company’s management team attended regularly in order 
to pacify existing drivers and potentially recruit new ones. The LTDA owned the radio 
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taxi company and its branch meetings provided a platform at which drivers used to 
air grievances about the radio taxi company. 
 
An early example of this antipathy towards business process change was an 
amendment to the booking allocation process known as ‘cab better’ and the 
replacement of this process with a process known as ‘first cab on the right call’. The 
shortage of radio channel availability and the growing volumes of trips meant that the 
management team needed to identify more efficient processes to allocate trips that 
used less valuable air time, as air time value was heightened by the peaks and 
troughs nature of demand and the paucity of radio channel availability. The traditional 
method of allocation, cab better, had been used since 1955 when radio taxi 
operations first started in London and was generally accepted as a fair system 
amongst drivers. This evaluation was based on the general principle of it ensuring as 
far as practicable that the right job went to the right driver and was therefore aligned 
with the industry’s culture and generally adopted practice of taxi etiquette..  
 
The process involved the radio dispatcher announcing the brief details of the trip, this 
included the first line of the address, whether it was a booking or an as soon as 
possible request, and the payment arrangements, i.e. cash or account.  Radio taxi 
drivers from all companies were trained and then conditioned to push their talk button 
when they were within the correct calling distance and ennunciating their call sign 
(e.g. Kilo seven zero (K70)) into the microphone. First call was 440 yards, second 
call 880 yards and so on. In areas that are heavily populated by taxi drivers eight or 
ten drivers may call in on first call. This led to a jumble of voices being received and 
the dispatcher having to take up valuable air time saying things like, “Was there a 
cab with a seven?” or similar until he could identify a whole call sign and then 
establish the driver’s position. This also cast doubt on the integrity of the process. 
Some drivers felt that if the job was a good one (i.e. profitable) the despatcher could 
tip off his friends by asking for a cab with a certain number. 
 
Later technology was introduced to recognise the first driver’s signal that was 
received and display his call sign on a small monitor in front of the dispatcher. This 
was a system known as automatic VI [Vehicle Identification]. This seemingly 
innocuous development was a major innovation in enabling trips to be allocated 
quickly and improving the integrity of the process. It saved significant air time through 
not having to waste time identifying call signs and enabled more trips to be handled. 
The dispatcher would identify the driver by his call sign from the VI indicator and ask 
him where he was. The driver would describe where he was e.g. Smith Street corner 
of Jones Road, the dispatcher would repeat this so the fleet could hear and then he 
asked for a cab better (hence the name of the process). Taxi drivers who thought or 
judged that they were nearer the pick-up than the driver(s) who had called in 
previously then called in and the process was repeated until the best taxi i.e. the 
nearest to the pick-up address was identified. Clearly with jumbled transmissions, 
false calls (cabs that were not better claiming they were), misunderstandings, and 
signal problems leading to elongated attempts to establish drivers’ positions and an 
adjudication process by the dispatcher, this was a slow and cumbersome process. 
However it broadly matched the right driver/right job concept that was a core element 
of the culture of the trade. 
 
In order to speed up the cab better process management announced a change which 
reduced the number of challenges to the first cab to four (previously it was unlimited), 
thereby capping the length of each cab better transaction. Drivers, mainly 
traditionalists, who reasoned that if there had been more than four challenges under 
the cab better system they would have been allocated a particular trip and so saw it 
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as their trip, resigned in anger. Clearly this change to the cab better process was in 
direct conflict with the London taxi driver ideology of an etiquette or belief in which 
trip or job belonged to which driver. No end of justification by management for the 
need for a mind-set (Watson, 1982) change from the nearest cab to the pick-up 
identified through cab better bidding, to a swings and roundabouts approach 
(Watson, 1982), where on balance and based on the law of averages all drivers 
would get their fair share, convinced drivers of the justification. Stories abounded of 
drivers who were outside a building when a trip was announced and would have, 
quite rightly in their opinion, received the booking in question under the cab better 
system but due to the four challenge system were excluded from what was rightfully 
their job. These stories were often spiced up with claims the trip was going to the 
airport or was an even more lucrative fare.  Drivers in their quest for rationality went 
as far as to claim that they would prefer less work allocated if it was allocated fairly 
compared to the new process, which the drivers considered considerably less than 
fair. A minority of drivers even commented that they would not want the trip if it was 
allocated in these circumstances as “if it was not their job” [fare]. The ideology of, and 
obsession with, fairness appeared to override all other considerations, notably the 
management’s expressed desire to improve both service quality and capacity to 
enable growth to achieve commercial success. 
 
A further refinement quickly followed which was to be known as ‘first cab’. It 
happened in two stages with the number of cab better challenges reduced to three 
(previously four). This caused a ripple of complaints and sudden highly emotive and 
angry driver resignations. Terms such as “This is a piss take”, “This is a liberty” were 
used by drivers. Watson (1982:268) under similar circumstances asserted that; 
 
‘Management were in fact shifting the ‘frontier of control’. They were invading 
certain ‘territory’ within the working day - territory which belonged to the 
workers themselves and [over] which managers had no rights’. 
 
The territory that was being invaded and the frontier of control that was being shifted 
by Computer Cab management was the direct challenge to the taxi driver ideology of 
fairness, of luck and the fundamental concern about which trip was rightly whose.  
 
Drivers expressed happiness with the cab better system, it may have been clunky 
and ritualistic, there may have been sharp practices and cheating, but it apparently 
established, through iteration, which driver should eventually receive the job that was 
he was destined to receive. Disgruntled drivers used language such as not wishing to 
be treated as employees underlining their ideology of being self-employed, of some 
believing themselves to be small business men, their attachment to autonomy 
(Scwalbe and Wolkmir, 2001) and their fear of assimilation with other driving jobs. 
 
The management had ‘depended upon on the assumed existence of certain 
organizational goals’ (Watson 1982:261). These were ‘changes initiated by 
management to achieve managerial goals’ (Watson 1982:261) i.e. expand radio 
capacity, increase throughput and trip volumes and ultimately revenue, profit and 
commercial success. Management had expected what they considered to be a 
rational reaction to what was in their view a non-emotive business process change 
decision. Management had also convinced themselves that drivers were only 
interested in money, a term frequently used during management meetings by 
members of the Computer Cab management team who came from a taxi driving 
background. The Managing Director often asserted during this period that money 
solves most problems in the taxi industry and drivers just want more work [fares] and 
money. The discourse often used amongst the management when discussing driver 
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recruitment was that what we need are hungry, young drivers,  with new badges, new 
cabs, big mortgages, kids, a high spending wife and a bird [girlfriend or mistress] on 
the side. This was a reinforcement of the management’s belief that money was a key, 
possibly the only, motivator. 
 
The business process change had been introduced by management without any 
consultation with the drivers. The change process simply relied upon a letter being 
sent out announcing the change. This means of communication was a direct 
challenge to the ‘we are all equal’ ethos of the industry as it positioned the letter 
writer, normally the managing director, as appearing to be above the rest of the taxi 
drivers.  The rationale for the business process change explained in the letter was 
that Computer Cab would be able to deliver more trips to drivers. This rationale was 
based on the assumption that the majority would be prepared to accept procedural 
change for the benefit of more trips and that any resistance amongst the small 
number of founder drivers and traditionalists would be overwhelmed by the rational 
majority who were more interested in money than tradition. An important 
consideration here was the implicit requirement from management that drivers’ 
organisational commitment (Blau, 1973) was stronger than their 
occupational/professional commitment (Burrell and Morgan, 2003). In industrial 
relations terms (Beynon, 1975) drivers were being asked to back management rather 
than colleagues. Nevertheless, the ‘we are all equal’ culture prevalent in the London 
taxi industry conspired against this strategy being successful.  
 
Some background information was given out by management (Watson, 1982) about 
the lack of radio channels and inefficient use of airtime. There was also a term that 
was to be used many times over future years to justify the change; swings and 
roundabouts. Radio taxis according to the letter was about swings and roundabouts. 
It went on, “Yes, a driver may lose out on an individual trip that under cab better he 
would have received but as there will be more trips the driver will have more chances 
of receiving trips and overall do better” [i.e. make more money]. These claims of a 
common benefit were mathematically and operationally incorrect as the process 
would, inadvertently, if it achieved what management hoped for, actually level 
earnings, the effect being that the high earners would earn less and lower earning 
drivers would earn more.  This went contra to the aspirations of the drivers who had 
been the target of Computer Cab’s recruitment campaigns during the previous years. 
The target driver was someone who needed to earn more than the average driver, 
not the same. Likewise many lower earning drivers were lower earning for their own 
reasons and were not seeking to increase the amount of money they earned from 
radio. 
 
Overall there appeared to be fundamental errors in the change management 
processes adopted by management. Management assumed a position of power and 
authority based on their responsibility to deliver commercial success. They ignored 
the cultural beliefs of all taxi drivers being equal and many believing they were small 
businessmen who expected to be consulted about any change. The belief that jobs 
or fares belonged to specific drivers based on a set of unwritten rules was also 
ignored in favour of increasing throughput and stimulating commercial success. The 
approach adopted by management appeared to be high risk and relied on a number 
of significant culture changes being accepted for the benefit of the majority. A core 
premise of the change was mathematically flawed and relied on the concept of 
swings and roundabouts. This offended the taxi drivers’ cultural beliefs on many 
levels. 
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The next section examines the management’s responses to the industrial relations’ 
problem. 
5.4.3 Challenging Culture 
In this section a number of identity, cultural and political issues are examined. The 
relationship between dispatcher and drivers was a key interface and responsible for 
motivating drivers. The concept of gamification, drivers pitting their wits against 
dispatchers to earn above average income levels was also an important motivator 
and was under threat through the business process changes proposed by 
management. Important cultural and motivational factors were ignored during what 
became an increasingly political and personalised battle for control. Key cultural traits 
and beliefs such as all drivers, whether management or driver, being equal were 
challenged, as was the belief concerning which booking belonged to which driver. 
Management ideology clashed with taxi driver culture and led to increasingly bitter 
relations.   
 
Watson (1982:272–273) talks of ‘allusions’; in this case management attempted to 
create allusions of swings and roundabouts, they attempted to blame the business 
process change on the technical necessity caused by the shortage of radio channels, 
and the promise that there would be more trips and that drivers would have more 
chances of receiving trips and overall would do better. Watson (1982:273) views 
these attempts as a means of creating ‘a specific vocabulary and hence a limited 
frame of reference which will effectively depoliticize the issues’. The ‘other motif’ 
(1982:272) of ‘technical necessity’ (1982:273) is also an attempt at depoliticising 
what is viewed by drivers as a clearly a highly political issue.  Watson (1982:273) 
goes on to purport that ‘attempts are thus made to frame the issues in ways which 
insidiously mobilize bias in favour of managerial interests’.  
 
After the new business processes were imposed there were allegations that some 
dispatchers had given a trip to a driver who was further away than the 440 yards that 
was supposed to be first call. As commonly happens in the industry these stories 
were told and embellished in cafes frequented by taxi drivers all over London. The 
new business process relied heavily on the judgement of the dispatcher. These 
judgements had to be made quickly by the dispatcher and he had to establish 
whether the driver was within the distance specified or not. The dispatcher’s 
adjudication was communicated across the radio channels and therefore heard and 
considered by every driver who was listening, often many hundreds. Each of these 
drivers possessed the Knowledge of London and was therefore capable of 
adjudicating on the dispatcher’s decision. The dispatcher was in a no win situation. If 
the dispatcher accepted a driver who had given a borderline position the drivers who 
were well within the distance were quick to criticise and escalate their criticism to 
management. If he knocked the driver back (i.e. excluded the driver on the basis that 
he was too far away from the pick-up) the driver complained. Dispatchers relied on 
building rapport with drivers to get the bookings fulfilled during busy periods when 
drivers could easily accept street hirings in preference to radio despatched bookings. 
Dispatchers needed to be trusted by drivers and occasionally as part of this trust 
building process both enjoyed some latitude with each other. This latitude reduced as 
business process rules grew more prescriptive which impacted adversely upon the 
driver/dispatcher relationship. This relationship was important as it was the main and 
certainly the most frequent interface between the company and the driver. 
 
Having been able to observe the management at close quarters during this period of 
business process change my belief is that Watson’s (1982) view is somewhat worker 
centric and in this case unfair to management who genuinely believed that growth 
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would benefit everyone. A cynical view could be that those benefits would probably 
benefit management more than individual taxi drivers.  Despite this I still believe that 
management appeared genuine in their belief that growth in market share and 
profitability would ultimately bring financial benefits to the mass drivers both directly 
in higher earnings but also from the perspective that the company’s owners the LTDA 
would own a more valuable asset and provide an indirect benefit to drivers who were 
all LTDA members and therefore indirect owners.  
 
Management’s actions and language could be considered insidious (Watson 1982) 
as they were prepared personally and viciously to discredit any individual driver who 
disagreed with their philosophy. This was indiscriminate and included many founder 
drivers as well as comparatively new recruits. Hewitt and Hall (1973: 273) take a 
more reasoned view in their assertion that management are creating ‘quasi theories’.  
Watson expands on this point to explain ‘ad hoc explanations [are] brought to 
problematic situations to give them order and hope’ (1982). My belief is that 
management’s response to criticisms of their quasi theories lay somewhere between 
order and hope and insidiousness. I believe that they genuinely wanted drivers to buy 
into the new process in order for the organisation to overcome the technical 
constraints and prosper. However they also used the discontent as an opportunity to 
eradicate opponents, mainly traditionalists, and settle old scores. Importantly the 
gamification (see glossary) of radio was being lost or to a large part eroded by the 
new business processes thereby alienating high earning drivers, deskilling 
despatchers and tearing up the right job/right driver concept so valued by founder or 
long serving drivers and apparently the industry as a whole.  
 
Some high earning drivers formed an uneasy alliance with another group, those who 
might be termed traditionalists, who wanted to retain cab better for its fairness rather 
than for any pecuniary advantage. The younger, hungrier, high earning drivers 
wanted to retain cab better for its unfairness, its opportunity for them to cheat and get 
more work but they did share a common agenda with their traditionalist colleagues – 
cab better was good for both of them albeit for different reasons. The proposed 
business process change had the effect of alienating founders, traditionalists and 
high earners. The middle tier of drivers, who were the majority of the fleet often 
described by management as “Mr Average” were less inclined to react in any way to 
these changes as they would be largely unaffected. 
 
The discussion above shows that the management had assumed that drivers would 
put growth and success for the majority in front of their own narrow personal desire to 
achieve above average earnings, yet for a number of cultural, personal and political 
reasons this assumption was flawed. The approach to organisational and business 
process change adopted by the management appeared to alienate most groups of 
drivers, albeit for different reasons, and crystallised opposition. This situation was 
aggravated further through the settling of old scores, introducing a bitter and highly 
personalised element to a tense and difficult situation.  
 
In the next section the tactics management adopted in light of an increasingly serious 
industrial relations problem are considered and examined in the context of the culture 
and identity of London’s taxi drivers. A key theme was that management attempted 
as they saw it to manage. In effect this meant imposing change after change based 
on a top down philosophy which conflicted with the culture of the industry which 
considered all drivers, whether in management or not are equal.  
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5.4.4 Frontiers of Control 
In this section management’s quest for control over what it viewed as its business 
processes continued. Given the increasingly intractable positions of both sides and 
the cultural obstacles to resolution management sought to ignore the taxi drivers’ 
antipathy towards the organisational and business process changes. This led to 
conflict amongst shareholders, directors and management as the level of the 
industrial relations problem became acute.   
  
Computer Cab management played for time hoping that the issue would blow over 
and that especially new drivers, who, it was claimed by management, were only 
interested in money not procedures, would just get back to doing what they liked 
most; earning money.  Opposition grew ever stronger amongst a growing number of 
disaffected drivers. These issues were aired loudly and angrily at LTDA branch 
meetings and during personal visits by drivers to Computer Cab’s offices. Matters 
were also escalated directly and in some cases formally to the LTDA, the ultimate 
parent company of Computer Cab. Half of the four man LTDA executive team were 
regarded by Computer Cab management as anti-radio. This was actually a 
shortened, slightly skewed version of what they really meant which was anti radio 
company management, whom the anti-radio LTDA executive team termed as the tail 
wagging the dog. These so called anti-radio LTDA executive members happily took 
up aggrieved radio taxi drivers’ concerns with the radio company management and 
insisted on change. It provided them with the moral high ground to criticise the radio 
taxi company management whilst being viewed by the growing number of disaffected 
drivers as the workers’ champions. This contrasted with drivers’ views of the radio 
taxi management as anti-worker. The position that the taxi drivers accused the 
management of taking conflicted with the cultural value amongst taxi drivers of all 
being equal.    
 
Similarly to the management group that Watson (1982: 269) observed, Computer 
Cab management eventually ‘realized that ideological utterances would not be 
enough to win the workers’ acceptance of the change’. The management team at 
Computer Cab were increasingly a group who were under siege by their drivers, 
which were the workforce, and their ultimate parent and 100% shareholder, the 
LTDA. Some of the non-taxi driver management also began to feel uneasy and urge 
a more consultative approach to achieve a compromise and an end to the conflict.  
 
The outcome of these splits, lobbying and protesting was that a change was made to 
the business process by the radio taxi company’s management. The change 
addressed a symptom of the problem rather than the actual problem and was once 
again an attempt to delay any real change in the hope that the problem would go 
away. Instead of dispatchers having to use their Knowledge of London to adjudicate 
whether the route from the driver’s position to the pick-up exceeded the specified 
distance, the distance would be measured on a crow flies basis. Prior to this change 
dispatchers had to calculate distances based on driven distance, cognisant of one 
way systems and restricted turns. This required dispatchers to possess and 
demonstrate an excellent and very detailed topographical knowledge together with 
the ability to calculate routes and make distance based decisions very quickly.  
 
These skills which were displayed over the radio to the working drivers (which 
normally totalled many hundreds) flattered dispatchers self-worth, as possessing an 
excellent topographical knowledge and being skilled enough to make the right instant 
decisions. To operate the new processes dispatchers were issued with Perspex 
rulers that showed the 440, 880 etc. yard distances that the calls were based on. 
When the driver called in on the radio to bid for a booking the dispatcher was 
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required to measure the distance between the position the driver claimed to be at 
and the pick up on a map using the Perspex ruler. If the driver was within the correct 
distance he then allocated the trip to the driver and if it wasn’t he continued to seek to 
identify a driver on the correct call i.e. within the correct distance from the pick-up.  
 
The introduction of this procedural change made matters worse as the number of 
drivers now in contention for each trip had increased significantly due to the crow fly 
rule. (Prior to the crow fly rule many drivers would have been precluded as the one 
way and restricted turn system would have meant that they had to drive too far to 
qualify for a particular call). Amongst the despatchers there was what Watson 
(1982:268) described as ‘a fear of deskilling’. Deskilling in this context is defined as 
despatchers and drivers no longer needing to use their skills, their Knowledge and 
expertise to assess whether the drivers were within the distance of the call. The skills 
acquired during the Knowledge of London process are fundamental to the identity of 
London’s taxi drivers, whether driving or dispatching, and the attempts by 
management to deskill the process and by extension the role of both driving and 
dispatching offended the drivers and dispatchers view of their self-worth and 
professionalism.  
 
Following this procedural change drivers were even unhappier than before. This was 
due to one way systems, restricted turns etc not being considered and frequently 
resulting in a driver with a much longer journey to the pick-up than another being 
allocated the trip. This offended the industry culture of trips being allocated to the 
driver who rightfully deserved the trip.  The deskilling of the dispatchers’ role also 
adversely affected their view of the process. They were now measuring maps with 
Perspex rulers rather than using and demonstrating the topographical and decision 
making skills of which they were very proud. Any discretion and latitude was 
effectively removed from the dispatcher’s role, leading to a less favourable 
relationship with drivers. This bred antipathy towards the process which dispatchers 
subtly exploited by raising drivers’ awareness of the perceived unfairness of the 
allocation model.  As dispatchers were in constant voice contact via radio throughout 
a driver’s entire shift the dispatchers were in a privileged position to make subtle 
asides and comments that influenced the drivers’ perception of the process. 
Management now had unhappy drivers, unhappy dispatchers and unhappy 
shareholders. 
 
The LTDA branch meeting attendances increased from six or twelve regular 
attendees at most meetings to well over a hundred on a regular basis. Letters from 
drivers, began to arrive daily at Computer Cab’s office, which was unusual. The trade 
press letters pages began to fill up with Computer Cab drivers complaining about the 
first cab and then crow flies procedures. The company’s management who adopted a 
‘management must manage’ philosophy then implemented another version of the 
process, this had the unfortunate and almost certainly unintended consequence of 
pitting driver against driver. This situation was completely counter to the culture of 
taxi drivers having developed informal protocols to ensure that they worked 
harmoniously and thus avoided chaos.  
 
The management decided that instead of the dispatcher deciding whether the driver 
was within the specified distance, drivers would decide this themselves. In practice 
the system returned to a driven distance i.e. one way systems and restricted turns 
were included in the calculation of the 440, 880 etc yards calculation but there would 
be no adjudication by dispatchers. When a driver called in on a particular call, his 
position would be repeated over the air and he would be automatically allocated the 
trip. Any driver who disagreed with the trip being allocated was advised to ‘put the 
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driver on complaint’ i.e. initiate disciplinary action. The number of drivers who came 
to the office demanding that their radio equipment be stripped out of their taxi 
because they had ‘been outside a pick up address and still not been allocated the 
job’ and yet ‘a driver miles away had been given it’ grew weekly. Fairness, an 
important cultural belief, or the lack of it, was a word and a concept that peppered 
every driver interaction on this subject.  
 
This was a difficult time to work at Computer Cab as every interaction with drivers 
was dominated by anger at what drivers considered to be inept processes, 
irresponsible management, lack of consultation, constant change and more than 
anything else, unfairness. Dispatchers, who spent eight hours per day involved in 
angry exchanges with drivers and being accused of unfairness, were de-motivated 
and staff were generally frightened and confused as to which group, management or 
drivers, was correct. This was a clear and stark example of Hiatt and Creasey’s 
(2003) engineer vs. psychologist dichotomy of change management.  
 
After another round of what seemed like mayhem to me and many others working in 
the Computer Cab office, a referendum by drivers was sanctioned by Computer Cab 
management. The language that the management used in the referendum 
documentation was couched in terms that could be described as similar to a letter 
from a cooperative, trade union, or friendly society to their members. The 
documentation included terms such as the majority can decide, we want to be 
democratic and similar platitudes. This was much more aligned with the culture of the 
industry than the very managerialist style of letters that had been sent previously.   
 
The referendum offered a number of options for the allocation process from which 
drivers who belonged to Computer Cab could select. There was no compromise on 
the first cab system but issues such as self-adjudication vs. dispatcher adjudication 
and crow flies and driven distance were offered to the drivers as choices. The 
referendum was counted by volunteer drivers and the results were grudgingly 
accepted by most drivers within the consensual culture of the industry. However the 
approach management had taken with these business process changes remained 
what can only be termed as an unresolved conflict for many years. This unresolved 
conflict manifested itself as a form of abuse against management, being an example 
of management arrogance of being out of touch and of acting in, as they described it, 
an undemocratic manner.  
 
This had been the first serious industrial relations dispute (Beynon, 1975) that I had 
witnessed between Computer Cab management and its drivers. Effectively 
management had won their battle for control of the organisation’s business 
processes but the cost in driver attrition, driver loyalty and management credibility 
had been high. Neither side had won outright as both sides had been exposed as 
weak. The drivers needed and wanted to earn money, management wanted to keep 
their jobs and their developing portfolio of perks. Many drivers were still loyal to the 
circuit but no longer to the management, an interesting position where loyalty to an 
amorphous concept was declared rather than to individuals. Many drivers who may 
have preferred to leave Computer Cab would not have qualified for another radio 
circuit as they did not own their own taxis and would in any event have to wait 
upwards of two years to join another radio taxi company, which would have adversely 
affected their income levels.  
 
The outcomes were anger amongst drivers for management positioning themselves 
as a professional elite (Stacey, 2001) who were convinced of the virtue of their 
proposition and equally convinced that the drivers were blinkered, shop floor 
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operatives who should just follow orders and leave management and business 
process design to them. The management had in effect adopted a scientific 
management approach believing in a one best way to achieve improved efficiency. 
Beynon relates his analysis of a similar dispute at Fords, ’It is in this way that 
disputes over control at work, that the class struggle has been fought out by the 
British working class during this century’ (1975:129), except in this case the workers 
(taxi drivers) did not view themselves as working class and neither did they view the 
company managers as their bosses. However these beliefs do not dilute the position 
that the dispute was very much about control at work. 
 
As a staff member I had the feeling at the time of the company having been under 
siege, of being hated, of palpable anger from drivers and glib platitudes from senior 
management, who stayed behind their locked doors issuing letters and apparently 
making the situation much worse. 
 
The changes had been introduced with a single objective of increasing throughput 
(Mills et al, 2009) thereby ignoring Pfeffer’s valid observations that, ‘organizations are 
involved in creation, holding and allocation of wealth and they thus affect their 
members’ power and chances in society at large’ (1978:271). Opening up 
opportunities, real and perceived, to deprive honest drivers and assist dishonest 
drivers, to level the field and to disenfranchise drivers who favoured the cab better 
system impacted the allocation of wealth and also impacted their chances in society 
at large through adversely impacting status, earning potential, power, job satisfaction 
and organisational commitment (Blau, 1973).  The outcome was therefore a mixture 
of intended and unintended consequences. Every change that management made 
appeared to disenfranchise one or more groups and the formerly successful 
approach of managing largely through consensus and most definitely in alignment 
with the culture of the industry had been abandoned.  The fatal flaw appeared to be 
the original aim of levelling the field which was not attractive to either high earners 
who saw their income drop or low earners who were happy to carry out a relatively 
low amount of business from the radio preferring to generate a higher proportion of 
their income in cash rather than on account. 
 
The drivers’ power in this scenario was weakened by their need to earn money rather 
than leave Computer Cab. I would suggest that they, like management, had a narrow 
objective, which was the right to continue their ritualistic behaviour with regard to trip 
allocation processes that delivered what one group, the traditionalists, considered to 
be fairness, and another, the less productive target drivers, as opportunity. Watson’s 
(1982:270) observations of the management group he observed sums up the 
situation that Computer Cab management created; 
 
‘The more important inference to draw at the more general level is this; to 
understand processes of organizational change we need to recognize that the 
definitions of situations which people develop and the actions which relate to 
these are informed by real sociological and economic phenomena as well as 
psychological ones. The essentially political nature of organizational life has 
to be recognized and the social class context of employment relationships 
appreciated’  
 
All the ingredients listed in Watson’s description were present in the industrial 
relations problems at Computer Cab and each played their role in turning what 
management viewed as a logical change in the tradition of scientific management 
(Mills et al, 2009) into a type of class war (Beynon, 1975); management vs. workers 
(in this case taxi drivers). Computer Cab management’s unerring belief that taxi 
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drivers’ sole interest was in money clouded their judgement, and their ambition for 
growth based on the premise of swings and roundabouts and how the mean average 
would be beneficial to a group whose earnings were spread along a very broad 
continuum was apparently flawed. 
 
The arguments about the dispute raged literally for years. Management and drivers 
who were members of the radio taxi company at, and before, the time of the change 
rewrote the history of the dispute in order to make their ancient arguments more 
credible. Weick’s (1969) contention appears to normalise this situation, pointing out,  
 
‘that sense-making in organizations is largely retrospective – part of the 
continual and negotiation based process of organizing whereby attempts are 
continually being made to render information less ambiguous’  
 
or in this case to render both sides’ arguments stronger and more rational than the 
other and through that process make each side’s arguments less ambiguous.  
 
Faced with what at the time Computer Cab Management viewed as being an illogical 
and certainly non-commercial view of what were in their view unemotional business 
process changes that would have a beneficial effect on the organisation and an 
operational need to continue to make further changes, the management team had 
become increasingly shocked at the ferocity and duration of the dissent. As a 
consequence they became slightly more consultative, in effect a move away from 
their scientific management approach to a human relations approach. This 
consultation was limited in its application as the management were not seeking 
consensus and had no desire to expend the time, effort and energy needed to 
achieve consensus, neither did consensus fit with their new strategy whereby they 
positioned themselves as professional business managers. This positioning was 
explicitly counter culture to the taxi drivers beliefs. The approach management began 
to employ could be termed as engagement rather than consultation, telling drivers 
what the problem was and what the proposed solutions were; often these were 
presented as options.  Mass meetings with drivers became more frequent, letters and 
magazines were frequently produced and the language changed from “Dear driver”, 
when addressing letters and other communications, to “Dear member” (Handy, 
1995:7) thereby attempting to develop a more collegiate model where drivers were 
encouraged to feel that they belonged. This could be described as an attempt to 
encourage a feeling of drivers working with rather than for (Dutton, Dukerich and 
Harquail, 1994 and Hatch and Schultz, 2000) the radio taxi company. 
 
Computer Cab Management had failed to understand, as did the management group 
that Watson (1982:270) studied, that ‘the problems they faced in bringing about the 
changes were more than ones of communication’.  Pfeffer (1978:271) points out that 
“a critical issue is not just what the consequences of various structural arrangements 
are, but who gains and who loses from such consequences”. There were complex 
cultural issues and the changes which were poorly introduced ran counter culture to 
many taxi driver ideologies, such as which fare is rightfully whose, we are all equal 
and the taxi trade obsession with fairness. From phone calls, personal visits, the 
numerous driver meetings that were held and the new fashion of receiving letters 
from drivers it appeared that the three main groups all considered that they lost; the 
high earners were unable to gain advantage over other drivers, the founder members 
and traditionalists lost their preferred business process and the management lost 
their ability to manage the operational aspects of the business. The only gainers 
were the mid-level income group whose earnings increased as the average earning 
levels increased.  The next section analyses how having realised the problem 
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Computer Cab’s management team went on to address it. The management’s tactics 
ultimately included some recognition of the culture of the industry which enabled an 
accommodation to be reached. 
 
5.4.5 Referendum and Change Management Process Tactics 
Following the difficult industrial relations period described in the previous section 
management decided to re-establish a working relationship with the drivers. In this 
section I explain how the management developed a number of tactics to resolve the 
industrial relations problems and how these went through a few fairly well defined 
stages. Overall the new approach adopted by management had a closer fit with the 
culture of the industry in that it appeared to treat taxi drivers as business men. 
Despite the changes dissatisfaction remained amongst some drivers particularly 
where they considered a change strayed across a frontier that they considered was 
outside of management’s control. Meetings became part of the change management 
process and quickly these became ritualised and adopted a fairly predictable format 
and behaviour pattern. 
 
As Computer Cab’s booking volumes/demand grew and technical and operational 
constraints became more acute, operational and procedural changes were frequently 
introduced to drivers, using the concept of a six week pilot. The six week pilot 
concept relied upon a letter to all drivers (normally from the Managing Director) 
explaining the problem, the solution (the change) and that after six weeks a 
referendum would be held where members could vote to keep or throw the change 
out. This approach was generally successful as drivers appeared to enjoy being 
consulted and appreciated the opportunity to vote – response levels to referendums 
were in the in the region of 90%. The concept of a referendum fitted with the cultural 
belief that all drivers, which in the drivers’ opinion included the ex-taxi driver element 
of the management, were equal, and so all drivers having a say supported the 
prevailing culture. I would suggest it also sat well with the belief amongst many 
drivers that they were small businessmen who would expect to be consulted over 
what were in effect contractual and business process changes within the strategic 
alliance that they had with the radio circuit.  
 
Management also became more sensitive and responsive to criticism and driver 
feedback. Following a small number of letters from drivers questioning the vote 
counting methodology and its fairness, it was decided by the Managing Director that 
vote counting would in future be carried out by drivers under the supervision of a 
member of the management team rather than using in-house administrative staff. 
Once again this was a significant change where drivers were being invited into the 
organisation to perform a role rather than being kept on the outside. 
 
In general terms the belief pertained amongst the senior management  that the 
overall majority of drivers were more interested in earning money than voting. 
Following a small number of referendums few further industrial disputes arose. This 
appeared to support the management’s view. However a small number of company 
watchers amongst the drivers were keen to raise the issue of referendums at every 
occasion possible and carried forward a growing amount of unresolved conflict. How 
many of the silent majority amongst the drivers felt the same way is not clear. 
Earning money was probably enough to keep them quiet but it did not mean they 
were happy about these issues. There was always a sense of an iceberg of 
dissent/support and although normally only small numbers of dissenters were visible 
occasionally an apparently small or innocuous issue would cause the mainly silent 
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majority to loudly dissent. The situation appeared to be a truce with both sides 
moving their ground towards an uneasy consensus. 
 
London’s taxi drivers do not even jokingly criticise each other in a professional sense 
having all undertaken the Knowledge there is an acceptance of a common standard 
of competence. The introduction of a system of referendum had removed the 
opportunity to criticise management because any criticism of any change would in 
effect be criticising fellow taxi drivers who had voted for  the change; those who were 
against any change were effectively neutralised. Many more than usual management 
meetings were held during this unstable period and a common mantra amongst 
senior management when this phenomenon was questioned was that it’s not about 
what will make the drivers happy – it’s about what they will stand for.  
 
The senior management team did not abrogate the responsibility for setting the 
strategy or policy making of the company to its [taxi driver] members yet the grounds 
or criteria for when an issue would go to a referendum were never made completely 
clear. Staff spoke frequently about what was happening as many were concerned for 
their jobs and the future of the company. Internally the belief amongst staff, including 
me, was that if drivers were likely to vote in favour of something then management 
would hold a referendum. If however the decision was in doubt or the change was an 
important one for financial, customer service or strategic reasons, it was deemed or 
classified by management to be a policy decision which was not open to a 
referendum. This assertion was generally accepted by drivers despite its clash with 
the prevailing culture. This suggests that drivers accepted to a degree that 
management had to manage. As a consequence of this policy where change was in 
management’s view needed and where the senior management team considered it 
was unlikely to be accepted easily by drivers no referendum was offered but 
meetings would be arranged so drivers could raise their concerns (and voices). Non 
referendum based changes included policy changes such as increases in charges, 
decreases in payments, innovative incentive schemes and technology changes. 
Operational changes were used tactically as well as from necessity. If business was 
quiet or if there was going to be a charges increase this would often be preceded by 
an operational change.  The type of changes that would be made included reducing 
the calling distance from 440 yards to 100 yards, changing the day of the week that 
cheques were sent to drivers for the contract work they had undertaken and 
introducing changes to the increasingly complex payments and credits scheme that 
was meant to motivate drivers to undertake more radio journeys in preference to 
street hail work.  
 
The change would be announced, brought in, all hell would break loose and the 
charges would be increased. A drivers meeting would be called ostensibly to discuss 
the recent increase in charges, whereas the only real issue most of the drivers 
wanted resolved was the operational change. Drivers were interestingly quite tolerant 
of price increases but operational changes which were perceived as impacting on 
fairness, or the drivers’ skills, or the number of trips that the busier and more 
outspoken drivers could undertake, clearly had a far greater impact on their earning 
potential than a low percentage increase in charges. I would suggest that this is not 
just an issue of financial vs. working practices or even acquiescence of increased 
charges.  I believe it is far more fundamental and central to Watson’s (1982) work 
regarding the frontiers of control. I would suggest that drivers were ambivalent 
towards company charges and increases in them as these issues could be viewed 
very clearly as being within the rightful control of management, whereas business 
process changes appeared to be considered by drivers as outside of the frontier of 
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management control. The consensus abruptly ended once working practices were 
changed particularly where the changes were counter to the culture of the industry. 
 
At the driver meetings a ritualised demonstration of behaviour quickly developed. The 
normal format would be applied, the Managing Director would explain the reasons for 
the charges increase to an icy cold atmosphere, an occasional driver would storm 
out, a few drivers would interrupt the meeting and demand to talk about the 
operational change supported by the rest of drivers demonstrated through clapping 
and cheering, the meeting would be halted, the Managing Director would address the 
operational change,  a compromise of some sort would be determined and everyone 
would eventually praise the management. 
 
Over the course of these mass meetings the drivers who carried out most trips on the 
radio appeared to gain the ascendency and have most to say. Meeker drivers or 
those concerned about lack of work or increased charges, who often appeared to act 
quite independently, would be shouted down, abused or even threatened by busier 
drivers to a point where they gave up trying to raise their points. The busier drivers 
also engaged senior management before and after the meeting, developing an 
almost informal, off the record type relationship. They appeared to view themselves 
as opinion formers and were even verbally and sometimes physically protective of 
senior management.  If independent drivers were abusing or threatening 
management at the meeting this group would intervene and threaten, intimidate or 
abuse the individual until he either left the meeting or kept quiet. Although quite 
useful at times this was an unhealthy relationship but one that senior management 
did nothing to discourage or curtail. Gouldner (1954) referred to these relationships 
as an indulgency pattern which (Watson 1982:270) described as being where 
“supervisory authority was dependent upon a certain amount of conniving at rule 
breaking”. Although the busier drivers were not supervisors in anything like a 
conventional sense their indulgence by management gave them an implicit authority 
to act as such at driver meetings.  
 
It was clear that senior management believed that the busiest drivers were the 
smartest and had developed methods to circumvent operational rules. They were not 
subject to the driver vs. driver complaints system as they were capable of intimidating 
the complainant and thus avoiding formal resolution. Rumours circulated of drivers 
being physically assaulted or of their cabs being damaged. As with many rumours in 
the industry the truth of the rumours was unknown.  In what was an increasingly 
political environment securing the support of influential groups such as these was a 
benefit to management, particularly given this group’s aggression to dissenters, who 
they often threatened to take physical action against. Their protective nature towards 
the management was considered useful in situation which could often be volatile and 
threatening and enabled management to appear professional whilst the busier 
drivers maintained order. 
 
This section provides some important insights into the rituals, behaviour and culture 
of the industry. The management’s change of tactics to accommodate the culture of 
the industry appeared to be largely successful. In spite of the change in tactics not all 
of the drivers subscribed to the approach that management adopted and some 
contention was still discernible, especially where there was contention around the 
control of frontiers, Management had not fully aligned with the culture of the industry 
and therefore both drivers and management remained on the edge of trusting one 
another but in the main never quite achieved it. The next section highlights another 
series of changes that resulted in offence to the identity of both taxi drivers and 
dispatchers.  
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5.4.6 Dumbing Down the Allocation Process  
An example of an operational change that was introduced by management, as 
described above, was a significant change to the methodology of allocating trips to 
taxis in the City of London. The City was/is one of the busiest areas for lucrative taxi 
contract work in London. This change was in my opinion second only to the roller 
bond issue (see section 5.5.1) in the impact it had on driver reaction. The operational 
problem to be resolved was that drivers would continually circle buildings in the City 
that housed large and very busy contracts. Whilst this was beneficial from a trip 
fulfilment (taxis were always available in the area) and a customer service (quick 
cabs) perspective, it was against the company’s operational rules. Trips would be 
announced and drivers circling the building would inevitably receive the trip on the 
first cab allocation system. These practices worsened with drivers parking at the rear 
of buildings to save diesel or taking some time to drive off after dropping a customer 
off outside the building, which involved feigning administrative duties sorting out 
paperwork and exercising other delaying tactics, thereby being able to legitimately 
claim that they were outside if they were fortunate enough to hear a booking being 
announced on the radio. Driver dissatisfaction with what they saw as unfair practices 
mounted. Drivers alleged that other drivers had modified their radios so the signal 
was stronger; this was investigated but never proven. Others claimed that drivers had 
developed methods of ensuring their VI appeared on the dispatchers screen before 
others through pressing an emergency button just as the dispatcher finished 
speaking but before he opened the channel for drivers to speak. Claims became ever 
more imaginative and fantastic but management were aware that their credibility in 
running what had always claimed to be a straight [honest] circuit was being 
questioned.   
 
At the same time as dissatisfaction was at its height the Corporation of the City of 
London Engineer and the City Police approached Computer Cab management with a 
proposal. The police needed to keep the area around Liverpool Street Station clear of 
parked cars in case of emergency but found it increasingly difficult and manpower 
intensive to do so. Their proposal was to create a huge taxi rank at Liverpool Street 
where cabs could rank and then if there was an emergency people would rush out of 
the station to hail the taxis and the road space would be clear for emergency 
vehicles. During normal conditions the ranking taxis would prevent illegal parking. 
The company’s management readily agreed as there was a shortage of large ranks 
in the City and this creative approach was considered an answer to one of the 
company’s operational problems. It was also flattering to the management to be 
consulted by the City of London Police and the Corporation of the City of London. 
 
The rank was promoted to members (drivers) of Computer Cab by management 
telling them that for an experimental period (a tactic that avoided a referendum) all 
work from a number of contracts would be called to the rank i.e. drivers needed to be 
ranked up to be allocated a trip from particular contract addresses.  Initially the 
dispatcher would see a trip from a named account and ask “who is on the Liverpool 
Street Station Rank” later shortened to “who is on the Liver”. The shortened version 
fitted with the industry culture of developing nick names and radio specific jargon. 
The driver at the front of the rank, or as it is known in the trade on the point or the 
sharp end, would press his button and be allocated the trip. This system worked well 
for several hours but as the day passed into evening the rank was hopelessly 
oversubscribed and traffic in the area came to a standstill.   
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The Police Sergeant who had proposed the idea was livid and one particular evening 
gave Computer Cab two minutes to suspend the use of the rank, after which he 
would arrest the company’s Operations’ Director. A meeting was held and agreement 
was reached that Computer Cab would divide the City into four sectors and use six or 
eight ranks in each sector to call work for specified buildings that housed large 
contracts. The ranks would be called in rotation thus ensuring that there was no 
benefit in overloading any one rank. This system worked really well from an 
operational perspective. Trips were despatched to taxis that were close to the 
building; it was fair in that every driver had the same chance. 
 
My experience of the taxi industry showed that there are two very clear ideologies 
amongst drivers with regards to taxi ranks; rankers and rovers. Some drivers will 
drop a customer off and then habitually drive to the nearest rank to await their next 
trip. These drivers will cite savings on diesel, taxi mileage, vehicle wear and tear and 
driver fatigue as well as claiming that the best jobs come off ranks, as their rationale 
for being rankers.  Other drivers will drive past ranks on the basis of why sit behind 
thirty cabs on a rank when just up the road will be someone who wants a cab? This 
debate rages in cafes and taxi shelters night and day. Drivers on radio often say that 
a benefit of being on radio is that you don’t have to sit on a rank. The significant 
impact of this change to using ranks  in the busiest area of London for radio drivers 
was enormous. Letters arrived by the score, personal visits were made by groups of 
drivers who normally carried out large amounts of contract work presenting their 
radio work statements as proof of the detrimental impact on their earnings. Drivers 
demanded a meeting, a referendum and there was even talk of a strike, an unheard 
of concept in the radio taxi business. Some drivers drove around with a sign in their 
window; ranks no thanks. One driver removed his ComCab [Computer Cab’s brand 
name] logos from the side of his taxi and refitted them upside down as a protest. 
 
A mass driver meeting was arranged by management and a referendum was agreed 
as management were aware that they were in serious danger of losing, up to this 
point, their busiest or most productive radio drivers. This was a calculated risk. It was 
obvious that the busiest, i.e. most productive, radio drivers also represented the 
minority of drivers. It was also obvious from statistics that the average and below 
average driver, who made up the majority of drivers, had benefited significantly from 
the flattening impact of the change to the allocation of trips in the City. The 
referendum passed and ranks stayed. Apart from a small number of resignations 
most of the busier radio drivers stayed, as apparently they felt the process had been 
fair. This outcome once again provides evidence of the obsessive belief in, and 
cultural expectation of, fairness amongst London’s taxi drivers. It is also likely, 
although unproven, that the busier drivers moved from working in the City to working 
elsewhere and were therefore able to operate as they had done in the City prior to 
the radio ranks being implemented. 
 
In the London taxi industry it is apparent that even if drivers don’t like a decision or 
change as long as they feel the process is fair most are prepared to accept it. Blau 
(1986:273) sums up this concept when he states that “common ideals provide 
incentives for the members of a collectivity to sacrifice the loss of ‘material rewards’, 
in order to advance its cause”. The ideal in this instance was a democratic approach 
to decision making and although the vote was close the losing side accepted the 
material loss ( i.e. the flattening effect of operating from ranks) in order to restore 
harmony.   
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The next section sheds light on the drivers’ keen interest in technology and how they 
were influenced to make a considerable financial commitment to avail themselves of 
the most modern technology.  
5.4.7 Taxi Drivers and Technology 
In the late nineteen seventies and early eighties computer technology was generally 
in its infancy. Computers were massive installations and internet, pcs and mobile 
phones were yet to become commonly available to the public. This section highlights 
the desire amongst taxi drivers to access technology solutions and how this 
coincided with management’s desire for scaling up the company’s operations through 
technology and the tactics adopted to align these two positions.    
 
Radio Taxi Drivers were almost to a man technology hungry this was evidenced 
through their constant requests to provide more gadgets and automation. They 
appeared to really enjoy demonstrations of new technology and were really keen to 
have new technology installed in their taxis. No reason was ever established for this 
by management but my view at that the time was that taxi driving could be mundane 
and repetitive and technology generally provided some interest; drivers were able to 
receive messages, review a list of trips they had undertaken, calculate the value of 
trips, plus it provided a discussion point with other drivers at station ranks. Whether 
the data and information provided by the system was the real interest or benefit or 
the availability of something to play or fiddle with was the real benefit is outside of the 
scope of this study. The technology in question was initiated prior to widespread 
availability of the internet, mobile phones, computer games etc. The subsequent and 
almost ubiquitous take up of these technologies over the last twenty years indicates 
that interest in technology is not peculiarly restricted to taxi drivers.  
 
The biggest change that the company introduced during the first twenty five years of 
its existence was automated despatch. This concerned the replacement of voice 
despatch with a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) tracking system. The process of 
implementing this change along with the outcomes was a fascinating experience 
from a business administration, commercial and industrial and social history 
perspective. 
 
The problem of managing growth effectively and efficiently that management sought 
to solve had been recognised around five years after the company was formed in 
circa 1980. As referred to above the company was struggling to scale up during a 
period when technology was rudimentary and inherently inefficient. Very High 
Frequency (VHF) radio channels, which were the channel used at the time by radio 
taxi companies to identify the position of taxis and then allocate the booking by 
speech, were in high demand in London from emergency services, taxi companies, 
minicab companies, delivery services and couriers. There was not enough spare 
radio spectrum to meet demand. Due to both the limited availability of radio spectrum 
and the competing demands for it the Home Office, who licensed the use of radio in 
London, was unable to allocate any more channels to the company. The company 
had six channels. They brought experts in who managed to split the six channel 
frequencies that the company owned and thereby doubled the capacity to twelve. 
They developed a range of technical solutions over the years that addressed the 
capacity problems for a period of time but due to the relentless growth in demand for 
radio taxis from the influx of very large financial services companies each solution 
had only a limited lifecycle before volumes grew to a point where the latest solutions 
were once again ineffective. The problem was exacerbated by poor quality signals, 
outages and intermittent technical failures.  
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Managers and staff were instructed by the Managing Director to respond to all letters 
and complaints from drivers about poor radio signal quality, fairness of work 
allocation, capacity issues, late trip despatching and anything remotely connected 
with these issues as “insolvable until we have automatic vehicle location”. This term 
was often shortened to AVL. At mass driver meetings AVL was deliberately 
introduced into debates by management as the solution to most of their operational 
problems and gradually drivers started asking when AVL would be available. The 
standard company response which the staff who interacted with drivers was 
encouraged to provide was; “it is available now but we [the company] cannot afford 
it”. Drivers then started to ask how much it would cost and the response was always 
the same; lots (i.e. lots of money). Articles on AVL appeared in the company’s in-
house magazine that was sent to drivers each month explaining how it could work 
and the potential and perceived benefits. After a twelve month campaign by 
management the drivers were practically demanding AVL. The management team 
judged when the time was right and a mass meeting was called specifically to deal 
with the adoption or otherwise of AVL. 
 
The meeting, which was held at a nine hundred seat auditorium called the Logan Hall 
in Bloomsbury, was by London taxi industry standards a spectacular affair. Every 
driver was personally invited and urged to attend this important meeting but the 
agenda for the meeting was kept confidential for what were described as commercial 
reasons. Drivers were required to bring along an individually numbered ticket and a 
copy of their taxi licence which contained a photograph of the driver. On arrival 
drivers were issued with a professionally produced conference pack. Security on the 
day of the meeting, a Sunday, was both obvious and intentionally heavy handed. The 
presentation had been professionally produced and a large production team ensured 
that this was to be the most impressive event ever staged in the London taxi industry. 
At exactly two o’clock with the auditorium full of taxi drivers the lights dimmed, Space 
Odyssey was played at a deafening level and a picture of a space launch was 
projected onto the screen with dry ice smoke emitted in tandem with the launch of the 
space craft on screen. At the end of the launch the drivers enthusiastically clapped 
and cheered.  
 
The Managing Director appeared on stage and during his opening remarks almost 
succeeded in taking full credit for the space launch which had been projected on 
screen. He then went on to give a 45 minute presentation concerned with satellite 
technology and how it could be used in taxis. Interestingly prior to the meeting a hall 
within the complex had been hired for drivers to watch a high profile international 
football match that had clashed with the meeting date. England won. During the 
meeting the Managing Director announced that England had also won a high profile 
international rugby game. These sporting events and the space launch somehow 
appeared to be an omen that the day was going well and that AVL, the system he 
was promoting, would likewise go well. At the end of his presentation his message to 
the drivers was that you can have all of this (what was termed as full AVL), some of it 
(a cut down zonal system), some minor modifications to the current system or none 
of it, but he explained, “If you want it you must pay for it”. Voting papers that were 
inside the conference pack were then completed and counted by a group of volunteer 
drivers. 
 
Following a tense break while the papers were counted the results were announced. 
Overwhelmingly drivers had voted for full AVL but also voted to pay seventeen 
pounds per month for seven years to develop it. This was a total of some four million 
pounds. In nineteen ninety this was a lot of money for drivers to commit to something 
they did not own and that was merely a concept.  
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A number of ingredients that went into the lead up to, and the actual event, were fully 
in line with the culture of the industry. Rumour had been successfully used to 
stimulate interest in the technology, drivers had been informed about the technology, 
its application and benefits over a period of time by credible and authoritative 
sources. Drivers had felt that they were driving the agenda through raising issues at 
meetings, and demanding the technology and ultimately voting for and committing to 
paying for it.  
 
The Logan Hall meeting and the call for members to pay for the AVL system had put 
management in the position where they needed, once again, to talk to drivers, to 
consult and to an extent ask their permission; this was welcomed by drivers. In my 
view this event demonstrated radio taxi drivers’ love affair with technology, their 
developing trust in management and their willingness to invest in generating more 
trips. They had been consulted by the Managing Director. They had been treated like 
shareholders facing a cash call and were made to feel like equals, something that 
appealed to their values, beliefs, psyche and the culture of the industry. The format of 
the meeting and the supporting documentation, voting arrangements, catering and 
security all appealed to the feeling of being, or the aspiration to be, businessmen. 
 
When compared to earlier attempts at change, e.g. the sudden appearance of locks 
on doors in the new office building, operating procedure changes and the introduction 
of the roller bond, this change had been managed to benefit from the culture of the 
industry rather than to ignore it or even challenge it. My earlier reflections that the taxi 
industry as a body did not like change and sought to maintain the status quo was 
challenged by this example. Changes introduced from above by what the drivers 
considered to be other taxi drivers offended the cultural belief of all taxi drivers, 
regardless of office or position, of being equal, that management somehow knew 
better than the thousands of people who make up the industry and see themselves 
as businessmen and very able to understand concepts such as capacity 
management, technology constraints and the commercial need to cut costs.   
 
Overall what this section shows at a micro level is the importance of aligning change 
with the prevailing culture. Further the lack of a clear, well thought through strategy 
and contingency for such a high risk plan put the business in a precarious position. 
Internal and external communications appeared to exacerbate an already fraught and 
angry situation. Added to all of this the settling of personal scores concerning founder 
members, branch committee members and those who favoured the heritage first cab 
system just added to the alienation of various stakeholder groups who then contacted 
the LTDA Executive Team who were obliged to raise these issues to annoyance of 
the radio taxi company management team. Nowhere in the process were there any 
attempts to sell the concept, to develop champions or to consult in any meaningful 
way. This was very much a managing by position display that ran counter to the taxi 
industry culture of all being equal and many taxi drivers believing and identifying 
themselves as small businessmen and expecting to be treated as such.  
 
5.4.8 Summary 
This section provides an important insight into how the management of Computer 
Cab moved from attempting to manage by position to aligning organisational and 
business process change with the culture within the industry. This change appears to 
have come about through necessity rather than choice. The apparently disparate 
nature of taxi driving appears to be no barrier to acting as a united workforce when 
there is a cause of mutual benefit. The identity issue of wishing to be seen as a 
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businessman rather than just as an employee appears important. Management’s 
recognition of these important factors and then presenting their proposition 
appropriately appears to have been a strategy that assisted the organisational 
change to be accepted by the drivers. This decision and the organisational change 
involved drivers in considerable extra expense but it addressed three important 
factors; culture, identity and management treating drivers as both businessmen and 
equals. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH AND LEARNING 
The aims of my research were to fill a vacuum where there was little comprehensive 
or rigorous research into the people, their social structures, their behaviour, and their 
relationships with each other and the institutions that make up the London taxi 
industry. Through my research I set out to throw light upon the issues and uncover 
the complex networks, social structures, career paths and behaviours that contribute 
to or influence the culture of the industry.   
 
The ability of taxi drivers to operate an apparently homogenous service within a 
virtual and disparate group was an area that I wanted to research to establish how, if 
at all, they organised and managed themselves. I wanted to research how 
behaviours such as the etiquette which have evolved in order to avoid chaos and a 
selfish culture (Blau, 1986) developed and became accepted by the majority if indeed 
they had.  
 
I set out to unearth the day to day motivational factors of both individuals and groups 
of taxi drivers and compare their behaviours with the social norms of working in a 
conventional, contemporary organisational environment (Hatch and Schultz, 1997) 
e.g. an office, shop or factory. I wanted to investigate the similarities between the 
procedures and behaviours that are imposed and encouraged by managers amongst 
workers in classic organisations (Hatch and Schultz, 1997; Beynon, 1975) and those 
that have evolved, apparently organically, amongst London’s taxi drivers and how 
this had happened. 
 
Rich (1997) considers the impact of the many tasks that managers are responsible 
for on job satisfaction and their effect on performance. These were important issues 
for my research as London taxi drivers do not have a manager in the normal 
workplace sense (Beynon, 1975) from which they may derive job satisfaction. Given 
that situation my research has sought to establish from where or from whom London 
taxi drivers derive their job satisfaction.   
 
Further I sought to highlight the conflict that occurred when the management of the 
radio taxi company in the case studies in section 5.5 tried to exert its managerial will 
during an organisational change management program which ran counter to the 
prevailing culture of this self-managed and independent group. Having been a 
witness to the conflict which appeared to be between the culture of the taxi drivers 
and the approach that management took in relation to organisational change I was 
interested to research the issues that apparently offended the drivers’ identity of 
themselves, their place in the industry, their profession, and the perceived impact of 
organisational change on their identity. 
 
During my research I used a small number of organisational change management 
changes as case studies. I was not concerned with the concept of change 
management processes per se, my interest was as an observer to see how changes 
in behaviour, power and the frontiers of control had led in some cases to identity and 
cultural conflict whilst in other cases they were accepted consensually. I was 
interested to observe the impacts of change from a political, social and economic 
perspective.  
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6.1 Conclusions  
 
6.1.1 The Knowledge – Rite of Passage and Influence on Culture 
My research showed that the applicants who complete the Knowledge appear to 
regard surviving its deprivations and demands as a rite of passage to an ancient and 
honourable institution, the qualification to a new career and a status symbol amongst 
other working class peers. Those who complete the Knowledge of London, about 
10% of those who start it, appear to already possess or acquire the personal 
characteristics of being self-disciplined, highly resilient to adversity, physical 
discomfort and surprisingly persistent. They also need to be people who can manage 
the financial hardships and challenges of the Knowledge. As well as coping with the 
demands of acquiring the Knowledge of London students have also to develop the 
strength of character to cope with the ritual humiliation (Townsend, 2003) of them by 
the Public Carriage Officers responsible for their testing.  
 
The characteristics of this group suggest that the demographic of those who become 
taxi drivers is somewhat polarised from a personal characteristic and circumstances 
perspective through the evidently unintended consequences (Stacey, 2001. Garner 
and Stokoe, 2000) of the Knowledge of London process. The onerous requirements 
and ritual humiliation of the Knowledge process appear to be Darwinian in nature and 
consequently entry to the industry is restricted to a select demographic. This 
relatively narrow demographic appears to lead to adoption of the prevailing culture, a 
relatively common identity that shares very similar beliefs and values and presents 
very similar behaviours all of which are explained in the next section. The culture of 
the industry appears to be co-created. 
 
The next section explains my conclusions concerning the culture of the industry and 
about how London taxi drivers identify themselves and how they identify with the 
industry. Taxi drivers appear to closely align their identity (Dutton, Dukerich and 
Harquail, 1994) with the industry, its antecedents and its institutions. How this identity 
is cultivated and why and how that aligns with the identity of and with (Whetten, 
1997) the industry given its disparate nature and virtual workforce developed into a 
particular interest for me during the course of my research.   
 
6.1.2 Identity And Culture 
My research showed that having successfully passed the Knowledge of London, taxi 
drivers immediately felt legitimised to drive for hire and reward and to join and identify 
with the taxi driver community. They appear to feel that they are part of a community 
and a legitimate industry or, in its broad sense, an organisation. This view was 
evidenced during my interview with Taxi Driver Interviewee No.1.  
 
Taxi drivers demonstrate a strong commitment to both their occupation (Burrell and 
Morgan, 2003) and their industry, evidenced by the longevity of their service to, and 
membership of, the profession (Donaldson, 2005). This commitment appears to be 
heavily influenced by the deprivations and demands of the acquisition of the 
Knowledge of London qualification which adds both intrinsic and extrinsic value to 
their entry to the industry. In addition to the personal achievement of completing the 
Knowledge of London qualification drivers appear to be flattered by the respect of 
non-taxi driving peers who recognise the effort involved in gaining it. The qualification 
appears to provide instant acceptance and recognition for new entrants to the 
industry and they appear to be welcomed as part of the established community of 
taxi drivers, a form of practitioner who demonstrate many of the characteristics of a 
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professional elite evidenced by the mutual respect given and received amongst 
London’s taxi drivers, the informal support groups that form in shelters and cafes and 
the sharing of information and intelligence.  
 
In spite of these factors taxi drivers appear to have a low expectation of, or fear for, 
the longevity of their industry in its current form (Townsend 2003, Taxi Driver 
Interviewee No.1).  The recognition or legitimacy that taxi drivers assume by dint of 
completing the Knowledge of London and from the perceived job security (Blau, 
1986) and autonomy (Scwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001) afforded by it quickly passes 
and drivers adopt the fears that are prevalent within the industry.  
 
This situation could be compared with the threats and fears that Ford workers and 
their unions (Beynon, 1975) had with management and the ever present risk of 
finding themselves outside the gates. Both these groups of workers, Ford’s and taxi 
drivers, appear to fear a threat to their livelihood and/or working conditions from 
people, powers or institutions outside of their peer group. This fear may be 
widespread amongst working class and professional groups but this possibility was 
outside of the scope of my research. This phenomenon has a number of impacts on 
taxi drivers’ identity, particularly an antipathy towards change, attempts to control 
them and a suspicion of institutions and organisations. 
 
This fear manifests itself in the development of an industry identity that is presented 
as heavily burdened by regulations (e.g. the Knowledge of London, specific vehicle 
regulations, regulated fares etc) which is used as way of demonstrating and 
demanding legitimacy. As they are viewed by taxi drivers, interlopers such as 
minicabs can operate free of this onerous framework and are permitted to threaten 
taxi drivers’ aspirations to maintain the status quo, which is important to their identity 
as part of what they view as the legitimate institution of their industry. 
 
The comments made by the unknown journalist from The Economist (2002) who 
asserts that London taxi drivers scare politicians stiff is an example of the external 
identity of taxi drivers that in many respects demonstrates two very different 
perspectives of identity. The taxi drivers view themselves as continually under threat 
whereas their external identity appears to place them as the threat. This perceived 
fear, it is alleged by the anonymous author, has discouraged politicians from trying to 
reform the regulations that protect licensed taxi drivers (The Economist, 2002). 
Assertions suggesting a closed shop, or of the taxi industry being protected or being 
some kind of monopoly, are a constant source of irritation and even anger in the taxi 
industry, as these assertions undermine their identity as people who had completed 
the Knowledge, have a clean criminal record and have earned their place as a 
member of their community, organisation or the institution that is the London taxi 
industry. In effect a meritocracy, they had earned the right to be a taxi driver through 
hard work, perseverance and physical discomfort and resent being categorised as 
merely inheriting these important rights.   
 
The widely held belief amongst taxi drivers that they are able to earn more money 
than those in other driving jobs or careers, e.g. bus drivers,  most of which are 
viewed by taxi drivers as lower skilled roles due to the lack of a requirement to 
complete the Knowledge of London qualification, appears important to taxi drivers’ 
identities. They appear to regard their qualification as a taxi driver as a status symbol 
that placed them above other working class people. Money may well be an important 
determinant in the decision to become a taxi driver but earning potential does not 
remain the central concern nor the only influence on taxi drivers’ rituals, behaviour, 
beliefs and actions. It appears that the drivers’ ideology evolves and changes as they 
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achieve a level of financial equilibrium. Flexibility and job security is valued highly as 
a reason to become a taxi driver, as evidenced by the taxi drivers I interviewed as is 
the opportunity to be one’s own boss (Abrahams, 2000) with the beneficial impact on 
identity and social status that this brings. Given the longevity of service (Donaldson, 
2005) amongst most taxi drivers leading to almost permanence amongst this albeit 
virtual workforce a strong identity and culture has evolved and developed which 
appears to be adopted by newer drivers. 
 
Although income does appear to be an important issue in the taxi industry a strong 
tradition of support for taxi trade charities, which are highly regarded within the 
industry and with which drivers are keen to be identified, as evidenced by the support 
they give to these important symbols of the industry’s identity. Involvement in taxi 
charity outings is evidently considered important by a majority of taxi drivers as a 
method of identifying the industry as one that is constituted from a caring group of 
people.  
 
How taxi drivers appear to identify with the institutions of the industry was 
demonstrated by the majority of radio taxi drivers who appear to develop a cognitive 
and emotional foundation on which they build attachments and create meaningful 
relationships (Hatch and Schultz, 2000) with their radio taxi organisation. Drivers 
have been heard to talk about how they love their radio circuit. This behaviour has 
been observed in cafes and taxi driver shelters as well as through the letter pages of 
the trade press. This compares in many ways with men who love the football team 
that they support and identify with it despite having no real input to the management 
of the club or exercising any tangible or even intangible influence as to how it is run 
or how or which players are selected to form the team. That same lack of power into 
the strategic direction of the radio taxi companies is in evidence. Taxi driver members 
of such organisations appear to have some tactical influence and during periods of 
change especially where change is perceived to be counter culture or is likely to 
adversely impact their identity the level of their influence or desire for influence is 
heightened.   
 
These meaningful relationships featured amongst the drivers I interviewed with Taxi 
Driver Interviewee No.1 in particular providing what I considered to be an almost 
extreme example of an emotional and meaningful relationship with the organisation, 
in this case the London taxi industry. I found that taxi drivers feel immense pride in 
achieving entry to the community and the industry, an industry and community that 
closely aligns with many of their values and beliefs such as equality, honesty, fair 
play, professionalism, and legitimacy. 
 
I found during my research that there is almost an obsession with fairness (Hooper, 
2007) and equality across the industry. Fairness is a key concept in the industry that 
appears to be commonly accepted and defines expected, and to a large extent, 
demonstrated behaviour and practice, as can be determined from the protocol that 
has evolved to classify which trip belongs to which taxi driver. This etiquette is 
commonly observed (Hooper, 2007) and is largely consensual. Acceptance of the 
radio taxi companies’ disciplinary code, as evidenced by radio taxi companies’ 
complaints committees, based on peer based judgement being accepted by London 
taxi drivers is another example of drivers’ desire for fairness and their readiness to 
accept power consensually where it is deemed to be legitimate, fair and/or necessary 
to do so to avoid a crudely selfish culture (Blau, 1986). Stacey (2001) views this type 
of behaviour as a form of management control by webs of self-managing 
professionals with shared interests and common values. The radio taxi companies 
operate with various management structures, some elected and some appointed, but 
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their drivers or more correctly the drivers aligned with them tend to operate as groups 
of franchisees rather than employees. Management set the boundaries in which taxi 
drivers are obliged and agree to operate. Communication of, and adherence to the 
taxi driver etiquette is a clear example of Watson’s (1987) definition of culture, where 
he talks of shared meanings which define what is good, bad and appropriate ways for 
members of a group to think and behave. 
 
An important finding of my research was that the flat career structure within the 
industry whereby drivers have the same earning potential and, without intervention or 
identity cultivation, status, on the last day of their career as they did on the first is 
overlain by a pseudo hierarchy created by the drivers themselves.   
 
Although London’s taxi drivers are self-employed business men (Public Carriage 
Office Website, 2009), operating as a disparate and virtual workforce they display 
many behaviours more typical of those working in conventional jobs (Hatch, 2000). 
Longer serving taxi drivers appear to attempt to build pseudo seniority strata through 
antecedents, artefacts, stories, behaviour and the use of exclusive language and the 
development of proxy status symbols. They also try to identify with other long 
servers. Due to their long careers as taxi drivers (Donaldson, 2005), promotions, 
CVs, qualifications and former jobs cannot be used to cultivate identity and status so 
length of service and development of an identity that is the antithesis of a butterboy 
[newly qualified taxi driver] was the apparently commonly adopted method. 
 
Rumours and exaggeration are part of the taxi industry in London. Associated with 
this are gossip and storytelling. This appears to be as much of a sport and skill 
development activity as a malicious and divisive activity or a method of 
communication. What is evident is that gossip and storytelling is widespread between 
drivers and between drivers and customers and it appears that it is used for a variety 
of purposes including highlighting attempts to introduce practices that are counter 
culture to the industry or where cultural beliefs and values are being challenged or 
attacked. They are also used to influence and reinforce behaviour and adherence to 
the behaviours that are commonly adopted by the majority of drivers.  
 
My research found that London’s taxi drivers appear to identify with the values of the 
London taxi industry but also quickly adopt the identity of their industry. Their identity 
appears to be fashioned by aspects of the traditions of their industry, for example the 
onerous requirements and deprivations of the Knowledge of London qualification, the 
generosity of supporting the trade’s charities and the reputation of the industry for 
honesty and integrity. Some aspects of a common identity are adopted in order to 
stimulate acceptance within the taxi driver community. Some taxi drivers appear to 
enjoy the adoption of the identity that has been created by the press and amongst 
non-taxi driving peers as being tough and street wise. It appears that taxi drivers 
enjoy the status of being perceived of being at the top of a hierarchy of driving roles 
and identify strongly with it. Overall identification with the industry, with each other 
and as part of a long established and highly respected community appear important 
to those within it. Doubts and fears about the longevity of the industry amongst taxi 
drivers are mitigated through championing the status quo. The personal achievement 
of gaining the Knowledge of London not only qualifies the individual to become a taxi 
driver but also to adopt the identity and culture of that industry and to identify with it 
and the individuals in it.  
 
The next section looks at the institutions and influences on taxi driver behaviour and 
the cultural response to attempts to manage them by manipulating the frontiers of 
control and/or to exercise control over taxi drivers.   
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6.1.3 Management and Change 
My research clearly established that in the London taxi industry there is no concept of 
managers or management in the conventional sense. Where these concepts do 
exist, for example in the institutions of the industry drivers appear to consider 
themselves above any such roles. There is a strong belief amongst drivers that the 
taxi industry exists for taxi drivers rather than for the benefit of the public. This belief 
colours the interactions with authorities, trade associations and other institutions. 
Further the culturally based belief that all taxi drivers are equal neutralises attempts 
by any whom by dint of their position try to introduce organisational, business 
process or cultural change.   
 
The taxi trade press appear to position themselves as the body that sets out, or 
enables individuals to set out, how London’s taxi drivers should behave. The taxi 
trade press is normally distributed free, drivers can take it or not and read it or not 
and practice what is proposed, purported or not. Amongst a disparate workforce it is 
an important part of the extensive communication’s web that is evident in the 
industry. Therefore some influence on culture and behaviour appears to be exerted 
through the trade press. In addition to the trade press there is evidence that radio taxi 
companies, and to a very limited extent the industry regulator, the Public Carriage 
Office, also attempts to influence taxi drivers’ behaviour. The advice from these 
institutions is often resented by taxi drivers whereas the trade press’s advice, 
criticisms and proposals are largely accepted by most taxi drivers. This appears to be 
due to the trade press often criticising the radio taxi companies and the Public 
Carriage Office and therefore being considered by drivers to be on their side and 
providing helpful advice for the common good, whereas advice provided by the 
institutions of the industry are apparently viewed by drivers as being critical and 
exceeding their remit or powers.   
 
The level of resentment felt towards the Public Carriage Office appears somewhat 
complex. Prospective and licensed drivers appear to submit to the authoritarian ethos 
of the Public Carriage Office consensually with little dissent. Knowledge Boys comply 
with the ritualistic conduct and the humiliations of the testing program required to 
gain the Knowledge of London vocational qualification. My research shows that 
Knowledge Boys and taxi drivers are influenced by the myths and stories surrounding 
the Public Carriage Office, possibly invented by and apparently spread by Knowledge 
Students, particularly in relation to the Public Carriage Office’s reputation for 
retribution against mavericks, non-conformists or rule breakers. Whilst this could 
simply be considered a communication of the culture of Knowledge Boys my 
research identified it as a form of informal coaching and mutual support. There is 
very little explicit objection to the Public Carriage Office’s behaviour towards taxi 
drivers, although individually drivers express resentment towards what they consider 
a mixture of heavy handed discipline and enforcement of regulation against taxi 
drivers and the demonstration of impotence towards interlopers such as minicabs. It 
is my finding that this sometimes grudging acceptance of the Public Carriage Office’s 
attempts to manage the industry is influenced to a degree by risk aversion or, as in 
my case, narrow self-interest. There also appears to be a view that the strictness of 
the Public Carriage Office towards the industry will somehow juxtapose into the 
preservation of the industry in its current form. 
 
The culture of the industry is heavily based upon a view that everyone within the 
industry is equal (Beynon, 1975). There appears to be little, if any, tolerance of one 
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set of drivers attempting to dominate the majority. This point is clearly made amongst 
the co-operative radio taxi companies where popular election speech content is 
based upon rhetoric such as electing a candidate because he is a working driver and 
will bring a driver’s common sense to the boardroom often using terms such as; 
being one of you, just a cab driver like you. During a driver interview with Taxi Driver 
Interviewee No.3 he made a point that; “I don’t want people to feel I have become too 
big for my boots” further enforcing both the fear of being identified as attempting to 
dominate, act, or imply some seniority to other drivers and a desire to remain as a 
driver, in spite of owning a significant number of taxis that he hires out to other 
drivers. Taxi Driver Interviewee No.3 still drives a taxi frequently to remain, or to 
appear to remain, just another taxi driver and thereby an equal. 
 
I found during my research that attempts by the radio taxi companies to take a 
management role and influence driver behaviour and organisational change 
processes were not accepted anywhere near as readily as those emanating from the 
trade press or even the Public Carriage Office.  Two significant events (The 
corporatisation of London Wide Radio Taxis (see section 5.4) and attempts by the 
Radio Taxi Company Executives to introduce the Quickie Knowledge (see section 
5.2.16) manifested themselves as a clash between management power and the 
culture of the industry. The reasons for the antipathy these changes attracted from 
individual taxi drivers and the industry in general was evidently because rather than 
an external body empowered with legitimate executive power radio circuits were 
managed by people the taxi drivers considered to be peers and consequently equals. 
The culture of the industry appears to be based strongly on a belief that taxi drivers 
are all equal and attempts by a group of peers to move the frontiers of control or 
affect fundamental change from a position of assumed or self-appointed powers were 
viewed with hostility.  
 
My research established that where taxi drivers are involved in battles with each 
other, intra industry, or when the battle is peer based it is evident that groups 
supporting or opposing the issue quickly form and evolve a coherent and unified 
response. A good example of this was the battle between Computer Cab and its 
drivers over the business process changes (see section 5.4.2). This is very different 
when the battle is with a party or parties external to the industry.  The lack of an 
effective trade union type organisation and the cooperation needed to form a united 
opposition or group action in disputes with organisations regarded as the 
establishment or external to the industry amongst a disparate workforce appears to 
inhibit effective responses to unwelcome or harmful interventions e.g. a dispute with 
the vehicle manufacturer. My finding on this was that taxi drivers felt much more 
comfortable fighting with their peers who had attempted to usurp the informal rules or 
culture of the industry than it did fighting with external bodies e.g. hotels who allowed 
their doormen to sell airport journeys to minicab drivers. This was perhaps due to the 
potential threat to their licence, a threat never made peer to peer but one of the first 
retorts from external organisations seeking to neutralise driver protests or other 
activity. 
 
My interpretation indicates that the relative power of cliques (Dalton, 1961) or small 
groups (Blau, 1986) to effect change within the industry is dependent for success 
upon the alignment of their arguments with the prevailing culture. This concept is 
amply demonstrated by the adversity that arose through the radio circuit 
managements’ attempts to reduce the scope of the Knowledge of London through 
the concept that became to be known as the Quickie Knowledge, compared to the 
consensual acceptance of, and adherence to, the taxi driver etiquette championed by 
Hooper (2008), Pessok (2006) and Townsend (2003) through the trade press. The 
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attempts at the corporatisation of London-Wide into Computer Cab by the company’s 
managers; as they saw it, to professionalise the organisation they managed, was 
another example of the adverse reaction of trying to introduce change that ran 
counter culture to the industry e.g. the belief that all taxi drivers are equal meant that 
taxi drivers did not take kindly to a what they considered to be a small group of peers 
setting themselves up as management professionals who knew what was best for the 
organisations. 
 
Although radio circuit management teams appear to have significant power regarding 
policies such as levying charges from and making payments to drivers and designing 
business processes and workflow (Slack and Lewis, 2002) their power, at an industry 
wide level appears, when judged by their attempts at industry wide change, to be 
muted. Their attempts when championing the Quickie Knowledge to appeal to the 
mass of taxi drivers using slogans such as seeing the big picture, putting the 
customer first and other rhetoric added to the drivers’ determination to obstruct 
attempts to water down, as they saw it, the key differentiator (the Knowledge of 
London) between them and the lack of vocational qualifications of other driving jobs. 
Some of the adverse reaction amongst taxi drivers was as a result of poor 
organisational change management practice (Strickland and Thompson, 1998) but 
overall the change was not acceptable to the industry for cultural and identity reasons 
and this together with the poor change management practices that were adopted 
appeared to lead to the revolts and vilifications that resulted.  
 
During the industrial dispute concerned with the Quickie Knowledge the Licensed 
Taxi Drivers’ Association (LTDA) was able to garner the taxi drivers’ support for their 
campaign against the introduction of the Quickie Knowledge as their defence of the 
Knowledge was a cultural fit with the beliefs and values of the majority of drivers.  
The LTDA was able to capitalise on the industry’s inherent fear of assimilation with 
private hire or other apparently, low paid and mundane driving jobs. It warned that 
any watering down of the Knowledge of London would ultimately lead to London taxi 
drivers’ biggest fear, the demise of the industry in its current form and the 
assimilation to taxi driving just being another driving job would be axiomatic, with the 
consequent loss of autonomy, status, identity, earning potential, job security, and 
flexibility of being a taxi driver. The psychological contract that linked the demands of 
the Knowledge with the entitlement to operate as a taxi driver was being threatened 
by a group that had appointed themselves as appearing to be superior or senior to 
the taxi driver and not caring for or considering the driver, all of which conflicted with 
the culture amongst taxi drivers and the identity they had developed. 
 
 
6.2 Further Research 
During the course of this research study a number of subjects that have not been 
comprehensively researched were uncovered. Of particular interest are passengers’ 
views of the service, the driver discourse and their view regarding the added value 
provided by drivers as alluded to by Craik (2009). The whole area of customer and 
driver relationships is an area of social research that could provide useful outcomes 
in relation to understanding how useful the taxi proposition meets customer needs 
and requirements. Taxi Driver Interviewee No.2 whilst being interviewed referred to 
the changes in customer/driver interactions given the impact of mobile phone 
technology. This area could be expanded to include the impact of social media on 
stories, gossip and the dissemination of information within the industry. 
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Minicab drivers appear to have less trenchant views about taxi drivers than vice 
versa. This may be as a consequence of the lower barriers to entry (Porter, 1980) to 
the Private Hire industry than is the case for taxi drivers. It would also be interesting 
to analyse the minicab drivers’ views of their own legitimacy and identity (Dutton, 
Dukerich and Harquail, 1994). A further benefit of this research would be the 
correlation, if any, between taxi drivers and minicab drivers’ views on their jobs and 
commitment to the profession.  
 
The PCO is a significant stakeholder within the taxi industry and latterly, following the 
introduction of Private Licensing, the Private Hire industry. It would be illuminating to 
understand how the principals within this institution view their role in the industry and 
how they influence the culture of the London taxi industry. The relatively recent 
changes that have seen the PCO moved from the control of the Home Office to 
Transport for London would also be an interesting area of research to see if the 
previous rituals and processes pertain and the effect of any change on the status of 
the Knowledge and the consequent impact on driver identity. 
 
Although my research has looked in depth at the Knowledge of London experience, 
the usefulness and longevity of the Knowledge and the impact of Satellite 
Technology and other systems on the Knowledge is an area that I am keen to 
research. The impact of any change to the Knowledge could potentially impact the 
current narrow demographic that survive the Knowledge and become taxi drivers. It 
would be useful and interesting to track any changes in demography prior to and post 
any changes to the Knowledge of London. 
 
The role and culture of the industry may change due to the impact of technology on 
the Knowledge of London, taxi drivers and the taxi industry. The variances in 
commitment to the industry and the profession between radio and non-radio taxi 
drivers and the perspectives of newer and longer serving taxi drivers are areas that 
are touched upon in my research but deserve further analysis.  
 
The taxi and private hire industries will continue to evolve and develop and as they 
do it is my view that they provide an interesting and valuable research subject. 
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6.3 Lessons For Other Organisations 
My research has some important lessons for more conventional organisations, 
especially those that could be described as communities of practice (Stacey, 2001). 
My research provides a usual reference tool for a range of stakeholders including taxi 
drivers, radio circuit managers, Transport for London, trade unions and trade 
associations, the London Mayor’s Office and policy makers. It also has a useful and 
reusable contribution for those who are managing dispersed workforces, groups of 
contractors or other disparate supply chains.  
 
Although a somewhat negative use my work also provides a very useful historical 
context to the industry and if the taxi industry were to wither as a consequence of 
new entrants and changes in technology, the ever growing number and quality of 
substitute services the behaviours, identity, culture, institutions and management 
structure are recorded for posterity. The lessons are transferable to similar practice 
groups of dispersed and disparate supply chains. 
 
The lessons for each are discussed below; 
 
My research has shown that whilst managers agonise over what has become to be 
seen as management’s role to define, develop or set up frameworks for influencing or 
even more adventurously setting organisational culture, expending vast amounts of 
effort on developing processes for communication, identifying key messages, mission 
and vision statements and putting succession plans with multiple strata of 
management levels in place a virtual organisation, the London taxi industry, has 
achieved all of this with almost no formal management function. This is an important 
and valuable lesson. My research shows that people left to organise themselves are 
quite capable of doing so consensually and very effectively (Stacey, 2001). Before 
embarking on major programmes to implement processes I would propose that 
consideration be given to what is in place, whether the processes will develop 
anyway and whether management have better things to do.   
 
A counter argument could be that there are shareholder pressures, regulatory 
requirements or other pressures for a directive management style that sets out how 
and when, and in what direction the processes should be orientated. If this is the 
case, and as a consequence organisational change management programs are 
needed, then another important lesson is that any change must be aligned, at a 
strategic level, with the culture of the organisation and at a tactical or operational 
level with the identity of those who will be affected. My research has shown that 
informal communication channels can be as effective and in some cases even more 
effective than formal or corporate communication channels. Organisational or 
business process changes that are counter to culture or offend the identity of those 
who are affected are likely to be targeted by groups of objectors who form quite 
informally but effectively and who are capable of frustrating management’s attempts 
to implement change.      
 
In my experience ethnography does not feature strongly in managerial thinking. 
Reliance on processes and top down change are often dressed up as strategy and 
necessity and any opposition, formal or informal, is viewed as disloyal or at the 
extreme ignorance. A more ethnographic approach to understanding the workforce, 
their behaviours, their identity formulation, their culture and their values and beliefs 
could provide many valuable insights into what change is already happening, what 
could happen and the best way to align culture, change and identity. Reflexivity is 
likewise a concept that is not widely practised in management thinking in my 
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experience. Positivity, a reliance on data, an obsession with change, has crept into 
business management practice and viewed as far more certain and providing 
predictable outcomes.  My research has shown that these concepts need to be 
questioned as people are much more capable of adapting to and even championing 
change if their culture and identity are understood and change is aligned with them. 
The need for change is not an axiom, it is an opinion, a judgement and often a flawed 
one. The eagerness of management to be seen as in charge, decisive, and doing 
something can override the natural direction of an organisation and it can also 
demotivate, sap energy and be corrosive to an organisation’s culture, identity and 
encourage behaviours that are unhelpful. 
 
My research has recorded, ethnographically and in a reflexive style a period of 
evolution and development in the industry and the reactions and behaviours of those 
in it to that evolution.  Regulators, Transport for London, and the Mayor’s Office 
aspire to, as they would claim, improve customer service and transport provision 
generally. This research provides a contribution to original knowledge about how 
change is perceived, rejected and embraced amongst the specific research subject, 
London’s taxi drivers. It provides a reference point from which to start to develop 
plans for change that references the importance of culture and identity and the 
myriad of sensitivities that pervade the industry and its drivers. 
 
Taxi drivers, I believe will find the research useful in providing a valuable insight into 
their world. They will no doubt recognise much of what is presented but, due to the 
nature of my research, will obviously differ in their views of the validity of some 
aspects and conclusions. Nonetheless when threatened by or with change this 
research will assist them to understand the nature and level of the threat and the 
remedies needed to resolve remove it. Likewise trade unions and trade associations 
can call upon the research to interpret the industry, the drivers’ culture, the 
importance of identity and both the similarities with more conventional organisations 
and thereby other examples of change or threats to culture, identity and/or practice.  
 
The taxi industry has provided a very interesting case study. The lack of 
management and formal process, the lack of a management layer and none of the 
normal clutter of organisational life has not apparently harmed this virtual 
organisation. Without a formal communications plan the taxi drivers have inherited 
and developed and refined their key marketing messages. They have set up informal 
support groups. They have developed coaching skills. Their culture could be 
described as co-created (Mintzberg, 1973). Despite being a virtual organisation with 
only loose tie relationships they have established a community with clear rules, 
values and beliefs. Whilst not promoting a movement to remove management from 
every organisation I would urge management to carefully reflect on just how much 
intervention and direction is required to maximise business efficiency.  
 
 
7. POST SCRIPT 
This section provides a short overview of changes that have taken place in the taxi 
industry since I completed my research. Minicabs have been licensed and have 
gained considerable market share leaving the three licensed radio taxi companies 
struggling for survival. New entrants, such as Uber, utilising mobile applications 
(apps) have suddenly appeared in London and have had a further adverse impact on 
the viability of the taxi industry. The Mayor of London has recently announced that 
the number of Knowledge Boys has reduced by 30%. This is the first time any such 
reduction has been experienced. 
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Uber has manifested itself as the most serious threat to the survival of the taxi 
industry in its history. Uber in particular has been the recipient of billions of pounds of 
Venture Capital Funding which has meant that it can provide free fares, introduce a 
new concept of promo codes [promotional codes that enable service users to deduct 
amounts of money e.g. £10, £20 from the journey cost] and refer a friend schemes 
whereby both the recommender and the recommended receive a payment. Uber has 
also been very effective at encouraging people to join the industry as minicab drivers. 
The number of licensed minicab drivers has increased over the last three years from 
circa 55k drivers to 107k drivers. Uber presents itself as a disruptor. Its disruptive 
strategy has largely impacted the taxi industry reducing business carried out taxis by 
a reported 40-50%. The introduction of free fares, promo codes, recommend a friend 
schemes and continued price erosion by Uber has been largely responsible together 
with oversupply and easy to use technology has largely been responsible for the 
acquisition of market share from taxis to Uber.  Uber has ignored and frequently 
manipulated regulations and regulators to enable it to grow its business at the 
expense of the more highly regulated and compliant taxi industry. Offshoring their tax 
affairs has provided additional benefits to Uber.  
 
The response to this external threat from taxi drivers has been that many more have 
joined organisations such as the LTDA. Its membership has increased from 7,000 to 
10,000.  This supports my research which found that external threats are the most 
difficult for the taxi industry to combat due to their disparate nature and the lack of 
effective representation due to the independent nature of the industry and its 
tendency to shun membership of trade organisations.  
 
Taxi drivers have changed their communication channels from conversations on 
ranks and in shelters to social media. Twitter is now an important communications 
channel. Conversations in taxis between driver and passenger have also reduced as 
drivers are constantly talking to one another on hands free mobile phones and 
passengers act in a similar way.    
 
Although Uber and other new entrants have largely captured market share through 
various methods of cutting fares the taxi industry has been unable or unwilling to do 
likewise and therefore simply expanding the gap in fares between the disruptors and 
the incumbent taxi industry. 
 
A generational change has taken place in the trade press which now features a lot 
fewer examples of the words that were peculiar to the taxi industry. The diversity of 
the industry has broadened to include many more women and a greater 
representation of ethnic minorities. Many familiar traditions continue; the thirteen 
shelters appear to be in rude health whenever I walk past them, obituaries continue 
to appear in the trade press with the familiar explanations and claims as to the 
‘deceased’ decency, honesty and commitment to the trade. 
 
The industry has become more militant and has over the last year and held many 
drive-ins. These are basically protests where taxis all drive to a certain place at a pre-
determined time. These protests have focused on TfL’s inability to regulate the new 
entrants to the industry properly. A recent Greater London Hearing into taxi drivers 
and the PH industry’s complaints about TfL’s regulatory enforcement and determined 
that they were ‘woeful’. TfL displays no obvious regret that the taxi industry is 
unhappy with their standard of regulation. The apparent reduction in standards and 
the reduction in drivers’ earning potential is affecting the identity of drivers, which is 
moving from proudly independent and autonomous to victim. 
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The pride the industry took in the 90% failure rate of those undertaking the 
Knowledge of London, the strict regulation of the industry, their position in the 
hierarchy of driving jobs and their ability to earn above average wages appears to be 
waning, and with that there is an impact on taxi drivers identity which in turn affects 
the culture of the industry. An industry that found change difficult to cope with is 
evidently in the midst of a revolution in public and personal transport. New entrants 
who have not undertaken the Knowledge are able to cut prices and yet still attract 
customers, the number of minicabs have grown and continue to grow, the larger 
minicab companies have displaced in the region of £100m per annum of account 
business from taxis to minicabs, public transport benefited significantly from 
investment running up to and since the Olympics. The overall impact according to the 
trade press is that London taxi drivers’ income is down 30-40%. 
 
The change to the environment has been sudden, somewhat brutal and shows no 
sign of returning to the previous equilibrium. These issues perhaps expose the 
weakness of an organisation that does not have a management layer, whose 
workforce in the main inflexible in relation to working hours, charges, qualification 
standards, is largely opposed to change and to an extent relying on their perceived 
legitimacy and qualification to somehow rescue them from commercial reality. The 
trade associations’ response has been to encourage militancy, initiate legal 
proceedings on peripheral, very technical regulatory breaches by new entrants and to 
attempt to influence politicians to ‘save the taxi’. The change that has taken place is 
very much in the commercial environment and that is where ultimately, I believe, the 
battle will be won and lost. My research showed that battling external threats is 
where the taxi industry is at its weakest. The new entrants and substitute services 
are also strong where the taxi industry is at its weakest notably strategy, ability to 
change, marketing expenditure, pricing flexibility and access to a significant pool of 
low cost labour. 
 
Having survived for 350 years the taxi industry now faces its greatest risk to survival.  
 
End 
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APPENDIX 1 – TAXI DRIVER INTERVIEW PROMPTS 
 
Introduction 
 Ask if they wish to use a pseudonym or their own name 
 Tell them interview will last approximately 45 minutes  
 Provide background and purpose of interview; 
 Research into the people in the industry 
 No right or wrong answers 
 Interested in what they think 
 
Interview  
 Why did you become a taxi driver 
 How long have you been a taxi driver 
 What did you do before you were a taxi driver 
 Will you stay a taxi driver 
 How long did the Knowledge take 
 How did you find it 
 Did you know any taxi drivers before you came into the industry  
 Describe your working day/your normal daily routine 
 Do you observe the taxi etiquette 
 How did you learn the etiquette 
 What do you think about other taxi drivers 
 What do you think about customers 
 Do you have views on tipping 
 What do you think about the PCO 
 Will the trade continue as it is 
 Would you like things to change if so what 
 Do you think the trade is homogenous, why? 
 If I were to ask you about the culture of the industry how would you 
describe it? 
  Is there an official and unofficial culture and if there is how it is defined 
and manifested? 
 Describe your relationship as a radio taxi driver and the radio taxi 
company leader 
 The relationship between radio taxi drivers and their radio taxi company 
leader 
 What trust issues are important to you. 
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Closing 
 Thanks for your time 
 Is it okay if I email or phone you if I need any more information or want 
to follow up on any of what you have said?  
 
End 
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APPENDIX 2 – SAMPLE TAXI DRIVER INTERVIEW NOTES 
(TAXI DRIVER INTERVIEWEE NO.1)
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APPENDIX 3 – Callsign Magazine Article 
Cars v Taxis 
This is the first time I have ever written a letter to this magazine, but the 
despair I feel with the erosion of our work has inspired this momentous event. 
Ok, let’s assume cars are cheaper. If we control the cars, why not first offer 
the job to the DaC fleet? At 2pm there is a trip from Jermyn St to LAP fixed at 
£55; if no one wants it, then pass it on to the cars. Alternatively, at 2am, 
Ropemaker St to Basildon fixed at £80. Again, if no one wants it then pass it 
on to the cars. Board members must realise there is no such thing as cab and 
car work, it has to be less rigid. I’m not paying subs to fatten the wallet of car 
drivers. If this does happen, we must keep our mouths shut. If we carry a 
banker, do not tell him what an a-hole [arsehole] he is even if it is true! Finally 
we need a Board passionately committed to the product it is selling. Is that 
this BoM [Board of Management]? I am yet to be convinced... 
Stephen Field (F68) 
Brian Rice responds: Who said we control the cars? We don't, the customer 
does! You must remember that we only have Concierge [a booking 
distribution engine that routes bookings to minicab companies] in five of our 
larger accounts and they are the only accounts where we handle their ground 
transportation - there is not one other account in our database that requires us 
to send them cars. I think you will agree Stephen, these five are our largest 
accounts, so what makes you think they will accept a taxi when they actually 
ask for a car! If you believe we can actually dictate to a client and tell them 
they can only have what we say - then we would not have that account for 
very long!  
Finally, to accuse me and the BoM of not being passionate; I don't know if you 
have put that in for effect or you actually believe it, I hope it is the former! 
During my stewardship, we have acquired Deutsche Bank, Citi and 
JPMorgan, three of our largest accounts and three of the largest in London, 
please don't insult me by telling me I am not passionate about DaC - just look 
at our achievements! 
NB Brian Rice is the chairman of Dial-a-Cab 
Reproduced by kind permission of Callsign Magazine.  
http://www.dac-callsign.co.uk/10/May10/page33.html  
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 Appendix 4 – Public Carriage Office Appointment Card  
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